in Re glaze/tillis Minors ( 2019 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re GLAZE/TILLIS, Minors.                                         June 11, 2019
    No. 345180
    Wayne Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 15-520588-NA
    Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and GADOLA and LETICA, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent mother appeals as of right the order of the trial court terminating her parental
    rights to her minor children, SLG, SMT, SMG, EDG, and MMG, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
    (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to
    provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if
    returned to custody of the parent). We affirm.
    I. FACTS
    This case arises out of allegations that respondent did not protect SMT from sexual abuse
    by respondent’s boyfriend. The initial petition alleged that the boyfriend sexually abused SMT,
    and that when SMT informed respondent of the sexual abuse, respondent spanked the child and
    did not inform the authorities of the abuse. The initial petition also alleged that respondent knew
    that SLG and SMG had witnessed the sexual abuse of SMT, but refused to permit SLG and SMG
    to talk to Child Protective Services (CPS). CPS inspected respondent’s home and discovered
    that the home had little food and was sparsely furnished. The children were removed from
    respondent’s care, and after a jury trial regarding the allegations, the trial court assumed
    jurisdiction of the children.
    Thereafter, respondent was provided numerous services with the objective of reunifying
    respondent with the children. The service plan required respondent to successfully complete and
    benefit from parenting classes, participate in a psychiatric evaluation and follow the
    recommendations, participate in individual therapy and family therapy, maintain suitable
    housing, maintain a legal source of income, remain in contact with her caseworker, submit
    random drug screens, attend all court hearings, and regularly visit the children.
    -1-
    After almost two years, however, respondent had failed to comply with most aspects of
    the service plan. Specifically, respondent had not participated in the required drug screens for
    several months leading up to the termination hearing. Respondent had attended only 34 of 87
    scheduled visits with the children. Some of the children became upset when respondent missed a
    visit, but when she did attend a visit, the children sometimes expressed a desire to leave. The
    foster care worker described the visits respondent did attend with the children as “chaotic,” and
    testified that respondent did not demonstrate adequate parenting skills during her visits.
    Respondent left one visit early, stating that the children were “too cranky” for her. Respondent
    missed 18 of 26 family therapy sessions that were scheduled to occur after her visits with the
    children. Respondent also failed to provide the foster care worker with documentation to verify
    employment or other source of income, nor had she permitted the foster care worker to assess her
    home. In addition, the children’s various foster parents indicated that they were willing to adopt
    the children in their care. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court terminated
    respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and also found that
    termination was in the best interests of the children. Respondent now appeals from the order of
    the trial court.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate
    her parental rights. She also argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the best
    interests of the children. We disagree.
    This Court “reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate
    determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 
    303 Mich. App. 701
    , 709-
    710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). To be clearly erroneous, a trial court’s determination must be more
    than possibly or probably incorrect. In re Ellis, 
    294 Mich. App. 30
    , 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). A
    finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
    Id. In reviewing
    the trial court’s
    determination, this Court must give due regard to the unique opportunity of the trial court to
    judge the credibility of those witnesses who appeared before it. Id.; see also MCR 2.613(C).
    “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
    termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re
    Olive/Metts Minors, 
    297 Mich. App. 35
    , 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[W]hether termination of
    parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence.” In re Moss, 
    301 Mich. App. 76
    , 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review the trial
    court’s ruling regarding best interests for clear error. In re Schadler, 
    315 Mich. App. 406
    , 408;
    890 NW2d 676 (2016).
    Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate
    her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent specifically argues
    that the trial court lacked clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights under
    each of the statutory grounds, and that she complied with her treatment plan. The record does
    not support respondent’s argument.
    -2-
    “Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
    terminate a respondent’s parental rights.” In re 
    Ellis, 294 Mich. App. at 32
    . In this case, the trial
    court found three statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights, MCL
    712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), by clear and convincing evidence. In relevant part, MCL
    712A.19b authorizes a trial court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing
    evidence that any of the following exist:
    (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182
    or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and
    the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
    (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
    no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a
    reasonable time considering the child’s age.
    * * *
    (g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails
    to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
    expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within
    a reasonable time considering the child’s age.1
    * * *
    (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
    child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
    the parent.
    The statutory basis to terminate a parent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
    exists “when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite
    time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services . . . .” In re
    
    White, 303 Mich. App. at 710
    (alteration in original; citation and quotation marks omitted). Here,
    the initial dispositional order was entered on October 14, 2016, more than 182 days before the
    trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights on June 20, 2018. At the adjudication
    trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that respondent neglected and refused to provide proper
    or necessary support to the children, the children were subject to a substantial risk of harm to
    their wellbeing while in respondent’s care, and that respondent’s home was unfit for the children
    because of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity. In its written order
    terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court found that respondent had failed to
    1
    MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was amended by 
    2018 PA 58
    , effective June 12, 2018. The previous
    language of that statutory section provided “The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide
    proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
    able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”
    -3-
    benefit from services, participate in drug screens, consistently visit the children, or find and
    maintain a stable source of income. The record supports each of these findings. Respondent
    failed to establish that she had a legal source of income between the adjudication and the
    termination of her parental rights. Respondent missed more than 50 visits with the children, 18
    family therapy sessions, and 63 drug screens. Additionally, two CPS workers testified that
    respondent failed to comply with her service plan or benefit from parenting classes. One of the
    CPS employees also stated that respondent’s visits with the children were unstructured; the other
    CPS employee opined that respondent was not fit to care for the children. Thus, the trial court
    did not err by terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
    When examining the pre-amendment language of MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), this Court has
    found that “[a] parent’s failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that
    the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody.” 
    White, 303 Mich. App. at 710
    . Similarly, when examining MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), this Court also held that “a parent’s
    failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the
    child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” 
    Id. at 711.
    Because respondent failed to
    fully participate in, benefit from, or comply with her service plan, the trial court did not err by
    terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)2 and (j).
    Respondent next argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the best
    interests of the children. “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine
    the children’s best interests.” In re 
    White, 303 Mich. App. at 713
    . In considering the child’s best
    interests, the trial court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich
    App at 87. “In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may
    consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
    permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.”
    In re Olive/Metts 
    Minors, 297 Mich. App. at 41-42
    (citations omitted). “The trial court may also
    consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case
    service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care,
    and the possibility of adoption.” In re 
    White, 303 Mich. App. at 714
    . In making the
    determination, the trial court may rely upon evidence in the entire record, including the evidence
    establishing the statutory grounds for termination. In re Trejo, 
    462 Mich. 341
    , 353-354; 612
    NW2d 407 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re 
    Moss, 301 Mich. App. at 83
    . Under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, “[h]ow a parent treats one child is
    certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re LaFrance Minors, 
    306 Mich. App. 713
    , 730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (alteration in original; quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    2
    The pre-amendment language of MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was in effect at the time this case was
    initiated and when the termination hearing began. When the trial court issued its opinion from
    the bench at the conclusion of the termination hearing on June 15, 2018, and when the trial court
    issued its order on June 19, 2018, the amended language of the statute was in effect. A review of
    the record supports termination of respondent’s parental rights under either version of the statute.
    -4-
    Furthermore, “[a] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is
    required to consider” when making its best interests determination, In re Gonzales/Martinez, 
    310 Mich. App. 426
    , 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015), and “a child’s placement with relatives weighs
    against termination.” In re Mason, 
    486 Mich. 142
    , 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Relative” is
    defined by MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) as
    an individual who is at least 18 years of age and related to the child by blood,
    marriage, or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent,
    aunt or uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle,
    sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin once removed,
    and the spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by death or
    divorce.
    Thus, a child’s biological parent is not their “relative” but a child’s grandparent or uncle is his or
    her relative. See MCL 712A.13a(1)(j); In re 
    Schadler, 315 Mich. App. at 413
    .
    Respondent argues that the trial court failed to address that SLG, SMG, and MMG were
    in relative placements in the termination order. Respondent’s argument, however, is not
    supported by the record or the trial court’s termination order. In its order, the trial court
    indicated that SLG and SMG were placed with their paternal grandmother and that MMG was
    placed with her paternal uncle. The termination order also stated that the children’s “permanent
    placements and plans should be allowed to proceed without any further negative interference
    from [respondent]” and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best
    interests. Thus, the trial court did specifically acknowledge and consider the relative placements
    of SLG, SMG, and MMG in the termination order.
    Respondent’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to address the best interests of
    each of the children individually similarly fails. A trial court only needs to address the best
    interests of each child individually if the best interests of the children significantly differ. 
    White, 303 Mich. App. at 715-716
    . Respondent failed to make any argument regarding whether the
    needs of the children significantly differ. The record’s only indication regarding a significant
    difference in the needs of the children was SMT’s stated desire to return to respondent’s care;
    none of the other children expressed a desire to return to respondent’s care. The trial court
    specifically acknowledged SMT’s desire to return to respondent’s care and found that SMT’s
    bond with respondent and her desire to return to respondent’s care was outweighed by the factors
    in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. Thus, the best interests of the children in
    this case do not significantly differ and the trial court did not err by failing to address the best
    interests of each of the children individually.
    In its written order terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court found that
    termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests because of
    respondent’s lack of progress with her parent agency treatment goals and her lack of proper
    parenting skills. The trial court also found that adoption was the best permanency plan for SLG,
    SMT, SMG, and EDG, that MMG’s paternal uncle was willing to plan for her long-term care,
    and that SMT’s bond with respondent was outweighed by the continuing risk of harm to SMT.
    When making its statutory basis findings, the trial court found that respondent had not benefitted
    from services during the three years the Department of Health and Human Services had custody
    -5-
    of the children. Respondent’s failure to participate in drug screens, consistently visit the
    children, and find and maintain a stable source of income also contributed to the trial court’s
    statutory basis findings.
    The record supports the trial court’s findings. Respondent failed to establish that she had
    a legal source of income between the adjudication and the termination of her parental rights.
    Respondent missed more than 50 visits with the children, 18 family therapy sessions, and 63
    drug screens. Additionally, respondent failed to benefit from parenting classes and one CPS
    worker testified that termination of respondent’s parental rights would provide permanency and
    stability to the children. Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that termination of
    respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
    /s/ Michael F. Gadola
    /s/ Anica Letica
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 345180

Filed Date: 6/11/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/12/2019