People of Michigan v. Ian Gunther Lucker ( 2018 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
    June 12, 2018
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                  No. 331986
    Berrien Circuit Court
    IAN GUNTHER LUCKER,                                                LC No. 2015-015390-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine, MCL
    333.7403(2)(b)(i), for which he was originally sentenced, as a second offense, MCL
    333.7413(2), to 120 days’ jail time and two years’ probation. Defendant later pleaded guilty to
    three counts of violating his probation, for which he was sentenced to 10 to 20 years’
    imprisonment. Defendant then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal that sentence,
    which this Court denied.1     Subsequently, defendant applied for leave to appeal this Court’s
    order with our Supreme Court, which ordered that the application be held in abeyance pending
    the outcome of appeals that “may resolve an issue in the present application for leave to appeal.”
    People v Lucker, 887 NW2d 405 (2016). On July 24, 2017, the Court issued its opinion in
    People v Steanhouse, 
    500 Mich 453
    ; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (Steanhouse II), and subsequently,
    entered an order remanding the instant case to this Court “for consideration, as on leave granted,
    of whether the defendant’s sentence is reasonable under the standard set forth in Steanhouse.”
    People v Lucker, 
    501 Mich 875
    , 875-876; 901 NW2d 863 (2017). We now affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Defendant was at a home that was under surveillance for a methamphetamine lab when
    the police executed a search warrant. He was located in the basement where an active lab was
    found with components and some processed methamphetamines. He unsuccessfully tried to
    escape. Defendant admitted to police that he had used meth the day before.
    1
    People v Lucker, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 25, 2016 (Docket
    No. 331986).
    -1-
    The trial court sentenced defendant to 120 days’ jail time and two years’ probation with
    the condition that he must successfully complete the Kalamazoo Probation Enhancement
    Program (KPEP) in Berrien County. Shortly after being released from jail, defendant violated
    his probation by refusing to enter the KPEP and by committing first-degree home invasion and
    assault by strangulation. As noted, defendant pled guilty to those probation violations and the
    trial court sentenced him to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
    II. SENTENCING
    Defendant now argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence of 10 to 20
    years’ imprisonment for possession of methamphetamines, which has a guidelines range of 0 to
    17 months, imposed subsequent to his probation violation, is unreasonable and not proportionate
    to his offense.
    A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
    “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an
    appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Lockridge, 
    498 Mich 358
    , 392: 870 NW2d 502
    (2015). “[T]he standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for
    reasonableness on appeal is abuse of discretion.” Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 471.
    “In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate
    courts may . . . take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation
    from the Guidelines. We reject, however, an appellate rule that requires ‘extraordinary’
    circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at 474. An abuse of
    discretion occurs when a trial court violates the principle of proportionality or fails to “provide
    adequate reasons for the extent of the departure sentence imposed.” Id. at 476.
    As noted, we review this issue for reasonableness. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. The
    controlling standard of reasonableness is the principle of proportionality pursuant to Milbourn,
    435 Mich at 636. See Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 471-472. As this Court recently explained in
    People v Dixon-Bey, 
    321 Mich App 490
    , 520-521; 909 NW2d 458 (2017):
    “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by
    an appellate court for reasonableness.” []Lockridge, 498 Mich [at 392]. “[T]he
    standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for
    reasonableness on appeal is an abuse of discretion. [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at
    471.] In Steanhouse [II], the Michigan Supreme Court clarified that ‘the relevant
    question for appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness” is “whether
    the trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality . . .
    .” [Id.] The principle of proportionality is one in which
    “a judge helps to fulfill the overall legislative scheme of criminal
    punishment by taking care to assure that the sentences imposed
    across the discretionary range are proportionate to the seriousness
    of the matters that come before the court for sentencing. In
    making this assessment, the judge, of course, must take into
    -2-
    account the nature of the offense and the background of the
    offender.” [Id. at 472, quoting []Milbourn, 435 Mich [at 651].]
    Under this principle, “ ‘[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to
    the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the
    guidelines’ recommended range.’ ” Steanhouse [II], 500 Mich at 472, quoting
    Milbourn, 435 Mich at 661.
    The sentencing guidelines are an “aid to accomplish the purposes of proportionality . . . .”
    Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 524. The sentencing guidelines “ ‘provide objective factual
    guideposts that can assist sentencing courts in ensuring that the offenders with similar offense
    and offender characteristics receive substantially similar sentences.’ ” Id., quoting People v
    Smith, 
    482 Mich 292
    , 309; 754 NW2d 284 (2008) (brackets omitted). The Michigan Supreme
    Court has been clear that while the sentencing guidelines are now only advisory, they “remain a
    highly relevant consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion . . . .” Lockridge,
    498 Mich at 391. See also Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474-475. As this Court recently
    explained:
    Because the guidelines embody the principle of proportionality and trial courts
    must consult them when sentencing, it follows that they continue to serve as a
    ‘useful tool’ or ‘guideposts’ for effectively combating disparity in sentencing.
    Therefore, relevant factors for determining whether a departure sentence is more
    proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range continue to include (1)
    whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime, People v
    Houston, 
    448 Mich 312
    , 321-322; 532 NW2d 508 (1995), see also Milbourn, 435
    Mich at 657, (2) factors not considered by the guidelines, Houston, 
    448 Mich at 322-324
    , see also Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660, and (3) factors considered by the
    guidelines but given inadequate weight, Houston, 
    448 Mich at 324-325
    , see also
    Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660 n 27. [Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 524-525.]
    Other factors to consider “include the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, Houston, 
    448 Mich at 323
    , the defendant’s expressions of remorse, 
    id.,
     and the defendant’s potential for
    rehabilitation, id.” Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525 n 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
    “key test” applicable to sentencing is “whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of
    the matter . . . .” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 661 (emphasis added).
    B. ANALYSIS
    Defendant does not challenge the scoring of any offense variables (OVs) or prior record
    variables (PRVs). Thus, the minimum guideline range for his possession of methamphetamine
    conviction was for 0 to 17 months’ imprisonment. MCL777.65. For that conviction defendant
    was sentenced to 10 to 20 years’, or 120 to 240 months’ imprisonment. That sentence was
    therefore above the guideline range. MCL 777.65.
    The trial court considered multiple factors when sentencing defendant. The trial court
    articulated that defendant had been convicted of approximately 38 different crimes in 10 years.
    It also took into account that defendant engaged in serious felony behavior while on probation,
    -3-
    failed to complete anything on probation, and blatantly refused to comply with community
    resources. The trial court stated that the purpose of the sentence was “punishment, protection of
    the community, deterrence, reformation and restitution.” The court also informed defendant that
    for “11 years you’ve been victimizing our community, you can spend 10 years of it in prison
    now paying for your past crimes.”
    “[T]he sentencing court is not precluded from considering events surrounding the
    probation violation when sentencing the defendant on the original offense.” People v Hendrick,
    
    472 Mich 555
    , 557; 697 NW2d 511 (2005). “[T]he sentencing guidelines apply to sentences
    imposed after a probation violation and that acts giving rise to the probation violation may
    constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines.” 
    Id.
     In this case,
    defendant failed to successfully complete the KPEP in Berrien County and committed first-
    degree home invasion and assault by strangulation. In fact, defendant refused to even enter the
    program as instructed by the trial court and his probation officer, while knowing that the
    consequences could be severe.
    Based on defendant’s history of total disregard for the law and legal system, his
    engagement in new and violent criminal behavior, and his failure to comply with his probation
    conditions, the sentence the trial court imposed was reasonable and “proportionate to the
    seriousness of the matter.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that a
    prison sentence of 10 to 20 years was justified. Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 471-472; Milbourn,
    435 Mich at 661.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Peter D. O'Connell
    /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
    /s/ Michael J. Riordan
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 331986

Filed Date: 6/12/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2018