United States v. Joseph Hall , 514 F. App'x 352 ( 2013 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4248
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    JOSEPH SAMUEL HALL,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.     Frederick P. Stamp,
    Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00034-FPS-JES-1)
    Argued:   February 1, 2013                 Decided:   March 20, 2013
    Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge King and Judge Thacker joined.
    ARGUED: Edward Lee Gillison, Jr., GILLISON LAW OFFICES, Weirton,
    West Virginia, for Appellant.     David J. Perri, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    ON BRIEF: William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney,
    Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
    Joseph Samuel Hall appeals his conviction for being a felon
    in possession of firearms in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g).
    Finding no merit in his appellate contentions, we affirm.
    I.
    Because the government prevailed at trial, we review the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the government.                       United
    States v. Jefferson, 
    674 F.3d 332
    , 341 n.14 (4th Cir. 2012).                        On
    February 19, 2011, Hall, a convicted felon, entered a Cabela’s
    retail store near Wheeling, West Virginia, with an acquaintance
    named Airiel Underwood.            There, Underwood attempted to buy two
    guns.     Cabela’s ran a background check on Underwood through the
    National Instant Criminal Check System (“NICS”), which did not
    immediately       approve   the    transaction.           Consequently,      Cabela’s
    refused    to    complete    the   sale.        However,    because    it    did   not
    receive notification from NICS within three business days that
    Underwood       was   ineligible     to        purchase    the    guns,     Cabela’s
    eventually allowed Underwood to purchase the guns.                          Underwood
    and   Hall      returned    to   Cabela’s      on   February     27   to    make   the
    purchase.
    During the February 27 visit, Cabela’s sales clerk Miranda
    Cordery noticed that Hall stayed very close to Underwood.                      Then,
    after Underwood purchased the guns, Hall stated that they would
    2
    need   ammunition.        Cordery   then    discussed      different    types     of
    ammunition with Hall, and he selected ammunition for Underwood
    to purchase.     After leaving Cabela’s with Hall, Underwood placed
    the guns and ammunition in the trunk of Hall’s car and rode with
    him to her apartment, where he dropped her off and drove away
    with the guns and ammunition.           Hall gave Underwood the money to
    purchase the guns and additional money for her assistance.
    Shortly   thereafter,    NICS    determined      that      Underwood      was
    prohibited from purchasing the guns because of a recent drug
    offense.     Accordingly      Joe   Price,    an   agent    of    the   Bureau    of
    Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“A.T.F”), attempted to retrieve
    the guns from Underwood, but she told Price that she had given
    the guns to her boyfriend.           Underwood gave Price a fictitious
    name for her boyfriend, but Price determined that Underwood had
    given the guns to Hall and arranged for Hall to be arrested near
    his home in Detroit, Michigan.               Eventually, one of the guns,
    identified by serial number, was found approximately eight miles
    from Hall’s home.
    Hall was indicted for aiding and abetting a false statement
    in   acquisition     of   a   firearm   in    violation      of    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6) and for being a felon in possession of firearms in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) & 2(a).             A jury acquitted him on
    the first count but convicted him on the second.                  He now appeals
    that conviction.
    3
    II.
    A.
    We turn first to Hall’s contention that the district court
    erred by denying his motion for acquittal, in which he argued
    that    the   evidence      was     insufficient     to     establish    that   he
    possessed the guns.         We review challenges to the sufficiency of
    the evidence de novo, United States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    , 693
    (4th Cir.2005), and we must sustain the verdict if there is
    substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
    government, to support it.           Burks v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    ,
    17 (1978).       Here, we find that the evidence was sufficient to
    support Hall’s conviction.
    To sustain a conviction for being a felon in possession of
    firearms, constructive possession is sufficient.                   United States
    v. Gallimore, 
    247 F.3d 134
    , 136-37 (4th Cir. 2001).                     “A person
    has constructive possession over contraband when he has                     . . .
    control   over    the   .   .   .   vehicle    in   which    it   is   concealed.”
    United States v. Armstrong, 
    187 F.3d 392
    , 396 (4th Cir. 1999).
    As noted, evidence at trial established that Underwood and Hall
    purchased the guns together in Cabela’s.                  They left the store
    together and proceeded to Hall’s car, where Underwood placed the
    guns in the trunk.          Hall then took Underwood to her apartment
    and drove away with the guns.                This evidence is sufficient to
    establish that Hall had constructive possession of the guns.
    4
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion
    for acquittal.
    B.
    We turn next to Hall’s challenge to the district court’s
    decision to allow Cordery to testify about Underwood and Hall
    purchasing ammunition.         Hall contends that Cordery’s testimony
    was evidence of other crimes offered to prove bad character,
    which should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).              The
    district court disagreed for several reasons, including that the
    testimony was not admitted to show bad character but rather to
    provide    context     for   the   gun   purchase.    The   district    court
    concluded that, under United States v. Kennedy, 
    32 F.3d 876
    ,
    885-86 (4th Cir. 1994), the testimony was admissible for that
    purpose.    We review the district court’s decision to admit this
    testimony for abuse of discretion.            United States v. Lighty, 
    616 F.3d 321
    , 351 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) limits the circumstances under which
    “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” may be admitted,
    but   “evidence   of    uncharged    conduct    is   not   considered   other
    crimes evidence [and falls outside the scope of Rule 404(b)] if
    it arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged
    offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the
    crime on trial.”        Kennedy, 
    32 F.3d at 885
     (internal quotations
    and alterations omitted).          Here, the ammunition purchase arose
    5
    out of the same series of events as the gun purchase.                              Further,
    since the government’s case depended upon proving that Underwood
    was a straw buyer for Hall, showing that Hall asked to buy
    ammunition       and       chose    the   type      of     ammunition        to    buy       was
    “necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.”                                     
    Id.
    (internal quotations and alterations omitted).                           Therefore, this
    testimony was admissible under Kennedy, and the district court
    did not abuse its discretion by allowing it.
    C.
    Hall next challenges the district court’s decision to admit
    into evidence the gun recovered near his home in Detroit.                                     On
    that    point,      Hall    argues    that    the    district        court     should       have
    excluded the gun under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because its probative
    value    was     substantially       outweighed          by    the   danger       of    unfair
    prejudice.           We     review    evidentiary             rulings    for      abuse       of
    discretion.         Lighty, 616 F.3d at 351.              Here, we find no abuse of
    discretion and affirm the district court’s ruling.
    Fed.    R.    Evid.    403    states       that   relevant       evidence       may    be
    excluded if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by
    a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”                            Hall argues that the
    unfair prejudicial value of the gun was high in relation to its
    probative      value       because    the     gun    was       not   recovered         in    his
    possession.         However, there was ample evidence linking the gun
    to Hall, including the fact that its serial number matched the
    6
    serial    number     on   one     gun   Underwood   purchased      for   Hall    at
    Cabela’s.     With that evidence linking the gun to Hall, the fact
    that it was recovered in someone else’s possession does little,
    if anything, to diminish its probative value or increase the
    danger of unfair prejudice.              Therefore, we find no abuse of
    discretion in the district court’s decision to admit the gun,
    and we affirm that ruling.
    D.
    We now turn to Hall’s challenge to the district court’s
    decision to deny his motion for a mistrial.                     In that motion,
    Hall contended that the government improperly argued to the jury
    that     Underwood    had    no     motive    to    lie   to     inculpate      him.
    Specifically, the government stated in its closing argument:
    Defense counsel has gone to great lengths to try to
    suggest to you that [Underwood] – her credibility is
    suspect and you can’t believe what she says.     Well,
    what has the defense suggested to you as to her motive
    to incriminate this guy? Why? What motive?
    J.A. 609.      The court denied the motion for a mistrial, after
    which the government continued to encourage the jury to question
    what motive Underwood had to inculpate Hall.                   We review whether
    allegedly improper remarks from counsel require a mistrial de
    novo.     United States v. Collins, 
    415 F.3d 304
    , 307 (4th Cir.
    2005).    Finding no error, we affirm.
    To obtain a new trial based on improper remarks from the
    government, a defendant must show that the remarks were improper
    7
    and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights to
    such a degree that they deprived him of a fair trial.                         United
    States v. Chorman, 
    910 F.2d 102
    , 113 (4th Cir. 1990).                         Here,
    Hall argues that the government’s remarks were improper because
    there was evidence that Underwood had a motive to lie, but Hall
    points to no such evidence.              In fact, the only evidence he
    points to is testimony from Underwood that she initially lied to
    the A.T.F. in an attempt to exonerate, not inculpate, herself
    and Hall.     Therefore, the government’s remarks questioning what
    motive Underwood had to inculpate Hall were not inconsistent
    with   the   evidence    or   improper       in    any   way.    Accordingly,    we
    affirm the district court’s decision to deny the motion for the
    mistrial.
    III.
    The final two issues we address pertain to the government’s
    investigation and trial preparation.                     We begin by recounting
    additional    facts     and    procedural         history    pertinent   to   these
    issues.
    Prior to Hall’s trial, Price showed Cordery a black and
    white photograph of Hall and asked her whether the photograph
    showed the person who had accompanied Underwood into Cabela’s on
    the two occasions described above.                 Cordery responded that “the
    picture was too bad.          It was too grainy.            [She] couldn’t really
    8
    tell.” 1      J.A. 280.           Counsel for the government represented to
    this Court at oral argument that Price made no notes pertaining
    to this conversation with Cordery.
    Under the district court’s Initial Scheduling Order, the
    government was required to disclose all exculpatory evidence by
    October 3, 2011, and was requested to disclose all “statements
    or   reports”        from    prospective         witnesses    by    December       6,   2011.
    (Dist.      Ct.   Doc.      18,    ¶    7,    requesting    disclosure        of   “material
    described in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3500
    ,” which requires disclosure of
    “statements or reports” from witnesses.)                      The government did not
    disclose the fact that Price had conducted the photo display or
    that Cordery could not definitively identify Hall in it.
    At    trial,      the      government      asked    Cordery       to   identify     the
    person      who   had      accompanied         Underwood    into    Cabela’s.           Hall’s
    counsel, unaware that Cordery had been unable to identify Hall
    in the photo display, objected and claimed that the in-court
    identification was “cumulative.”                      J.A. 261.    The district court,
    also       unaware    of     the       display,       overruled    the    objection,       and
    Cordery      identified        Hall      as    Underwood’s    companion.           Then,    on
    1
    At sentencing, Price testified about the photo display and
    explained that “Ms. Cordery stated that it was a grainy photo
    and she was pretty sure. She gave, like, maybe 90 percent, but
    she couldn’t say that she was 100 percent sure” that the
    photograph depicted the person who accompanied Underwood into
    the store. J.A. 692.
    9
    cross examination, Hall’s counsel asked Cordery whether she had
    ever seen a photo of Hall, and she testified about the photo
    display          and   her   inability    to      identify   Hall   in      it.    This
    testimony was the first notice Hall or the court received of the
    display.          At this point, Hall’s attorney made no objection or
    motion based on the government’s failure to disclose the photo
    display.          Further, at closing argument, Hall’s counsel admitted
    that Hall was the person with Underwood in Cabela’s during at
    least one of the visits.              Also, at oral argument to this Court,
    Hall’s      counsel      conceded     that     Hall’s    identity      as   Underwood’s
    companion is not contested. 2
    On appeal, Hall raises two issues that involve the display.
    First,      he     contends    that   Cordery’s      in-court    identification      of
    Hall       was     tainted    by   the   display,       which   Hall    contends   was
    improperly          suggestive.       Second,      he   contends    that     Cordery’s
    inability to identify him in the photo display was exculpatory
    evidence that the government should have disclosed under Brady
    v. Maryland,           
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963).          The parties agree that plain
    error review is appropriate for the Brady issue, but they argue
    for different standards of review on the objection to the in-
    2
    There was ample evidence beyond Cordery’s testimony that
    Hall was, in fact, Underwood’s companion in the store.     This
    evidence included but was not limited to Underwood’s testimony
    and store video showing Hall with Underwood.
    10
    court identification.           We need not resolve this dispute because,
    with regard to both issues, the standard of review does not
    affect our decision.
    Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(a) directs that “[a]ny error, defect,
    irregularity,      or    variance       that   does    not    affect      substantial
    rights    must    be    disregarded.”          “Under      [this]    harmless-error
    standard,    we    will    not    reverse      if     we   can    ‘say,    with   fair
    assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping
    the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
    substantially swayed by the error.’”                   United States v. Byers,
    
    649 F.3d 197
    , 211 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
    States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 765 (1946)).                Here, even if we assume that
    the photo display was improperly suggestive, 3 that it affected
    Cordery’s    in-court      identification,          and    that     the    government
    should have disclosed Cordery’s inability to identify Hall, none
    of   those   points     could    have    swayed     the    outcome   of    the    trial
    because Hall does not contest that he was, in fact, the person
    with Underwood at Cabela’s.                Accordingly, the alleged errors
    3
    The Supreme Court and this Court have stated that single-
    photograph displays are unduly suggestive and should generally
    be viewed with suspicion.    See Manson v. Brathwaite, 
    432 U.S. 98
    , 116 (1977) (explaining that identifications “arising from
    single-photograph displays may be viewed in general with
    suspicion”); United States v. Johnson, 
    114 F.3d 435
    , 441-42 (4th
    Cir. 1997) (concluding that the use of a “single photograph
    display” for pretrial identification was unduly suggestive).
    11
    concern   an   issue   that   is   not    in   dispute—Hall’s   presence   at
    Cabela’s—so they are harmless and do not entitle Hall to relief.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hall’s conviction.
    AFFIRMED
    12