Steven N. Hyland v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 04 2017, 8:16 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nicholas F. Wallace Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Steven N. Hyland, April 4, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1605-CR-1166
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Samuel R. Keirns,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-1510-F6-1040
May, Judge.
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[1] Steven N. Hyland appeals his conviction of Level 6 felony resisting law
enforcement. 1 He appeals the admission of evidence he claims was obtained
unconstitutionally. He also argues the State did not provide sufficient evidence
at trial to prove he committed Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately 2:15 a.m. on October 27, 2015, Officer Lisa Woods
responded to a hit and run accident. When she arrived on the scene, Officer
Woods observed the victim, who had sustained serious but non-fatal head
injuries, on the ground. The vehicle that had struck the victim was gone.
Officer Woods spoke with several witnesses, one of whom indicated a silver
Pontiac hit the victim, and a maroon station wagon “pulled in and picked up
people and drove off.” (Suppression Tr. at 21.) Another witness indicated a
person named “[C]lick [C]lack” or “Neal 2” was involved in the incident. (Id.)
(footnote added). While Officer Woods was interviewing a witness at the gas
station across the street from the scene of the accident, another witness
indicated the maroon station wagon had just passed the scene and “Neal’s in
the car.” (Id. at 26.)
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014).
2
Officer Woods testified she knew the name “[C]lick [C]lack” from her time working in the neighborhood
and knew Hyland’s middle name was Neal.
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[3] Officer Woods left the scene in her marked police vehicle and followed the
maroon station wagon (“Hyland’s vehicle”). Hyland’s vehicle left the
immediate commercial area where the hit and run occurred and entered a
residential area, where he made thirteen turns in a span of five square blocks.
Officer Woods testified she believed Hyland’s vehicle exceeded the speed limit
for a residential area based on her experience as an officer and “was attempting
to get away from [her].” (Id. at 40.) At least once, Officer Woods observed
Hyland’s vehicle make a turn without a turn signal. After that observation, she
activated her emergency lights. Hyland kept driving and made another turn
without using his turn signal. Officer Woods then activated her siren. Hyland
made another turn without using his turn signal. Officer Woods finally caught
up with Hyland when he stopped at a stop sign. She then arrested Hyland.
[4] On October 30, 2015, the State charged Hyland with Level 6 felony resisting
law enforcement. On January 14, 2016, Hyland filed a motion to suppress
evidence or dismiss the charge, arguing the stop of his vehicle was
unconstitutional. The trial court denied Hyland’s motions on February 22,
2016, after a hearing on the matter. Hyland’s jury trial occurred on April 19,
2016, and the jury found him guilty as charged.
Discussion and Decision
Motion to Suppress
[5] Hyland did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of his motion to suppress
but instead appeals following trial. This issue is therefore “appropriately
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framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence
at trial.” Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Our
review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same
whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by trial
objection. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting
evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. However, we must also
consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.[6] The record reflects Hyland did not object at trial to the admission of the video
recording from Officer Woods’ car, which contained the evidence Hyland
sought to suppress, specifically what happened during Officer Woods’ pursuit
of Hyland’s vehicle. “To preserve a suppression claim a defendant must make a
contemporaneous objection that is sufficiently specific to alert the trial judge
fully of the legal issue. Where a defendant fails to object to the introduction of
evidence . . . the defendant waives the suppression claim.” Moore v. State, 669
N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ind. 1996) (internal citations and emphasis omitted), reh’g
denied. We address Hyland’s argument, waiver notwithstanding.
[7] Hyland was charged with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, which
required the State to prove he knowingly or intentionally used a vehicle to flee
from Officer Woods after she identified herself as a law enforcement officer and
ordered him to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014) (elements of
Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement). In Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249(Ind. 2014), our Indiana Supreme Court held, “the statutory element ‘after the
officer has . . . ordered the person to stop’ must be understood to require that
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such order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is,
specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that
criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 1255. We determine whether reasonable
suspicion existed on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the
circumstances. Person v. State, 764 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
denied.
[8] Based on Gaddie, Hyland contends Officer Woods’ stop of his vehicle violated
his Fourth Amendment 3 right under the United States Constitution to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure because Officer Woods did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop Hyland’s vehicle. In Gaddie, our Indiana Supreme
Court decided the State had not proven the officer who arrested Gaddie had
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Gaddie after receiving a report of
a disturbance because “a report of a disturbance, without more, is not a
sufficient basis upon which to conduct an investigatory stop.” Id. at 1255.
However, in this case, the totality of the circumstances created reasonable
suspicion to justify Officer Woods’ stop of Hyland.
[9] At the scene of the accident, a witness told Officer Woods a maroon station
wagon had “pulled in and pick[ed] up people and drove off,” (Suppression Tr.
at 20), following the collision between the victim and another vehicle. The
witness indicated Hyland’s vehicle was involved in the accident, and the person
3
At the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, Hyland also argued the stop violated his rights under the
Indiana Constitution. He does not make that argument on appeal.
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who was driving the maroon station wagon was known as “[C]lick [C]lack” or
“Neal.” (Id. at 21.) Officer Woods was interviewing another witness when she
was told the maroon station wagon, with Hyland driving, passed the scene of
the accident. She followed Hyland into a residential area in her marked police
car, where the vehicle made multiple turns, weaving from street to street.
Officer Woods testified she believed, based on her experience as an officer, that
Hyland’s vehicle exceeded the speed limit for a residential area and “was
attempting to get away from [her].” (Id. at 40.) Officer Woods activated her
emergency lights after observing Hyland fail to activate his turn signal prior to
turning. Hyland made another turn, and Officer Woods activated her siren.
Hyland turned again, and Officer Woods caught up with him at a stop sign.
[10] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Officer Woods had
reasonable suspicion to stop Hyland. A witness at the scene of an accident
identified Hyland as a person involved in the accident, Officer Woods described
his driving as “very erratic,” (Trial Tr. at 27), and he failed to use a turn signal
multiple times. See McKnight v. State, 612 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(reasonable suspicion existed when vehicle stopped matched the description of
a vehicle that a witness indicated was involved in crime, vehicle was driving in
the vicinity of the crime, vehicle was travelling over the speed limit, and driver
had committed traffic infraction), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Hyland’s argument
is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See
Lundquist, 834 N.E.2d at 1067 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence when
considering admission of evidence). The trial court did not abuse its discretion
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when it admitted evidence collected during Officer Woods’ stop of Hyland’s
vehicle.
Sufficiency of Evidence
[11] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[12] To prove Hyland committed Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, the State
had to prove Hyland knowingly or intentionally used a vehicle to flee from
Officer Woods after she identified herself as a law enforcement officer and
ordered him to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014) (elements of
Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement). Hyland argues the State did not
present sufficient evidence he knowingly or intentionally fled from Officer
Woods once she activated her emergency lights and siren because he was
unaware she intended to pull him over until right before he stopped.
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[13] Hyland points to what he claims are discrepancies in the video from the
dashboard camera in Officer Woods’ car. Officer Woods testified she activated
her emergency lights after she observed Hyland turn without using a turn
signal. The video shows Officer Woods activating her lights, but Hyland’s
vehicle was not visible at that time. The taillights of his vehicle were visible on
the video shortly thereafter, as Hyland made a quick turn onto a side street
without using his turn signal. Officer Woods activated her siren. He made
another quick turn without using his turn signal before Officer Woods caught
up with him at a stop sign. Hyland’s argument he was unaware of Officer
Woods’ intention to stop him is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and
judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d
at 146 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses).
[14] Hyland also argues Officer Woods did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
him, an argument we rejected in our analysis of the constitutionality of Officer
Woods’ stop of Hyland’s vehicle. As Officer Woods had reasonable suspicion
to stop Hyland and he fled from her after she identified herself as a law
enforcement officer by activating her emergency lights and siren, we conclude
the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Hyland committed Level 6
felony resisting law enforcement. See Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 901
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (State presented sufficient evidence to support conviction
of felony resisting law enforcement where the defendant continued to drive after
the officer activated his lights and siren), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
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Conclusion
[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Officer
Woods’ stop of Hyland’s vehicle because Officer Woods had reasonable
suspicion to stop Hyland based on the totality of the circumstances. The State
also presented sufficient evidence Hyland committed Level 6 felony resisting
law enforcement. Accordingly, we affirm.
[16] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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