Platz v. Hamilton ( 1982 )


Menu:
  •                            No. 82-64
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1982
    LOIS PLATZ, Clerk of Court,
    Big Horn County, Montana,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    LORRAINE HAMILTON, Treasurer,
    Biq Horn County, Montana,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appeal from:      District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Big Horn
    Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding.
    Counsel of Record:
    For Appellant:
    Robert J. Em.ons argued, Great Falls, Montana
    For Respondent:
    James E. Seykora, County Attorney, argued, Hardin,
    Montana
    Submitted: September 16, 1982
    Decided: November 4, 1982
    Filed:   hi,^   4 -1982
    Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of
    the Court.
    Lois Platz, clerk of the District Court of Big Horn
    County, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the
    county treasurer, Lorraine Hamilton, entered in the District
    Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, Big Horn County.
    Lois Platz filed an action for declaratory judgment to
    determine whether a clerk of District Court is required to
    remit to the county treasurer the fees collected by the
    clerk in the issuance and execution of passports.    Platz
    alleges that a clerk of court should be allowed to retain
    the execution fee for his or her personal use.
    Because no genuine issue as to any material fact
    existed, both parties moved for summary judgment under Rule
    56, M.R.Civ.P.    The District Court granted Hamilton's motion
    for summary judgment, and thereby required the clerk of
    court to remit the fee to the county treasurer.
    The United States Congress has the exclusive authority
    to regulate the issuance and execution of passports, and has
    exercised that authority by enacting 22 U.S.C.    211a, et seq.
    It also implemented federal regulations which designate
    persons before whom passport applications can be executed
    and oaths can be administered.    These persons include, among
    others, state clerks of court of record, state judges,
    clerks of probate courts, and post office personnel.     
    22 C.F.R. § 51.21
    (b).   The execution of passports is not, however, a
    mandatory function imposed upon these public officials by
    the Congress.    Any of the designated officials could refuse,
    without violating a duty of office, to handle passport
    applications.
    The federal statutes and regulations also state that
    two fees can be collected.     The first is a $10 passport fee
    which must be p a i d t o t h e United S t a t e s T r e a s u r y .                 
    22 U.S.C. § 214
    .     The c o l l e c t i o n of t h i s p a s s p o r t f e e i s n o t
    d i s p u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h i s c a s e .     The second f e e , which
    i s t h e c e n t e r o f t h i s d i s p u t e , i s a $5 e x e c u t i o n f e e which
    "may be c o l l e c t e d and r e t a i n e d by any S t a t e o f f i c i a l b e f o r e
    whom a n a p p l i c a t i o n i s e x e c u t e d . "    22 C . F . R .   5 51.61(b),
    F l a t z c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o r e t a i n t h i s
    e x e c u t i o n f e e f o r h e r p e r s o n a l u s e . Hamilton, c o n v e r s e l y ,
    contends t h e execution f e e should be remitted t o t h e county
    g e n e r a l fund.
    I n Montana, no s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e e x i s t s which imposes a n
    o f f i c i a l d u t y upon a c l e r k of D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e x e c u t e
    passport applications.                  Nor i s t h e r e a s p e c i f i c Montana
    s t a t u t e which r e q u i r e s t h a t an e x e c u t i o n f e e c o l l e c t e d by a
    c l e r k o f D i s t r i c t C o u r t b e p a i d o v e r t o t h e county t r e a s u r e r .
    The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d , however, e n a c t a g e n e r a l s t a t u t e
    r e l a t i n g t o t h e c o l l e c t i o n of f e e s , which s t a t e s i n p a r t :
    "No s a l a r i e d county o f f i c e r may r e c e i v e f o r h i s
    own u s e any f e e s , p e n a l t i e s , o r emoluments o f
    any k i n d , e x c e p t t h e s a l a r y a s p r o v i d e d by l a w ,
    f o r any o f f i c i a l s e r v i c e r e n d e r e d by him."
    (Emphasis added. ) S e c t i o n 7-4-2511 ( 2 ) , MCA.
    I n 1972, A t t o r n e y General Woodahl i s s u e d an o p i n i o n
    i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s s t a t u t e i n l i g h t of execution fees.             We
    s t a t e d , "There b e i n g no s t a t u t o r y d u t y imposed upon t h e
    c l e r k s of c o u r t c o n c e r n i n g t h e i s s u a n c e o f p a s s p o r t s , it
    i s n o t a d u t y o f t h e i r o f f i c e f o r which t h e y a r e r e g u l a r l y
    compensated         ...         Therefore,.            . . the . . . fee         collected
    f o r i s s u i n g p a s s p o r t s may b e r e t a i n e d by t h e c l e r k s o f c o u r t
    i n t h e v a r i o u s c o u n t i e s o f t h e s t a t e , and t h e c l e r k s of
    c o u r t a r e not required t o d e p o s i t t h e s a m e with t h e county
    t r e a s u r e r f o r d e p o s i t i n t h e c o u n t y g e n e r a l f u n d . " 3 4 Opinion
    of A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 4 1 .
    In 1979, Attorney General Greely reversed the 1972
    opinion, finding that the execution of passports was an
    "official service" as used in section 7-4-2511(2), MCA.      He
    stated, "The fact that a state official performs a function
    under federal rather than state law does not necessarily
    mean that he or she is not rendering an official service.
    When the individual is permitted to perform the function
    solely because of his or her official status, he or she
    renders an official service, regardless of whether the
    service is authorized by state or federal law."    38 Opinion
    of Attorney General (1979), 46.   Therefore, the Attorney
    General concluded that county clerks of court must pay the
    execution fees to the county treasurer.
    We do not agree with the latest Attorney General opinion.
    Instead, we would apply the rationale set forth in Anderson
    v. Hinman (1960), 
    138 Mont. 397
    , 
    357 P.2d 595
    .    Anderson
    involved the question of whether the clerk of the Supreme
    Court could retain fees paid by West Publishing Company for
    copies of opinions of the Supreme Court.   Anderson, who was
    then the attorney general, took the position that the fee
    paid by West Publishing Company was paid for an official
    duty of the clerk of the Supreme Court, and therefore the
    fee must be remitted to the State Treasury.   The Supreme
    Court held, however, that the clerk of the Supreme Court
    could properly retain the fee for his or her own use.
    The court in Anderson stated several reasons why the
    clerk was allowed to retain the fee.   First, "[tlhe right of
    the state to monies collected depends upGn some legislative
    enactment clearly identifying them as compensation owing to
    the state."   Anderson, 138 Jlont. at 408, 357 P.2d at 901.
    To determine whether a clear legislative enactment existed,
    the court in Anderson reviewed the following two statutes:
    "82-504 [R.C.M. 19471. D u t i e s .                I t is t h e duty
    o f t h e c l e r k [ o f t h e Supreme C o u r t ] t o             ...
    p e r f o r m s u c h o t h e r d u t i e s a s may b e r e q u i r e d o f
    him by t h e supreme c o u r t .
    "52-503(2) [R.C.M.             19471. F e e s . A l l f e e s
    c o l l e c t e d by [ t h e c l e r k o f t h e Supreme C o u r t ]
    must b e p a i d i n t o t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r y , a l l o f
    which s h a l l b e c r e d i t e d t o t h e c r e d i t o f t h e
    S t a t e law l i b r a r y f u n d . "
    I n l i g h t o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s , t h e c o u r t c o u l d f i n d no l e g i s -
    l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y i n g f e e s p a i d by W e s t
    P u b l i s h i n g Company t o t h e c l e r k a s compensation owing t o t h e
    state.
    I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , no s t a t e s t a t u t e e x i s t s which
    imposes a d u t y upon a c l e r k of D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e x e c u t e
    passport applications.                  Nor i s t h e r e a s t a t u t e which c l e a r l y
    r e q u i r e s t h e c l e r k t o r e m i t t h e e x e c u t i o n f e e t o t h e county
    treasurer.          T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no " l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t
    c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y i n g [monies c o l l e c t e d ] a s compensation owing
    t o the State.        "    supra.
    Anderson s t a t e d a second r e a s o n why c l e r k s s h o u l d be
    allowed t o r e t a i n t h e f e e :           "Under S e c t i o n 82-504,           supra,
    t h e S t a t e i s c l e a r l y e n t i t l e d t o any monies c o l l e c t e d by t h e
    c l e r k w h i l e a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y and p e r f o r m i n g
    t h e d u t i e s t h e r e i n enumerated and t h e c o n v e r s e i s e q u a l l y
    t r u e t h a t t h e S t a t e i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any f e e s e x c e p t t h o s e
    s e t by l a w . " Anderson a t 409, 357 P.2d a t 901.                            In the
    p r e s e n t case, t h e S t a t e has n o t provided f o r t h e d i s p o s i t i o n
    of e x e c u t i o n f e e s , e v e n though Congress g a v e t h e S t a t e t h e
    power t o do s o .           2 2 U.S.C.       S 214.        Therefore, t h e S t a t e
    h a s n o t " s e t by law" any f e e r e l a t i n g t o t h e e x e c u t i o n o f
    passports.
    A t h i r d r e a s o n s t a t e d i n Anderson i s t h a t a f u n c t i o n
    performed by a c l e r k must b e "demanded by law."                                Anderson a t
    409, 357 P.2d at 902.     In the present case, a clerk of
    District Court is not "demanded by law" to execute passpcrts
    applications.    By federal law, the clerk of the District
    Court is merely authorized to execute passport applications.
    22 C.F,R. S 51.21(b).    Mere authorization to perform an act
    does not impose a mandatory duty upon a public official.     If
    a statute is permissive, as the federal regulation is here,
    there is no "clear mandatory duty" to perform the function
    enumerated by the statute.    Dreyer v. Board of Trustees
    (1979),     Mont.   -   , 
    598 P.2d 205
    , 209, 
    36 St.Rep. 1396
    ,
    Fourth, the court in Anderson stated that "an officer
    is not obliged, because his office is salaried, to perform
    all manner of public service without additional conpensation,
    and for services performed by request, not part of the
    duties of his office, and which could have been as appropriately
    performed by any other person, he may recover a proper
    remuneration."   Anderson at 412, 357 P.2d at 903, quoting 67
    C.J.S. Officers, 326, S 88.     When executing passport
    applications, a clerk of District Court is performing a
    discretionary act.    It is not "part of the duties of his
    office," as prescribed in sections 3-5-501 to 3-5-515, PICA,
    to execute passport fees.     In addition, many other persons,
    including post office personnel, may execute passport
    applications.    Therefore, the clerk of District Court "may
    recover a proper remuneration."
    Finally, the court in Anderson emphasized that where
    there is no state statute fixing a fee, no debt is owing to
    the State Treasury.     Anderson at 412-413, 357 P.2d at 903.
    Because Congress has imposed the supremacy clause, Art. VI,
    C l a u s e Two of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n t h e a r e a o f
    passports, t h e S t a t e cannot f i x a f e e f o r execution of
    passport applications.                  The s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e c a n , however,
    p r o v i d e t h a t any f e e c o l l e c t e d f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n s
    s h a l l be p a i d t o t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r .       I n Montana, t h e
    l e g i s l a t u r e has f a i l e d t o enact a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e with
    regard t o execution fees.                   T h e r e f o r e , no d e b t i s owed by
    t h e c l e r k s t o t h e county t r e a s u r e r f o r e x e c u t i o n f e e s i n
    passport cases,
    W e h o l d t h a t s i n c e t h e e x e c u t i o n of p a s s p o r t a p p l i c a t i o n s
    i s n o t an o f f i c i a l d u t y imposed upon a c l e r k of D i s t r i c t
    C o u r t by s t a t e s t a t u t e , and s i n c e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s n o t
    e n a c t e d a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of
    e x e c u t i o n f e e s , t h e c l e r k h a s no d u t y t o r e m i t t h e f e e s t o
    t h e c o u n t y g e n e r a l fund.      The summary judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t
    C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d , w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r summary judgment
    i n favor of t h e clerk-appellant.
    I
    9       .
    r                       2%
    .     b       -   (   I
    Justice          B
    W e Concur:
    Mr.   J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea d i s s e n t i n g :
    I would a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment r e q u i r i n g
    t h e county c l e r k t o r e m i t t h e p a s s p o r t f e e s t o t h e county
    treasurer.         The c l e r k c o l l e c t s t h e p a s s p o r t f e e s d u r i n g
    business hours, county t i m e is used, county personnel i s
    u s e d t o p r o c e s s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s , c o u n t y equipment i s
    u s e d and p r e s w t a b l y c o u n t y p o s t a g e i s u s e d t o m a i l t h e
    passport a p p l i c a t i o n s t o S e a t t l e f o r f i n a l processing.
    The s e r v i c e i s r e n d e r e d by t h e c l e r k s o l e l y b e c a u s e o f t h e
    clerk's official status.
    I a g r e e w i t h t h e o p i n i o n of t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l which
    held that:
    "The f a c t t h a t a s t a t e o f f i c i a l p e r f o r m s
    a f u n c t i o n under f e d e r a l r a t h e r than s t a t e
    law d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t h e o r s h e
    i s n o t r e n d e r i n g a n o f f i c i a l s e r v i c e . When t h e
    i n d i v i d u a l i s permitted t o perform t h e f u n c t i o n
    s o l e l y because of h i s o r her o f f i c i a l s t a t u s ,
    he o r she r e n d e r s an o f f i c i a l s e r v i c e , r e g a r d l e s s
    o f w h e t h e r t h e s e r v i c e i s a u t h o r i z e d by s t a t e o r
    f e d e r a l law."       38 O p i n i o n o f A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
    (1979) a t 4 6 .
    The c l e r k s c o l l e c t t h e f e e s u n d e r c o l o r o f t h e i r
    office.       Absent a s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o w i n g c l e r k s t o
    r e t a i n t h e f e e s , t h e f e e s should be t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e
    county t r e a s u r e r .    When t h e c l e r k s t o o k o f f i c e t h e y d i d s o
    on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e i r c o m p e n s a t i o n was g o v e r n e d by
    s e c t i o n 7-4-2503,      MCA.      This s t a t u t e does n o t permit t h e
    c l e r k s t o a l s o c o l l e c t c o m p e n s a t i o n i n t h e form o f p a s s p o r t
    fees.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 82-064

Filed Date: 11/3/1982

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014