People of Michigan v. Kemo Knicombi Parks ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                     Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    Syllabus
    Chief Justice:               Justices:
    Bridget M. McCormack        Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been                Reporter of Decisions:
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.                  Kathryn L. Loomis
    PEOPLE v PARKS
    Docket No. 162086. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 2, 2022. Decided
    July 28, 2022.
    Kemo K. Parks was convicted by a jury in the Genesee Circuit Court, Celeste D. Bell, J.,
    of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); carrying a concealed pistol, MCL
    750.227(2); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
    750.227b. In 2016, Parks was 18 years old when his older cousin, Dequavion Harris, shot and
    killed the victim in the parking lot of a convenience store. According to a witness, prior to the
    murder, Parks and Harris spoke to each other in low voices and whispers in the back seat of a car
    parked outside the convenience store. Parks then gave a gun to Harris. Both men entered the
    store, and Harris exited to the parking lot a short time later. Parks remained inside the store.
    Thereafter, the victim, who was sitting in his car in the parking lot, was shot and killed. At trial,
    the prosecution’s theory was that Harris and Parks planned to kill the victim in retaliation for the
    prior murder of Harris’s cousin. The prosecution charged Parks with first-degree premeditated
    murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Parks was convicted and sentenced to mandatory life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his conviction of first-degree murder, to be
    served consecutively with the mandatory two-year minimum for felony-firearm and concurrently
    to 24 to 60 months’ imprisonment for his conviction of carrying a concealed pistol. Defendant
    appealed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals consolidated his case with Harris’s
    case. In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued August 13, 2020 (Docket Nos. 346586 and
    346587), the Court of Appeals, MURRAY, C.J., and CAVANAGH and SWARTZLE, JJ., affirmed
    Harris’s and Parks’s convictions and sentences, with the exception of ordering a limited remand
    in Parks’s appeal to redetermine a portion of Parks’s restitution order. The Court of Appeals
    specifically rejected Parks’s challenge to his sentence as cruel and/or unusual punishment under
    the federal and state Constitutions. Parks sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the
    Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address
    whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 
    567 US 460
     (2012),
    which held that imposing mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of
    parole on homicide offenders who were under 18 years old at the time they committed the offense
    was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, and Montgomery v Louisiana, 
    577 US 190
     (2016),
    which held that Miller applied retroactively, should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years
    old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory
    life without parole under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Const 1963,
    art 1, § 16, or both. 
    508 Mich 940
     (2021).
    In an opinion by Justice WELCH, joined by Chief Justice MCCORMACK and Justices
    BERNSTEIN and CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
    Mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a
    sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the principle of
    proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution and thus constitutes unconstitutionally
    cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16; Parks’s automatic sentence of life without parole
    was unconstitutional; and while a judge can still sentence an 18-year-old to life without parole,
    Parks and other 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder are entitled to the full
    protections that exist within the individualized sentencing procedure of MCL 769.25 prior to that
    determination.
    1. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that excessive bail
    shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
    Article 1, § 16 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment; therefore,
    Michigan’s provision is broader than the federal Eighth Amendment. The United States Supreme
    Court in Miller held that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide
    offense was unconstitutional because it precludes consideration of the juvenile’s chronological age
    and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
    and consequences. While there was no legal support for extending Miller’s protections under the
    Eighth Amendment, Miller and Montgomery were persuasive to the extent they held that juveniles
    are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of imposing a life-without-parole sentence,
    and that general proposition was adopted under the Michigan Constitution. However, United
    States Supreme Court jurisprudence was not followed to the extent that it drew the line for defining
    the class of defendants who are entitled to individualized sentencing to those under the age of 18.
    To determine where to draw the new line under Michigan’s constitutional provision, scientific and
    social-science research regarding the characteristics of the late-adolescent 18-year-old brain was
    considered. In the punishment context, science has always informed what constitutes “cruel” or
    “unusual” punishment in regards to certain classes of defendants. Late adolescence—including
    the age of 18—is a key stage of development characterized by significant brain, behavioral, and
    psychological change.        The key characteristic of the adolescent brain is exceptional
    neuroplasticity, which is a critical period of cognitive development for young adults that has
    significant consequences on their behavior. Late adolescents are hampered in their ability to make
    decisions, exercise self-control, appreciate risks or consequences, feel fear, and plan ahead. Thus,
    this period of late adolescence is characterized by impulsivity, recklessness, and risk-taking. This
    period of development also explains why late adolescents are more susceptible to negative outside
    influences, including peer pressure. Finally, these hallmark features of the developing brain render
    late adolescents less fixed in their characteristics and more susceptible to change as they age. This
    evolving understanding of a juvenile’s neurological and psychological development is reflected
    generally in Michigan statutory provisions that treat 18-year-olds differently than other adults.
    2. Michigan’s Constitution requires that sentencing decisions be proportional. People v
    Bullock, 
    440 Mich 15
     (1992), citing People v Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich 167
     (1972), held that courts, in
    evaluating the proportionality of sentences under the “cruel or unusual punishment” clause, are
    required to consider (1) the severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense, (2)
    sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) sentences imposed in other
    jurisdictions for the same offense, and (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically
    rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions. Determining whether the Legislature’s chosen sentence runs
    afoul of the Michigan Constitution’s protections is well within the purview of this Court. Under
    this test, mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering
    the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment; thus, automatic life without parole
    for this class of defendants is a disproportionate sentence that constitutes “cruel or unusual
    punishment” under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The first factor weighed in favor of finding that the
    penalty was cruel or unusual. While defendant’s crime was serious, the sentence was the most
    severe sentence available in Michigan, and young persons will inevitably serve more time and
    spend a greater percentage of their lives behind prison walls than similarly situated older adult
    offenders. Moreover, because of the dynamic neurological changes that late adolescents undergo
    as their brains develop over time and essentially rewire themselves, automatic condemnation to
    die in prison at 18 was cruel. The logic articulated in Miller about why children are different from
    adults for purposes of sentencing applied in equal force to 18-year-olds. Michigan’s sentencing
    scheme has failed to consider whether any 18-year-old defendants are irreparably corrupt, whether
    they have the capacity to positively reform as they age, and whether they committed their crime at
    a time in their life when they lacked the capability to fully understand the consequences of their
    actions. This was completely contrary to Bullock, which held that for a punishment to be
    constitutionally proportionate, it must be tailored to a defendant’s personal responsibility and
    moral guilt. The second factor also weighed in favor of finding the penalty cruel or unusual.
    Because 18-year-old offenders will inevitably spend more time behind prison bars than any other
    adult offenders convicted of the same crime or similarly severe crimes, this penalty was
    disproportionate to other offenders in Michigan. Moreover 18-year-old offenders will spend more
    time in prison than most equally culpable juvenile offenders, who are eligible for term-of-years
    sentences with the possibility of parole at some point in their adult lives under Miller and MCL
    769.25. The third factor was more neutral than the first two, although it weighed slightly in favor
    of an individualized sentencing procedure for 18-year-old offenders. Excluding Michigan, 17
    states and the federal government mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder.
    However, 25 states and the District of Columbia do not legislatively mandate life without parole
    for equivalent first-degree murder, regardless of the age of the offender. The state of Washington,
    with a similarly broad punishment provision in its constitution, judicially found the neurological
    differences between juveniles and 18-year-olds to be nonexistent and mandated that young adults
    through the age of 20 receive the same individualized sentencing protections as juveniles.
    Likewise, six more states only mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder when
    there are proven aggravated circumstances. Michigan was thus among the minority of states that
    legislatively mandate life without parole for every perpetrator of first-degree murder above the age
    of 17. Finally, the fourth factor, the goal of rehabilitation, which is a specific goal of Michigan’s
    criminal-punishment system, was not accomplished by mandatorily sentencing an individual to
    life in prison without any hope of release. Accordingly, under the proportionality test, Michigan’s
    sentencing scheme mandating that 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder receive
    a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole constituted cruel or unusual
    punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
    3. Parks had to be resentenced given that he was automatically sentenced to spend the rest
    of his life in prison under MCL 750.316. The sentencing court in this case gave no consideration
    to any of the attributes of youth that Parks shared with juvenile defendants. The attributes of youth
    must be considered to ensure that the sentencing of 18-year-old defendants found guilty of first-
    degree murder passes constitutional muster. Nor was he given the same benefit of an
    individualized sentencing procedure that exists pursuant to either MCL 769.25a or MCL 769.25
    as afforded to juveniles neurologically identical to him.
    4. The prosecution’s request to revisit Lorentzen and Bullock was declined because there
    was no basis for overturning the well-established precedent that the Michigan Constitution
    provides broader protection to criminal defendants from disproportionate punishments than that
    offered under the federal Constitution. There is an unambiguous, meaningful textual difference
    between the federal constitutional provision and Michigan’s constitutional provision. The original
    meaning of a constitutional provision is not easily definable and should not be used to overturn 50
    years of precedent.
    Part II(B)(4) of the Court of Appeals opinion was reversed, Parks’s sentence for first-
    degree murder was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Genesee Circuit Court for Parks to
    be resentenced under MCL 769.25. Leave to appeal was denied in all other respects. On remand,
    the Genesee Circuit Court was directed to redetermine a portion of Parks’s restitution order
    pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals.
    Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring, agreed with the majority’s analysis of the proportionality
    test outlined in People v Bullock, 
    440 Mich 15
     (1992), and with the majority’s conclusion that the
    imposition of mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on 18-
    year-old offenders violates this proportionality principle, but he wrote separately to highlight
    additional reasons that support this position. The majority’s decision shifted more control over
    difficult sentencing decisions to local actors, which Justice BERNSTEIN believed would only help
    when making difficult choices on an individualized basis. Additionally, evolving standards of
    decency have changed enough to both redefine what type of punishment is viewed as cruel and
    unusual and the breadth of the class afforded protection from such punishment; accordingly,
    Justice BERNSTEIN believed that it was problematic to draw a bright line under which age is the
    only criterion in determining whether a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole
    is cruel or unusual. He believed that a better approach would be to institute a shifting age-based
    presumption through which offenders could move to seek additional process based on other, non-
    age-based qualities of diminished culpability, which could entitle some offenders over the age of
    18 to the same protections as youthful offenders.
    Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice VIVIANO, dissenting, joined Justice CLEMENT’s dissenting
    opinion in full and would accept the prosecution’s invitation to revisit caselaw interpreting Const
    1963, art 1, § 16—specifically whether Article 1, § 16 provides greater protection than the Eighth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution and whether Article 1, § 16 contains a
    proportionality guarantee.
    Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justices ZAHRA and VIVIANO, dissenting, would not have
    extended Miller’s rule to offenders who were 18 years old at the commission of their crime because
    imposing mandatory sentences of life without parole on 18-year-old offenders is not
    unconstitutional under either the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Const
    1963, art 1, § 16. When applying the proportionality test, the first factor, the gravity of the offense
    as opposed to the severity of the punishment, weighed in favor of finding the penalty constitutional.
    First-degree murder is a very serious offense, arguably the most serious offense one can commit;
    accordingly, a very severe sentence is proportionate. Moreover, even given young adults’ ongoing
    neurological development, 18-year-olds are generally more than able to comprehend the gravity
    of the offense of first-degree murder. The second factor, the penalty imposed for the offense
    compared to penalties imposed on other offenders in Michigan, also weighed in favor of finding
    the penalty constitutional because mandatory life without parole for first-degree murder is not out
    of place when considered alongside other punishments that also require the imposition of a
    mandatory sentence of life without parole, including first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
    adulteration of drugs with intent to kill, and possession with intent to unlawfully use an explosive
    device causing death, among other offenses. The third factor, the penalty imposed for the offense
    in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, weighed in
    favor of finding the penalty constitutional. Seventeen other states and the federal government also
    have mandatory sentences of life without parole for 18-year-old offenders, and the existence of
    one opinion by a sister state’s supreme court did not shed much light on whether the third factor
    weighed in favor of the penalty’s unconstitutionality. Finally, although the fourth factor, whether
    the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation, does not weigh in favor of the
    penalty’s constitutionality given that a defendant sentenced to mandatory life without parole has
    little realistic chance for parole, there are other valid penological goals, such as retribution,
    deterrence, and incapacitation. Accordingly, the first three factors weighed strongly in favor of
    the punishment’s constitutionality, and to the extent that the fourth factor weighed against the
    punishment’s constitutionality, this factor alone was insufficient to support a determination that
    mandatory sentences of life without parole are unconstitutional. Furthermore, the majority’s
    reliance on neuroscience demonstrated that its decision was based in large part on policy, and
    policy decisions should be left to the Legislature.
    Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    OPINION
    Chief Justice:                 Justices:
    Bridget M. McCormack         Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    FILED July 28, 2022
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                               No. 162086
    KEMO KNICOMBI PARKS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
    WELCH, J.
    This is the direct appeal of the mandatory life-without-parole sentence imposed on
    defendant, Kemo Knicombi Parks, for his first-degree premeditated-murder conviction
    under MCL 750.316(1)(a). Parks was 18 years old when he aided and abetted in the
    murder. Parks asserts that his sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the
    United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court
    precedent, Parks’s Eighth Amendment argument must fail. However, we hold that his
    sentence of mandatory life without parole violates the Michigan Constitution’s ban on
    “cruel or unusual” punishment. Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Specifically, his sentence lacks
    proportionality because it fails to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth,
    specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the
    judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Parks’s sentence, vacate Parks’s life-without-
    parole sentence, and remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for resentencing
    proceedings that are consistent with this opinion.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On October 5, 2016, Parks’s older cousin, Dequavion Harris, shot and killed the
    victim in the parking lot of a convenience store. According to a witness, prior to the
    murder, Parks and Harris spoke to each other in low voices and whispers in the back seat
    of a car parked outside the convenience store. Parks then gave a gun to Harris. Both men
    entered the store, and Harris exited to the parking lot a short time later. Parks remained
    inside the store. Thereafter, the victim, who was sitting in his car in the parking lot, was
    shot and killed. Witnesses heard gunshots and observed Harris flee the parking lot. Parks
    was 18 years old at the time of the shooting.
    At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that Harris and Parks planned to kill the victim
    in retaliation for the prior murder of Harris’s cousin. The prosecution never alleged that
    Parks shot the victim; instead, the prosecution charged Parks with first-degree premeditated
    murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Both Harris and Parks were found guilty of
    first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); carrying a concealed pistol, MCL
    750.227(2); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-
    2
    firearm), MCL 750.227b. Both defendants were sentenced to mandatory life without
    parole for their first-degree-murder convictions, to be served consecutively with the
    mandatory two-year minimum for felony-firearm.
    With the aid of counsel, both defendants appealed in the Court of Appeals, and the
    Court of Appeals consolidated the cases. 1 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court
    of Appeals affirmed Harris’s and Parks’s convictions and sentences, with the exception of
    ordering a limited remand in Parks’s appeal to redetermine a portion of Parks’s restitution
    order. People v Harris, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
    August 13, 2020 (Docket Nos. 346586 and 346587), p 14.            The Court of Appeals
    specifically rejected Parks’s challenge to his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment
    under the federal and state Constitutions. Id. at 11-12.
    Parks sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered additional briefing to
    address
    whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama,
    
    567 US 460
     (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 
    577 US 190
     (2016),
    should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they
    commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory
    life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.[2]
    1
    People v Harris, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 31, 2020
    (Docket Nos. 346586 and 346587). Parks moved to remand the case to the trial court for
    an evidentiary hearing regarding the issues he raised on appeal, and the Court of Appeals
    denied the motion. People v Parks, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
    August 30, 2019 (Docket No. 346587).
    2
    People v Parks, 
    508 Mich 940
    , 940 (2021). We also scheduled oral argument in People
    v Poole (Docket No. 161529) at the same session. 
    Id.
     We have remanded Poole to the
    3
    B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DICTATES THAT YOUTH MATTERS IN
    SENTENCING
    The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in full: “Excessive
    bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
    inflicted.” US Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). “[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees
    individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the
    basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
    the offense.” Roper v Simmons, 
    543 US 551
    , 560; 
    125 S Ct 1183
    ; 
    161 L Ed 2d 1
     (2005)
    (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). To that end, the United States Supreme
    Court has stated that to determine if a punishment is disproportionate, courts must look to
    the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society . . . .” 
    Id. at 561
     (quotation marks and citation omitted). “By protecting even those convicted of
    heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the
    dignity of all persons.” 
    Id. at 560
    . “The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits
    the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.” Graham v
    Florida, 
    560 US 48
    , 59; 
    130 S Ct 2011
    ; 
    176 L Ed 2d 825
     (2010).
    The Supreme Court has long recognized that children are constitutionally different
    from adults for sentencing purposes. See Miller v Alabama, 
    567 US 460
    , 471; 
    132 S Ct 2455
    ; 
    183 L Ed 2d 407
     (2012). Overall, juveniles have diminished culpability and greater
    prospects for reform, thereby making them “less deserving of the most severe
    punishments.”    
    Id.
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).      “Youth is more than a
    Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant Poole’s case in light of this opinion.
    People v Poole, ___ Mich ___ (2022) (Docket No. 161529).
    4
    chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible
    to influence and to psychological damage.” Roper, 
    543 US at 569
     (quotation marks,
    citation, and brackets omitted).
    The United States Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the three significant
    differences between juveniles and adults. “First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an
    underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless
    risk-taking.” Miller, 
    567 US at 471
     (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Second,
    children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including
    from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and
    lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” 
    Id.
    (citation omitted). “And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his
    traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e]
    deprav[ity].’ ” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a
    danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigible’—but
    ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’ ” 
    Id. at 472-473
     (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). This basic overall principle—that youthful characteristics render defendants less
    culpable—has shaped Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for the last two decades.
    In 2005, the United States Supreme Court first recognized that children are different
    from adults for sentencing purposes when it abolished the death penalty for minors in
    Roper, 
    543 US at 578-579
    . In doing so, it determined that the differences between juvenile
    and adult defendants “are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
    person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” 
    Id. at 572-573
    . As the
    death penalty is reserved for only the worst offenders, this group could not include
    5
    juveniles. 3 See 
    id. at 569
    . In making this bright-line prohibition of the death penalty for
    those under 18 years old, the Court explained why it drew the line at 18:
    Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
    objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that
    distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns
    18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of
    maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed,
    however, a line must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society
    draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is,
    we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. [Id.
    at 574 (emphasis added).]
    Five years later, in Graham, 560 US at 74, the Court concluded that “penological
    theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders,”
    and thus the penalty was deemed cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. “This
    clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be
    imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that
    punishment.” Id. Thus, defendants in this situation should be given “some meaningful
    opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at
    75. Notably, in its holding the Court cited Roper’s reasoning about why it drew the line
    3
    As further support for its holding in Roper, the Court also noted:
    Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
    punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that
    the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
    official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become
    controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our
    responsibility. Yet . . . the Court has referred to the laws of other countries
    and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
    Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. [Roper,
    
    543 US at 575
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
    6
    between adulthood and childhood at age 18, concluding that the same line applied to the
    categorical ban of life-without-parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses. Id. at 74-75. 4
    In Miller, 
    567 US at 477
    , the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life
    without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense was unconstitutional because
    it “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—
    among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”
    Miller therefore established a constitutional rule that requires that sentencing courts
    consider the unique characteristics of youth. To do so, the Court established factors that a
    sentencing court must consider, and these factors have become known as the “Miller
    factors.” These include: (1) chronological age and immaturity, impetuosity, and the failure
    to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the offender’s family and home environment; (3)
    circumstances of the offense, including the extent of participation in the criminal conduct
    and the effect of familial and peer pressures; (4) the effect of the offender’s youth on the
    criminal-justice process, such as the offender’s inability to comprehend a plea bargain; and
    (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. 
    Id. at 477-478
    . These “distinctive attributes of youth
    diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
    offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” 
    Id. at 472
    . The Court concluded:
    We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
    scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
    offenders. Cf. Graham, 560 U.S., at 75, 130 S.Ct., at 2030 (“A State is not
    required to guarantee eventual freedom,” but must provide “some
    4
    Again, like in Roper, as justification for its holding, the Supreme Court noted that at the
    time only 11 nations authorized life without parole for juvenile offenders under any
    circumstances and that the United States was one of only two nations that ever imposed
    the punishment in practice. Graham, 560 US at 80-81.
    7
    meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
    rehabilitation”). By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to
    imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a
    risk of disproportionate punishment. . . . But given all we have said in Roper,
    Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and
    heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
    sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.
    That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and
    Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender
    whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
    juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Roper, 
    543 U.S., at 573
    , 
    125 S.Ct. 1183
    ; Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct., at 2026-
    2027. Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that
    judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children
    are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
    sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. [Miller, 
    567 US at 479-480
    (emphasis added).]
    Following Miller, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question
    whether Miller’s ban on mandatory sentencing schemes applies retroactively. Montgomery
    v Louisiana, 
    577 US 190
    , 193-194; 
    136 S Ct 718
    ; 
    193 L Ed 2d 599
     (2016). In Montgomery,
    the Court clarified:
    Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is
    excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
    irreparable corruption, it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional
    penalty for a class of defendants because of their status—that is, juvenile
    offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. As a result,
    Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other
    substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it necessarily carries a
    significant risk that a defendant—here, the vast majority of juvenile
    offenders—faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.
    [Montgomery, 577 US at 208-209 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets
    omitted; emphasis added).]
    The Court reiterated that “[a]lthough Miller did not foreclose a sentencer’s ability
    to impose life without parole on a juvenile, the Court explained that a lifetime in prison is
    a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect
    8
    ‘ “irreparable corruption.” ’ ” Id. at 195, quoting Miller, 
    567 US at 479
    , in turn quoting
    Roper, 
    543 US at 573
    . Ultimately, Montgomery clarified that Miller “required that
    sentencing courts consider a child’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
    change before condemning him or her to die in prison.” Montgomery, 577 US at 195
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Most recently, in Jones v Mississippi, 
    593 US ___
    , ___; 
    141 S Ct 1307
    , 1317; 
    209 L Ed 2d 390
     (2021), the Supreme Court held that “Miller required a discretionary
    sentencing procedure.” The Court explained: “The key assumption of both Miller and
    Montgomery was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the
    defendant’s youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed
    only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.” 
    Id.
     at ___;
    141 S Ct at 1318.
    Post-Miller, and in anticipation of Montgomery, Michigan’s Legislature established
    juvenile resentencing procedures that are consistent with these cases. MCL 769.25a; MCL
    769.25. The statutes require the court to sentence a defendant to at least a 60-year
    maximum term and a minimum term of not less than 25 years or more than 40 years, unless
    the prosecuting attorney files a motion seeking a sentence of life without parole. MCL
    769.25a(4)(b) and (c); MCL 769.25(3) and (9). If the prosecutor seeks a sentence of life
    without parole, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the Miller factors, any
    other relevant criteria, and the defendant’s record while incarcerated. MCL 769.25a(4)(b);
    MCL 769.25(6). In People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No.
    154994), we held that the combination of Miller and MCL 769.25 creates a rebuttable
    presumption against life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders and that the
    9
    prosecution, as the moving party, must overcome this presumption by clear and convincing
    evidence.
    C. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION FORBIDS EXCESSIVE IMPRISONMENT
    Michigan’s Constitution has its own punishment provision, but it is broader than the
    federal Eighth Amendment counterpart. The provision reads in full: “Excessive bail shall
    not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall
    not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16
    (emphasis added). We have held that unusually excessive imprisonment is forbidden by
    Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution. People v Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich 167
    , 170 n 1,
    172; 194 NW2d 827 (1972) (invalidating a mandatory minimum prison sentence of 20
    years for selling any amount of marijuana). We further stated that this standard is informed
    by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
    Id. at 179
     (quotation marks and citation omitted). The definition of this standard is “progressive
    and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
    enlightened by a humane justice.” 
    Id. at 178
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Further, we have held that our Constitution requires that sentencing decisions be
    proportional. Our seminal opinion on the principle of proportionality is People v Bullock,
    
    440 Mich 15
    ; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). In that case, we held that a life-without-parole
    sentence for possession of 650 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine was
    unconstitutional under the state Constitution because of a lack of proportionality. 
    Id. at 27, 30
    . We set forth three compelling reasons that the state Constitution’s ban on “cruel or
    unusual” punishment offers broader protection than its federal counterpart. 
    Id. at 30
    . First,
    10
    there are textual differences between the state and federal Constitutions; a bar on
    punishments that are either cruel or unusual is necessarily broader than a bar on
    punishments that are both cruel and unusual. 
    Id.
     at 30 n 11. Second, by 1963, the words
    “cruel” and “unusual” had been understood “for more than half a century to include a
    prohibition on grossly disproportionate sentences,” indicating that the framers and adopters
    of the 1963 Constitution had intended a broader view of the state constitutional protection.
    
    Id. at 32
    . Lastly, we recognized that there is longstanding Michigan precedent to support
    this broader view of Michigan’s constitutional provision. 
    Id. at 33
    .
    In particular, we noted that Michigan courts, in evaluating the proportionality of
    sentences under the “cruel or unusual punishment” clause, are required to consider: (1) the
    severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the
    same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the
    same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in
    Michigan’s legal traditions . . . .” 
    Id. at 33-34
    , citing Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 176-181
    . The
    Court in Bullock concluded that the Lorentzen analysis was “firmly and sufficiently rooted
    in Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Id. at 34. We thus held that the punishment at issue in Bullock
    was unconstitutional because it failed the Lorentzen balancing test, then added:
    The proportionality principle inherent in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, is
    not a simple, “bright-line” test, and the application of that test may,
    concededly, be analytically difficult and politically unpopular, especially
    where application of that principle requires us to override a democratically
    expressed judgment of the Legislature. The fact is, however, the people of
    Michigan, speaking through their constitution, have forbidden the imposition
    of cruel or unusual punishments, and we are duty-bound to devise a
    principled test by which to enforce that prohibition, and to apply that test to
    the cases that are brought before us. The very purpose of a constitution is to
    subject the passing judgments of temporary legislative or political majorities
    11
    to the deeper, more profound judgment of the people reflected in the
    constitution, the enforcement of which is entrusted to our judgment. [Id. at
    40-41 (emphasis added).]
    Therefore, in addition to those protections guaranteed to every citizen of this country under
    the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution, our state Constitution has historically
    afforded greater bulwarks against barbaric and inhumane punishments. It is through this
    heightened protective standard that we must consider the issue before us today. 5
    II. ANALYSIS
    After reviewing the arguments of the parties as well as the amici, we are left with
    the inescapable conclusion that mandatorily condemning 18-year-olds to die in prison,
    5
    We decline the prosecution’s request to revisit Lorentzen and Bullock, because we see no
    basis for overturning the well-established precedent that our Constitution provides broader
    protection to criminal defendants from disproportionate punishments than that offered
    under the federal Constitution. See People v Feezel, 
    486 Mich 184
    , 212; 783 NW2d 67
    (2010) (“Indeed, this Court should respect precedent and not overrule or modify it unless
    there is substantial justification for doing so.”). Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent
    in Miller indicates that the words “cruel and unusual” are meant to be read together in
    Eighth Amendment jurisprudence; thus, it remains logical to us that the Michigan
    Constitution’s choice of the word “or” deliberately and meaningfully provides broader
    protection to criminal defendants. See Miller, 
    567 US at 493
     (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
    (“Today, the Court invokes that Amendment to ban a punishment that the Court does not
    itself characterize as unusual, and that could not plausibly be described as such.”).
    Additionally, the original meaning of a constitutional provision is not easily definable and
    should not be used to overturn 50 years of precedent. See People v Stovall, ___ Mich ___,
    ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 162425) (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring); slip
    op at 9. This is particularly true when there is an unambiguous, meaningful textual
    difference between the federal constitutional provision and our own. See People v Collins,
    
    438 Mich 8
    , 32; 475 NW2d 684 (1991) (explaining that a compelling reason for
    “independent state construction” of a constitutional provision “might be found if there were
    significant textual differences between parallel provisions of the state and federal
    constitutions” in addition to if history provides a reason to believe a different interpretation
    is warranted). Given this long-established understanding that our Constitution offers
    broader protection than the federal Constitution, we decline the invitation to revisit the
    precedent that supports this broader interpretation.
    12
    without consideration of the attributes of youth that 18-year-olds and juveniles share, no
    longer comports with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
    maturing society.” Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 179
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Therefore, we conclude that the Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds
    convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure
    under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being
    subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.
    We acknowledge that some of the mitigating characteristics in the scientific research
    submitted by amici and defense counsel apply to young adults, in some form, up to the age
    of 25. We also do not dispute the dissent’s point that any line-drawing will, at times, lead
    to arbitrary results. The United States Supreme Court grappled with this same issue in
    Roper, 
    543 US at 574
    , noting, “Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to
    the objections always raised against categorical rules.” While line-drawing is difficult, our
    Constitution compels us to make these difficult decisions. Given that Parks and Poole (the
    defendant in the companion case) were both 18 at the time they committed their crimes,
    our opinion only applies to 18-year-olds. We need not address the Michigan constitutional
    requirements for sentencing offenders who were over 18 years old at the time of the
    offense.
    A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review questions of constitutional law de novo. People v Kennedy, 
    502 Mich 206
    , 213; 917 NW2d 355 (2018). Moreover, we alone are “the ultimate authority with
    regard to the meaning and application of Michigan law.” Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 27
    .
    13
    B. THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE DRAWN A CLEAR LINE BETWEEN
    JUVENILES AND ADULTS FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES UNDER THE EIGHTH
    AMENDMENT
    The parties in this case were asked to address whether the United States and/or
    Michigan Constitutions protect 18-year-olds from receiving a mandatory sentence of life
    without parole. Under current federal precedent, the Eighth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution does not prohibit such sentences.
    The United States Supreme Court has, for the better part of this century, reshaped
    how juveniles convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced in this country.
    Undoubtedly, condemning children to die in the custody of the state, either through
    execution or behind prison walls, without any specialized consideration of their brain’s
    neuroplasticity and the attendant characteristic of their capacity for rehabilitation, has been
    deemed barbaric under the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment. For those
    who commit the most heinous of crimes, the Supreme Court has indicated a clear, even if
    arguably arbitrary, demarcation between adult sentencing and juvenile sentencing. While
    this holding relies on the brain science that applies equally to juveniles and early
    adolescents—which includes 18-year-olds—we cannot contradict the Supreme Court if it
    has drawn a clear and unambiguous line under the United States Constitution between those
    under the age of 18 and those aged 18 and older.
    The Court has indeed drawn that line. In 2005, the Court noted in Roper that “[t]he
    qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns
    18” but that it must draw the line where society has traditionally marked the transition from
    childhood to adulthood. Roper, 
    543 US at 574
    . Likewise, Graham drew a bright line at
    18 when categorically prohibiting juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide offenses,
    14
    citing the same logic from Roper. Graham, 560 US at 74-75. The subsequent decisions
    of Miller, Montgomery, and Jones did not question or reform the bright line drawn in
    Roper. 6
    Therefore, in light of current federal precedent, we find no support in the Eighth
    Amendment for extending Miller’s protections under the Eighth Amendment beyond the
    bright line originally set in Roper. But the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
    decided to draw the line at 17 does not preclude us from drawing a different line pursuant
    to the broader protections provided by the Michigan Constitution. It is only logical that
    Michigan’s “cruel or unusual” language is broader than the Eighth Amendment floor. And
    the Supreme Court, in fact, recently indicated that states have a wide latitude in providing
    greater Miller protections. See Jones, 593 US at ___; 141 S Ct at 1323 (“Importantly, like
    Miller and Montgomery, our holding today does not preclude the States from imposing
    additional sentencing limits . . . . States may also establish rigorous proportionality or
    other substantive appellate review of life-without-parole sentences.”).
    In other words, we may draw our own line, and we do so today.
    6
    Additionally, multiple federal circuit courts of appeal have declined challenges similar to
    those raised by Parks. See, e.g., United States v Sierra, 933 F3d 95, 97 (CA 2, 2019)
    (“Since the Supreme Court has chosen to draw the constitutional line at the age of 18 for
    mandatory minimum life sentences, . . . the defendants’ age-based Eighth Amendment
    challenges to their sentences must fail.”), cert denied sub nom Beltran v United States, ___
    US ___; 
    140 S Ct 2540
     (2020); Wright v United States, 902 F3d 868, 872 (CA 8, 2018)
    (“[The defendant] was sentenced for conspiratorial conduct that extended well into his
    adult years . . . . Thus, the procedural element of the new substantive rule of constitutional
    law made retroactive in Montgomery does not apply . . . .”).
    15
    C. THE 18-YEAR-OLD BRAIN
    Although we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
    the Eighth Amendment when interpreting our constitutional prohibition on cruel or unusual
    punishment, we find Miller and Montgomery persuasive to the extent they held that
    juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of imposing a life-without-
    parole sentence and, for the reasons stated in this opinion, adopt that general proposition
    under the Michigan Constitution. However, we part ways with the United States Supreme
    Court’s jurisprudence to the extent the Court drew the line for defining the class of
    defendants that are entitled to individualized sentencing to those under the age of 18.
    In order to determine where to draw that new line, we must consider the scientific
    and social-science research regarding the characteristics of the late-adolescent 18-year-old
    brain. By doing so, we take our cue from the United States Supreme Court, which has
    consistently noted the scientific justifications for its holdings regarding juvenile
    punishments. See, e.g., Roper, 
    543 US at 569-574
    ; Graham, 560 US at 67-69; Miller, 
    567 US at 471-479
    . The dissent casts no criticism on the United States Supreme Court’s
    decision to draw its bright line in Miller based on the neurological characteristics of
    juveniles as a class. Miller, 
    567 US at 471-479
    . Our consideration of brain science to
    determine whether the Legislature’s chosen sentence—mandatory life without parole—is
    cruel or unusual to impose on 18-year-olds who commit first-degree-murder is no different
    than the analysis the United States Supreme Court undertook a decade ago in Miller.
    Such judicial determinations and considerations are not an exercise of an
    inappropriate policy-making function but a requirement under our Constitution. Appellate
    courts, including our Court, often use science to determine evidentiary issues in criminal
    16
    cases. 7 And, most importantly, in the punishment context, science has always informed
    what constitutes “cruel” or “unusual” punishment in regards to certain classes of
    defendants. See, e.g., Roper, 
    543 US at 569-574
     (“Once the diminished culpability of
    juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty
    apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”); Atkins v Virginia, 
    536 US 304
    , 317-321;
    
    122 S Ct 2242
    ; 
    153 L Ed 2d 335
     (2002) (analyzing the neurological characteristics of
    intellectually disabled defendants in determining that they have lessened criminal
    culpability; therefore, the deterrent and retributive purpose of the death penalty was not
    achieved and execution was not a “suitable punishment” for this class of defendants). In
    short, while the dissent claims that we have embarked upon an inappropriate judicial “foray
    into neuroscience” or that we are “playing amateur scientists,” it is our role to consider
    objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining whether a punishment is
    unconstitutional as to a certain class of defendants. Our role is no different than that of the
    United States Supreme Court and its own historical approach to Eighth Amendment
    jurisprudence. 8
    Based on the submissions from defense counsel and the neuropsychologist,
    psychologist, and criminal-justice scholar amici, there is a clear consensus that late
    adolescence—which includes the age of 18—is a key stage of development characterized
    7
    See People v Feezel, 
    486 Mich 184
    , 207-212; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (holding that 11-
    carboxy-THC is not a controlled substance, in part, because it is a metabolite that is created
    when a person’s body breaks down THC).
    8
    Moreover, our decision today is not solely based on science but on other factors relevant
    to the proportionality test.
    17
    by significant brain, behavioral, and psychological change. This period of late adolescence
    is a pivotal developmental stage that shares key hallmarks of adolescence. This consensus
    arises out of a multitude of reliable studies on adolescent brain and behavioral development
    in the years following Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.            And the inherent
    malleability and plasticity of late-adolescent brains are features that are similar to those
    that the Miller Court found relevant to its culpability analysis, which, in turn, formed the
    basis of Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for adolescent
    defendants.
    The key characteristic of the adolescent brain is exceptional neuroplasticity. See
    Aoki, Romeo, & Smith, Adolescence as a Critical Period for Developmental Plasticity,
    1654 Brain Res 85 (2017).        Because of multiple ongoing processes that relate to
    development of the brain, during which the brain essentially rewires itself, young
    adolescents undergo a period during which they are still developing cognitively. See, e.g.,
    Selemon, A Role for Synaptic Plasticity in the Adolescent Development of Executive
    Function, 3 Translational Psychiatry 1 (2013); Spear, Adolescent Neurodevelopment, 52 J
    Adolescent Health 7 (2013). This crucial period of cognitive development has significant
    consequences for young adults’ behavior.
    First, the research indicates that late adolescents are hampered in their ability to
    make decisions, exercise self-control, appreciate risks or consequences, feel fear, and plan
    ahead. See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Promise of
    Adolescence: Realizing Opportunity for All Youth (Washington, DC: The National
    Academies Press, 2019), pp 37, 51-52.         Thus, this period of late adolescence is
    characterized by impulsivity, recklessness, and risk-taking, as evidenced by the heightened
    18
    incidents of drunk driving, unintended pregnancies, binge drinking, and arrests during this
    period. See Willoughby et al, Examining the Link Between Adolescent Brain Development
    and Risk Taking from a Social-Developmental Perspective, 83 Brain & Cognition 315,
    315-320 (2013). This process of brain rewiring means that young adults have yet to reach
    full social and emotional maturity, given that the prefrontal cortex—the last region of the
    brain to develop, and the region responsible for risk-weighing and understanding
    consequences—is not fully developed until age 25. See, e.g., The Promise of Adolescence:
    Realizing Opportunity for All Youth, p 51; Arain et al, Maturation of the Adolescent Brain,
    9 Neuropsychiatric Disease & Treatment 449, 449-450, 453-454 (2013).
    Secondly, this period of development also explains why a young adult is more
    susceptible to negative outside influences, including peer pressure.        See Gardner &
    Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in
    Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 Dev Psychol 625, 629-634 (2005).
    This susceptibility to peer pressure exacerbates late adolescents’ predisposition to risk-
    taking and deficiencies in decision-making. See 
    id.
     In the presence of peers, young adults
    are more sensitive to the potential rewards as opposed to the potential consequences or
    costs of a decision. See O’Brien et al, Adolescents Prefer More Immediate Rewards When
    in the Presence of their Peers, 21 J Res on Adolescence 747, 747-753 (2011). This results
    in a late adolescent often behaving more similarly to a 14- or 15-year-old, as opposed to an
    older adult, when in the presence of their peers. See 
    id.
     Furthermore, 18-year-olds are
    acutely sensitive to the potential of social rejection, which increases conformity with their
    peers. See Blakemore, The Social Brain in Adolescence, 9 Nature Reviews Neuroscience
    267, 269 (2008).
    19
    Lastly, these hallmarks of the developing brain render late adolescents less fixed in
    their characteristics and more susceptible to change as they age. Late adolescents, as they
    age, continue to formulate their identities, become more assertive and decisive, show
    increases in self-control and the ability to resist outside influence, become more reflective
    and deliberate, and demonstrate a decrease in aggressiveness and alienation. See, e.g.,
    Adolescence as a Critical Period for Developmental Plasticity, 1654 Brain Res at 85;
    Tanner & Arnett, The Emergence of “Emerging Adulthood”: The New Life Stage Between
    Adolescence and Young Adulthood, in Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New
    Perspectives and Agendas (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp 39-42.
    Overall, late-adolescent brains are far more similar to juvenile brains, as described
    in Miller, 
    567 US at 471-479
    , than to the brains of fully matured adults. Notably, the
    prosecution does not even attempt to refute the scientific consensus that, in terms of
    neurological development, there is no meaningful distinction between those who are 17
    years old and those who are 18 years old. The ongoing neurodevelopment described in
    scientific and medical literature, characterized by neuroplasticity and its attendant
    characteristics, blurs the already thin societal line between childhood and young adulthood.
    This evolving understanding of a juvenile’s neurological and psychological
    development is reflected generally in Michigan statutory provisions governing young
    adults. In Michigan, when an individual attains the age of 18, their ability to partake in
    certain activities is still heavily regulated. Despite obtaining access to some rights and
    privileges, 18-year-olds still may not purchase, consume, or possess alcohol, MCL
    436.1109(6) and MCL 436.1703(1); purchase or possess cannabis for adult use under state
    law, MCL 333.27954(1) and MCL 333.27955; open a credit card without a cosigner, 15
    20
    USC 1637(c)(8); or obtain a concealed-carry permit for a pistol, MCL 28.425b(7)(a).
    Additionally, Michigan has long recognized the differences in late-adolescent brain
    development, as evidenced by the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et
    seq. HYTA was passed in 1966 and originally covered youths between the ages of 17 and
    24, allowing these late adolescents to be assigned “youthful trainee” status and to be placed
    on probation if they plead guilty to a criminal offense. In 2021, the qualifying age for
    HYTA sentencing was raised to late adolescents between the ages of 18 and 26. 
    2020 PA 396
    . Both federal and state laws suggest that our society has judged 18-year-olds as not
    sufficiently mature to engage in certain risky and potentially dangerous activities; these
    laws recognize that 18-year-olds make decisions differently. They have therefore been
    provided different sentencing pathways than their adult counterparts.          This societal
    recognition is highly relevant to determining whether mandatory life without parole is
    unconstitutional as applied to 18-year-old offenders. See Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 179
    .
    The Washington Supreme Court has also recognized this evolving scientific and
    social consensus. In 2021, that court determined that modern social-scientific evidence
    regarding the development of the human brain, as well as its own precedent and “a long
    history of arbitrary line drawing,” demonstrated no clear line between childhood and
    adulthood. See In re Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305, 306-307; 482 P3d 276 (2021).
    Washington’s constitution prohibits “cruel punishment.” Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14.
    The Washington Supreme Court has held that its constitution affords heightened protection
    beyond that offered by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
    Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court determined that with regard to mandatory
    life-without-parole sentences, Miller’s constitutional guarantee of an individualized
    21
    sentence (including its required consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth) applies
    to defendants over the age of 18. Notably, in analyzing the scientific evidence, the
    Washington Supreme Court concluded:
    [N]o meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age
    18 . . . . Thus, sentencing courts must have discretion to take the mitigating
    qualities of youth—those qualities emphasized in Miller . . .—into account
    for defendants younger and older than 18. Not every 19- and 20-year-old
    will exhibit these mitigating characteristics, just as not every 17-year-old
    will. We leave it up to sentencing courts to determine which individual
    defendants merit leniency for these characteristics. Our aggravated murder
    statute’s requirement of [life without parole] for all defendants 18 and older,
    regardless of individual characteristics, violates the state constitution. [In re
    Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 326 (first emphasis added).]
    These principles are all helpful as we determine the constitutionality under Const
    1963, art 1, § 16 of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year-olds convicted of
    first-degree murder.
    D. PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
    In order to determine whether our Constitution compels additional considerations
    when sentencing 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to mandatory life
    without parole, we apply the Lorentzen test, as reaffirmed in Bullock. The Lorentzen test
    is used to determine whether a punishment is disproportionate and thus “cruel or unusual.”
    We reiterate that this four-factor test requires us to consider: (1) the severity of the sentence
    relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for
    other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4)
    the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in Michigan’s legal
    traditions . . . .” Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 33-34
    .
    22
    We hold that this test, overall, compels the conclusion that mandatorily subjecting
    18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is
    unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes
    “cruel or unusual punishment” under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. While the Legislature has
    authorized such sentences, we are duty-bound to enforce the state Constitution through
    application of the Lorentzen test to reflect “the deeper, more profound judgment of the
    people reflected in the constitution . . . .” Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 40-41
    . That judgment
    compels an individualized sentencing process before condemning 18-year-olds to die
    behind prison walls. 9
    While the dissent believes that the punishment rendered in this case is a statutory
    decision that is only within the purview of the Legislature, we note that the interpretation
    of Const 1963, art 1, § 16 governs our decision. We are duty-bound to interpret the
    Constitution, no matter the outcome. Contrary to what the dissent argues, determining
    whether the Legislature’s chosen sentence runs afoul of our Constitution’s protections is
    well within the purview of this Court and does not violate any separation-of-power
    principles. We cannot shirk our duty and defer to the Legislature’s choice of punishment
    9
    We recognize that this Court has previously held that a mandatory life-without-parole
    sentence for felony murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See People v Hall, 
    396 Mich 650
    , 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976). However, that decision did not address the
    issue of sentencing a juvenile to life without parole. Moreover, Hall was decided before
    the United States Supreme Court decided Miller and its progeny, and the Hall Court did
    not have the benefit of the scientific literature cited in this opinion. Accordingly, that
    decision does not preclude our holding in this case. Moreover, our holding today does not
    foreclose future review of life-without-parole sentences for other classes of defendants;
    however, our opinion today does not affect Hall’s holding as to those older than 18. See
    Hall, 
    396 Mich at 657-658
    .
    23
    when its choice is offensive to our Constitution. See Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 41
     (“The very
    purpose of a constitution is to subject the passing judgments of temporary legislative or
    political majorities to the deeper, more profound judgment of the people reflected in the
    [C]onstitution, the enforcement of which is entrusted to our judgment.”).
    1. THE SEVERITY OF THE SENTENCE; THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE
    Parks’s current fate is to die in prison because of his conviction for first-degree-
    premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), based on a theory of aiding and abetting his
    cousin, Harris. There can be no dispute that any form of murder is one of the most severe
    and heinous crimes that a person can commit in any jurisdiction, and first-degree murder
    is particularly heinous. See People v Stovall, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022)
    (Docket No. 162425); slip op at 10 (quoting People v Carp, 
    496 Mich 440
    , 514; 852 NW2d
    801 (2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated sub nom on other grounds Carp v Michigan, 
    577 US 1186
     (2016), for the proposition that first-degree murder is “ ‘almost certainly the
    gravest and most serious offense that an individual can commit under the laws of
    Michigan’ ”). While Parks was not the principal actor in this particular murder, there can
    be no dispute that the crime of which he was convicted was grave and heinous. A long
    prison term was indeed warranted. However, our inquiry does not end there, because the
    proportionality analysis we are required to follow applies equally to those who commit
    severe crimes and to those who commit lesser offenses. See Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 40-41
    .
    Just as there can be no dispute that Parks’s crime was serious, there can also be no
    dispute that his sentence is severe. Mandatory life without parole is the most severe
    24
    sentence available in Michigan. 10 Indeed, other than the death penalty, it is the most severe
    sentence still available in the whole country. As the United States Supreme Court has
    noted, life without parole “ ‘share[s] some characteristics with death sentences’ ” because
    unlike any other sentence, imprisonment without hope of release for the whole of a person’s
    natural life is “ ‘a forfeiture that is irrevocable.’ ” Miller, 
    567 US at 474-475
    , quoting
    Graham, 560 US at 69. This fate is particularly acute for young persons like Parks, because
    they will inevitably serve more time and spend a greater percentage of their lives behind
    prison walls than similarly situated older adult offenders. Contrary to the dissent’s
    assertion, the length of time an offender will spend in prison is undoubtedly a relevant
    consideration in determining the constitutionality of mandatory life-without-parole
    sentences. See Miller, 
    567 US at 475
    , quoting Graham, 560 US at 70 (noting that life
    without parole “is an ‘especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,’ because he will almost
    inevitably serve ‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult
    offender.’ The penalty when imposed on a teenager, as compared with an older person, is
    therefore ‘the same in name only’ ”) (citation and ellipsis omitted). 11
    10
    Michigan was the first state in the nation to abolish the death penalty; it was abolished
    a decade after the state was admitted to the Union. The last execution to take place under
    Michigan law was in 1830. State Bar of Michigan, Michigan Legal Milestones: 41.
    First            to            Abolish            the             Death             Penalty
     (accessed
    June 28, 2022) [https://perma.cc/NG5K-LW6L].
    11
    We also find the unpublished Court of Appeals decisions relied on by the dissent, which
    rejected the argument that term-of-years sentences are equivalent to life sentences for older
    defendants, are inapposite to the question we are faced with today. Unlike those cases, our
    decision today deals with a class of late-adolescent defendants who are faced with a prison
    sentence to be served for the remainder of their biological lives, with no possible hope of
    25
    And, beyond the condemnation to spend nearly the entirety of one’s adulthood
    behind bars, the unique characteristics of 18-year-old brains make this penalty even more
    severe. Because of the dynamic neurological changes that late adolescents undergo as their
    brains develop over time and essentially rewire themselves, automatic condemnation to die
    in prison at 18 is beyond severity—it is cruelty. The brains of 18-year-olds, just like those
    of their juvenile counterparts, transform as they age, allowing them to reform into persons
    who are more likely to be capable of making more thoughtful and rational decisions. This
    means that 18-year-olds, as they age, are likely to begin to take fewer risks, further
    understand consequences, become less susceptible to peer pressure, and have decreased
    aggressive tendencies. All of this suggests that 18-year-olds, much like their juvenile
    counterparts, are generally capable of significant change and a turn toward rational
    behavior that conforms to societal expectations as their cognitive abilities develop further.
    Most importantly, the same features that characterize the late-adolescent brain also
    diminish the culpability of these youthful offenders, rendering them less culpable than
    older adults. Eighteen-year-olds are at the peak of their risk for criminality because of the
    neuroplasticity of their brains, causing a general deficiency in the ability to comprehend
    the full scope of their decisions as compared with older adults. 12 Put differently, the logic
    release. For the myriad of reasons stated in this opinion, this is an entirely different inquiry
    than challenges brought by much older adults who are faced with term-of-years sentences.
    12
    We do not dispute the dissent’s general point that 18-year-olds are capable of
    comprehending the consequences of their actions in the abstract. However, the science
    informs us that adolescents also are often negatively influenced by peers and lack impulse
    control.
    26
    articulated in Miller about why children are different from adults for purposes of sentencing
    applies in equal force to 18-year-olds. Miller, 
    567 US at 471-479
    .
    Despite all this, the current sentencing structure mandatorily condemns all 18-year-
    olds who are convicted of certain crimes to life in prison without considering whether they
    are capable of positive change and without any consideration of their lessened culpability,
    both of which are undeniable neurobiological facts. In other words, our current sentencing
    scheme fails to consider whether any 18-year-old defendants are irreparably corrupt,
    whether they have the capacity to positively reform as they age, and whether they
    committed their crime at a time in their life when they lacked the capability to fully
    understand the consequences of their actions. This is completely contrary to Bullock,
    which held that for a punishment to be “constitutionally proportionate” it “must be tailored
    to a defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt.” Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 39
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). “While we emphatically do not minimize the
    gravity and reprehensibility of defendants’ crime, it would be profoundly unfair to impute
    full personal responsibility and moral guilt” to those who are likely to be biologically
    incapable of full culpability.   
    Id.
       Such an automatically harsh punishment without
    consideration of mitigating factors is unconstitutionally excessive and cruel.
    2. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES
    The second Lorentzen proportionality factor also weighs in favor of finding that
    mandatory life without parole is cruel or unusual. Life without parole is the harshest
    available punishment in Michigan and is seldom mandatorily imposed. It stands to reason
    that such a harsh sentence should be reserved for those whose criminal culpability
    27
    mandates automatic, permanent removal from society. Michigan’s sentencing scheme
    generally reflects this. Nonjuvenile individuals are subject to life without parole when they
    commit first-degree murder, commit severely violent or highly dangerous offenses, or
    habitually sexually assault children. MCL 791.234(6); MCL 750.316. These crimes all
    reflect a high degree of moral guilt. See Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 39
    .
    However, because life without parole is necessarily cabined to biological life, not
    all these sentences are, in practice, reflective of culpability equally. Having been charged
    and convicted for a crime committed when he was 18 years old, it is highly probable that
    Parks will spend more time behind prison bars than any other adult defendants convicted
    of the same crime or similarly severe crimes. See Miller, 
    567 US at 474-475
    . This is
    disproportionate to other offenders in this state. For example, Parks, at 18 years old, aided
    and abetted his cousin in committing this murder 13 and thus was mandatorily subjected to
    the harshest and severest penalty available in this state. If Parks lives to be 70, he will have
    served an approximately 52-year prison sentence. Another first-degree murderer, at age
    50, who undertakes a multiple-day crime spree involving numerous robberies and murders
    would also mandatorily receive the harshest and severest penalty available—life without
    parole. However, if that hypothetical defendant lived to be the same age as Parks, he would
    13
    We do not dispute the dissent’s general point that aiders and abettors are equally liable
    for the same crime as the principal actor under MCL 767.39. However, a defendant’s status
    as an aider and abettor is undoubtedly relevant in the punishment context. Indeed, the
    United States Supreme Court in Miller noted that a juvenile’s status as an aider and abettor
    was relevant to determining relative culpability for purposes of sentencing. Miller, 
    567 US at 478
     (noting that the defendant at issue “did not fire the bullet that killed” the victim but
    was instead convicted on an aiding-and-abetting theory, which was a circumstance
    considered when analyzing the defendant’s “culpability for the offense”).
    28
    have only served an approximately 20-year prison sentence. Considering that Parks’s
    offense could be reflective of his diminished capacity as a late adolescent and that the
    hypothetical defendant’s crime spree would have occurred long after his cognitive abilities
    had fully matured, the disproportionality is apparent. It is cruel that our current sentencing
    scheme requires 18-year-old defendants to, on average, serve far more severe penalties
    than equally or more culpable older adult defendants.
    Moreover, Parks will spend more time in prison than most of his equally culpable
    juvenile offenders. Post-Montgomery, every juvenile first-degree murderer in this state has
    the opportunity for a specialized Miller sentencing hearing, at which the prosecution must
    demonstrate that the juvenile offender should be sentenced to life without parole and the
    sentencing court must agree; otherwise, the juvenile offender will receive a term-of-years
    sentence. MCL 769.25. Those juvenile offenders who are a matter of days younger than
    Parks are eligible to receive a term-of-years sentence—despite the two offenders’ identical
    neuroplasticity—that will make the juvenile offenders eligible for parole at some point in
    their adult lives. It is cruel punishment to mandatorily impose a life-without-parole
    sentence on an 18-year-old who is one day older and has the same “immaturity,
    impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” Miller, 
    567 US at 477
    , as a
    17-plus-364-day-old when that 17-year-old is likely to receive a less-severe sentence. 14
    This arbitrary line-drawing for punishment of defendants with equal moral culpability
    neurologically does not pass scrutiny under the second Lorentzen factor.
    14
    Additionally, we recently held “that a parolable life sentence for a defendant who
    commits second-degree murder while a juvenile violates Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan
    Constitution.” Stovall, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 15.
    29
    3. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
    The third Lorentzen proportionality factor is more neutral than the first two, though
    we also conclude that it slightly weighs in favor of an individualized sentencing procedure
    for 18-year-old defendants in these cases. In contrast to Michigan, 25 states and the District
    of Columbia do not legislatively mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree
    murder, regardless of the age of the offender. 15 Likewise, Washington, with a similarly
    broad punishment provision in its constitution, judicially found the neurological
    differences between juveniles and 18-year-olds to be nonexistent and mandated that young
    adults through the age of 20 also receive the same individualized sentencing protections as
    juveniles. See generally In re Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305. Likewise, six more states only
    mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder when there are proven
    aggravated circumstances. 16 This places Michigan among the minority of states that
    15
    These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Alaska Stat 12.55.125; District of Columbia, DC Code
    22-2104; Georgia, Ga Code Ann 16-5-1; Idaho, Idaho Code 18-4004; Illinois, 730 Ill Comp
    Stat 5/5-4.5-20(a); Indiana, Ind Code 35-50-2-3; Kentucky, Ky Rev Stat Ann 532.030;
    Maine, Me Stat, tit 17-A, § 1603; Maryland, Md Code Ann, Crim Law 2-201; Montana,
    Mont Code Ann 45-5-102(2); Nevada, Nev Rev Stat 200.030(4); New Jersey, NJ Stat Ann
    2c:11-3; New Mexico, NM Stat Ann 31-18-14; New York, NY Penal Law 70.00; North
    Dakota, ND Cent Code 12.1-32-01; Ohio, Ohio Rev Code Ann 2929.02; Oklahoma, Okla
    Stat, tit 21, § 701.9; Oregon, Or Rev Stat 163.115; Rhode Island, RI Gen Laws 11-23-2;
    South Carolina, SC Code Ann 16-3-20; Tennessee, Tenn Code Ann 39-13-202; Utah, Utah
    Code Ann 76-5-203; Virginia, Va Code Ann 18.2-10 and 18.2-32; West Virginia, W Va
    Code 61-2-1 and 61-2-2; Wisconsin, Wis Stat 939.50; and Wyoming, Wyo Stat Ann 6-2-101.
    16
    These states are: California, Cal Penal Code 190.2; Connecticut, Conn Gen Stat 53a-35a
    and 53a-54b; Hawai’i, Haw Rev Stat 706-656 and 706-657; Kansas, Kan Stat Ann 21-
    6620, 21-5401(a)(6), and 21-6617; Texas, Tex Penal Code Ann 12.31 and 12.32; and
    Vermont, Vt Stat Ann, tit 13, §§ 2303 and 2311.
    30
    legislatively mandate life without parole for every perpetrator of first-degree murder above
    the age of 17.
    While this increased leniency in other states is persuasive to us, we would be remiss
    if we did not note that, excluding Michigan, 17 states 17 and the federal government 18 do
    still mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder. Michigan is not as
    overwhelming of a national outlier in this case as it was in Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 40
     (“[N]o
    other state in the nation imposes a penalty even remotely as severe as Michigan’s for mere
    possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine.”), or Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 179
     (“Only one
    state, Ohio, has as severe a minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana as Michigan.”).
    Nonetheless, we are persuaded that our Constitution mandates that 18-year-olds be
    treated in the same manner as juveniles in these cases. We examine today an irrevocable
    sentence, offering no hope of release, for a group of defendants that are neurologically less
    culpable than others serving the same or, oftentimes, less-severe sentences for the same
    crimes. Like Washington, which has a similarly broad constitutional provision as our
    Const 1963, art 1, § 16, we find that our sentencing scheme does not comport with our
    17
    The remaining states are: Alabama, Ala Code 13a-6-2(c); Arizona, Ariz Rev Stat Ann
    13-1105(D); Arkansas, Ark Code Ann 5-10-101; Colorado, Colo Rev Stat 18-3-102 and
    18-1.3-401; Delaware, Del Code Ann, tit 11, §§ 636(b)(1) and 4209(a); Florida, Fla Stat
    782.04(1)(a) and (b) and 775.082(1)(a); Iowa, Iowa Code 707.2 and 902.1(1); Louisiana,
    La Stat Ann 14:30; Massachusetts, Mass Gen Laws, ch 265, §§ 1 and 2(a); Minnesota,
    Minn Stat 609.185 and 609.106; Mississippi, Miss Code Ann 97-3-21; Missouri, Mo Rev
    Stat 565.020; Nebraska, Neb Rev Stat 28-303 and 29-2520; New Hampshire, NH Rev Stat
    Ann 630:1-a; North Carolina, NC Gen Stat 14-17(a); Pennsylvania, 18 Pa Cons Stat 2502
    and 1102; and South Dakota, SD Codified Laws 22-16-4 and 22-6-1.
    18
    18 USC 1111.
    31
    Constitution’s mandate forbidding excessively harsh punishment. In re Monschke, 197
    Wash 2d at 307, 311 & n 6, citing Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14. The majority of
    jurisdictions now reflect a society and a criminal-punishment system more “enlightened by
    a humane justice” than Michigan’s current sentencing scheme set forth in this matter. See
    Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 178
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    4. THE GOAL OF REHABILITATION
    As to the fourth and final Lorentzen proportionality factor, it cannot be disputed that
    the goal of rehabilitation is not accomplished by mandatorily sentencing an individual to
    life behind prison walls without any hope of release. This is a long-established principle.
    See Graham, 560 US at 74 (“A sentence of life imprisonment without parole, however,
    cannot be justified by the goal of rehabilitation.”). Without hope of release, 18-year-old
    defendants, who are otherwise at a stage of their cognitive development where
    rehabilitative potential is quite probable, are denied the opportunity to reform while
    imprisoned.
    Rehabilitation is a specific goal of our criminal-punishment system. Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 34
    . Indeed, it is the only penological goal enshrined in our proportionality test as
    a “criterion rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions,” Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 34
    , despite the
    Lorentzen Court’s clear awareness of those other penological goals cited and relied on by
    the dissent, 
    id. at 34-35
    ; Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 180-181
    . However, the current system of
    punishment of 18-year-old first-degree murderers to life without the possibility of parole
    “ ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.’ ” Miller, 
    567 US at 473
    , quoting Graham,
    560 US at 74. And because an 18-year-old defendant has a “child’s capacity for change,”
    32
    as articulated in Miller, 
    567 US at 473
    , it is particularly antithetical to our Constitution’s
    professed goal of rehabilitative sentences to uniformly deny this group of defendants the
    chance to demonstrate their ability to rehabilitate themselves. Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 34
    .
    In sum, after considering all four factors of the proportionality test from Lorentzen
    and Bullock, we conclude that our Constitution prohibits imposing sentences of mandatory
    life without parole for 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder, given that
    their neurological characteristics are identical to those of juveniles, as articulated in Miller,
    
    567 US at 471-479
    . We hold that Michigan’s sentencing scheme mandating that 18-year-
    old defendants convicted of first-degree murder receive a sentence of life imprisonment
    without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1,
    § 16.
    E. PARKS’S MANDATORY LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCE IS
    UNCONSTITUTIONAL
    After committing his crimes at age 18, Parks was automatically sentenced to spend
    the rest of his life in prison under the first-degree murder statute, MCL 750.316. The
    sentencing court in this case gave no consideration to any of the attributes of youth that
    Parks shared with juvenile defendants. Nor was Parks given the same benefit of a
    specialized procedure under either MCL 769.25a or MCL 769.25 as afforded to juveniles
    neurologically identical to him. Instead, his sentence was applied automatically. This
    procedure violates our Constitution and requires that Parks be resentenced.
    While Parks argues that the sentence he received is unconstitutional as applied to
    him because of the mitigating circumstances of his offense and his person, our inquiry
    today does not require us to examine anything specific to Parks at this juncture. Instead,
    33
    we hold that it is the application of mandatory life without parole to those 18-year-olds—
    some of whom will inevitably share the same mitigating characteristics of youth as
    juveniles—that offends our Constitution, not the application of this sentencing scheme to
    Parks specifically. In other words, we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that “no
    meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18”; to treat those two
    classes of defendants differently in our sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point
    of being cruel under our Constitution. See In re Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 326; Bullock,
    
    440 Mich at 33-34
    . Because Parks was not given the benefit of the post-Miller and
    Montgomery individualized sentencing procedure enshrined in Michigan law, his
    mandatory life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional.
    The attributes of youth must be considered to ensure that the sentencing of 18-year-
    old defendants found guilty of first-degree murder passes constitutional muster. To
    facilitate this requirement, the same protections provided to juveniles pursuant to MCL
    769.25, as described in Taylor, ___ Mich ___, must be extended to 18-year-old offenders.
    This requires that the prosecutor move to sentence these defendants to life without parole
    under the procedure outlined in the statute and that the sentencing court provide these
    defendants with a Miller hearing before deciding to sentence them to life without parole.
    See MCL 769.25(2), (3), and (6). Otherwise, such defendants will be sentenced to a term
    of years in accordance with MCL 769.25(9). We hold that, in order to comport with our
    Constitution, all protections afforded by MCL 769.25 fully apply to 18-year-old
    34
    defendants. 19 Because Parks was sentenced without consideration of the attributes of
    youth, his sentence is unconstitutional, and he must be resentenced.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We hold that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-
    degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality
    derived from the Michigan Constitution, Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 176-181
    ; Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 33-34
    , and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963,
    art 1, § 16. This renders Parks’s automatic sentence of life without parole unconstitutional.
    Parks and other 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder are entitled to the
    full protections of MCL 769.25 and our caselaw, as opposed to the automatic sentencing
    scheme in MCL 750.316(1). Therefore, we reverse Part II(B)(4) of the Court of Appeals
    opinion, vacate Parks’s sentence for first-degree murder, and remand this case to the
    Genesee Circuit Court for Parks to be resentenced. If the prosecutor intends to move for
    the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence, the prosecutor shall have 90 days from the
    date of this opinion to file such a motion. MCL 769.25(3). Otherwise, Parks shall be
    19
    This includes all the protections enumerated in our caselaw interpreting this statute. The
    prosecutor will have the burden of proof and persuasion to demonstrate by clear and
    convincing evidence that an 18-year-old defendant should receive a sentence of life without
    parole. See Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 11. As with juveniles, the default sentence
    shall be a term of years, with a minimum sentence of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment and a
    maximum sentence of at least 60 years’ imprisonment. See id. at ___; slip op at 12; MCL
    769.25(9). If the prosecutor elects not to move for life without parole—or does but fails to
    meet its burden of proof—these defendants should be sentenced to the applicable term of
    years. MCL 769.25(4) and (9). In such sentencing hearings, these defendants are also
    entitled to have their attributes of youth, such as those described in Miller, considered, in
    accordance with People v Boykin, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No.
    157738), and People v Tate, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 158695).
    35
    resentenced to a term of years, pursuant to MCL 769.25(9). In all other respects, we deny
    leave to appeal for failure to persuade the Court of the need for review. On remand, the
    Genesee Circuit Court shall also redetermine a portion of defendant’s restitution order
    pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals.
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    Bridget M. McCormack
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    36
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                        No. 162086
    KEMO KNICOMBI PARKS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring).
    The United States Supreme Court has held that imposing a sentence of mandatory
    life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on individuals who were under 18 years
    old when they committed a crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
    and unusual punishment. See Miller v Alabama, 
    567 US 460
    ; 
    132 S Ct 2455
    ; 
    183 L Ed 2d 407
     (2012); Montgomery v Louisiana, 
    577 US 190
    ; 
    136 S Ct 718
    ; 
    193 L Ed 2d 599
     (2016).
    Before Miller, all offenders in Michigan who were convicted of first-degree murder were
    sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, regardless of
    their age. In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan
    Legislature has since codified protections for juvenile offenders and enacted a scheme
    through which juvenile offenders are instead sentenced to a term of years in prison unless
    the prosecution moves for a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
    and demonstrates that such a sentence is proportional. See MCL 769.25; 1 People v Boykin,
    1
    MCL 769.25a was passed by the Legislature at the same time as MCL 769.25, but rather
    than being used to guide the procedure for initial sentencing or resentencing decisions for
    ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 157738); slip op at 3-4 (explaining
    how Miller effected MCL 769.25 and how MCL 769.25 operates). The statutory language
    makes clear that when juvenile offenders are convicted of first-degree murder, the trial
    court must consider the factors listed in Miller, as well as any other relevant criteria, and
    explain its rationale clearly and specifically on the record before sentencing a juvenile
    offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. MCL 769.25(6) and (7).
    This case asks us to consider whether defendant, who was 18 at the time he
    committed a crime that resulted in a first-degree murder conviction, is entitled to these
    same protections. I agree with the majority’s thorough analysis of the test outlined in
    People v Bullock, 
    440 Mich 15
    ; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). Extending the protections offered
    by MCL 769.25 to 18-year-old offenders fits squarely within what Michigan’s Constitution
    requires under its prohibition against “cruel or unusual” punishment. Const 1963, art 1,
    § 16 (emphasis added). As the majority opinion states, the “cruel or unusual” punishment
    test is based on proportionality. See Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 32, 40-41
    . For the reasons
    explained by the majority, the imposition of mandatory sentences of life imprisonment
    without the possibility of parole on 18-year-old offenders violates this proportionality
    principle. Although I concur fully with the majority, I write separately to highlight
    additional reasons that support this position.
    juvenile offenders, MCL 769.25a guides the procedure for resentencing juveniles who had
    been sentenced to mandatory life without parole before its enactment. MCL 769.25a is not
    relevant to this case because defendant will be resentenced according to MCL 769.25.
    2
    I. MORE LOCAL AND INDIVIDUALIZED CONTROL OVER SENTENCING
    DECISIONS
    Under the new sentencing scheme enacted after Miller, when a juvenile offender
    commits a crime for which a life sentence without the possibility of parole is possible, it is
    the local prosecutor who must decide whether to pursue such a sentence. MCL 769.25(2).
    If the local prosecutor believes such a punishment is appropriate, they must file a motion
    with the court. MCL 769.25(3). The court must then conduct a hearing on that motion.
    MCL 769.25(6). At that hearing, the local prosecutor is required to prove that the defendant
    should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, taking into
    account the Miller factors and all the mitigating and aggravating circumstances relevant to
    the defendant and the crime. See People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___
    (2022) (Docket No. 154994); slip op at 11 (holding that the burden of proof is on the
    prosecutor at a hearing held under MCL 769.25). If the prosecutor declines to file such a
    motion for any defendant of this class, that defendant may only be sentenced to a term of
    years. MCL 769.25(4); see also Boykin, ___ Mich at ___ n 2; slip op at 4 n 2.
    Once the local prosecutor makes the decision to pursue a sentence of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the authority to make the sentencing
    decision remains local, because the trial court must then, after hearing and considering all
    the evidence presented by the prosecution and defendant, decide whether that is a
    proportionate sentence. If the trial court determines that the local prosecutor has not proven
    the sentence to be proportionate, the trial court shall impose an appropriate term-of-years
    sentence. MCL 769.25(9).
    3
    Understanding how these statutes work is important for understanding what the
    majority’s holding means. It does not mean that we are punishing the most severe crime
    of first-degree murder less severely. Instead, it means that 18-year-old offenders convicted
    of the most serious crimes may not be automatically sentenced to the harshest sentences
    without first being afforded an additional layer of process. Local prosecutors may still
    advocate for youthful offenders to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
    of parole, and local trial courts may still agree. This decision merely underscores one of
    the foundations of a functioning criminal-justice system—that procedure matters for all
    criminal defendants, even those who commit the most serious crimes. See, e.g., People v
    Peeler, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 163667) (BERNSTEIN, J.,
    concurring); slip op at 4.
    Sentencing youthful offenders who have committed the most serious crimes is an
    exceptionally daunting task. The Legislature has concluded that the local prosecutor and
    local trial court should be responsible for making these difficult decisions, and it is these
    local actors who will be able to make the most informed decisions about individual
    defendants. Having now decided that there is no meaningful difference between a 17- and
    18-year-old offender, this opinion merely requires these local actors to engage in an
    additional layer of process before sentencing 18-year-old offenders to life imprisonment
    without the possibility of parole.
    II. PROPORTIONALITY TO THE OFFENSE AND THE OFFENDER
    The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that “youth matters
    in sentencing.” Jones v Mississippi, 593 US at ___, ___; 
    141 S Ct 1307
    , 1314; 
    209 L Ed
                                            4
    2d 390 (2021). In several opinions, the Supreme Court has articulated factors, which have
    colloquially become known as the “Miller factors,” that sentencing courts must consider
    before sentencing youthful offenders to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
    As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has grounded these factors in “ ‘developments
    in psychology and brain science [that] continue to show fundamental differences between
    juvenile and adult minds’—for example, in ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior
    control.’ ” Miller, 
    567 US at 471-472
    , quoting Graham v Florida, 
    560 US 48
    , 68; 
    130 S Ct 2011
    ; 
    176 L Ed 2d 825
     (2010). In other words, internal and external factors associated
    with youthful brains and the juvenile experience mean that such offenders are less culpable
    or less deserving of the harshest punishments for even the most severe crimes without some
    individualized consideration of how the Miller factors have affected an individual offender.
    To provide guidance, the Supreme Court has tried to draw a bright line at age 18 to
    demarcate the age of maturity, at which point a youthful offender is no longer eligible for
    these constitutional protections. The Supreme Court first drew this bright line in Roper v
    Simmons, 
    543 US 551
    ; 
    125 S Ct 1183
    ; 
    161 L Ed 2d 1
     (2005), holding that the death penalty
    is prohibited for all offenders under age 18 who are convicted of capital crimes. Roper and
    its progeny show the difficulties and flaws associated with such a bright-line cutoff, and I
    am concerned that applying a bright line in this way might not be the best approach to
    resolve the difficult question of how to sentence offenders who commit the most serious
    offenses.
    First, because the federal constitutional protection against cruel and unusual
    punishments requires analyzing “ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
    progress of a maturing society,’ ” any conclusions that might be drawn could change in a
    5
    short amount of time. 
    Id. at 561
    , quoting Trop v Dulles, 
    356 US 86
    , 101; 
    78 S Ct 590
    ; 
    2 L Ed 2d 630
     (1958). Roper, which was decided in 2005, offered a time line for how the
    Supreme Court arrived at its holding. This history showed that, in 1988, a plurality of the
    Supreme Court determined that the constitutional standards of decency did not permit the
    execution of anyone under the age of 16 at the time of a crime. Roper, 
    543 US at 561
    ,
    citing Thompson v Oklahoma, 
    487 US 815
    ; 
    108 S Ct 2687
    ; 
    101 L Ed 2d 702
     (1988). The
    next year, the Supreme Court held that the standards of decency allowed for the imposition
    of the death penalty for those over 16. Roper, 
    543 US at 562
    , citing Stanford v Kentucky,
    
    492 US 361
    ; 
    109 S Ct 2969
    ; 
    106 L Ed 2d 306
     (1989). The result of Thompson and Stanford
    meant that, by 1989, the bright-line cutoff was established at age 16 for death-penalty cases.
    On the same day that Stanford was decided, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
    did not mandate an exemption from the death penalty for offenders with intellectual
    disabilities. Roper, 
    543 US at 562
    , citing Penry v Lynaugh, 
    492 US 302
    ; 
    109 S Ct 2934
    ;
    
    106 L Ed 2d 256
     (1989). But by 2002, the same standards of decency had evolved even
    further, resulting in the holding that the death penalty was cruel and unusual for offenders
    with intellectual disabilities. Roper, 
    543 US at 563
    , citing Atkins v Virginia, 
    536 US 304
    ;
    
    122 S Ct 2242
    ; 
    153 L Ed 2d 335
     (2002). Likewise, this evolution of the standards of
    decency led to the holding that the death penalty was cruel and unusual for all juvenile
    offenders, not just those under the age of 16. Roper, 
    543 US at 564, 578
    .
    Over a period of just 16 years, the bright-line cutoff for death-penalty eligibility
    jumped from age 16 to age 18, and over a period of less than 25 years, the Supreme Court
    went from allowing the death penalty for 17-year-old offenders to holding that mandatory
    sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are unconstitutionally cruel
    6
    and unusual for all juvenile offenders. In other words, evolving standards of decency have
    changed enough to both redefine what type of punishment is viewed as cruel and unusual
    and the breadth of the class afforded protection from such punishment. These changes
    show the Supreme Court’s continued commitment to reexamine the applicable standards
    of decency for youthful offenders, which are ever evolving.
    Second, Roper showed the very flaws associated with drawing a bright line when it
    noted that
    [d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections
    always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish
    juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the
    same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some
    adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line
    must be drawn. The plurality opinion in Thompson drew the line at 16. In
    the intervening years the Thompson plurality’s conclusion that offenders
    under 16 may not be executed has not been challenged. The logic of
    Thompson extends to those who are under 18. The age of 18 is the point
    where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
    adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility
    ought to rest. [Id. at 574.]
    The Supreme Court thus acknowledged that drawing the line at 18 was both overinclusive
    and underinclusive.
    I agree with Roper that it was necessary, although difficult, to draw some line as the
    only way to ensure that a class of youthful offenders would receive constitutional
    protections against cruel and unusual punishment. However, having a line in place does
    not mean that such a line should represent both the floor and ceiling of constitutional
    protections, especially when we already understand that such a line might not be
    sufficiently protective. There might be a way to both ensure constitutional protections for
    7
    an entire class of offenders while also mitigating the underinclusiveness problem
    associated with drawing a line.
    Consider, again, the fact that Roper believed that the standards of decency for
    juvenile offenders had evolved because of a parallel evolution of the standards of decency
    for offenders with intellectual disabilities from Penry to Atkins. See Roper, 
    543 US at
    562-
    563. Atkins, which held that the death penalty was constitutionally impermissible for
    offenders with intellectual disabilities, contained language that was eventually used in
    Miller to support the holding that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole are constitutionally impermissible for juvenile offenders. Again,
    Miller stressed that several factors associated with the underdeveloped brains of juveniles
    made juvenile offenders less culpable and more capable of rehabilitation than adult
    offenders.   Atkins similarly outlined several reasons why offenders with intellectual
    disabilities were less culpable for their crimes and capable of rehabilitation. Atkins, 
    536 US at 306-307
     (explaining that “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning,
    judgment, and control of their impulses, however, [these offenders] do not act with the
    level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.
    Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital
    proceedings against [them]”). Still, although Miller and Atkins use similar language and
    reasoning, the bright line that Miller establishes for juveniles means that under Miller, a
    nonjuvenile offender with an intellectual disability could receive a mandatory sentence of
    life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and would not have the benefit of a
    hearing to demonstrate that such a sentence was not proportionate to the offense and the
    offender. There ought to be a better way to sentence such offenders.
    8
    To avoid these downfalls, we could instead consider that all offenders ages 18 and
    younger have an irrebuttable presumption of youth and diminished capacity, as recognized
    by the majority opinion. Because the presumption is irrebuttable, all offenders within this
    class must be afforded the processes outlined in MCL 769.25 before they may be sentenced
    to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.        However, we could enable
    defendants who are older than 18 to assert that they possess some qualities—such as an
    intellectual disability or other mitigating circumstances—that render their brains more like
    someone who is age 18 or younger. In other words, once offenders reach the age of 19,
    the irrebuttable presumption of youthfulness would transform into a rebuttable
    presumption of maturity and a defendant over the age of 18 would bear the burden of
    demonstrating the need for a hearing to ensure that a sentence of life without the possibility
    of parole was proportionate. I believe that the additional process associated with a shifting
    presumption rather than a bright line would help to alleviate the problem associated with
    drawing a line that we know will be, at least in part, underinclusive.
    In sum, adopting a bright-line rule is likely to leave out some individuals who need
    additional protections. This effect is consequential, as this cutoff would determine whether
    a defendant may be mandatorily sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and
    without the opportunity to show that they had diminished culpability. It should be
    incumbent on us to find a way to ensure that those individuals who are the most vulnerable
    are able to access sufficient process before they are automatically sentenced to serve their
    lives in prison. Accordingly, I believe that a better approach to these difficult sentencing
    decisions would be through a shifting presumption that accounts for relevant individual
    attributes, rather than a bright-line rule.
    9
    III. CONCLUSION
    I concur fully with the majority opinion. This result will shift more control over
    difficult sentencing decisions to local actors, which I believe can only help when making
    difficult choices on an individualized basis. However, there are problems associated with
    drawing a bright line under which age is the only criterion in determining whether a
    mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual.
    Accordingly, I believe that a better approach would be to institute a shifting age-based
    presumption through which offenders could move to seek additional process based on
    other, non-age-based qualities of diminished culpability, which could entitle some
    offenders over the age of 18 to the same protections as youthful offenders. Because this
    case does not present the opportunity for us to reach this issue, I concur with the majority’s
    analysis and conclusion.
    Richard H. Bernstein
    10
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                            No. 162086
    KEMO KNICOMBI PARKS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ZAHRA, J. (dissenting).
    I join Justice CLEMENT’s dissenting opinion in full. For the reasons stated in People
    v Stovall, ___ Mich ___, ___ n 24, ___ n 25; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 162425)
    (ZAHRA, J., dissenting); slip op at 6 n 24, 10 n 25, I would accept the prosecution’s
    invitation to revisit our caselaw interpreting Const 1963, art 1, § 16—specifically whether
    Article 1, § 16 provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution and whether Article 1, § 16 contains a proportionality guarantee.
    Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                           No. 162086
    KEMO KNICOMBI PARKS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    CLEMENT, J. (dissenting).
    In Miller v Alabama, 
    567 US 460
    , 465; 
    132 S Ct 2455
    ; 
    183 L Ed 2d 407
     (2012), the
    United States Supreme Court prohibited mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences
    for offenders who were under 18 years old at the commission of their crime. Defendant
    asks this Court to extend that rule to offenders who were 18 years old at the commission
    of their crime. Because I do not believe mandatory LWOP as it pertains to 18-year-old
    offenders is unconstitutional under either the Eighth Amendment or Const 1963, art 1, § 16,
    I would not do so.
    I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
    I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts. In short, defendant was 18 years
    old when he aided and abetted his cousin in committing first-degree murder. The trial court
    imposed an LWOP sentence, which is mandatory under MCL 750.316(1). Because
    defendant was 18 years old at the time of his offense, this sentence is not prohibited by
    Miller, 
    567 US at 465
    , which held “that mandatory life without parole for those under the
    age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel
    and unusual punishments.’ ” See also Montgomery v Louisiana, 
    577 US 190
    , 212; 
    136 S Ct 718
    ; 
    193 L Ed 2d 599
     (2016) (holding that Miller was a substantive rule of law that
    applied retroactively).
    Defendant now argues that this Court should extend Miller’s prohibition on
    mandatory LWOP to defendants who were 18 years old when they committed their crimes.
    He points to two possible bases on which this Court could do so—the first is the Eighth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual
    punishments,” 1 and the second is Article 1, § 16 of our state Constitution, which prohibits
    “cruel or unusual punishment.” 2 I agree with the majority that the Eighth Amendment does
    not prohibit defendants who were 18 years old at the time of their crime from being
    sentenced to mandatory LWOP. 3 But contrary to the majority, I do not believe that Const
    1963, art 1, § 16 prohibits that either.
    1
    US Const, Am VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
    nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added).
    2
    Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be
    imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be
    unreasonably detained.”) (emphasis added).
    3
    There are several federal decisions declining to extend Miller. See, e.g., United States v
    Dock, 541 F Appx 242, 245 (CA 4, 2013); United States v Davis, 531 F Appx 601, 608
    (CA 6, 2013); Wright v United States, 902 F3d 868, 872 (CA 8, 2018); United States v
    Sierra, 933 F3d 95, 97 (CA 2, 2019); Ong Vue v Henke, 746 F Appx 780, 783 (CA 10,
    2018). See also Doyle v Stephens, 535 F Appx 391, 395 (CA 5, 2013) (declining to extend
    the prohibition on the death penalty for juvenile offenders from Roper v Simmons, 
    543 US 551
    ; 
    125 S Ct 1183
    ; 
    161 L Ed 2d 1
     (2005)). The only federal case I am aware of that
    extended the holding of Miller was Cruz v United States, unpublished opinion of the United
    States District Court for the District of Connecticut, issued March 29, 2018 (Case No. 11-
    CV-787). But that opinion was later vacated and remanded by the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cruz v United States, 826 F Appx 49, 52 (CA 2, 2020)
    2
    II. ANALYSIS
    Whereas the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,” Const
    1963, art 1, § 16 prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.” This difference in language has
    led this Court to interpret our constitutional provision as providing broader protection.
    People v Bullock, 
    440 Mich 15
    , 30-35; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).
    We presume a statute is constitutional “unless the contrary clearly appears[.]” Cady
    v Detroit, 
    289 Mich 499
    , 505; 
    286 NW 805
     (1939). “[I]n case of doubt every possible
    presumption not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter is to be made
    in favor of the constitutionality of legislation.” 
    Id.
     Specific to the mandatory LWOP
    sentence at issue here, “[l]egislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional
    and presumptively valid.” People v Brown, 
    294 Mich App 377
    , 390; 811 NW2d 531
    (2011).
    A. THE APPLICATION OF BULLOCK’S FOUR-FACTOR TEST
    In People v Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich 167
    ; 194 NW2d 827 (1972), and Bullock, our
    Court set forth a four-part test to determine whether a sentence violates Const 1963, art 1,
    § 16. Under that test, we must consider: (1) “the severity of the sentence imposed
    compared to the gravity of the offense,” (2) “the penalty imposed for the offense compared
    to penalties imposed on other offenders” in Michigan, (3) “the penalty imposed for the
    offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states,”
    and (4) “whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation.”
    (“[W]e conclude that the district court erred when it held that the Eighth Amendment
    forbids a mandatory life sentence for a defendant who was eighteen at the time of his
    offense.”).
    3
    People v Carp, 
    496 Mich 440
    , 520; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated
    sub nom on other grounds Carp v Michigan, 
    577 US 1186
     (2016), citing Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 33-34
    , and Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 176-181
    .
    1. THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE VERSUS THE SEVERITY OF THE
    PUNISHMENT
    To apply that test, we first consider the gravity of the offense as opposed to the
    severity of the punishment. First-degree murder is undoubtedly a very serious offense,
    arguably the most serious offense one can commit. Accordingly, a very severe sentence is
    proportionate. Mandatory LWOP is, undoubtedly, just that. It is, as the majority notes,
    the most severe penalty in Michigan. The punishment fits the crime. As this Court stated
    in Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515:
    [F]irst-degree murder is almost certainly the gravest and most serious offense
    that an individual can commit under the laws of Michigan—the premeditated
    taking of an innocent human life. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the people
    of this state, through the Legislature, would have chosen to impose the most
    severe punishment authorized by the laws of Michigan for this offense.[4]
    See also People v Hall, 
    396 Mich 650
    , 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976) (stating that “the
    punishment exacted [i.e., mandatory LWOP] is proportionate to the crime [of felony
    murder]”).   While I do not take the mandatory imposition of LWOP lightly, it is
    commensurate with the gravity of the offense in this case.
    The majority contends that the penalty is more severe for defendant than it is for
    older adults because those who committed crimes at his age are more likely to act recklessly
    and to be susceptible to peer pressure, as they are still developing neurologically. They are
    4
    See also People v Manning, 
    506 Mich 1033
    , 1035 (2020) (MARKMAN, J., concurring),
    quoting Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515.
    4
    also more likely to mature and rehabilitate. I do not argue with the science the majority
    discusses. However, I do not believe that science is sufficient to show that the first factor
    weighs in favor of finding the penalty unconstitutional.
    We are not the first court to consider that young adults are still developing
    neurologically and still have some juvenile traits. The United States Supreme Court
    recognized young adults’ ongoing neurological development in 2005 in Roper v Simmons,
    
    543 US 551
    ; 
    125 S Ct 1183
    ; 
    161 L Ed 2d 1
     (2005), in which it found that the execution of
    juvenile offenders was unconstitutional. Tellingly, the Court commented:
    Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
    objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that
    distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns
    18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of
    maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed,
    however, a line must be drawn. [Id. at 574.]
    I find that reasoning persuasive. A line must be drawn, and that line will always lead to
    some arbitrary results, as there will be no appreciable difference between a person one day
    before his 18th birthday versus on his 18th birthday—or now, under the majority’s holding,
    one day before his 19th birthday versus on his 19th birthday. Though the age at which
    society considers a person an adult has changed and is not consistent across every activity,
    it is still true that 18 is the general age at which society considers someone an adult. Roper,
    
    543 US at 574
     (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
    between childhood and adulthood.”). 5 Even if 18-year-olds are not so well-developed
    5
    Our Legislature has also set the age of majority for most purposes at the age of 18. See
    MCL 722.52(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in the state constitution of 1963 and
    subsection (2), notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person who is
    at least 18 years of age on or after January 1, 1972, is an adult of legal age for all purposes
    5
    neurologically as 27-year-olds, they are sufficiently neurologically developed to make
    major decisions about their lives.
    Moreover, first-degree murder, in particular, is an obviously serious offense, the
    gravity of which I believe 18-year-olds are generally more than able to comprehend.
    Consequently, even given young adults’ ongoing neurological development, I still believe
    that the severity of the punishment fits the gravity of the offense for this class of defendants.
    This factor weighs in favor of finding the penalty constitutional.
    Also, I note that the majority’s holding is overbroad when compared to some of the
    facts it appears to find relevant in regard to the first factor. First, the majority notes that
    18-year-olds are uniquely susceptible to peer pressure. However, its holding eliminates
    mandatory LWOP even in cases in which there is no evidence that a defendant acted as a
    result of peer pressure. Additionally, the majority emphasizes that defendant was not found
    guilty as a principal actor but rather as an aider and abettor, noting that defendant’s
    conviction is “based on a theory of aiding and abetting” and that “Parks was not the
    principal actor in this particular murder . . . .” However, in this context there is no legal
    difference. MCL 767.39 (“Every person concerned in the commission of an offense,
    whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or
    abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall
    be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.”). I fail to see why the majority
    mentions defendant’s status multiple times when it makes no difference as to defendant’s
    whatsoever, and shall have the same duties, liabilities, responsibilities, rights, and legal
    capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age.”).
    6
    legal culpability or to the majority’s holding, as the holding is applicable to 18-year-olds
    who are found guilty as principals. 6
    2. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES
    Second, we consider the sentences we impose for other offenses. I believe this
    factor also weighs in favor of finding the penalty constitutional. All adults 18 and older
    who commit first-degree murder face mandatory LWOP. Adults who commit arguably
    less-serious offenses can also still face mandatory LWOP.          As the majority notes,
    mandatory LWOP is the penalty imposed on adult defendants guilty of first-degree murder,
    first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and various other offenses committed with an intent
    to kill or resulting in death. See, e.g., MCL 791.234(6) (listing various offenses subject to
    mandatory LWOP); MCL 750.316 (first-degree murder); MCL 750.520b (first-degree
    criminal sexual conduct); MCL 750.16(5) (adulteration of drugs with intent to kill); MCL
    750.18(7) (mixing drugs improperly with intent to kill); MCL 750.211a(f) (possession with
    intent to unlawfully use an explosive device causing death); MCL 333.17764(7)
    (mislabeling drugs with intent to kill and causing death); MCL 750.200i(2)(e) (possession
    6
    The majority responds that Miller referred to the defendant’s role as an aider and abettor.
    Because I am bound by Miller’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, People v Victor,
    
    287 Mich 506
    , 514; 
    283 NW 666
     (1939), I express no opinion on the merits of its reasoning.
    However, our Court is the final arbiter of our state’s Constitution. People v Tanner, 
    496 Mich 199
    , 221-222; 853 NW2d 653 (2014) (“[W]e need not, and cannot, defer to the United
    States Supreme Court in giving meaning to the [Michigan Constitution]. Instead, it is this
    Court’s obligation to independently examine our state’s Constitution to ascertain the
    intentions of those in whose name our Constitution was ‘ordain[ed] and establish[ed].’ ”)
    (alterations in original). Though Miller referred to the defendant’s role as an aider and
    abettor and proceeded to hold that mandatory LWOP was prohibited for all juvenile
    offenders, I still believe there is a disconnect between relying on this specific defendant’s
    role—a role with no legal significance—and issuing an opinion that will affect defendants
    who played a different role.
    7
    of a harmful biological, chemical, radioactive, or electronic device resulting in death).
    Mandatory LWOP for first-degree murder is not out of place when considered alongside
    the other punishments our state imposes for other offenses.
    The majority contends that because of his young age, defendant’s life sentence is,
    practically, longer than the life sentence of an older defendant. Of course it is true that
    defendant is likely to spend more time imprisoned than an older offender, but we do not
    generally consider how long a defendant will, as a practical matter, serve a sentence given
    his or her life expectancy. When appellants fairly frequently contend that their term-of-
    years sentence is a de facto life sentence because of their more advanced age, our Court
    and the Court of Appeals routinely reject such arguments. 7 I see no reason why, in that
    scenario, we would refuse to consider that a term-of-years sentence is a de facto life
    sentence but, in the instant case, we would consider—relatedly but in reverse—that a
    particular life sentence is a de facto longer term-of-years sentence than other life
    sentences. 8
    7
    See, e.g., People v Washington, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
    issued July 25, 2019 (Docket No. 343987), p 7 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that his
    term-of-years sentence was a de facto life sentence); People v Williams, unpublished per
    curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 20, 2018 (Docket No. 335401),
    p 9 (same).
    8
    The majority contends that Miller also considered how long juvenile offenders will spend
    in prison. However, again, while I express no opinion on Miller’s merits insofar as we are
    bound by the United States Supreme Court’s decision regarding the scope of the Eighth
    Amendment, it is up to our Court to interpret Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See note 6 of this
    opinion. Consequently, I am not persuaded that a line of reasoning is unassailable simply
    because Miller appears to use it as well.
    8
    The majority also notes that defendant will spend more time imprisoned than “most
    of his equally culpable juvenile offenders.” However, it is not the case that defendant is as
    equally culpable as other juvenile offenders. Even if there is no drastic difference between
    an older 17-year-old and a younger 18-year-old, surely most 18-year-old defendants are
    more mature than most 17-, or 16-, or 15-year-old defendants. As Roper stated, a line must
    be drawn somewhere. Defendant is older than juvenile offenders guilty of the same crime,
    and therefore, he is presumably more mature and more culpable.
    Related to the need for line-drawing, the majority notes the unfairness that offenders
    only a few days younger than defendant are sentenced more leniently “despite the two
    offenders’ identical neuroplasticity[.]” But the majority’s holding simply replaces that
    unfairness with another—that now defendants who are 18 years and 364 days old will be
    sentenced more leniently than defendants who are 19 years old. The majority readily
    admits that the science does not support that dividing line either.
    3. PENALTIES IMPOSED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
    For the third factor we consider the penalties that other jurisdictions impose for first-
    degree murder. The majority says that this factor is more neutral but weighs slightly in
    favor of finding the instant penalty unconstitutional. I do not see how that is the case. As
    the majority notes, 17 other states and the federal government allow mandatory LWOP for
    offenders who were 18 and older at the commission of the crime. 9 Michigan is hardly an
    9
    Alabama, Ala Code 13a-6-2(c); Arizona, Ariz Rev Stat Ann 13-1105(D); Arkansas, Ark
    Code Ann 5-10-101; Colorado, Colo Rev Stat 18-3-102 and 18-1.3-401; Delaware, Del
    Code Ann, tit 11, §§ 636(b)(1) and 4209(a); Florida, Fla Stat 782.04(1)(a) and (b) and
    775.082(1)(a); Iowa, Iowa Code 707.2 and 902.1(1); Louisiana, La Stat Ann 14:30;
    Massachusetts, Mass Gen Laws, ch 265, §§ 1 and 2(a); Minnesota, Minn Stat 609.185 and
    609.106; Mississippi, Miss Code Ann 97-3-21; Missouri, Mo Rev Stat 565.020; Nebraska,
    9
    outlier. In past cases in which we found sentences unconstitutional, there were few or no
    states with penalties so harsh as the one we imposed. See Bullock, 
    440 Mich at 40
     (“[N]o
    other state in the nation imposes a penalty even remotely as severe as Michigan’s . . . . Of
    the remaining 49 States, only Alabama provides for a mandatory sentence of life
    imprisonment without possibility of parole for a first-time drug offender, and then only
    when a defendant possesses ten kilograms or more of cocaine.”) (quotation marks and
    citation omitted; emphasis added); Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 179
     (“Only one state . . . has as
    severe a minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana as Michigan.”) (emphasis added).
    The majority relies on In re Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305; 482 P3d 276 (2021), in
    which the Washington Supreme Court extended the prohibition on mandatory LWOP to
    20-year-old offenders based on Washington’s state constitution. However, the majority
    does not thoroughly consider the reasoning in Monschke in order to determine whether it
    is persuasive. 10
    I do not find Monschke’s reasoning persuasive. Washington has two tests under
    which it reviews the constitutionality of punishments. Both tests have some overlap with
    Neb Rev Stat 28-303 and 29-2520; New Hampshire, NH Rev Stat Ann 630:1-a; North
    Carolina, NC Gen Stat 14-17(a); Pennsylvania, 18 Pa Cons Stat 2502 and 1102; and South
    Dakota, SD Codified Laws 22-16-4 and 22-6-1. See also 18 USC 1111(b); 18 USC 5031
    (defining “juvenile” as “a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the
    purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile
    delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday” and “juvenile
    delinquency” as “the violation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior
    to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult”).
    10
    See People v DeRousse, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No.
    358358); slip op at 4 (“ ‘Caselaw from sister states and federal courts is not binding
    precedent but may be relied on for its persuasive value.’ ”), quoting Haydaw v Farm
    Bureau Ins Co, 
    332 Mich App 719
    , 726 n 5; 957 NW2d 858 (2020).
    10
    ours. But Monschke used neither. First, it has a “proportionality test,” which consists of
    four factors. 11 Three of the four factors of that test are similar (to some extent) to our
    factors from Lorentzen and Bullock: “(1) the nature of the offense; (2) the legislative
    purpose behind the habitual criminal statute; (3) the punishment defendant would have
    received in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the punishment meted out for
    other offenses in the same jurisdiction.” State v Fain, 94 Wash 2d 387, 397; 617 P2d 720
    (1980) (en banc) (emphasis added). If Monschke had reached its conclusion after applying
    these similar factors, its reasoning would perhaps be of some persuasive value in
    determining whether mandatory LWOP for 18-year-olds violates our Constitution as well.
    However, Monschke did not apply this test.
    Washington also has a “categorical bar analysis,” which it used in State v Bassett,
    192 Wash 2d 67, 90; 428 P3d 343 (2018), to hold that juveniles could not be sentenced to
    LWOP, even if it were not mandatory. That categorical-bar analysis has only two factors,
    one of which is similar to one of ours. Id. at 83 (setting out the categorical-bar test as “(1)
    whether there is objective indicia of a national consensus against the sentencing practice
    at issue and (2) the court’s own independent judgment based on ‘ “the standards elaborated
    by controlling precedents and by the [c]ourt’s own understanding and interpretation of the
    [cruel punishment provision]’s text, history, . . . and purpose” ’ ”) (citation omitted;
    emphasis added; alterations in original). Again, if Monschke had used this test, at least its
    analysis of its first factor might be persuasive as to our third factor. But Monschke did not
    11
    Monschke attributes this test to State v Fain, 94 Wash 2d 387, 397; 617 P2d 720 (1980)
    (en banc).
    11
    use that test either.      Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 328 (“No [proportionality test] or
    categorical bar analysis is necessary to reach this decision.”).
    Instead, the reasons Monschke considered were (1) that United States Supreme
    Court jurisprudence has grown more protective of young offenders, id. at 313-317; (2) that
    courts do not always defer to legislative bright lines when striking down punishments, such
    as in Hall v Florida, 
    572 US 701
    ; 
    134 S Ct 1986
    ; 
    188 L Ed 2d 1007
     (2014), Monschke,
    197 Wash 2d at 317-319; (3) that the age of majority is flexible, depending on context, id.
    at 319-321; and (4) that neurological science reveals no meaningful difference in
    neurological development between 17- and 18-year-olds, id. at 321-325.                   Those
    propositions might all be true, but they are not very persuasive in showing that under our
    four-factor test, mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old offenders violates Const 1963, art 1,
    § 16. 12
    In any case, the existence of one opinion by one sister state’s supreme court hardly
    sheds much light on whether the third factor—penalties imposed for the same offense in
    other jurisdictions—weighs in favor of finding the penalty here unconstitutional. That 17
    other states and the federal government also have mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old
    offenders shows quite the opposite.
    12
    I find it a bit eyebrow-raising that Monschke used neither test. Additionally, I believe
    Justice Owens makes compelling points in her dissent in Monschke. Though I consider the
    critique more thoroughly later in this opinion, most pertinent is that the court failed to
    respect the legislature’s role. See, e.g., Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 341 (Owens, J.,
    dissenting) (“[T]he lead opinion improperly strips the legislature’s role in defining the age
    of majority and replaces it with a handful of scientific studies. The court’s second guessing
    of the legislature is questionable as this court is inferior to the legislature in both time and
    resources to adequately consider the issue.”).
    12
    4. WHETHER THE PENALTY ADVANCES THE GOAL OF REHABILITATION
    Finally, we consider whether the punishment helps offenders to rehabilitate.
    Mandatory LWOP generally does not advance the goal of rehabilitation, as defendant has
    little realistic chance for parole.     We did remark in Hall, 
    396 Mich at 658
    , that
    “rehabilitation and release are still possible, since defendant still has available to him
    commutation of sentence by the Governor to a parolable offense or outright pardon.” That
    is true, though I recognize that those are avenues of relief that are unlikely to benefit most
    prisoners. 13 Nevertheless, I do note that even if the sentence does not generally facilitate
    rehabilitation, there are other valid penological goals, such as retribution, deterrence, and
    incapacitation, 14 which I believe it does facilitate.
    The first three factors weigh strongly in favor of the punishment’s constitutionality.
    Though the fourth factor does not weigh in favor of the punishment’s constitutionality, for
    the reasons stated in Hall, it does not weigh strongly against its constitutionality either.
    And to the extent that the fourth factor weighs against the punishment’s constitutionality,
    this factor alone is insufficient to support a determination that mandatory LWOP is
    unconstitutional. 15 I thus conclude that mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old offenders does
    13
    See Carp, 496 Mich at 521 (noting that LWOP “ ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative
    ideal’ ”), quoting Graham v Florida, 
    560 US 48
    , 74; 
    130 S Ct 2011
    ; 
    176 L Ed 2d 825
    (2010).
    14
    See Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 180
     (listing rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation as
    policy factors underlying penalties).
    15
    Indeed, if failure to advance the goal of rehabilitation alone were enough to render a
    punishment unconstitutional, LWOP for defendants of any age would be unconstitutional.
    13
    not violate our state Constitution. As such, defendant’s sentence should stand, and Miller’s
    protections should not be extended to 18-year-old offenders.
    B. THE MAJORITY’S RELIANCE ON NEUROSCIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT
    ITS DECISION IS BASED IN LARGE PART ON POLICY, AND POLICY
    DECISIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE LEGISLATURE
    A striking feature of the majority opinion is its discussion of and reliance on
    neuroscience. Though courts must consider scientific evidence in some limited contexts, 16
    the majority’s reliance on scientific evidence to justify its holding is extraordinary, and it
    signals what I believe is the overarching flaw in the majority’s analysis. That flaw is that
    the majority is viewing the issue at hand not only through a legal lens—which would
    involve the sources and methods we typically consider, such as caselaw and the rules of
    statutory construction (as applied to our Constitution in this case)—but the majority is also
    viewing the issue through a policy lens. 17
    Our Court has long said that it is not for us to decide policy issues; those questions
    should be left to the Legislature. 18 In 1860, our Court noted that “[t]he expediency or
    16
    One example of when courts must consider scientific evidence is when determining
    whether evidence is admissible under MRE 702. MRE 702 (“If the court determines that
    scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
    understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
    knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
    opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the
    testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
    the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”).
    17
    The majority contends that Miller also looked at scientific evidence. However, that is
    not enough reason to make me abandon my critique of how the majority interprets our
    Constitution. See notes 6 and 8 of this opinion.
    18
    People v Collins, 
    3 Mich 343
    , 348 (1854) (opinion of GREEN, P.J.) (“The Legislature
    may have acted very unwisely, and departed in our opinion, very widely from that line of
    policy which the interest of the State demands; yet if they have acted within the scope of
    14
    the powers conferred upon them by the Constitution, this tribunal has no authority to nullify
    their acts, or to restrain the free exercise of their legislative discretion.”); 
    id. at 398
     (opinion
    of PRATT, J.) (“As to the policy and expediency of a statute, Courts have nothing to do[.]”);
    People ex rel Whipple v Auditor General, 
    5 Mich 193
    , 200-201, 203 (1858) (“But any
    question of mere policy can throw but little light on the proper construction of this
    Constitution. It must be construed by its language and the changes made by it in our then
    existing system. All other guides must be uncertain.”); Cady v Detroit, 
    289 Mich 499
    , 509;
    
    286 NW 805
     (1939) (“Courts cannot substitute their opinions for that of the legislative
    body on questions of policy.”); French v Ingham Co, 
    342 Mich 690
    , 700; 71 NW2d 244
    (1955) (“It is well settled that a court is without authority to pass on the wisdom, policy, or
    equity of a statute.”); Lansing v Lansing Twp, 
    356 Mich 641
    , 648; 97 NW2d 804 (1959)
    (“The mere fact a statute appears impolitic or unwise is not sufficient for judicial
    construction but is a matter for the legislature.”); People v McIntire, 
    461 Mich 147
    , 158;
    599 NW2d 102 (1999) (“Thus, while the [Court of Appeals] majority makes compelling
    arguments that support a rational, but different, policy choice . . . , the object of judicial
    statutory construction is not to determine whether there are valid alternative policy choices
    that the Legislature may or should have chosen, but to determine from the text of the statute
    the policy choice the Legislature actually made.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted;
    alteration in original); Mayor of Lansing v Pub Serv Comm, 
    470 Mich 154
    , 161; 680 NW2d
    840 (2004) (“We have observed many times in the past that our Legislature is free to make
    policy choices that, especially in controversial matters, some observers will inevitably
    think unwise. This dispute over the wisdom of a law, however, cannot give warrant to a
    court to overrule the people’s Legislature.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, as
    stated in South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental
    Quality, 
    502 Mich 349
     (2018); Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 
    473 Mich 562
    , 589; 702
    NW2d 539 (2005) (“The majority believes that policy decisions are properly left for the
    people’s elected representatives in the Legislature, not the judiciary.”); Johnson v Recca,
    
    492 Mich 169
    , 187; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (“This Court only has the constitutional
    authority to exercise the ‘judicial power.’ ‘[O]ur judicial role “precludes imposing
    different policy choices than those selected by the Legislature . . . .” ’ ‘Whether or not a
    statute is productive of injustice, inconvenience, is unnecessary, or otherwise, are questions
    with which courts . . . have no concern.’ ”) (citations omitted); People v Harris, 
    499 Mich 332
    , 345; 885 NW2d 832 (2016) (“Our role as members of the judiciary is not to second-
    guess those policy decisions or to change the words of a statute in order to reach a different
    result.”); People v Betts, 
    507 Mich 527
    , 565; 968 NW2d 497 (2021) (“We decline to
    encroach on the Legislature’s plenary authority to create law or on its role in shaping and
    articulating policy by choosing among the plethora of possibilities.”). See also 5 Smith &
    Philbin, Michigan Civil Jurisprudence (April 2022 update), Constitutional Law, § 48
    (“Legislative enactments, as they bear on a matter of public policy, are conclusive; indeed,
    it is fundamental that courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature.”)
    (citations omitted).
    15
    policy of the statute has nothing to do with its constitutionality[.]” Tyler v People, 
    8 Mich 320
    , 333 (1860). More recently, in People v Harris, 
    499 Mich 332
    , 356, 358; 885 NW2d
    832 (2016), we reiterated:
    [O]ur statutory analysis is controlled by principles of interpretation, not
    palatability of outcomes. It is not our role to rewrite the law or substitute our
    own policy judgment in the face of the text of the statute . . . .
    * * *
    [I]n our democracy, a legislature is free to make inefficacious
    or even unwise policy choices. The correction of these policy
    choices is not a judicial function as long as the legislative
    choices do not offend the constitution. Instead, the correction
    must be left to the people and the tools of democracy: the ballot
    box, initiative, referendum, or constitutional amendment.
    [Id. (second alteration by the Harris Court), quoting People v McIntire, 
    461 Mich 147
    , 159; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).]
    I wholeheartedly believe that to be true. We must not strike down a statute because we
    disagree with the Legislature’s policy choice. Indeed, leaving policy to the legislative
    branch is a mainstay of the country’s jurisprudence, not just that of our Court. Several of
    the leading national treatises contain the same instruction that courts should refrain from
    policymaking. 19
    19
    See, e.g., 16 CJS (May 2022 update), Constitutional Law, § 426 (“It is for the legislature
    to determine the justice, wisdom, necessity, desirability, or expediency of a law which is
    within its powers to enact, and such questions are not open to inquiry by the courts. It is
    not the province of a court to question the wisdom, social desirability, or economic policy
    underlying a statute as these are matters for the legislature’s determination. It is the court’s
    province to determine only the applicability, legality, and constitutionality of a statute.
    When searching for legislative intent, a court’s duty is simply to construe the legislative
    will as the court finds it, without regard to the court’s own views as to the wisdom or justice
    of the statute.”) (citations omitted); 16A Am Jur 2d (May 2022 update), Constitutional
    Law, § 184 (“[A]ll questions of policy, including changes in policy, are for the
    determination of the legislature and not for the courts. If Congress’ coverage decisions are
    16
    The principle that courts should leave policy decisions to the legislative branch is
    based in separation-of-powers concerns. See Const 1963, art 3, § 2 (“The powers of
    government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person
    exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another
    branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”) (emphasis added). Under that
    doctrine, the judiciary should not take on a legislative role by engaging in policymaking. 20
    Additionally, the Legislature is, as a practical matter, better able to weigh policy
    concerns. 21 It is the more democratic institution that better reflects the will of the voters. 22
    mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them; the Supreme Court should
    not legislate for them. When reviewing for constitutional unreasonableness, the judiciary
    must give great deference to legislative action and should not substitute its own public
    policy judgments for that of the enacting body. In short, public policy is not a basis for
    declaring a statute unconstitutional.”) (citations omitted); 16A Am Jur 2d (May 2022
    update), Constitutional Law, § 281 (“A fundamental principle of the constitutional
    separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch
    is the ultimate arbiter of public policy. Thus, the determination of public policy lies almost
    exclusively with the legislature, and courts will not interfere with that determination in the
    absence of palpable errors. A court must interpret and apply statutes in the manner in
    which they are written and cannot rewrite them to comport with the court’s notions of
    orderliness and public policy.”) (citations omitted). See also Miller, 
    567 US at 493
    (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Determining the appropriate sentence for a teenager convicted
    of murder presents grave and challenging questions of morality and social policy. Our role,
    however, is to apply the law, not to answer such questions.”).
    20
    See Kyser v Kasson Twp, 
    486 Mich 514
    , 536; 786 NW2d 543 (2010) (“[P]olicy-making
    is at the core of the legislative function.”).
    21
    Devillers, 
    473 Mich at 589
     (“The Legislature, unlike the judiciary, is institutionally
    equipped to assess the numerous trade-offs associated with a particular policy choice.”);
    People v Steanhouse, 
    500 Mich 453
    , 483-484; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (LARSEN, J.,
    concurring) (stating that the Legislature “is certainly better equipped than this Court to
    weigh the policy options”).
    22
    See Miller, 
    567 US at 515
     (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When a legislature prescribes that a
    category of killers must be sentenced to life imprisonment, the legislature, which
    17
    It is better able to consider scientific evidence and weigh competing interests. 23 Unlike the
    Legislature, the judiciary resolves disputes between parties. That function does not easily
    translate to evaluating the strength of scientific claims. 24 Despite the decades of legal
    experience the justices on this Court have, I do not believe we are well-suited for this foray
    into neuroscience.
    I understand that it is the Court’s responsibility to judge whether penalties violate
    our Constitution’s “cruel or unusual punishment” clause and that, in the abstract, doing so
    and striking down a penalty as unconstitutional does not necessarily mean that the Court is
    impermissibly treading into the policy realm. The majority, of course, does not simply say
    that it finds mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old offenders unsavory and unscientific, but
    presumably reflects the views of the electorate, is taking the position that the risk that these
    offenders will kill again outweighs any countervailing consideration, including reduced
    culpability due to immaturity or the possibility of rehabilitation. When the majority of this
    Court countermands that democratic decision, what the majority is saying is that members
    of society must be exposed to the risk that these convicted murderers, if released from
    custody, will murder again.”).
    23
    See Henry v Dow Chem Co, 
    473 Mich 63
    , 92 n 24; 701 NW2d 684 (2005)
    (“ ‘[Legislatures] can gather facts from a wide range of sources to help lawmakers decide
    whether the law should be changed and, if so, what sorts of changes should be made.’ ”),
    quoting Schwartz & Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through
    Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 Conn L Rev 1215, 1219 (2001); Henry, 
    473 Mich at 91
    (explaining that balancing competing interests is “a task more appropriate for the
    legislative branch than the judiciary”).
    24
    Betts, 507 Mich at 584 (VIVIANO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Given
    the nature of our role of adjudicating individual disputes and the consequent institutional
    limitations this role entails, we must exercise ‘humility about the capacity of judges to
    evaluate the soundness of scientific and economic claims[.]’ Barrett, Countering the
    Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 Const Comment 61, 74 (2017) (reviewing Barnett, Our
    Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People (New
    York: HarperCollins, 2016)).”) (alteration in original).
    18
    rather applies the relevant factors from Lorentzen and Bullock. For the reasons outlined in
    this opinion, I strongly disagree with how the majority applies those factors, especially the
    majority’s overreliance on neuroscience. As a result, I view the majority’s decision as
    replacing a constitutional penalty with a penalty that the majority believes is better policy.
    This not only usurps the Legislature’s role but also overrides the policy choice of the
    framers, whose Constitution, I believe, would permit the instant penalty. Justice Thomas
    M. Cooley warned against this kind of judicial overreach:
    What is right, what is expedient, what is proper, what constitute the
    inalienable rights of individuals, and what is necessary to be inserted in their
    constitution of government to protect them, the people who frame it must
    judge, and not generally he who, under it, is vested with executive or judicial
    functions. [Cooley, Preface: With Some Considerations Regarding the Study
    of the Law, in 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, x
    (Chicago: Callaghan & Cockcroft, 1871).]
    Moreover, insofar as the majority’s holding is a policy decision, it is one for which
    there is no clear limiting principle. I would not be surprised if the Court extends its current
    line in the near future. The science defendant offers indicates that there is significant
    neurological development until age 25, and while the majority acknowledges this science,
    the majority today extends Miller’s and Montgomery’s holdings only to offenders who are
    18 years old. I assume that in the coming years we will hear cases arguing that we should
    extend Miller’s protection to those in their early twenties as well. Relatedly, if mandatory
    LWOP is unconstitutional for 18-year-olds guilty of first-degree murder, surely it would
    be unconstitutional for 18-year-olds guilty of other offenses as well.           And as our
    understanding of neurological development continues to evolve in the future, must we
    reevaluate the line between youth and adulthood every few years? Should we begin to
    19
    consider any other factors that might affect adult brain function? Young adults are, after
    all, not the only ones subject to factors that cloud their reasoning—indeed, we are all
    subject to cognitive biases to different extents. 25 Other groups, such as older adults, may
    also have neurological factors that impair their decision-making. 26
    It is up to the Legislature to balance the science with society’s penological goals,
    i.e., “rehabilitation of the individual offender, society’s need to deter similar proscribed
    behavior in others, and the need to prevent the individual offender from causing further
    injury to society.” Lorentzen, 
    387 Mich at 180
    . But I fear that the majority’s opinion is
    the first step in making it the Court’s ongoing task to reconcile the Legislature’s sentencing
    scheme with every jot and tittle of new scientific evidence. While it’s understandable to
    want our law to be in line with the most recent scientific understanding, I believe it is also
    important for the court system and society to have stability. That stability is now thrown
    into question, as we face a future of frequently changing constitutional lines.
    III. CONCLUSION
    I take no issue with the scientific propositions that defendant raises. However,
    evaluating that scientific evidence is a task I believe is outside this Court’s wheelhouse.
    25
    See, e.g., Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
    2011).
    26
    See, e.g., Strough & Bruine de Bruin, Decision Making Across Adulthood, 2 Ann Rev
    Developmental Psychol 345, 357 (2020) (“Age-related declines in fluid reasoning ability
    and working memory can compromise the quality of older adults’ decision making when
    decisions       are      complex.”)        (citation   omitted),      available      at
    
    (accessed July 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/C3T9-B4EY].
    20
    Rather than playing amateur scientists, I believe that the judiciary should focus on
    interpreting and applying the law. Applying the relevant law here, I do not believe that the
    factors from Lorentzen and Bullock weigh against the constitutionality of mandatory
    LWOP for 18-year-old offenders.        As such, I believe that we should respect the
    Legislature’s constitutional choice of penalty rather than impose our own.
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    21