United States v. Stancil , 252 F. App'x 538 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5007
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER STANCIL, a/k/a Christopher
Stancel,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:04-cr-00381-BO)
Submitted: August 29, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bridgett Britt Aguirre, Fuguay-Varina, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Stancil* appeals his eighty-four month
sentence following his guilty plea and conviction for possessing a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 992(g)(1) and 924, and possessing a stolen firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and 924. His attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Stancil was notified of his opportunity to file a pro se
supplemental brief, and has filed a “Fact Statement.” The
Government filed a responding brief. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.
Stancil first contends the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. The Government counters that by
pleading guilty, Stancil waived the right to challenge the denial
of the suppression motion on appeal. Stancil’s unconditional,
voluntary plea of guilty waived his right to challenge such
antecedent, non-jurisdictional errors. See Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Hall v. McKenzie, 575 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.
1978). During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, Stancil agreed that he
was in fact guilty of the crimes charged, and the court accepted
his plea. The record establishes that Stancil’s guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily made, and he has not presented any
*
We have maintained the spelling of Appellant’s name as it was
docketed in the district court.
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evidence to the contrary. Thus, Stancil may not challenge the
denial of the motion to suppress on appeal.
Stancil next contends that the district court erred when
it simply accepted the probation officer’s position as to relevant
conduct without making a finding as to the reliability of the
evidence. At the time of Stancil’s arrest in June 2004, he made a
statement that he had possessed the firearm for about five years;
thus, the probation officer used this statement and made the
applicable period of relevant conduct stem back five years to June
1999. Stancil was previously released from incarceration on
October 26, 1999, after serving a sentence for a prior felon in
possession of a gun conviction. Accordingly, the probation officer
added two points pursuant to USSG § 4A1.1(e), because Stancil had
committed the instant offense less than two years after release
from imprisonment. The district court adopted this finding.
Stancil argues that the relevant conduct should have been limited
to the date he was arrested and that the statement upon which the
enhancement was based lacked any indicia of reliability.
Stancil himself stated to police in June 2004 that he had
owned the gun for five years. He fails to demonstrate why his
statement now should be deemed unreliable. Stancil did not
question the reliability of this statement at sentencing. Instead,
counsel emphasized that Stancil had “voluntarily and truthfully
[told police] that he had had that gun for five years.” This fact
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was undisputed at sentencing; thus, the court properly adopted the
probation officer’s recommendation for the two-point enhancement.
The argument that Stancil could not possess the gun
between June 1999 and October 1999 while he was incarcerated, and
therefore he did not “possess” the weapon for five years before the
2004 arrest date, also lacks merit. Section 4A1.1(e) extends to a
period of two years after a person is released from incarceration
and Stancil admittedly possessed the gun during that period.
To the extent Stancil intends to argue that the probation
officer should only count the day of the arrest as “relevant
conduct,” he offers no authority for this proposition. Stancil was
a convicted felon and possessed the weapon not just on the day he
was arrested but during the previous five years; thus, the offense
conduct was ongoing. The district court properly adopted the two-
point enhancement, and this claim lacks merit.
Finally, in Stancil’s pro se “Fact Statement,” he simply
reiterates that he was stopped and searched illegally and that he
did not consent to the search. As discussed above, Stancil’s
guilty plea waived the right to challenge his conviction based upon
purported Fourth Amendment errors.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Stancil’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Stancil, in writing, of the right to
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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Stancil requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Stancil.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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