City of East Grand Rapids v. Trevor Allen Vanderhart ( 2017 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    CITY OF EAST GRAND RAPIDS,                                           UNPUBLISHED
    April 11, 2017
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                    No. 329259
    Kent Circuit Court
    TREVOR ALLEN VANDERHART,                                             LC No. 14-010058-AR
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: MURPHY, P.J., and SAWYER and SWARTZLE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    This appeal presents the Court with a straight-forward question: Can an officer stop a
    vehicle because of a dim taillight? The answer is also straight-forward: Yes, at least under the
    circumstances of this case. On this, a majority agrees, and we affirm. As to the road taken to
    that destination, the panel diverges on who has the better claim.
    I. BACKGROUND
    During the early morning hours on January 5, 2014, Officer Daniel Lobbezoo was
    working road patrol in East Grand Rapids. He passed defendant’s vehicle traveling in the
    opposite direction. In his rearview mirror, Officer Lobbezoo believed that he saw that one of
    defendant’s taillights was completely out. Officer Lobbezoo turned around to follow defendant.
    After catching up to defendant, Officer Lobbezoo saw that his initial perception was incorrect
    but continued following defendant because one of defendant’s taillights was significantly
    dimmer than the other. Officer Lobbezoo pulled defendant over,1 and when he approached the
    vehicle, he smelled alcohol and saw that defendant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Officer
    Lobbezoo had defendant perform several field sobriety tests and determined that defendant was
    intoxicated. He then arrested defendant for OWI. Defendant was transported to the Kent County
    Jail and took two DataMaster DMT tests. The first test showed that defendant’s alcohol level
    1
    At trial, Officer Lobbezoo indicated that he did not pull defendant over based upon his belief
    that defendant violated a specific section of the vehicle code but rather based upon his belief that
    the vehicle code generally prohibited defendant’s defective taillight.
    -1-
    was 0.14 grams per 210 liters of breath, and his second test showed that his alcohol level was
    0.13 grams per 210 liters of breath.
    Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of
    Officer Lobbezoo’s traffic stop, arguing that Officer Lobbezoo lacked reasonable suspicion to
    stop defendant. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, Officer Lobbezoo testified that he was
    uncertain whether both of defendant’s taillights were visible from 500 feet. The district court
    admitted into evidence the dash-cam video from Officer Lobbezoo’s police cruiser, and Officer
    Lobbezoo testified that he was unable to speculate whether defendant’s taillights were visible
    from 500 feet. Visiting District Judge David L. Jordan denied defendant’s motion, finding that
    Officer Lobbezoo’s testimony was credible, that the dash-cam video was inconclusive as to the
    distance from which defendant’s taillights were visible, and that defendant’s malfunctioning
    passenger-side taillight gave Officer Lobbezoo reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Judge
    Jordon explained that defendant’s defective taillight caused his properly functioning taillight to
    appear brighter, thereby creating a safety concern because other drivers could reasonably
    perceive that defendant was “breaking in front of [them] all the time.” (M Tr, 62).
    At the close of the prosecution’s case at trial, defendant renewed his motion to suppress
    and moved for a directed verdict, again arguing that all of the evidence flowing from Officer
    Lobbezoo’s stop of defendant should be suppressed. Defendant argued that his taillights were
    visible from 500 feet and, therefore, he was not in violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code when
    Officer Lobbezoo pulled him over. District Judge Steven R. Servaas, who presided over
    defendant’s trial, was uncertain whether he could rule on the motion since a different judge had
    made the initial ruling, but he took defendant’s motion under advisement. The jury later returned
    a guilty verdict. Judge Servaas then granted defendant’s motion and set aside the jury’s verdict,
    finding that Officer Lobbezoo did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle
    because the dash-cam video of the stop showed that defendant’s taillights were clearly visible
    from 500 feet.
    The prosecution appealed to the circuit court, and the circuit court granted the
    prosecution’s leave to appeal. The circuit court vacated Judge Servaas’s ruling and reinstated the
    jury’s verdict, reasoning that Officer Lobbezoo’s belief that he could stop defendant to inspect
    the vehicle based on the dim taillight was reasonable. The circuit court relied on the U.S.
    Supreme Court’s recent decision in Heien v North Carolina, 574 US ___; 
    135 S. Ct. 530
    , 536; 
    190 L. Ed. 2d 475
    (2014), where the court held that reasonable suspicion can be predicated on a
    reasonable mistake of law.
    By leave granted, defendant challenges the circuit court’s ruling.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by reversing the district court’s
    ruling because Officer Lobbezoo’s stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
    -2-
    A.     Traffic Stops and the Fourth Amendment
    The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right of persons to be secure
    against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. In
    Michigan, the protective scope of each constitutional provision is the same. People v Custer,
    
    465 Mich. 319
    , 326 n 2; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). “A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is
    a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with
    the Fourth Amendment.” Heien, 574 US at ___
    ; 135 S. Ct. at 536
    (internal citations and quotation
    marks omitted).
    The benchmark for a lawful search and seizure is “reasonableness.” People v Beuschlein,
    
    245 Mich. App. 744
    , 749; 630 NW2d 921 (2001). “The Fourth Amendment permits brief
    investigative stops—such as the traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has a
    particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of” breaking the
    law. Navarette v California, 572 US ___, ___; 
    134 S. Ct. 1683
    , 1687; 
    188 L. Ed. 2d 680
    (2014)
    (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This basis for making a stop is known as
    reasonable suspicion. See 
    id. As explained
    recently by the U.S. Supreme Court, “[r]easonable suspicion arises from the
    combination of an officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law.”
    Heien, 574 US at ___
    ; 135 S. Ct. at 536
    . A “determination of whether there was reasonable
    suspicion to justify a stop must be made on a case-by-case basis, evaluated under the totality of
    the circumstances, and based on common sense.” People v Dillon, 
    296 Mich. App. 506
    , 508; 822
    NW2d 611, 614 (2012).
    Experience has taught that not all stops are justified. In those cases, the remedy for a
    Fourth Amendment violation is typically “suppression of the unlawfully obtained evidence.”
    People v Cartwright, 
    454 Mich. 550
    , 558; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). This is known as the
    exclusionary rule. See Mapp v Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
    , 656; 
    81 S. Ct. 1684
    ; 
    6 L. Ed. 2d 1081
    (1961).
    “The goal of the exclusionary rule . . . is to deter police misconduct.” People v Goldston, 
    470 Mich. 523
    , 538; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). Therefore, “the exclusionary rule should be employed
    on a case-by-case basis and only where exclusion would further the purpose of deterring police
    misconduct.” 
    Id. at 531.
    B.     Taillights Under Michigan’s Vehicle Code
    It is undisputed that the passenger-side taillight on defendant’s vehicle did not fully
    operate when Officer Lobbezoo stopped him. Michigan’s Vehicle Code has several provisions
    that could apply when a taillight is defective in some way. First, section 686, subsection (1)
    states in relevant part, “A motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with at least 1 rear lamp mounted
    on the rear, which, when lighted as required by this act, shall emit a red light plainly visible from
    a distance of 500 feet to the rear.” MCL 257.686(1). In turn, subsection (2) provides in relevant
    part, “A tail lamp or tail lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating the rear
    registration plate, shall be wired so as to be lighted whenever the head lamps or auxiliary driving
    -3-
    lamps are lighted.” If a vehicle has more than one taillight, all of the taillights2 must be lighted.
    People v Williams, 
    236 Mich. App. 610
    , 615; 601 NW2d 138 (1999).
    Second, in addition to the section dealing specifically with taillights, the Legislature set
    forth a more general “unsafe condition” prohibition for all vehicles on Michigan roads: “A
    person shall not drive . . . a vehicle . . . that is in such an unsafe condition as to endanger a person
    . . . .” MCL 257.683(1). A person who drives a vehicle in violation of section 686 or the more
    general “unsafe condition” provision of section 683 may be guilty of a civil infraction. MCL
    257.683(6). And, important for this case, a police officer who suspects “on reasonable grounds
    shown” a violation of either provision may stop and inspect the vehicle. MCL 257.686(2).
    C.      The District Court Erred by Suppressing the Evidence
    After trial, Judge Servaas, who did not preside over the earlier suppression hearing,
    granted defendant’s renewed motion to suppress, finding that both of defendant’s taillights were
    undoubtedly visible from 500 feet. “This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in a
    suppression hearing for clear error.” People v Nguyen, 
    305 Mich. App. 740
    , 750; 854 NW2d 223
    (2014). “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 
    466 Mich. 491
    , 497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).
    “[W]e review de novo the trial court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.” People v
    Williams, 
    472 Mich. 308
    , 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).
    In making his ruling, Judge Servaas said that he considered the transcript from the
    original motion to suppress. Yet, Judge Servaas failed to explain why he found not credible the
    testimony of Officer Lobbezoo, who testified during the prior suppression hearing before Judge
    Jordan that he could not speculate whether the taillights were visible from 500 feet. See People v
    Wolfe, 
    440 Mich. 508
    , 514-515, 289 NW2d 748 (finding that courts that “see and hear witnesses .
    . . are in a better position to decide the weight and credibility given to their testimony” than
    courts that are reviewing the testimony from a transcript). It appears that when Judge Servaas
    disregarded Officer Lobbezoo’s testimony, he did so solely based upon the video of the incident
    as recorded on the police dash-cam. Because this video “is something that [an appellate court]
    can review as easily as the trial court,” the Court can review Judge Servaas’s findings of fact
    with less deference. People v White, 
    294 Mich. App. 622
    , 633; 823 NW2d 118 (2011).
    Judge Servaas provided no guidance regarding how he arrived at his conclusion that
    defendant’s taillights were undoubtedly visible from 500 feet. After reviewing the video of the
    stop, which is included in the record, it remains unclear how Judge Servaas determined that both
    of defendant’s taillights were clearly visible from 500 feet. When the defendant’s car first
    appeared in the video, only one taillight was clearly visible. As the video continued, there
    became a point of distance where both of defendant’s taillights were clearly visible, but the video
    2
    The terms “tail lamp” and “taillights” are used interchangeably. See, e.g., The American
    Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969) (defining “taillight” as “[a] red light or one
    of a pair mounted on the rear end of a vehicle. Also called ‘tail lamp.’ ”).
    -4-
    gives no indication as to the measure of that distance. Both cars were moving and at no point is
    there a discernable way to determine the relative distance of objects in the video, much less a
    definitive way to determine how far back Officer Lobbezoo was from defendant’s vehicle when
    both taillights became visible. Further, defendant was driving through a well-lit area for most of
    the video. The ambient light from the surrounding area made it difficult to discern the distance
    that defendant’s taillights were visible from, and at some points made it hard to see the taillights
    at all.
    Officer Lobbezoo’s testimony contradicts Judge Servaas’s finding that defendant’s
    taillights were clearly visible from 500 feet. Officer Lobbezoo testified at the suppression
    hearing that he could not speculate regarding the distance from which defendant’s taillights were
    visible. Judge Jordon heard the testimony and found it credible. Given that the dash-cam video
    supports this testimony, the Court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been made.” 
    Johnson, 466 Mich. at 497-498
    . Accordingly, Judge Servaas’s finding that both
    taillights were visible from 500 feet is clearly erroneous. Based on the record produced below,
    there is simply no way to determine whether the vehicle’s taillights were visible from 500 feet.
    D.     The Circuit Court Erred by Relying on Heien to Vacate
    In vacating Judge Servaas’s decision, the circuit court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
    decision in Heien, 574 US at ___
    ; 135 S. Ct. at 536
    , insulated the challenged evidence from
    exclusion. The Heien court held that the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop
    may be predicated upon an officer’s reasonable but “mistaken understanding of the scope of a
    legal prohibition.” 
    Id. Thus, even
    if Officer Lobbezoo was incorrect that a dim taillight was a
    legally sufficient ground for stopping defendant, the officer’s belief was a reasonable mistake of
    law.
    Yet, from what source of law would Officer Lobbezoo have gained this reasonable-but-
    mistaken understanding? Stated another way, where in Michigan’s Vehicle Code does it state or
    is it reasonably inferred that an officer can stop a vehicle based on a taillight that works in some
    sense, but does not work in another sense—i.e., a dim taillight?
    To begin with the most likely source, subsection 686(2) requires that taillights must “be
    lighted.” MCL 257.686(2). Isolated from its context, and then joined with the requirement in a
    different section that equipment must be “in proper condition and adjustment,” MCL 257.683(1),
    one might conclude that a dim (not fully “lighted”) taillight is one that is not in proper condition
    or adjustment and is thereby illegal under the Vehicle Code.
    But is this a reasonable interpretation of the statute? “In considering a question of
    statutory construction, this Court begins by examining the language of the statute. . . . If the
    language is unambiguous, judicial construction is precluded.” Macomb Cty Prosecutor v
    Murphy, 
    464 Mich. 149
    , 158; 627 NW2d 247 (2001) (internal citations omitted). To point out the
    obvious, nowhere in section 686 can be found the adverb “fully” or similar grammatical
    modification with respect to the requirement “to be lighted”. See MCL 257.686(1), (2).
    Moving from what is not in the text to what is in the text, rather than read the phrase “to
    be lighted” in isolation, consider it in context. See Macomb Cty 
    Prosecutor, 464 Mich. at 158
    .
    -5-
    When read in context, it seems clear that subsection 686(2) does not set forth requirements on
    how a taillight must be lighted, but rather, it sets forth requirements when a taillight must be
    lighted: “A tail lamp or lamps . . . shall be wired so as to be lighted whenever the head lamps or
    auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.” MCL 257.686(2) (emphasis added.) When the headlamps
    are lighted, any taillight has to be lighted. But what does it mean “to be lighted”? On that
    question, subsection (2) is silent. From that silence, however, one need not infer ambiguity.
    In fact, one need not scour the Vehicle Code very far for the answer—it is found in the
    preceding subsection. Specifically, subsection 686(1) requires that a vehicle must have a
    taillight “which, when lighted as required by this act, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a
    distance of 500 feet to the rear.” MCL 257.686(1). Here, the Legislature set forth the how as:
    red light, plainly visible from 500 feet. And, when does the taillight have to be red, plainly
    visible from 500 feet? It has to be red and plainly visible from 500 feet “when lighted as
    required by this act”—i.e., when a headlamp or auxiliary lamp is lighted. MCL 257.686(2)
    (emphasis added).
    Read together, subsections 686(1) and (2) create a coherent whole: A vehicle must have a
    taillight, that taillight is considered “lighted” when it is red and plainly visible from at least 500
    feet, and that taillight must be lighted every time that a headlight or auxiliary lamp is lighted.
    Under this reading, a taillight would violate section 686 if (i) the taillight was not red, (ii) it
    could not be plainly seen from at least 500 feet, or (iii) it did not come on when the headlamps or
    auxiliary lamps were on. The flip side of this is that an otherwise dim taillight that was red, was
    plainly visible from at least 500 feet, and was on when the headlamps or auxiliary lamps were on
    would not violate section 686 and, without more, would not be reasonable grounds for a police
    officer to stop and inspect a vehicle. This reading of section 686 has the twin virtues of giving
    effect to both subsections 686(1) and (2) as well as providing a relatively clear, bright-line rule
    for police officers and courts to follow.
    What about the provision in section 683 that equipment on a vehicle must be in “proper
    condition and adjustment”? MCL 257.683(1). A dim taillight is certainly some evidence that
    the vehicle is not operating in full accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications. Yet, the
    Legislature did not create with the Vehicle Code an unbounded source of authority for police to
    stop and inspect any vehicle that somehow falls short of manufacturer specifications. Rather, the
    Legislature made clear in subsection 683(1) that the provision is expressly limited to “proper
    condition and adjustment as required in sections 683 to 711” of the Vehicle Code. 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Similar provisions in the code that permit a police officer to stop and inspect a vehicle
    are likewise tied to specific requirements set forth in the code. See, e.g., MCL 257.715(1)
    (“Equipment on motor vehicles as required under this act shall be maintained as provided in this
    act. A police officer may on reasonable grounds shown stop a motor vehicle to inspect the
    vehicle . . . .” (emphasis added)). Simply put, the Vehicle Code does not license a police officer
    to stop and inspect a vehicle for any and all perceived improper conditions and adjustments. A
    vehicle must be kept in the condition and adjustment expressly required by the Vehicle Code
    and, for taillights, those requirements are found in section 686.
    On this score, the circuit court erred when it concluded that a reasonable police officer
    could have believed that section 686 provided a reasonable basis to stop defendant. There was
    no testimony offered during the suppression hearing or at trial that defendant’s passenger-side
    -6-
    taillight was not red, not plainly visible from 500 feet, and not operating when the headlamps or
    auxiliary lamps were operating. Officer Lobbezoo testified, in fact, that he could not tell whether
    the taillight was visible from 500 feet and the passenger-side taillight did emit light when the
    headlamps were lighted, as the dash-cam video confirms. As explained above, it is not possible
    to conclude—one way or the other—whether the taillight was plainly visible from at least 500
    feet. Thus, the record evidence does not squarely fit the category of dim taillights that actually
    violate section 686.
    Nor is the language of section 686 so convoluted as to be one of those rare instances
    where a mistake of law could be considered reasonable. In fact, the Legislature spoke with
    relative clarity with respect to how a taillight must operate, as explained above. Where a
    provision, like section 686, does not “irreconcilably conflict” with another provision, or where it
    is not “equally susceptible to more than a single meaning,” there is no ambiguity under Michigan
    law. Mayor of City of Lansing v Mich Pub Serv Comm’n, 
    470 Mich. 154
    , 166; 680 NW2d 840
    (2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And, where there is no ambiguity in the
    law, Heien does not save an otherwise mistaken understanding of that unambiguous law. See
    Heien, 574 US at __
    ; 135 S. Ct. at 539-540
    (“The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable
    mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable. . . .
    Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he
    is duty-bound to enforce.”); id. at ___
    ; 135 S. Ct. at 541
    (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining that
    “[i]f the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires
    hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.” and
    noting that the U.S. Solicitor General and the State of North Carolina both conceded that such
    cases should be “exceedingly rare”); United States v Stanbridge, 813 F3d 1032, 1037 (CA 7,
    2016) (“The statute isn’t ambiguous, and Heien does not support the proposition that a police
    officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner by misinterpreting an unambiguous statute.”).
    This court did have the opportunity to consider the meaning of subsection 686(2) in
    Williams and a fair reading of that decision confirms that the court found part of the subsection
    ambiguous. Yet, the Williams decision does not support the circuit court’s decision here. The
    Williams court looked at the statute in the different context of whether a vehicle with multiple
    taillights had to have all of the taillights wired so as to be lighted or, instead, just had to have at
    least one taillight so wired. 
    Williams, 236 Mich. App. at 615
    . The question faced in that case, in
    other words, was a binary one: taillight on v. taillight off. The Williams court confirmed that the
    better reading of subsection 686(2) was that a vehicle equipped with two taillights must have two
    taillights that are lighted when the headlamps or auxiliary lamps are lighted. In this, Williams is
    similar to the statutory construction found in Heien.3
    3
    The concurring opinion suggests that there is another way to read section 686—the Legislature
    “plainly and specifically insisted that just one taillight emit a light from” 500 feet. Under this
    reading, a vehicle could have two or more taillights, all of them would have to be operational
    (from Williams), but only one of them would have to be red and plainly visible from 500 feet.
    Yet, is it really the case that section 686 is “equally susceptible” to this proposed alternate
    reading?
    -7-
    The present case is centered on the next logical, though distinct question: When a vehicle
    has two taillights and both taillights are, in some sense, operational, can the vehicle still violate
    section 686 when one of those taillights is not, in some other sense, fully operational?
    Defendant’s taillights were both operational in the sense that they were lighted when the
    headlamps were lighted, but one of them was not fully operational in that the light emitted was
    significantly dimmer than the other. As explained above, the answer is: Yes, a vehicle with an
    operating taillight can violate section 686, but only if the taillight is not red, it is not plainly
    visible from at least 500 feet, or it is not lighted when the headlamps or auxiliary lamps are
    lighted. Given the Legislature’s relatively clear guidance on this question, the circuit court erred
    in concluding that Officer Lobbezoo made a reasonable mistake under section 686 when he
    stopped defendant.
    There are good reasons to conclude that it is not. First, this alternate reading would seem to
    conflict with Williams, where the court held that the Legislature meant in section 686 that “all
    tail lamps intended for use on an automobile would have to be operative in order for the
    automobile to be in compliance with the Vehicle Code.” 
    Williams, 236 Mich. App. at 615
    . The
    Williams court based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that a different interpretation would have
    made the words “or tail lamps” in subsection 686(2) nugatory. 
    Id. at 614.
    The same logic
    applies here, in that the alternate reading would make the words “at least” in subsection 686(1)
    nugatory. To illustrate, if “just one taillight” had to be red and plainly visible from 500 feet, then
    subsection 686(1) should have instead read: “A motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with [] 1
    rear lamp . . . which, when lighted as required by this act, shall emit a red light plainly visible
    from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.” The Legislature eschewed this language, and chose
    instead to use the words “shall be equipped with at least 1 rear lamp.” MCL 257.686(1)
    (emphasis added).
    Second, the alternate reading would necessarily imply that the Legislature wrote subsection
    686(2) with the intent that multiple taillights must work together to enhance safety (Williams),
    but, when the Legislature specifically set forth how taillights should be lighted, the Legislature
    set aside any concern about multiple taillights working together in terms of the light emitted (this
    case). As long as one taillight was red and could be seen from 500 feet, another taillight could,
    for example, be green and visible from only 10 feet and still satisfy section 686, under the
    alternate reading. Needless to say, driving behind such a vehicle would be a rather disorienting
    experience. This reading would undermine, rather than enhance, vehicle safety—a reading at
    odds with the purpose of the Vehicle Code.
    Thus, regardless of whether the alternate reading is a reasonable one, section 686 is not “equally
    susceptible” to both readings. People v Hall, 
    499 Mich. 446
    , 453-454; 884 NW2d 561 (2016);
    People v Gardner, 
    482 Mich. 41
    , 50 n 12; 753 NW2d 78 (2008). As explained above, the better
    reading is the one employed in this opinion, where each word is given effect, each subsection is
    harmonious with the other, and a bright-line rule of conduct is recognized.
    -8-
    E.        Defendant Potentially Violated Section 683 of the Vehicle Code
    While a dim taillight that emits a red light plainly visible from at least 500 feet when the
    headlamps or auxiliary lamps are on works well enough for purposes of section 686, this is not
    the end of the inquiry. As noted above, subsection 683(1) of the Vehicle Code prohibits a person
    from operating “a vehicle . . . that is in such an unsafe condition as to endanger a person.” MCL
    257.683(1). This provision is separate from the provisions requiring that vehicles be kept in
    certain condition and adjustment, 4 meaning that a vehicle could satisfy all of the condition and
    adjustment requirements of the Vehicle Code and yet, if the vehicle is operated in a manner that
    creates an unsafe condition that endangers a person, that vehicle would still violate subsection
    683(1) of the Vehicle Code. MCL 257.683(1).
    In this case, the dash-cam video clearly shows that the passenger-side taillight on the
    vehicle in question was significantly dimmer than the one on the driver-side. As Judge Jordon
    noted during the suppression hearing, when one taillight is significantly brighter than the other, a
    dangerous condition may arise because other people may think that the person with the defective
    taillight was “braking in front of [them] all the time.” (M Tr, 62). Add to this the icy, wintery
    conditions present on the night in question, as Officer Lobbezoo testified, and the fact that
    defendant was driving in a congested area in the dark of early morning, as confirmed by the
    dash-cam video, and the potential for danger only increases. This narrow, factual finding by
    Judge Jordan that defendant’s defective taillight created a “dangerous” condition was, by itself,
    sufficient to justify the stop under MCL 257.683.
    Because Officer Lobbezoo witnessed defendant’s potential violation of the Vehicle Code,
    there existed reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Whren v United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 813;
    
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    ; 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (1996) (explaining that the reasonableness of a Terry stop does
    not depend upon the actual motivations of the officer involved). Accordingly, there was no
    Fourth Amendment violation and Judge Servaas erred in suppressing the evidence after the trial.
    See Draws v Levin, 
    332 Mich. 447
    , 454; 52 NW2d 180 (1952) (stating that the trial court’s
    reasoning does not prevent the reviewing court from affirming on other grounds).
    4
    Subsection 683(1) reads in full:
    A person shall not drive or move or the owner shall not cause or knowingly
    permit to be driven or moved on a highway a vehicle or combination of vehicles
    that is in such an unsafe condition as to endanger a person, or that does not
    contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with lamps and other equipment
    in proper condition and adjustment as required in sections 683 to 711, or that is
    equipped in a manner in violation of sections 683 to 711. A person shall not do
    an act forbidden or fail to perform an act required under sections 683 to 711.
    [MCL 257.683(1) (emphasis and bold added).]
    -9-
    F.         The Dissent
    Finally, as to the dissenting opinion: The dissent agrees with this lead opinion that the
    stop was not justified under section 686 and, in that respect, a reply is not needed. The dissent
    disagrees with this lead opinion that the stop was justified under section 683 and, in this respect,
    a reply is needed. Three brief comments will suffice.
    First, to the charge of appellate fact-finding, the response is—no. Judge Jordan, who
    heard testimony from Officer Lobbezoo and watched the dash-cam video during the suppression
    hearing, concluded that the significant difference in brightness between the two taillights created
    a dangerous condition because a person driving behind defendant could reasonably think that
    defendant’s vehicle was constantly braking. Moreover, the testimony of Officer Lobbezoo and a
    review of the dash-cam video confirm what one expects to find during January in Michigan—
    icy, wintery conditions. Taken together, these facts, as found by a trial judge and confirmed by
    video available to all, fit squarely within section 683’s express prohibition against unsafe
    driving.
    As for describing the difference in brightness between the two taillights as “significant,”5
    this is a fair characterization based on the record evidence. The dash-cam video is part of the
    record, and the video shows the driver-side taillight as very bright and the passenger-side
    taillight as quite dim. Taken together, “significant” accurately captures the qualitative difference
    between very bright and quite dim. Moreover, the fact that the passenger taillight was so dim
    that Officer Lobbezoo initially thought that it was completely out supports this characterization.
    In fact, as to the dissent’s contention of “pil[ing] supposition upon speculation,”6 one
    wonders where in the record Judge Servaas and the dissent find any evidence to show that
    defendant’s dim taillight was actually visible from 500 feet? Officer Lobbezoo testified that he
    could not speculate as to the distance, and the dash-cam video has no legend, scale, or other
    means of measuring the distance. Nothing else in the record touches on distance. As explained
    above, the best that can be said on this record is that the dim taillight became visible at some
    distance.
    Second, to the charge of inconsistency, the response is—again, no. There is nothing
    inconsistent with recognizing that the Legislature created a bright-line standard with respect to
    taillights, but then also recognizing that the Legislature included in section 683 a catch-all
    provision prohibiting a person from driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition that endangers
    5
    Opinion of SAWYER, J., infra, slip op at 3. While the dissent accuses the lead opinion of
    “employ[ing] rather vague generalities” by using the adjective “significant,” the dissent is not
    immune from its own criticism, as it describes the situation as one involving a “slightly dimmer”
    taillight. 
    Id. at 1
    n 2 (emphasis added).
    6
    
    Id. at 3.
    -10-
    others. MCL 257.683(1). To the contrary, it would be inconsistent to adhere to the plain
    meaning of section 686 while ignoring the plain meaning of section 683.
    Third, to the charge of legislating from the bench, the response is—once again, no. The
    dissent argues that if a vehicle has equipment that conforms to a specific requirement set forth in
    the vehicle code, then that equipment cannot, as a matter of law, be involved in the operation of
    a vehicle in an unsafe condition that endangers a person. More generally, the dissent takes the
    position that the three prohibitions in subsection 683(1)—(i) “unsafe condition as to endanger a
    person”; (ii) failure to have equipment as specified in the code; or (iii) having equipment in
    violation of the code—must be read as mutually exclusive.
    From a public-policy perspective, there appears to be nothing inherently illogical with
    this position. The Legislature could have enacted this policy into law, and it would have likely
    been reasonable in doing so.
    And yet, the Legislature did not enact the dissent’s policy into law. Michigan courts have
    long recognized that the Legislature is capable of creating mutually exclusive categories when it
    chooses to do so. See, e.g., Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 
    451 Mich. 129
    , 136 n 7; 545
    NW2d 642 (1996); cf Connecticut Nat’l Bank v Germain, 
    503 U.S. 249
    , 253; 112 SCt 1146; 117
    LEd2d 391 (1992) (holding that sections of a statute need not be mutually exclusive and in fact
    may overlap or be redundant in terms of their coverage, provided neither section contains
    limiting language to the contrary). A review of section 683 confirms that there is nothing in this
    section suggesting that the three prohibitions should be read as mutually exclusive.
    Nor is there anything absurd about reading the provisions as not mutually exclusive.
    Connecticut Nat’l 
    Bank, 503 U.S. at 253
    . The purpose of the Vehicle Code “is to promote traffic
    safety.” 
    Williams, 236 Mich. App. at 614
    . To further the goal of traffic safety, the Legislature set
    forth two provisions in subsection 683(1) requiring that certain equipment meet certain minimum
    requirements, and, while these provisions do not speak directly about traffic safety, the
    requirements implicitly further the goal of ensuring safe vehicles. The Legislature then added a
    catch-all provision that is explicitly focused on traffic safety—prohibiting the driving of a
    vehicle in an “unsafe condition as to endanger a person.” Given that subsection 683(1) does not
    include any “mutually exclusive”-type language; given that it is not uncommon for statutory
    provisions to have some regulatory overlap; and given that the Vehicle Code is intended to
    promote traffic safety, there appears to be no good reason to read the provisions of subsection
    683(1) as mutually exclusive.
    In sum. When confronted with the dissent’s admonition by Justice Scalia and Bryan
    Garner, with a dash of Judge Easterbrook thrown in for good measure, it is best to end with The
    Bard himself: The dissent doth protest too much, methinks.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
    -11-