United States v. Doles , 335 F. App'x 736 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 24, 2009
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                     No. 08-8065
    (D.Ct. No. 2:07-CR-00132-CAB-1)
    JEFFREY WAYNE DOLES,                                     (D. Wyo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, O’BRIEN, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Wayne Doles appeals his convictions on three
    counts of knowingly and unlawfully selling or offering for sale drug
    paraphernalia, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 863
    (a)(1) and (b). We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we AFFIRM.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Mr. Doles operated a store called “Hip Hop Hippies” in Gillette, Wyoming.
    On August 10, 2005, local police officers obtained a search warrant and
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    confiscated approximately 176 pipes and other items that they considered to be
    drug paraphernalia. Although the officers warned Mr. Doles not to continue
    selling similar items, on August 12 he reopened his store and was arrested. He
    was charged with three misdemeanor counts of delivering or possessing drug
    paraphernalia, all in violation of 
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1056
    . He was acquitted
    after a jury trial.
    Thereafter, Mr. Doles reopened Hip Hop Hippies in Gillette and opened a
    new store in Casper, Wyoming. In July 2006, law enforcement officers seized
    items from the Casper store. That September, officers seized items from the
    Gillette store.
    Mr. Doles was ultimately charged under federal law with three counts of
    knowingly and unlawfully selling or offering for sale drug paraphernalia, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 863
    (a)(1) and (b). At trial, Mr. Doles’s counsel asserted
    that the items sold at Mr. Doles’s stores were to be used primarily with legal
    products such as tobacco and medicinal herbs. The jury convicted Mr. Doles on
    all three counts. On appeal, he raises four arguments regarding the district
    court’s evidentiary rulings.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.     Standard of Review
    We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Curtis, 
    344 F.3d 1057
    , 1067 (10th Cir. 2003). Under this standard, we “will not
    -2-
    disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a distinct showing that it was based on a
    clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a
    clear error in judgment.” United States v. Jenkins, 
    313 F.3d 549
    , 559 (10th Cir.
    2002).
    B.       Prior Acquittal on Similar Charges
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about
    Mr. Doles’s acquittal on similar charges in state court. The district court
    excluded the evidence because it was irrelevant, and because its probative value
    was substantially outweighed by prejudice to the government and confusion of the
    issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. Mr. Doles contends that his state-court
    acquittal demonstrates that he did not have the necessary mens rea to commit the
    federal crimes. Specifically, he argues that the acquittal led him to believe that
    he was not selling drug paraphernalia. Under 
    21 U.S.C. § 863
    (a), “the
    Government must establish that the defendant knew that the items at issue are
    likely to be used with illegal drugs.” Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States,
    
    511 U.S. 513
    , 524 (1994). 1
    The district court made the correct determination under Rule 403 of the
    Federal Rules of Evidence. First, the evidence had little probative value.
    1
    Posters ‘N’ Things was decided under 
    21 U.S.C. § 857
    , which has been
    repealed and replaced by 
    21 U.S.C. § 863
    . See Posters ‘N’ Things, 
    511 U.S. at
    516 n.5. The statutes are identical except for their description of the offense. 
    Id.
    Both versions forbid selling or offering to sell drug paraphernalia. See 
    id.
     at 516
    & n.5.
    -3-
    Although the state-court acquittals may have given Mr. Doles a belief about the
    legality of selling those items, the test under Posters ‘N’ Things focuses not on
    whether he knew that the items were drug paraphernalia under the law but on
    whether he knew that the items were “likely to be used with illegal drugs.” 
    Id.
    The state-court acquittal had no bearing on Mr. Doles’s belief about the likely use
    of the items that he sold.
    In addition, the risk of confusion of the issues was high. The federal jury
    could only speculate as to why Mr. Doles was acquitted on state charges because
    the state jury used a general verdict form. See Doles v. State, 
    163 P.3d 819
    , 823
    (Wyo. 2007) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to a forfeiture
    proceeding against Mr. Doles because “we do not know whether the jury
    determined that the seized items were not drug paraphernalia”). In addition to
    disallowing the evidence of Mr. Doles’s acquittal, the court did not allow
    evidence of a forfeiture proceeding in which a state court found that the very
    same items were drug paraphernalia. See 
    id. at 820
    . If presented with conflicting
    verdicts from state court, the jury likely would have been confused and distracted
    from the issues of the federal case. The district court thus did not abuse its
    discretion in excluding the evidence.
    C.    Advice of Counsel
    The district court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow
    testimony about a conversation Mr. Doles allegedly had with Sergeant Andy
    -4-
    Boisvert of the Gillette Police Department. During cross-examination of Sergeant
    Boisvert, Mr. Doles’s counsel sought to have Sergeant Boisvert testify about a
    comment Mr. Doles had made to him. Mr. Doles allegedly told Sergeant Boisvert
    that Mr. Doles’s attorney had advised him that he could legally operate his store.
    Mr. Doles asserts that his purpose in presenting the statement was to show that he
    (1) had a good faith belief that he had committed no crime; and (2) did not know
    that what he was selling was drug paraphernalia.
    “The advice of counsel defense is only applicable where it may negate
    willful violation of the law.” United States v. Ragsdale, 
    426 F.3d 765
     (5th Cir.
    2005). Posters ‘N’ Things established, however, that a defendant’s subjective
    belief as to the legality of the materials that he was selling is immaterial to any of
    the elements necessary to make out a violation under § 863. Rather, the
    government need only show that a defendant possesses a knowledge of whether
    the materials “are likely to be used with illegal drugs.” Posters ‘N’ Things, 
    511 U.S. at 524
    . Cf. United States v. Hamling, 
    418 U.S. 87
     (1974) (statute prohibiting
    mailing of obscene materials does not require proof that defendant knew the
    materials at issue met the legal definition of obscenity, only that he knew of its
    contents, and that its contents were lewd as a matter of law). When a criminal
    statute “does not require an intent to violate the law, [a defendant can] not assert
    as a defense that he relied on counsel that the materials were not illegal.”
    Ragsdale, 
    426 F.3d at 778
    . Thus, it was proper to exclude Mr. Doles’s advice of
    -5-
    counsel defense. See 
    id.,
     
    426 F.3d at
    777–78 (rejecting argument that lawyer’s
    comments were non-hearsay because introduced to show state of mind, on ground
    that this was irrelevant to making out an “advice of counsel” defense).
    D.       Reference to “4-20”
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Sergeant Boisvert
    to testify that he had heard Mr. Doles answer the phone at Hip Hop Hippies with
    the greeting “4-20.” Sergeant Boisvert further testified that, based on his
    experience in law enforcement and with investigating narcotics offenses, the
    greeting “4-20” is a way for marijuana smokers to identify themselves to each
    other.
    Mr. Doles argues that Sergeant Boisvert’s testimony was unduly prejudicial
    under Rule 403 and constituted impermissible character evidence under Rule 404.
    We disagree. To begin, the testimony is not evidence of Mr. Doles’s character.
    Character evidence under Rule 404(b) is extrinsic evidence, meaning evidence
    that “involves an act wholly apart from and not intricately related to the asserted
    claim.” Elliot v. Turner Constr. Co., 
    381 F.3d 995
    , 1004 (10th Cir. 2004).
    Evidence that Mr. Doles answered the phone with “4-20” is not extrinsic to the
    charges against him. That evidence is relevant to whether Mr. Doles knew that
    the pipes sold at Hip Hop Hippies were likely to be used to smoke marijuana,
    which undercuts Mr. Doles’s claim that they were used primarily with legal
    products. In addition, the probative value of the testimony is not substantially
    -6-
    outweighed by any prejudice to Mr. Doles. While the evidence was to some
    degree prejudicial against Mr. Doles, the evidence also was probative of Mr.
    Doles’s knowledge about the use of the items in his store. The district court thus
    did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
    E.    Evidence Seized From Store Employee
    The district court was also within its discretion in allowing evidence that a
    Hip Hop Hippies employee possessed a grinder containing marijuana. The
    government put forth testimony describing this discovery, as well as testimony
    that the grinder was identical to grinders sold at the store. On appeal, Mr. Doles
    argues that this evidence was improper character evidence and improper evidence
    of prior bad acts under Rule 404. We disagree. As with the “4-20” evidence,
    evidence of the grinder tended to establish that Mr. Doles knew that the items at
    issue were likely to be used to ingest or smoke marijuana. Thus, it was not
    “extrinsic evidence” and cannot be defined as character evidence. In addition,
    even if the act of another person could be described as “other act evidence” under
    Rule 404(b), “other act evidence” is permissible if it “is relevant and tends to
    prove a material fact other than the defendant’s criminal disposition . . . .”
    United States v. Parker, 
    553 F.3d 1309
    , 1314 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations
    omitted). This evidence was relevant to Mr. Doles’s knowledge about the use of
    the products sold in his store. The district court therefore did not abuse its
    discretion by allowing the evidence.
    -7-
    III. CONCLUSION
    Mr. Doles’s convictions are AFFIRMED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
    Deanell Reece Tacha
    Circuit Judge
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-8065

Citation Numbers: 335 F. App'x 736

Judges: McCONNELL, O'Brien, Tacha

Filed Date: 6/24/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023