United States v. Hall , 337 F. App'x 340 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5211
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    STEVEN ALLEN HALL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District   of   West   Virginia,  at  Charleston.   John   T.
    Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (2:08-cr-00006-1)
    Submitted:    July 6, 2009                  Decided:   July 24, 2009
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
    Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Steven       Allen     Hall       was    convicted       by   a     jury      of
    possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).          The district court sentenced Hall to thirty
    months   of     imprisonment,           and   Hall    appeals    his    conviction         and
    sentence.       Finding no error, we affirm.
    Hall first challenges the district court’s denial of
    his   suppression         motions.           Hall   argues    that    the   officer        who
    arrested him did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him.
    “In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,
    we review the court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
    legal conclusions de novo.”                     United States v. Cain, 
    524 F.3d 477
    , 481 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).                         When the district
    court    denies       a    defendant’s          suppression      motion,        the    court
    construes     “the     evidence         in    the   light    most    favorable        to   the
    [G]overnment.”            United States v. Grossman, 
    400 F.3d 212
    , 216
    (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
    “[A]n       officer        may,       consistent      with    the       Fourth
    Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
    has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
    is    afoot.”      Illinois        v.    Wardlow,      
    528 U.S. 119
    ,   123       (2000)
    (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30 (1968)).                         The officer must
    have “at least a minimal level of objective justification for
    making the stop” and “must be able to articulate more than an
    2
    inchoate    and    unparticularized         suspicion      or     hunch    of   criminal
    activity.”         
    Id. at 123-24
        (internal         quotation     marks      and
    citations omitted).          Courts assess the legality of a Terry stop
    under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight to
    common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their
    experience and training.”              United States v. Perkins, 
    363 F.3d 317
    , 321 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).                          The court will
    “credit the ‘practical experience of officers who observe on a
    daily   basis     what     transpires      on   the     street.’”         
    Id.
       (quoting
    United States v. Lender, 
    985 F.2d 151
    , 154 (4th Cir. 1993)).
    With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
    record and find that the district court’s conclusion that the
    officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might
    have been afoot was not erroneous.                      We also find that Hall’s
    reliance    on    the    Second      Amendment     is    misplaced,       and   that    he
    failed to preserve for our review his claims based upon the
    state   concealed        weapon      statute.         Thus,     the    district     court
    properly denied Hall’s suppression motions.
    Hall next challenges the district court’s denial of a
    two-level    reduction          in    offense      level        for    acceptance      of
    responsibility under the guidelines.                  Following United States v.
    Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a district court must engage in a
    multi-step       process     at      sentencing.          After       calculating      the
    appropriate advisory guidelines range, a district court should
    3
    consider the resulting range in conjunction with the factors set
    out in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2006), and determine an appropriate
    sentence.        United States v. Abu Ali, 
    528 F.3d 210
    , 259-60 (4th
    Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1312
     (2009).
    This     court       reviews    a   sentence     for      reasonableness,
    applying    an     abuse    of     discretion      standard.         Gall    v.    United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , ___, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007); see also
    United   States     v.     Seay,    
    553 F.3d 732
    ,   742       (4th    Cir.   2009),
    petition for cert. filed (May 29, 2009) (No. 08-10729).                            In so
    doing, the court first examines the sentence for “significant
    procedural        error,”    including:         “failing        to    calculate       (or
    improperly       calculating)       the    [g]uidelines      range,        treating   the
    [g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
    factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
    or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .”
    Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    .                  “If the district court decides to
    impose a sentence outside the [g]uidelines range, it must ensure
    that its justification supports ‘the degree of the variance’;
    . . . .”     United States v. Evans, 
    526 F.3d 155
    , 161 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 476
     (2008) (quoting Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    ).      Finally, the court then “‘consider[s] the substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’”                       
    Id.
     (quoting Gall,
    
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    ).              If the sentence is within the guidelines
    range,     the     appellate       court     may     apply      a     presumption     of
    4
    reasonableness.            Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , ___, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    ,       2462-69     (2007)      (upholding           presumption    of
    reasonableness for within-guidelines sentence).
    The guidelines provide for a two-level reduction in
    offense       level     for    a     defendant      who    “clearly         demonstrates
    acceptance         of   responsibility.”           U.S.        Sentencing      Guidelines
    Manual       (“USSG”)    § 3E1.1(a)      (2007).         The    defendant      bears   the
    burden of proving that he is entitled to the reduction by a
    preponderance of the evidence.                   United States v. Harris, 
    882 F.2d 902
    , 907 (4th Cir. 1989).                    In addition, this court will
    review       the   district        court’s   determination         of    acceptance    of
    responsibility with “great deference.”                     See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt.
    n.5.     We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district
    court did not err in concluding that Hall failed to demonstrate
    acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions         are    adequately     presented       in    the    materials
    before       the   court    and     argument     would    not    aid    the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    5