State of Iowa v. Walter Brown ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-0942
    Filed February 16, 2022
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    WALTER BROWN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea Dryer,
    Judge.
    A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with intent
    to deliver. AFFIRMED.
    Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
    2
    SCHUMACHER, Judge.
    Walter Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with
    intent to deliver. He claims the district court violated his due process rights by not
    conducting an in-person plea colloquy. He also contends the court improperly
    sentenced him to prison, rather than a term of probation. Brown does not meet
    the “good cause” threshold for a direct appeal of his plea. The district court did not
    abuse its discretion when sentencing Brown. We affirm.
    I.     Background Facts & Proceedings
    Brown was charged by trial information in February 2020 for possession of
    a controlled substance with intent to deliver following the execution of a search
    warrant that led to the discovery of foil packets containing heroin.1 On March 12,
    2021, Brown filed a document captioned “Written Guilty Plea and Waiver of Rights
    (Alford Plea)” for possession with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section
    124.401(1)(c)(1) (2018), a class “C” felony, as charged in the trial information.2
    Brown’s written plea waived his right to an in-person plea colloquy. He did
    not file a motion in arrest of judgment, although the written plea advised him of the
    requirement to do so if he wished to challenge his plea. The district court held a
    sentencing hearing on July 8. Brown appeared personally for the sentencing.
    Defense counsel noted there were no pending motions and no legal reason that
    sentencing could not proceed. Brown provided a statement of allocution. The
    1The search warrant was executed in 2018 but charges were not filed until 2020.
    2An Alford plea allows the defendant to consent to imposition of a sentence without
    admitting their participation in the acts constituting the crime. See North
    Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 37 (1970).
    3
    court sentenced Brown to an indeterminate ten-year period of incarceration.
    Brown appeals.
    II.    Discussion
    Brown claims the district court violated his due process rights by failing to
    conduct an in-person plea colloquy, therefore preventing him from entering into the
    plea knowingly and voluntarily. Brown argues that because his plea was in writing,
    rather than in-person, there “were no guilty plea proceedings” and such constitutes
    reversible error. Brown also contends the district court failed to consider the goal
    of rehabilitation when sentencing him to a term of incarceration rather than
    probation.
    A.     Plea Colloquy
    Brown alleges the district court violated his due process rights by failing to
    provide an in-person plea colloquy. He acknowledges the lack of a motion in arrest
    of judgment, arguing his failure to file such motion is excused because his
    advisement of the necessity to file a motion was in writing, rather than in person.
    We look to whether Brown demonstrated good cause to appeal under Iowa Code
    section 814.6 (2021). This section prohibits direct appeal from guilty pleas unless
    the defendant can show good cause. 
    Iowa Code § 814.6
    (1)(a)(3). The statute,
    effective July 1, 2019, provides two exceptions to the prohibition from appealing
    guilty pleas: (1) class “A” felonies or (2) when the defendant establishes “good
    cause.” 
    Id.
     § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Because Brown entered a plea to a class “C” felony,
    the first exception does not apply.
    The second alternative permits an appeal only upon a showing of “good
    cause.” Id. § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Our supreme court has held that good cause means
    4
    “a legally sufficient reason.” State v. Damme, 
    944 N.W.2d 98
    , 104 (Iowa 2020). A
    legally sufficient reason is a ground that potentially would afford the defendant
    relief. State v. Tucker, 
    959 N.W.2d 140
    , 149 (Iowa 2021). “[W]hat constitutes
    good cause is context-specific.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 104.
    Brown was sentenced on July 8, 2021. As such, the statutory amendments
    of section 814.6 apply. See State v. Macke, 
    933 N.W.2d 226
    , 228 (Iowa 2019)
    (finding that the amendments to section 814.6 affect only those whose judgment
    and sentence was entered after July 1, 2019). As noted, Brown attacks the plea
    itself, claiming he did not enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily because the
    court did not hold an in-person plea colloquy.3
    Our supreme court has rejected a similar claim. In State v. Tucker, the
    defendant asked the court to expand the concept of good cause to include a claim
    that a plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made. 959 N.W.2d at 153. The
    court rejected the argument, noting,
    3 Brown does not challenge the Iowa Supreme Court’s authority to alter the criminal
    rules of procedure by administrative order due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While
    Brown argues that “there were no guilty plea proceedings” because Brown’s plea
    was in writing, Iowa Supreme Court administrative orders in effect at the time the
    district court accepted Brown’s plea permitted the acceptance of felony pleas in
    writing. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing
    Preparation for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services (Mar. 14, 2020);
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions For
    Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services (May 22, 2020); Iowa Supreme
    Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions For
    Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services pmbl. (Nov. 10, 2020); Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions For
    Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services (Nov. 24, 2020); Iowa Supreme
    Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Lessons Learned From the Judicial Branch
    Response To COVID-19 (Apr. 28, 2021); Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In
    the Matter of Ongoing COVID-19 Iowa Judicial Branch Court Services and
    Processes Continued to January 1, 2022 (June 21, 2022).
    5
    A legally sufficient reason to appeal as a matter of right is a reason
    that, at minimum, would allow a court to provide some relief on direct
    appeal. Here, there is no such possibility. Tucker pleaded guilty and
    requested immediate sentencing. He waived his right to file a motion
    in arrest of judgment. His failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment
    precludes appellate relief. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A
    defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea
    proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the
    defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”).
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Brown did not request immediate sentencing. However, he failed to file a
    motion in arrest of judgment challenging his plea even though the written plea
    informed him of the necessity of filing one. We determine Brown has failed to
    demonstrate good cause for the appeal of his plea. Given the lack of a motion in
    arrest of judgment, this court cannot afford Brown relief.
    B.     Sentencing
    Brown claims the district court failed to consider a sentence that would
    rehabilitate him, as required under Iowa Code section 901.5. As a result, he claims
    his imprisonment violates his due process rights. However, Brown’s briefing fails
    to include any supporting authority for his assertion that the district court’s
    sentence violates his due process rights.4
    A defendant cannot merely utter constitutional phrases and transform their
    claim into a constitutional violation. As such, we could consider this claim waived.
    See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3). Brown does not explain how the court’s
    alleged failure to properly weigh statutory factors in sentencing constitutes a due
    process violation rather than the normal standard of abuse of discretion. Because
    4 Brown argues that sentencing implicates due process. While true, it is insufficient
    to explain how his sentence violates his due process rights.
    6
    Brown concedes that this claim of error could be considered an abuse of discretion
    by the sentencing court, and because the claim more appropriately falls under that
    analysis, we consider the merits as an abuse-of-discretion claim.
    “We review the district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State
    v. Hill, 
    878 N.W.2d 269
    , 272 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). “A district court abuses
    its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an
    extent clearly unreasonable. A district court’s ‘ground or reason is untenable when
    it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous
    application of the law.’” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Sentences are presumed valid when they fall within the statutory
    parameters. State v. Hopkins, 
    860 N.W.2d 550
    , 554 (Iowa 2015). District courts
    should consider all relevant factors when considering what sentence to impose,
    including, but not limited to, “the nature of the offense, the attending
    circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of his
    reform.” State v. Leckington, 
    713 N.W.2d 208
    , 216 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).
    Importantly, “[t]he courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in
    determining a proper sentence.” 
    Id.
     (quoting State v. August, 
    589 N.W.2d 740
    ,
    744 (Iowa 1999)); see also 
    Iowa Code § 901.5
     (noting that the court should
    determine what sentence “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation
    of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by
    the defendant”).
    At sentencing, the district court considered Brown’s previous convictions
    and indicated, “Brown does have a significant substance abuse addiction.” The
    court also considered Brown’s age, who was sixty-seven years old at the time of
    7
    sentencing. The court noted that, “under many circumstances, I would agree that
    Mr. Brown would be an appropriate candidate for probation supervision.”
    However, the court weighed those considerations against the “numerous and . . .
    serious” pretrial supervision violations Brown committed, which mostly involved
    repeated drug violations, and sentenced Brown to an indeterminate ten years of
    incarceration.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Brown. We
    have consistently held that courts may consider whether the defendant would be
    a good candidate for probation. See State v. Carlson, No. 19-2113, 
    2021 WL 210702
    , at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (collecting cases). Here, the district
    court considered mitigating factors, like Brown’s addiction and age, and concluded
    that probation would not benefit Brown based on his repeated violations of pretrial
    release. The sentence imposed fell within the statutory parameters. The court did
    not abuse its discretion. We affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-0942

Filed Date: 2/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/16/2022