Stephanie Castaneda v. U.S. Attorney General , 338 F. App'x 862 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-10334                 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JULY 23, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    Agency No. A079-471-130
    STEPHANIE CASTANEDA,
    a.k.a. Stephanie Castaneda Herrera,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (July 23, 2009)
    Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Stephanie Castaneda petitions this court for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motion to reopen asylum proceedings.
    I. Facts
    Petitioner and her brother, Diego Castaneda (“Diego”), both natives and
    citizens of Columbia, were admitted into the United States in December 1998 as
    visitors for pleasure. The following month, their mother, Alexandra Herrera
    (“Herrera”), was also admitted. In December 2000, Herrera changed her status to
    nonimmigrant student, with Petitioner and Diego’s statuses changed to dependants
    of a nonimmigrant student. In April 2001, Herrera completed her studies, and thus
    her status as a student ended. In May 2001, Herrera filed an application for asylum
    with Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”), with her children included
    as derivative beneficiaries. In September 2001, Petitioner was issued a Notice to
    Appear, charging her with removeability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(C)(i),1 for
    failing to comply with the terms of her nonimmigrant status once her mother’s
    student status ended.
    Petitioner’s removal proceeding was treated as a companion case to that of
    the lead respondent, Herrera. The parties conceded removeability and Herrera
    renewed her application, on behalf of herself and her children, for asylum and
    withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
     and 1231, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
    1
    Herrera and Diego received similar notices.
    2
    Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”),
    
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c). A hearing was held in November 2002 before an immigration
    judge (“IJ”).
    Herrera was the only witness to testify at the hearing. She testified that as a
    result of her affiliation with the Colombian Liberal Party, she received telephone
    threats from the National Libertation Army (“ELN”), an ELN member attempted to
    kidnap her, armed ELN members broke into her home and demanded to know her
    whereabouts, and her business associate received letters from the ELN demanding
    that the business pay a “war tax.” Following the hearing, the IJ denied relief,
    concluding that the asylum application was untimely. The court alternatively
    denied relief on the ground that Herrera lacked credibility and had not established
    past persecution on account of a protected ground. Because Herrera had not met the
    burden for asylum, the IJ concluded that Herrera could not meet the more stringent
    standards for withholding of removal or CAT relief.
    Herrera appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the denial of her asylum
    application on the grounds that it was not filed within one year of entry, as required
    by statute, and she had not shown extraordinary circumstances or worsened country
    conditions to excuse the untimeliness of her application. Additionally, the BIA
    concluded that Herrera was not entitled to withholding of removal or CAT relief
    because she failed to make the requisite showing that she or her children would be
    3
    tortured or their lives would be threatened if they were returned to Colombia. The
    BIA did, however, reverse the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, but this holding did
    not impact the disposition of the appeal.
    Herrera later moved to reopen the proceedings, alleging ineffective assistance
    of counsel, but the BIA denied this motion. In 2006, Herrera returned to Colombia,
    Diego moved to Canada to seek asylum, and Petitioner remained in the United
    States.
    In 2008, Petitioner moved to reopen the asylum proceedings on the grounds
    that changed circumstances warranted review of the deportation order. Herrera and
    Diego were not parties to this motion. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that after her
    mother returned to Colombia, she again began working for the Liberal Party, as
    well as a religious group that works with Colombian youth. Petitioner alleged that
    as a result of these affiliations, Herrera was threatened and detained by the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”)2 and her secretary was
    kidnaped and interrogated about Herrera. Moreover, Petitioner alleged that her
    changed personal circumstances also warranted reopening of asylum proceedings
    because in the time since the removal proceedings, she has married a lawful
    permanent resident and given birth to a child in America.
    2
    The IJ’s decision only discussed the ELN. FARC is another major guerilla group in
    Colombia. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    , 1229 (11th Cir. 2005).
    4
    The BIA rejected Petitioner’s motion to reopen, concluding that her motion
    was untimely and that no exception to the time limitation applied. The BIA found
    that Petitioner had not met her burden of showing changed country conditions, the
    IJ’s initial decision already considered the fear of harm from guerillas, and that the
    new evidence submitted by Petitioner did not show that she would face harm if
    returned to Colombia.
    This petition for review followed.
    II. Discussion
    Petitioner argues that the BIA erred by denying her motion to reopen the
    asylum proceedings.3 She concedes that Herrera’s initial petition was untimely and
    that the instant motion to reopen was similarly untimely, as it was submitted to the
    BIA more than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was
    rendered. Petitioner argues, however, that her case fits within the exception to the
    timeliness rule for changed circumstances.4 Petitioner argues that changes in
    Colombia’s country conditions and in her personal life warrant reopening of her
    removal proceedings. Moreover, she contends that the IJ only addressed the merits
    3
    Petitioner only seeks to reopen her asylum proceedings, not the withholding of removal
    proceedings. See Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    487 F.3d 855
    , 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here are
    no derivative benefits associated with a grant of withholding of removal.”).
    4
    Petitioner also argues, for the first time on appeal, that she is entitled to humanitarian
    asylum relief under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(iii). We will not consider this argument because it
    was not raised before the BIA, and therefore has not been properly exhausted. See Sundar v.
    I.N.S., 
    328 F.3d 1320
    , 1323 (11th Cir. 2003).
    5
    of her application in the context of withholding of removal, not with regard to the
    less onerous standards of an asylum application. Petitioner therefore concludes that
    the BIA was incorrect that the fear of harm from guerillas had already been
    considered when the IJ denied asylum to Herrera and her children.
    We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Abdi
    v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    430 F.3d 1148
    , 1149 (11th Cir. 2005). “Our review is limited to
    determining ‘whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and
    whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.’” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). Motions to reopen are especially disfavored in “a deportation proceeding,
    where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable
    alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” I.N.S. v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992).
    Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final
    administrative decision over which review is sought. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c). “[A]
    motion to reopen must be based on changed country conditions if not filed within
    90 days of the BIA’s final order.” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., __ F.3d __, 
    2009 WL 1856787
     (11th Cir. June 30, 2009). The alien must produce evidence about the
    nation to which she is being deported that “was not available and would not have
    been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    6
    We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion because Petitioner did
    not demonstrate changed country conditions, as needed to excuse the untimeliness
    of her motion to reopen. First, Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate changed country
    conditions cannot be met by a showing of changed personal circumstances. Chen v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    565 F.3d 805
    , 809 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, for the purpose of this
    court’s inquiry, Petitioner’s marriage and the birth of her child are irrelevant.
    Second, Petitioner is incorrect that the IJ did not address the merits of her asylum
    claim. After concluding that Herrera’s asylum application was untimely, the IJ
    nonetheless went on to consider the merits of Herrera’s asylum claim. The IJ
    outlined the requirements for a successful asylum claim, held that Herrera had not
    demonstrated an entitlement to asylum, and concluded that Herrera therefore would
    not be able to meet the more stringent standard applicable to withholding of
    removal claims. Third, the evidence that Petitioner presented to the BIA in her
    motion to reopen consisted of, at most, allegations of continued persecution of
    Herrera. Herrera, however, is not a party to this motion. Petitioner has not
    produced any evidence that she will be personally persecuted if returned to
    Colombia, nor that any such persecution would be on account of a protected
    ground. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that to be entitled to asylum, “the
    applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
    7
    persecuting the applicant”). Moreover, she has not alleged that the threat posed by
    the ELN or FARC has increased since the time of the initial asylum petition.
    We thus conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying
    Petitioner’s motion to reopen her asylum proceedings.
    PETITION DENIED.
    8