James Walter Parchman v. Amwood Products, Inc. ( 2005 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CT-00075-SCT
JAMES WALTER PARCHMAN
v.
AMWOOD PRODUCTS, INC. AND MISSISSIPPI
MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION WORKERS’
COMPENSATION TRUST
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/15/2005
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SHARION R. AYCOCK
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JIM WAIDE
RON L. WOODRUFF
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: JOHN S. HILL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/12/2008
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
GRAVES, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On January 14, 2008, this Court granted James Parchman’s petition for writ of
certiorari to review the following issues:
I. Whether the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review and
failed to resolve all doubts in favor of compensation in its opinion.
II. Whether the Court of Appeals misapprehended binding precedent in
holding that Parchman had a compensable injury prior to September 2002.
III. Whether the Court of Appeals misinterpreted binding law in holding the
two-year statute of limitations was not tolled where Amwood failed to comply
with the notice requirement of the act.
IV. Whether the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that there was not
substantial evidence supporting the Commission’s split decision and
misapprehended facts concerning Parchman’s “wage-earning” capacity.
¶2. Although Parchman raised the issue of whether Amwood’s continued payment of his
salary constituted payment in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits on appeal, he failed to
reassert this issue in his petition for writ of certiorari to this Court. However, we find the
aforementioned issue to be dispositive of the case. Amwood’s continued payment of
Parchman’s salary through September of 2002, even though he was absent from work for
more than sixteen weeks as a result of his injury, constituted payment of salary in lieu of
workers’ compensation benefits. Accordingly, we find that Parchman’s petition to controvert
was not barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, we reverse and remand the case for
a hearing on the merits.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. James Parchman began working for Amwood Products in 1993, and he was promoted
to plant manager for Amwood in March 2000. Parchman’s responsibilties as plant manager
included overseeing several employees, and he was directly supervised by Jackie Burdine,
Amwood’s vice-president.
¶4. In March 2000, Parchman was assisting another Amwood employee with a welding
job when a piece of hot slag fell into his right boot, leaving two small burns on either side
of Parchman’s ankle. Because of the size of the burns, Parchman did not consider the injury
to be serious and simply put an antibiotic ointment and a bandage on the burns. It was not
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until several weeks later, when the burns had not healed, that Parchman sought medical
treatment for the injury. Under the orders of his doctor, Parchman began weekly treatments
for the burns from April 2000 through February 2002. At the commission hearing, Parchman
testified that he scheduled his doctor’s appointments during his lunch break so that he would
not miss work. In February 2002, when the wounds still had not healed, Parchman was
admitted to the hospital to undergo tests to determine why the wounds would not heal. At
that time, Parchman was hospitalized for three weeks.
¶5. In April and May of 2002, Parchman missed five weeks of work to undergo another
treatment for the unhealed burn wounds. After this treatment also failed to heal the wounds,
Parchman had skin grafts done on the area in the summer of 2002. Parchman received one
skin graft per week for eight weeks. During this process, Parchman was under doctor’s
orders to remain on bed rest, causing him to be absent from work for nearly three months.
¶6. While Parchman was off from work undergoing skin grafts, Amwood notified him
that they would no longer be able to pay his salary. Further, Greer, the president of
Amwood, suggested that Parchman apply for temporary disability benefits. Parchman
believed that he would be able to return to work at Amwood after the completion of his
treatments. However, Greer confirmed with Parchman that he was fired. Greer reported to
Parchman that Amwood was reorganizing and that his job as plant manager would no longer
exist. Amwood continued to pay Parchman’s full salary until his termination.
¶7. On July 23, 2003, Parchman filed his petition to controvert with the Mississippi
Workers’ Compensation Commission. Asserting that Parchman’s claim was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations, Amwood filed a motion to dismiss. At the hearing on
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Amwood’s motion to dismiss, Parchman testified that he reported to Burdine, Amwood’s
vice president, prior to his first doctor’s appointment that he was seeking medical treatment
for the burns on his foot. Further, he testified that he advised Burdine of each doctor’s
appointment prior to the appointment. Joey Southard, who was present when Parchman
sustained the injury, also testified that he and Burdine had discussed Parchman’s injury on
several occasions. Furthermore, Parchman discussed his injury on separate occasions with
two female employees of Amwood who were responsible for filing workers’ compensation
claims. One of the women, Ms. Edwards, testified that Parchman had told her that he did
not intend to file a claim for workers’ compensation, and further had advised her that he did
not wish her to file anything with the commission. Parchman denies that he requested Ms.
Edwards to refrain from filing anything with the commission.
¶8. Amwood maintained that it was unaware that Parchman’s injury was work-related
until more than a year after Parchman sustained the injury. After a hearing on the motion,
at which the aforementioned evidence was presented, the administrative law judge granted
the motion to dismiss, finding Parchman’s claim to be barred by the two-year statute of
limitations, as provided in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 71-3-35 (Rev. 2000).
Parchman appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to the full commission, which
affirmed the dismissal in a two-to-one decision on September 9, 2005. Parchman next
appealed the commission’s decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the dismissal.
Parchman then appealed that decision to this Court, which assigned the appeal to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, without dissent, affirmed the decision of the circuit court
on January 30, 2007. Parchman v. Amwood Prods., Inc., 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 31 (Miss.
4
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007). On January 17, 2008, this Court granted Parchman’s petition for
writ of certiorari. Parchman v. Amwood Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 2008).
ANALYSIS
¶9. Unless there exists an agreement “that the wage is a gratuity in addition to workmen’s
compensation,” when a claimant “is paid his usual salary and does no work for a given period
or does so little work that he really does not earn his wage” the continued payment of the
claimant’s salary “will be considered as having been in lieu of compensation.” Dunn,
Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation § 45 (3d ed. 1982) (emphasis added). “When an
employer elects to continue the payment of the wages of an injured employee and the
payment is not in return for work done or services rendered but is either expressly or
impliedly in lieu of compensation, the payments may be considered as payments of
compensation to the same extent and with like effect as payments otherwise made by an
insurance carrier under and in compliance with the Act. Dunn, Mississippi Workmen’s
Compensation § 318.1 (3d ed. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 348 So. 2d 236 (1977). Furthermore,
if the payment of wages was intended to be in lieu of compensation, credit for
the wages is allowed. However, since there is seldom any evidence on
whether such an intention lay behind the payment, it must be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the payment.
George S. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Harlow, 269 So. 2d 337, 338 (Miss. 1972). Moreover, “if
[the employee] is paid his regular wage, although he does no work at all, it is a reasonable
inference that the allowance is in lieu of compensation.” Id.
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¶10. The administrative law judge found that, even in light of the fact that Parchman
missed time from work beginning shortly after he sustained the injury, that he “continued to
perform the essential functions associated with his position,” such that Amwood’s continued
payment of Parchman’s salary did not constitute payment of his salary in lieu of workers’
compensation benefits. The commission agreed and dismissed the issue as without merit
without pointing to any facts to support its finding:
The Administrative Judge determined that claimant’s receipt of salary through
the fall of 2002 did not constitute “payment of salary in lieu of compensation”
but rather reflected payment of salary for work performed. We agree. The
claimant continued to work for the employer until September 2002 and was
paid for the services he rendered. The argument that wages or salary claimant
received were in lieu of compensation is spurious.
¶11. The Court of Appeals, applying the “substantial evidence” standard to review this
issue of fact, found that the commission’s decision was supported by “substantial evidence”
and therefore found the issue to be without merit. In support of its decision, the Court of
Appeals referenced the following:
Parchman testified in his deposition that during the periods that he was on
leave for treatment, he continued to communicate with the plant and do his job
to the best of his ability. Lanny Wilkerson, the office manager, also testified
that Parchman was in regular contact with his employees while he was out for
treatment. There was no evidence at all that Parchman was using paid sick
leave or vacation days during his extended absences as the basis for his
receiving his salary, as neither side raised the question. Accordingly, this
Court holds that the agency’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, and
Parchman’s arguments that his wages were paid in lieu of workers’
compensation benefits must fail.
Parchman v. Amwood Prods, Inc., 2007 Miss. Ct. App. LEXIS 31, *11-12, ¶ 18 (Miss. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2007).
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¶12. We disagree. The record reflects that Amwood continued to pay Parchman’s full
salary although he missed three weeks of work in February 2002, another five weeks of work
in April-May 2002, and nearly three months in the summer of 2002. This is clear evidence
that Parchman did not continue to “earn” his full wages. It is an erroneous conclusion that
Parchman was still performing the essential functions of his job and therefore continued to
“earn” his full salary when he was absent from work for three weeks in February, five weeks
in April-May 2002, and for the period of time that he missed in the summer of 2002 before
his termination. The following excerpt is from Parchman’s deposition regarding his job
duties and responsibilities:
Q. Any change in job responsibilities [after you assumed the position as plant
manager]?
A. No.
Q. What were your essential job responsibilities as assistant plant manager?
A. Basically to make sure the product moved from one end of the building,
out the back; make sure deliveries were on time; that we had the things to work
with; maintenance; upkeep; pretty well the whole nine yards. It (sic) was kind
of a jack of all trades.
....
Q. Did you have, for want of a better term, supervisors, foreman, lead men,
something like that that (sic) reported directly to you?
A. We did.
Q. How many people would have reported directly to you generally?
A. We probably had four lead people at all times, but I would say four.
....
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Q. So you were the person with principal responsibility or day-to-day in the
plant?
A. Correct.
¶13. Again, we find incredible the notion that Parchman continued to perform the job
duties and responsibilities that he described in his deposition testimony and therefore,
continued to “earn” his wages while he was absent from work for more than sixteen weeks.
Even the dissenting opinion acknowledges that “ . . . Greer told Parchman that Amwood
could no longer afford to pay his salary while he was not working and suggested that
Parchman apply for temporary social security disability benefits.” Therefore, we find that
Amwood’s continued payment of Parchman’s salary until September of 2002 constituted
payments made in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits, and that these payments, in the
place of workers’ compensation benefits, tolled the two-year statute of limitations.
Accordingly, Parchman’s petition to controvert, filed in July 2003, was not barred by the
statute of limitations. Furthermore, because we find this issue to be dispositive, the
remaining issues raised by Parchman need not be addressed. We reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case for a hearing on the merits.
CONCLUSION
¶14. We find that Amwood’s continued payment of Parchman’s salary, despite the fact that
he was absent from work seeking medical treatment for more than sixteen weeks, constituted
a payment of salary in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits. Accordingly, we find that
Parchman’s petition to controvert, filed in July 2003, was not barred by the statute of
limitations. Therefore, we reverse and remand the case for a hearing on the merits.
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¶15. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ.
CONCUR. EASLEY, J. DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
CARLSON, J. DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
SMITH, C.J..
CARLSON, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶16. Because I disagree with the majority that the employer’s salary payments to an
employee during certain periods when the employee missed work due to inpatient and
outpatient medical treatment for an on-the-job injury constituted payments of his salary in
lieu of workers’ compensation payments, thus tolling the applicable two-year statute of
limitations, I respectfully dissent.
¶17. On July 23, 2003, James Walter Parchman filed a Petition to Controvert with the
Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission concerning an injury he sustained while
working at Amwood Products, Inc. On August 15, 2003, Amwood filed its Answer. On
August 25, 2003, Amwood filed its Response to Requests for Admission. On May 7, 2004,
Amwood filed an Amended Answer to Petition to Controvert. On June 7, 2004, Parchman
filed a Pretrial Statement of Claimant. On June 14, 2004, Amwood filed a Motion to
Dismiss. On July 8, 2004, Parchman filed a Response to Amwood’s Motion to Dismiss,
along with deposition transcripts as exhibits.
¶18. Parchman testified in his first deposition that he began working at Amwood as an
assistant plant manager and had always been a salaried employee. Parchman had the
principal responsibilities of day-to-day operations in the plant. In the late 1980s, Parchman
was diagnosed with lupus, and he had check-ups for the condition every six months.
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Parchman also testified that in late March 2000, he was assisting fellow employee Joey
Southard 1 with a welding task when a piece of hot metal rolled into his boot and burned his
right ankle. He put a band-aid and Neosporin on his ankle and continued normal work
activity. In two to three weeks, the burn was bigger rather than healed. Parchman testified
that he told Jackie Burdine about the accident and made an appointment with Dr. McAuley
in Tupelo. Parchman filed his claims on his wife’s health insurance and missed no time from
work other than for doctor’s appointments. Parchman’s treatment was not working, so he
visited the wound center at North Mississippi Medical Center, beginning in June 2000, for
treatments once or twice a week until February 2002, normally at lunchtime, to minimize
time missed from work. Parchman’s doctors suspected that the wound’s failure to heal was
related to his lupus; however, tests conducted did not show that lupus was the cause.
¶19. In February 2002, Parchman was hospitalized for five days, which was the first time
he had missed work other than for doctor’s appointments. Parchman left the hospital and
then was again hospitalized for approximately three weeks. Parchman returned to work for
about six weeks. Beginning approximately in April 2002, Parchman received treatments for
five weeks and was unable to work. Parchman continued to draw his regular salary. He
again returned to work, and sometime in July 2002, Parchman’s doctor suggested that he
receive skin graft treatments for eight weeks. Parchman told Burdine that he would be
unable to work during the treatment, and Burdine did not say anything positive or negative
about the situation. Parchman then began the skin graft treatments around the first of August
2002 and missed eight weeks of work.
1
The record is replete with misspellings. The correct spelling is Southard.
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¶20. Around the third or fourth week, Thomas Greer, president of Amwood, called
Parchman and asked him to come by the plant. Parchman testified that Greer told Parchman
that Amwood could no longer afford to pay his salary while he was not working and
suggested that Parchman apply for temporary social security disability benefits. During the
seventh week, Greer again asked Parchman to come by the plant, where he told Parchman
that Amwood was restructuring and that his job was being eliminated. According to
Parchman, after leaving the meeting, he called Greer and asked him if he was being
terminated due to his inability to work, and Greer responded that Parchman had never
reported the incident. Parchman responded that Greer knew of the incident, and Greer again
stated that Parchman had not reported it. Parchman then worked at other jobs when he was
physically able to work. At the time of the deposition, Parchman was not working; he was
continuing medical treatment but had no disability benefits. All of Parchman’s medical
expenses were filed on his wife’s insurance plan. Parchman filed a separate lawsuit against
Amwood, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical
Leave Act.
¶21. Greer testified in his deposition that Parchman was a good employee and that he had
never been written up or verbally reprimanded. Parchman was promoted to plant manager
on April 1, 2001, but did not receive a pay raise. Greer testified that he never told Parchman
that he could not pay him while he was off work and that he offered to assist Parchman in
applying for disability benefits after, not before, he was terminated. Greer testified that he
stated that he could not continue to pay Parchman because Amwood could not continue his
position. Parchman was paid his salary through September 2002. According to Greer,
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Parchman never told him that he had suffered a work-related injury and that the first he had
heard of it was during Parchman’s own deposition testimony, which Greer apparently
attended. Greer testified that Parchman told him that his boot had rubbed a blister on his
ankle sometime in 2000 or 2001. Greer thought Parchman’s lupus was the cause, and he was
told after he terminated Parchman that the injury was work-related. Greer also testified that
“Mr. Parchman was a supervisor. He was plant manager. He did not punch a clock. He was
hired to do a job. And as long as he was doing his job, if he had to take off, that was his
business. I didn’t tell him when he had–couldn’t take off and go to a doctor’s appointment.
I only looked at the job he did.”
¶22. Burdine testified in his deposition that he learned the injury happened at work about
a year after the injury and that he had believed the problem to be related to Parchman’s lupus.
Burdine did not report the injury when he learned it was work-related because “[Parchman]
was the plant manager and it was his duty. He knew who to go to.” Burdine further testified
that Parchman should have reported the injury to Donna Edwards, the secretary. After
Burdine learned that Parchman’s injury was work-related, he discussed the situation with
Lannie Mae Wilkerson, secretary and treasurer of Amwood, and both were bewildered as to
why Parchman would not report the situation and have Amwood take care of it. Burdine
testified that employees were to report all injuries which occurred on the job, no matter how
minor, to Edwards.
¶23. Southard testified in his deposition that he continued to work for about five or six
months at Amwood following Parchman’s injury. Approximately half a dozen times,
Southard asked Burdine where Parchman was, and Burdine replied that Parchman had gone
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to the doctor to take care of the burn on his leg. Southard stated that he explained to Burdine
how Parchman’s injury occurred “probably that day” that it happened. Southard also
testified that if he had a work-related injury, he would have reported it to Parchman or
Burdine.
¶24. Parchman testified in his second deposition that he did not know who made the
decision whether or not to file or not to file a workers’ compensation claim, but that if
someone reported an injury to him, he directed that person to Wilkerson and Edwards.
Parchman also testified that at the time of injury, he did not think it was serious and did not
talk to anyone about it. Parchman told Burdine what had happened two to three weeks after
the incident, when he needed to leave for his first doctor’s appointment. He said he showed
Burdine the new medical boot he had to wear when he returned to work. Parchman testified
that he paid for the doctor’s visits by filing them on his wife’s insurance because he thought
his injury would heal quickly. Parchman also stated that it didn’t occur to him that he might
need to file a workers’ compensation claim even after the initial doctor’s visit, or even when
he began treatments at the wound center.
¶25. According to Parchman, at and from the time of the injury, he discussed with Edwards
what his doctors were doing, and that Edwards never asked if he wanted to file a workers’
compensation claim or how he was paying his medical bills. Parchman also testified that he
never saw the doctor that he believed Amwood preferred for its employees to see for work-
related injuries. Parchman further testified that he took no time off from work, except for
doctors’ appointments, until February 2002, and was paid his full salary because he “was
working full-time.” Parchman stated that he performed his job as plant manager until his
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two-to-three-week leave following his five-day hospital stay in February 2002, and then
worked again for two to three weeks.
¶26. Following his February 2002 hospital stay, Parchman said he regularly talked to
Burdine and other employees on the telephone to assist them and further testified that “there
was a good bit of communication.” Sometime in May or June 2002, Parchman’s doctors told
him to limit his work but did not advise him to not go back to work; he discussed this with
Burdine and Wilkerson. Parchman testified that he did not have any discussions with Greer
concerning his injury before he was terminated. Parchman also testified that he
communicated with the people at Amwood concerning plant operations throughout the time
he received skin grafts and also assisted another employee by repairing a bander at the plant
one day. Parchman worked at two other businesses after he was terminated from Amwood,
but his doctor told him to stop working on October 10, 2003, after being hospitalized.
Parchman testified that his doctors told him that lupus may have affected his ability to heal
but that they could not be certain.
¶27. Dr. Charles King, the rheumatolgist who treated Parchman’s lupus, testified in his
deposition that it was possible that the failure of the burn to heal was caused by Parchman’s
lupus but that there was no way to know that with certainty. Parchman told Dr. King that the
injury was work-related when he saw Dr. King in June 2000, and Dr. King referred him to
the wound center for treatment. Dr. King testified that he considered Parchman to be totally
disabled for the purposes of work on June 29, 2000, which was the date of Parchman’s first
visit with him after he had been burned.
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¶28. Wilkerson testified in her deposition that she learned that Parchman was having
trouble with his foot in spring or early summer of 2000, but she thought it was a blister and
not work-related. Wilkerson’s niece is Parchman’s wife, Jolayne. In the summer of 2002,
Wilkerson asked Jolayne’s mother how Parchman was doing and was informed that
Parchman had been injured at Amwood. Wilkerson told Jolayne’s mother that she believed
the time limit had expired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Wilkerson testified that
she wrote up all accidents that were reported to her, and Edwards was to do so also, although
Amwood did not send in reports to the commission for minor injuries. Wilkerson discussed
Parchman’s injury with Greer and Burdine when she discovered it was work- related; and
both Greer and Burdine told her that it had never been reported to them. Wilkerson further
testified that Edwards never told her that Parchman had been injured on the job while
Parchman was employed at Amwood.
¶29. In January 2003, Edwards stopped working at Amwood, and at that time told
Wilkerson “that [Parchman] had told her two or three weeks after the accident that he had
gotten burned at work but that he told her not to report it, that he would take care of it, and
she had never reported it.”
¶30. On July 6, 2004, Parchman completed an affidavit, wherein he stated:
After my ankle was burned while working at Amwood in approximately
March 2000, I originally did not believe it was a serious injury. However,
after a couple of weeks, and it did not heal, but instead it got worse, I went to
see the doctor.
Around this time, I discussed my doctor visits with Jackie Burdine, Donn[a]
Edwards, Randy Wellford, and some of the other employees at Amwood.
15
A couple of months after the injury, I was talking with Donna Edwards and she
asked me how I was paying for the doctor bills. I told Donna that I was on my
wife’s insurance. Donna asked whether that was getting expensive, and I told
her that I did not care how much it cost, I was just worried about my leg and
getting healthy.
I never told Donna Edwards not to report my injury to workers’s [sic] comp.
I never told Donna Edwards that I would take care of it.
I had little involvement with workers’ comp, that was handled by Donna
Edwards and Lannie Wilkerson. It was not my responsibility to fill out the
forms or file the forms. I did not know that they never wrote-up my injury, or
filed a report with the workers’ comp commission. I assumed that they
handled my injury, in regards to workers comp, the same way they handled
any other work related injury at Amwood.
¶31. On August 13, 2004, Parchman filed a Motion to Supplement his Response to
Amwood’s Motion to Dismiss, containing an affidavit from Donna Edwards and a copy of
Amwood’s first Report of Injury, which was filed with the commission on July 28, 2003.
Donna Edwards’s affidavit stated:
I remember arriving at work one morning and Mrs. Wilkerson and Mr.
Parchman were leaving my office talking. Mrs. Wilkerson made a reference
to Mr. Parchman’s foot as he was leaving. After he left, I asked Mrs.
Wilkerson what was wrong with his foot and she informed me that he had
burnt it the previous afternoon welding at work. I asked had she filled out the
paperwork as she usually did if I wasn’t working when an accident occurred,
she said that she didn’t think he was going to file it.
Several days later Mr. Parchman and I were in the office at Amwood, I asked
was he not going to file Workman’s Comp and he said that he just wanted his
foot to get well.
Many times during the duration of Mr. Parchman’s injury I discussed it with
Mr. Burdine and Mrs. Wilkerson. They always inquired as to how he was that
day. Mr. Burdine would tell me that he had checked on him if he wasn’t at
work or we would call from work. Mrs. Wilkerson did the same and would
tell of visiting him. Both knew that the accident had happened at work, as did
the other employees.
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¶32. On September 9, 2004, a hearing was conducted before Administrative Law Judge
Cindy P. Wilson. On December 16, 2004, Judge Wilson entered an order granting
Amwood’s Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Parchman’s Petition to Controvert with
prejudice. On December 30, 2004, Parchman filed a Petition for Review of Judge Wilson’s
Order with the commission. On June 6, 2005, the full commission held a hearing on the
Petition for Review. On September 9, 2005, the commission entered an order affirming
Judge Wilson’s order. However, the decision was 2-1, drawing a dissent.
¶33. On September 19, 2005, Parchman filed a Notice of Appeal to the Circuit Court of
Monroe County, along with his appellant’s brief. On December 19, 2005, the Circuit Court
of Monroe County, Judge Sharion Aycock presiding, entered an order affirming the
commission’s decision. On January 12, 2006, Parchman filed his Notice of Appeal to this
Court in the Monroe County Circuit Court.
¶34. We assigned this case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the commission’s
decision on January 30, 2007, 8-0, with two judges not participating. Parchman v. Amwood
Prods., 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 31 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan 30, 2007). Parchman’s motion for
rehearing was thereafter denied by the Court of Appeals. Parchman v. Amwood Prod., Inc.,
2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 742 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2007). On January 17, 2008, we
granted certiorari. Parchman v. Amwood Prod., 973 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 2008). The majority,
finding one issue dispositive, addresses only that issue; however, I will address each issue
Parchman presents.
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I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE
INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW.
¶35. The Court of Appeals stated:
In reviewing the decision of a chancery or circuit court regarding an agency
action, this Court applies the same standard employed by the lower court.
Mississippi Sierra Club v. Mississippi Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 819 So. 2d
515, 519 (P15) (Miss. 2002). This Court will not disturb an agency's ruling
unless the decision of the administrative agency "(1) was unsupported by
substantial evidence; (2) was arbitrary or capricious; (3) was beyond the power
of the administrative agency to make; or (4) violated some statutory or
constitutional right of the complaining party." Id.
Parchman v. Amwood Prods., Inc., 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 31, *5, ¶10 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan.
30, 2007). Parchman argues that whether the statute of limitations had expired presents a
question of law, and is thus reviewed de novo, directing us to Jordan v. Pace Head Start,
852 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. App. 2002). Furthermore, Parchman argues that remedial statutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of the injured, directing us to Holbrook by & Through
Holbrook v. Albright Mobile Homes, Inc., 703 So. 2d 842, 844 (Miss. 1997).
¶36. Assuming arguendo that Parchman is correct in his assertion that the Court of Appeals
should have utilized a de novo standard of review, it is my opinion that Parchman still has
failed to inform us as to how the different standard of review would have altered the decision.
“Assertions of error without prejudice do not trigger reversal.” Rollins v. State, 970 So. 2d
716, 722 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Jones v. State, 912 So. 2d 973, 977 (Miss. 2005); see also
Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So. 2d 744, 751 (Miss. 1996)). I find this issue to be
without merit; however, I discuss the standard of review in more detail infra.
II. WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT OF THE ACT.
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¶37. Parchman argues that Amwood failed to give the statutorily required notice to the
commission, and thus the statute of limitations is tolled. Parchman directs this Court to
Holbrook by & Through Holbrook v. Albright Mobile Homes, Inc., 703 So. 2d 842 (Miss.
1997) (employer estopped from relying on two-year statute of limitations defense where
employer failed to give notice and employer misrepresented existence of insurance coverage
for deceased employee) and Martin v. L. & A. Contracting Co., 249 Miss. 441, 162 So. 2d
870 (1964) (employer estopped from relying on two-year statute of limitations where
employer failed to comply with notice requirement and employer arranged coverage from
Florida instead of Mississippi because Florida benefits were less).
¶38. Parchman incorrectly relies on Holbrook and Martin, as the crux of those decisions
was other misconduct by the employer besides failure to give notice, that being
misrepresentation and providing less generous benefits from another state. Parchman further
argues that, according to our decision in Holbrook, either failure of the employer to give
notice or misconduct tolls the statute of limitations. I disagree. Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 71-3-67(1) (Rev. 2000) states:
Within ten (10) days after the fatal termination of any injury, the employer, if
self-insured, or its carrier, shall file a report thereof with the commission on
a form approved by the commission for this purpose.
In the event of an injury which shall cause loss of time in excess of the waiting
period prescribed in Section 71-3-11[2 ], a report thereof shall be filed with the
commission by the employer or carrier, on a form approved by the commission
for this purpose, within ten (10) days after the prescribed waiting period has
been satisfied.
2
The prescribed period is five days.
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Within ten (10) days after the employer or carrier knows, or reasonably should
know, that an injury has resulted, or likely will result, in permanent disability
or serious head or facial disfigurement, but which does not cause a loss of
time in excess of the prescribed waiting period, a report thereof shall be filed
with the commission on a form approved by the commission for this purpose.
(Emphasis added). First, Parchman’s injury was not fatal. Second, Parchman’s injury, which
occurred in March 2000, did not require any absence from work for more than five days at
the time of the injury. Thus, Amwood was not required to give the commission notice.
Finally, Amwood never knew that Parchman’s injury did cause or would likely cause
permanent disability and was therefore not required to give notice. I find that this statute is
not applicable to the case sub judice.
¶39. On the other hand, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 71-3-35(1) (Rev. 2000)3
states:
No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, within thirty (30) days
after the occurrence of the injury, actual notice was received by the employer
or by an officer, manager, or designated representative of an employer. If no
representative has been designated by posters placed in one or more
conspicuous places, then notice received by any superior shall be sufficient.
Absence of notice shall not bar recovery if it is found that the employer had
knowledge of the injury and was not prejudiced by the employee’s failure to
give notice. Regardless of whether notice was received, if no payment of
compensation (other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made and no
application for benefits filed with the commission within two years from the
date of the injury or death, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred.
I find that, pursuant to the applicable statutes, Amwood was not required to give notice to the
commission. I also find that, regardless of whether Amwood had actual notice of Parchman’s
3
The applicability of this statute was discussed by the Court of Appeals.
Parchman v. Amwood Prods., Inc., 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 31, **7-9, ¶¶ 12-14 (Miss.
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007).
20
injury, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the injury, and thus ran in March
2002. This issue is without merit.
III. WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTED TO
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION’S DECISION.
¶40. Parchman argues that “the evidence is overwhelming that Amwood had ‘actual notice’
of the injury” and that the Court of Appeals ignored this evidence. Having just set out in toto
section 71-3-35(1), I repeat here only a portion of the statute relevant to my discussion of this
issue.
Regardless of whether notice was received, if no payment of compensation
(other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made and no application
for benefits filed with the commission within two years from the date of the
injury or death, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred.
(Emphasis added). I find that, regardless of whether Amwood had actual notice of
Parchman’s injury, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the injury, and thus
ran in March 2002, because Amwood made no compensation to Parchman and Parchman did
not file a claim until July 23, 2003. This issue is without merit.
¶41. I respectfully disagree with the majority in its analysis. It is clear from the facts
discussed supra that Parchman was in fact doing the essential functions of his job at least
until February 2002 because he was absent only for doctor’s appointments, which he
scheduled mostly during lunchtimes. Parchman was a salaried employee and was free to
schedule his appointments as he wished. From February 2002 until Parchman was
terminated, he worked full-time when he was able and communicated his managerial
decisions by telephone while away. Parchman even went to Amwood one day during
treatments when he was needed to fix a problem. Greer testified that he paid Parchman to
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do his job and was concerned only that the work got done. It is clear from the record that
Amwood was paying Parchman for the job that he was doing and did not pay him in lieu of
benefits. Accordingly, pursuant to the statute, it is irrelevant whether Amwood had actual
notice of Parchman’s work-related injury because Parchman received no compensation and
did not file his claim within two years.
IV. WHETHER PARCHMAN HAD A COMPENSABLE INJURY
PRIOR TO HIS TERMINATION.
¶42. Finally, Parchman argues that “[i]t is undisputed that James Parchman did not have
a compensable injury until September 2002, when he was terminated because he had no loss
of wage earning capacity.” Parchman further argues that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run at the time of the injury, but rather when an employee becomes disabled. I
disagree. Again, section 71-3-35(1) states that if “no application for benefits [is] filed with
the commission within two years from the date of the injury or death, the right to
compensation therefor shall be barred.” Thus, from the clear language of the statute, the date
of the injury is determining. This issue is without merit.
¶43. In sum, I have already mentioned supra, that our standard of review concerning the
application of a limitations statute is de novo since this issue no doubt involves a question
of law; however, in order to answer this question in today’s case, we must consider the
totality of the record and apply the facts of this case to the applicable law. One cannot but
conclude, upon the reading of the majority opinion and this dissenting opinion, that any
decision in today’s case is understandably fact-driven. Thus, in my opinion, we have before
us today a mixed question of law and fact, and while we must review the interpretation of
22
law de novo, we review the factual findings of the lower court or agency for clear error.
Franklin Collection Service, Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 287 (Miss. 2007) (citing Hewes
v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Miss. 2003)). As we noted in Mississippi Sierra Club
v. Department of Environmental Quality, 819 So. 2d 515, 519 (Miss. 2002), “[w]hen this
Court reviews a decision by a chancery or circuit court concerning an agency action, it
applies the same standard of review that the lower courts are bound to follow.” (Citing Miss.
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Chickasaw County Bd. of Supervisors, 621 So. 2d 1211, 1216
(Miss. 1993)). In other words, on appeal, this Court must consider “whether the order of the
administrative agency 1) was unsupported by substantial evidence, 2) was arbitrary or
capricious, 3) was beyond the power of the administrative agency to make, or 4) violated
some statutory or constitutional right of the complaining party.” Miss. Sierra Club, 819 So.
2d at 519 (citing Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 621 So. 2d at 1215). See also Sierra
Club v. Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 943 So. 2d 673, 677-78 (Miss. 2006) (citing
McDermott v. Miss. Real Estate Comm’n, 748 So. 2d 114, 118 (Miss. 1999)).
¶44. With this being said, I respectfully submit that the majority has improperly re-weighed
the evidence in reaching today’s decision. In the administrative arena, on disputed evidence,
both the administrative law judge and the full commission found that the statute of limitations
had expired. In the judicial arena, both the Monroe County Circuit Court and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the full commission. I submit that there was substantial evidence to
support the full commission’s decision, and we should affirm the Court of Appeals on this
issue and all issues raised by James Walter Parchman.
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¶45. Because the majority holds otherwise, and for the reasons I have stated, I respectfully
dissent.
SMITH, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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