Estate of Kerin Lajoice v. Northern Michigan Hospitals Inc ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • Order                                                          Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    April 26, 2013                                                      Robert P. Young, Jr.,
    Chief Justice
    145946-7 & (56)                                                      Michael F. Cavanagh
    Stephen J. Markman
    145964-5                                                                 Mary Beth Kelly
    145977-8                                                                  Brian K. Zahra
    Bridget M. McCormack
    David F. Viviano,
    TIMOTHY LaJOICE, Personal Representative                                            Justices
    of the Estate of Kerin LaJoice,
    Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
    v                                              SC: 145946-7
    COA: 300684; 300788
    Emmet CC: 06-009165-NH
    NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS, INC.,
    DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D., and
    DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D., P.C.,
    Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellees,
    and
    BRAD E. VAZALES, M.D. and GREAT
    LAKES CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR
    SURGERY, P.L.L.C.,
    Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
    _________________________________________/
    TIMOTHY LaJOICE, Personal Representative
    of the Estate of Kerin LaJoice,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                              SC: 145964-5
    COA: 300684; 300788
    Emmet CC: 06-009165-NH
    NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    BRAD E. VAZALES, M.D., GREAT LAKES
    CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR SURGERY,
    P.L.L.C., DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D., and
    DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D., P.C.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________________/
    TIMOTHY LaJOICE, Personal Representative
    of the Estate of Kerin LaJoice,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                              SC: 145977-8
    COA: 300684; 300788
    NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS, INC.,             Emmet CC: 06-009165-NH
    BRAD E. VAZALES, M.D., and GREAT
    2
    LAKES CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR
    SURGERY, P.L.L.C.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D. and
    DANIEL E. McDONNELL, M.D., P.C.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    _________________________________________/
    On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the August 28, 2012
    judgment of the Court of Appeals are considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in
    lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE, in part, the judgment of the Court of
    Appeals and REINSTATE the Emmet Circuit Court’s September 30, 2010 order granting
    the defendants’ motions for summary disposition. The application for leave to appeal as
    cross-appellant is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented
    should be reviewed by this Court.
    Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ holding, Bush v Shabahang, 
    484 Mich 156
    (2009), does not apply here because the plaintiff did not file his notice of intent until after
    the period of limitations had expired and thus, unlike in Bush, the issue is not whether a
    defective notice of intent tolls the period of limitations. Rather, it is whether a complaint
    filed after the filing only of a defective notice of intent tolls the wrongful death saving
    provision. We have already answered that question in the negative in Boodt v Borgess
    Med Ctr, 
    481 Mich 558
     (2008). As Boodt, 481 Mich at 562-563, explains:
    MCL 600.2912b(1) states that “a person shall not commence an
    action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health
    facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility
    written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is
    commenced.” MCL 600.2912b(4) states that the “notice given to a health
    professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of
    at least all of the following . . . .” Therefore, a plaintiff cannot commence
    an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the
    information required under § 2912b(4). Because plaintiff’s notice of intent
    here did not contain all the information required under § 2912b(4), she
    3
    could not have commenced an action. Therefore, her complaint and
    affidavit of merit could not have tolled the period of limitations. [Citation
    omitted.]
    See also Ligons v Crittenton Hosp, 
    490 Mich 61
    , 74-75 (2011) (“once the limitations
    period has run, tolling is no longer available, even if a saving statute would still allow
    commencement of the action”). Because the plaintiff’s complaint did not toll the saving
    period, and because the saving period has now expired, the plaintiff’s action is time
    barred.
    CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to extend the principle
    established by a majority of this Court in Waltz v Wyse, 
    469 Mich 642
    , 644 (2004)—that
    a defective notice of intent does not toll the wrongful-death saving provision under MCL
    600.5852—to preclude plaintiff from amending the notice of intent despite the fact that
    plaintiff is entitled to such relief under Bush v Shabahang, 
    484 Mich 156
     (2009). I
    continue to adhere to my dissenting opinion in Waltz explaining that MCL 600.5856
    applies to toll the wrongful-death saving period. Waltz, 
    469 Mich at 655-672
    (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Thus, in my view, it makes no difference that the Bush
    plaintiff relied on the statute of limitations, whereas plaintiff here relies on the wrongful-
    death saving period.
    Irrespective of this Court’s holding in Bush, it is my view that “when a notice of
    intent . . . is deficient, MCL 600.2301 should control and the deficiency should be
    disregarded if there is no effect on the substantial rights of a party.” Boodt v Borgess
    Med Ctr, 
    481 Mich 558
    , 564 (2008) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). And under MCL
    600.2301, an amendment is allowed “‘at any time’ before judgment is rendered.” 
    Id. at 568
    , quoting MCL 600.2301; see, also, Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 
    466 Mich 57
    ,
    71-77 (2002) (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting). Further, the plain language of MCL
    600.5856(a) clearly states that the filing of a complaint tolls the limitations period.
    Kirkaldy v Rim, 
    478 Mich 581
    , 586-587 (2007) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in the result).
    Thus, despite any alleged defects in plaintiff’s notice of intent, in my view, the wrongful-
    death saving period was tolled by the filing of the complaint, and plaintiff is entitled to
    amend the notice of intent to meet the requirements of MCL 600.2912b.
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s order in this case.
    I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
    foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
    April 26, 2013                      _________________________________________
    d0423                                                                  Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 145946

Filed Date: 4/26/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014