in Re Soltys Estate ( 2014 )


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  • Order                                                                                        Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    November 26, 2014                                                                                    Robert P. Young, Jr.,
    Chief Justice
    148740                                                                                               Michael F. Cavanagh
    Stephen J. Markman
    In re Estate of DOLORES C. SOLTYS                                                                        Mary Beth Kelly
    Brian K. Zahra
    _________________________________________                                                         Bridget M. McCormack
    David F. Viviano,
    DENNIS SOLTYS, SR., and MARLENE                                                                                     Justices
    HARRIS,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v                                                                 SC: 148740
    COA: 311143
    St. Clair PC: 2009-000587-CZ
    DAVID A. SCHMIDLIN, Personal Representative
    of the Estate of KATHLEEN SCHMIDLIN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________/
    On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 7, 2014
    judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in
    lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals opinion
    affirming the ruling of the St. Clair Probate Court that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
    rebutted the statutory presumption of a depositor’s intention to vest title to jointly held
    accounts in the surviving joint owner, MCL 487.703. In this case, the statutory
    presumption that the decedent intended the joint accounts to become the property of the
    survivor arose based on evidence that the decedent created and maintained the accounts
    until her death. Jacques v Jacques, 
    352 Mich. 127
    (1958). The Court of Appeals stated
    that “the statutory presumption . . . can be rebutted by competent evidence.” However,
    although a party challenging the statutory presumption certainly must proffer competent
    evidence, the relevant question is whether the party has met its burden of proof to
    overcome the statutory presumption by providing reasonably clear and persuasive proof
    of a contrary intention. Id.; Lau v Lau, 
    304 Mich. 218
    (1943); see also Kirilloff v Glinisty,
    
    375 Mich. 586
    (1965). We REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for application of
    the proper standard. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not
    persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
    We do not retain jurisdiction.
    I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
    foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
    November 26, 2014
    p1125
    Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 148740

Filed Date: 11/26/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/28/2014