Christopher Lee Duncan v. State of Michigan ( 2010 )

Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
November 30, 2010 Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice
139345-7 (113) Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
CHRISTOPHER LEE DUNCAN, BILLY JOE Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
BURR, JR., STEVEN CONNOR, ANTONIO Diane M. Hathaway
TAYLOR, JOSE DAVILA, JENNIFER Alton Thomas Davis,
O’SULLIVAN, CHRISTOPHER MANIES, and Justices
BRIAN SECREST,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v SC: 139345
COA: 278652
Ingham CC: 07-000242-CZ
STATE OF MICHIGAN and GOVERNOR OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________/
CHRISTOPHER LEE DUNCAN, BILLY JOE
BURR, JR., STEVEN CONNOR, ANTONIO
TAYLOR, JOSE DAVILA, JENNIFER
O’SULLIVAN, CHRISTOPHER MANIES, and
BRIAN SECREST,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v SC: 139346
COA: 278858
Ingham CC: 07-000242-CZ
STATE OF MICHIGAN and GOVERNOR OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________/
CHRISTOPHER LEE DUNCAN, BILLY JOE
BURR, JR., STEVEN CONNOR, ANTONIO
TAYLOR, JOSE DAVILA, JENNIFER
O’SULLIVAN, CHRISTOPHER MANIES, and
BRIAN SECREST,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v SC: 139347
COA: 278860
Ingham CC: 07-000242-CZ
STATE OF MICHIGAN and GOVERNOR OF
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MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s July 16, 2010
order is considered, and it is GRANTED. We VACATE our order dated July 16, 2010,
and we REINSTATE our order in this case dated April 30, 2010, because reconsideration
thereof was improperly granted.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Dissenting statement of CORRIGAN, J., to follow.
DAVIS, J. (concurring).
I agree with Chief Justice KELLY’s dissent from the July 16, 2010, order, stating
that the prior motion for reconsideration should have been denied because it added
nothing new. To the extent the unanimous April 30, 2010, order was reconsidered
because of concerns that it could not be complied with, I have reviewed the record
thoroughly and I do not agree with those concerns. Furthermore, if those concerns
eventually prove warranted, the trial court should, and is in the best position to, make that
evaluation. The trial court has not yet had the opportunity to do so. As the April 30,
2010, order stated, this case is at its earliest stages and a decision on its substantive merits
is premature, but class certification should be reconsidered in light of Henry v Dow
Chemical Co, 484 Mich 483 (2009). The original, unanimous order of this Court was
correct, and no sufficient basis was presented for this Court to have reconsidered it.
HATHAWAY, J., joins the statement of DAVIS, J.
CORRIGAN, J., states as follows:
I object to the release of the Court’s order without my dissenting statement and I
reserve the right to file one as soon as I can. The majority has decided to grant the
motion for reconsideration, and to reverse our previous order, without affording
disagreeing Justices sufficient time to adequately respond to this decision. Instead, the
majority has now decided to expedite the release of its order regardless of the fact that I
have worked in a timely fashion to prepare a dissenting statement, but have not yet
completed such a statement. This is contrary to our practice during the 11 years I have
served on this Court. The Court’s decision to suddenly expedite this case seems designed
to prevent the new Court after January 1, 2011 from considering a motion for
reconsideration.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
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I dissent from the order granting plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, vacating
this Court’s July 16, 2010 order, and reinstating this Court’s April 30, 2010 order. The
July 16 order vacated the April 30 order and held that “[t]he defendants are entitled to
summary disposition because, as the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion recognized, the
plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable.” In a concurring statement, I explained that our
April 30 order was erroneous for two reasons:
First, as defendants observe, this order vacated the Court of Appeals
opinion without articulating any governing standards. Second, it is not
premature to decide this case because the precise issue presented is whether
plaintiffs have stated a claim on which relief can be granted, and this, as
well as the threshold justiciability issues, can be determined on the face of
the complaint. [Duncan v State of Michigan, 486 Mich 1071 (2010)
(MARKMAN, J., concurring).]
In addition, I concluded that defendants are entitled to summary disposition for the
following reasons set forth in the Court of Appeals’ dissent:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335(1963), and Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984), “was concerned
with results, not process. It did not presume to tell the states how to assure
that indigent criminal defendants receive effective assistance of counsel.”
284 Mich App 246, 357 (2009).
(2) Plaintiffs’ claims would have “the judiciary override the
Michigan system of local control and funding of legal services for indigent
criminal defendants,” despite the absence here of any constitutional
violation. Id. at 358.
(3) Plaintiffs’ claims are not sufficient to create a presumption of
either prejudice, or prejudice per se, that would warrant either declaratory
or injunctive relief. Id. at 361.
(4) Plaintiffs lack standing, and, therefore, their claims are not
justiciable. Id. at 371.
(5) Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for adjudication, and, therefore,
their claims are not justiciable. Id. at 371, 376.
(6) Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable and, therefore, the relief they
seek should not be granted. Id. at 385.
(7) In finding a justiciable controversy, the Court of Appeals erred in
adopting a number of assumptions that are conjectural and hypothetical,
including assumptions that plaintiffs and the class they purport to represent
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will be convicted of the crimes with which they are charged, that such
convictions will result from prejudice stemming from ineffective assistance
of counsel, that such ineffective assistance will be attributable to the
inaction of defendants, and that trial and appellate judges will be unable or
unwilling to afford relief for such violations of the Sixth Amendment. Id.
at 368-370.
(8) There is no constitutional precedent that “guarantees an indigent
defendant a particular attorney” or an “attorney of a particular level of
skill” [as long as the attorney is not “so deficient as to cause prejudice”];
that requires a “predetermined amount of outside resources be available to
an attorney”; or that requires that there be a “meaningful relationship with
counsel.” Id. at 370[, 384].
(9) The Court of Appeals assertions that affording plaintiffs
injunctive relief “could potentially entail a cessation of criminal
prosecutions against indigent defendants,” id. at 273, and “that nothing in
this opinion should be read as foreclosing entry of an order granting the
type of relief so vigorously challenged by defendants,” id. at 281,
accurately describe the potential consequences of its opinion, which
consequences would constitute an altogether unwarranted, improper, and
excessive response to plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 380-385.
(10) The Court of Appeals has “issued an open invitation to the trial
court to assume ongoing operational control over the systems for providing
defense counsel to indigent criminal defendants in Berrien, Genesee and
Muskegon counties.” And with that invitation comes a “blank check” on
the part of the judiciary to “force sufficient state level legislative
appropriations and executive branch acquiescence” in assuming similar
control over the systems in every county in this state, while “nullifying the
provisions” of the criminal defense act and “superseding the authority of
the Supreme Court and the State Court Administrator.” Id. at 383-384.
[Duncan, 486 Mich at 1072 (MARKMAN, J., concurring).]
Because plaintiffs have not presented anything in the present motion for reconsideration
that causes me to believe that the above reasons do not continue to justify our decision to
reverse the Court of Appeals, I would deny plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
CORRIGAN and YOUNG, JJ., join the statement of MARKMAN, J.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
November 30, 2010 _________________________________________
1124 Clerk