Thalia Ann Brockway-Guidry v. Auto Club Group Insurance Company ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THALIA ANN BROCKWAY-GUIDRY, UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 361473
Wayne Circuit Court
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 20-014581-NF
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (Progressive), appeals by leave
granted1 an order denying its motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s statutory claim for
personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. On appeal, Progressive argues that the trial court
erred in denying summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because: (1) there was no genuine
issue of fact that plaintiff was not domiciled with Progressive’s named insured at the time of the
accident; (2) there was no enforceable agreement between Progressive and defendant, Auto Club
Insurance Company (Auto Club), to pay 50% of plaintiff’s PIP benefits; and (3) Auto Club cannot
claim estoppel. We reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings.
1
Brockway-Guidry v Auto Club Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered on
September 23, 2022 (Docket No. 361473).
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I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff sustained injuries. At
the time of the accident plaintiff was living with her father, James Brockway (James), at his home
in Chesterfield, Michigan. Plaintiff did not have her own insurance so she sought PIP benefits
from Auto Club because she was domiciled in the same household as James. After further
investigation of plaintiff’s claim, Auto Club discovered plaintiff’s brother, Jack Brockway (Jack)
had an insurance policy issued by Progressive that listed James’s Chesterfield home as the address
for the policy. Auto Club contacted Progressive to file a claim based on its belief that plaintiff
lived with Jack, as well as James, and therefore, she would also be entitled to PIP benefits under
Jack’s Progressive insurance policy. Progressive’s claims adjuster found two addresses associated
with Jack: (1) the Chesterfield home, and (2) an address in Hamtramck, Michigan. Under the
belief that plaintiff was also domiciled in the same household as Jack, Progressive agreed to pay
half of plaintiff’s PIP benefits Auto Club already remitted. Progressive learned Auto Club paid
$7,627.09 on plaintiff’s claim, and after receiving the demand from Auto Club, Progressive paid
the pro rata share of plaintiff’s claim of $3,813.55.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint against Auto Club asserting a statutory claim for
PIP benefits and sought declaratory relief, alleging that Auto Club refused or unreasonably delayed
payment of benefits. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to add Progressive as a defendant.
Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she was living only with her father, James, in the
Chesterfield home at the time of the accident. James also testified that he and plaintiff were the
only people residing at the Chesterfield home at the time of the accident.
Based on this testimony, Progressive moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was not liable to pay plaintiff’s PIP benefits because she was not
domiciled in the same household as Jack, a Progressive named insured. In its response, Auto Club
did not dispute any of the facts concerning Jack’s residence or domicile. Instead, Auto Club argued
that it had entered into a binding contract with Progressive, under which Progressive agreed to pay
half of plaintiff’s claims for PIP benefits. Importantly, plaintiff averred that Auto Club was liable
for nonpayment of her PIP benefits; she took no position regarding enforcement of the alleged
prelitigation agreement; and she admitted that she was not domiciled in the same household as
Jack at the time of the accident. The trial court denied Progressive’s motion without holding a
hearing or providing any explanation. Progressive moved for reconsideration, which the trial court
also denied without an explanation. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Broz v
Plante & Moran, PLLC, 331 Mich App 39, 45; 951 NW2d 64 (2020). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504
Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must consider ‘[t]he affidavits, together with
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or
submitted by the parties’ in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bonner v City of
Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 220-221; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (citation omitted). The moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine
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issue regarding any material fact. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “when reasonable minds can differ on an issue after viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP,
481 Mich 419, 425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008).
We also “review de novo the interpretation and application of a statute as a question of
law. If the language of a statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed.” Eggleston
v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003). “A domicile
determination is generally a question of fact; however, where the underlying material facts are not
in dispute, the determination of domicile is a question of law for the circuit court.” Grange Ins Co
of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 489; 835 NW2d 363 (2013).
III. ANALYSIS
Progressive argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition
because: (1) there was no genuine issue of fact that plaintiff was not domiciled in the same
household as Progressive’s named insured, Jack, at the time of the accident; (2) there was no
enforceable agreement between Progressive and Auto Club to pay 50% of plaintiff’s statutory
claim for PIP benefits; and (3) Auto Club cannot claim estoppel. We agree.
MCL 500.3114(1) governs priority among insurers for payment of PIP benefits and states,
in relevant part: “[A] personal protection insurance policy . . . applies to accidental bodily injury
to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the
same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.” Domicile is “the place where
a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Grange Ins Co, 494 Mich at 493 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Domicile has also been defined as “that place where a person has voluntarily
fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making
it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” Id. (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Importantly, a person may only have one domicile at a time. Id. at
493-494.
Michigan courts apply the multifactor tests articulated in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-
Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners
Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 682; 333 NW2d 322 (1983) to determine whether an insured and a
claimant are domiciled in the same household. Grange Ins Co, 494 Mich at 497. “In considering
these factors, no one factor is, in itself, determinative; instead, each factor must be balanced and
weighed with the others.” Workman, 404 Mich at 496. The factors articulated in Workman are:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently
or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his
“domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the relationship
between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether the place where
the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same
premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging
“residence” or “domicile” in the household[.] [Id. 496-497 (citations omitted).]
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The factors articulated in Dairyland Ins Co are:
[W]hether the claimant continues to use his parents’ home as his mailing address,
whether he maintains some possessions with his parents, whether he uses his
parents’ address on his driver’s license or other documents, whether a room is
maintained for the claimant at the parents’ home, and whether the claimant is
dependent upon the parents for support. [Dairyland Ins Co, 123 Mich App at 682.]
In its motion for summary disposition, Progressive argued that plaintiff was not domiciled
with its named insured, her brother Jack, at the time of the accident. In support of its motion,
Progressive attached the deposition testimony of plaintiff and James, where each stated that Jack
did not live at the Chesterfield home with them at the time of the accident. In her deposition,
plaintiff testified that Jack did not live at the Chesterfield home at the time of the accident. Plaintiff
also stated that Jack did not have a room at the Chesterfield home, but kept personal belongings
such as his stereo equipment there. Similarly, James testified, at the time of the accident, he was
only living with plaintiff at the Chesterfield home, and Jack had not lived there for at least five
years. Importantly, plaintiff admitted that Jack did not reside with her and James at the time of the
accident in her reply to Progressive’s motion for summary disposition. Auto Club did not contest
any of the facts concerning Jack’s domicile, nor did it present evidence that Jack was, in fact,
domiciled with plaintiff at the Chesterfield home in opposing the motion for summary disposition.
Clearly, as required, Progressive came forward with evidence in support of its contention
that plaintiff was not domiciled in the same household as Jack. Although the evidence is required
to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” in the trial court, Auto Club
failed to come forward with any evidence “that a genuine and material issue of disputed fact
exists.” Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 141; 693 NW2d 825 (2005), citing MCR 2.116(G)(4).
In response to Progressive’s summary disposition motion, Auto Club exclusively relied on the
alleged contractual agreement between the insurers, without any effort to dispute or support the
location of Jack’s domicile. As such, the trial court erred in denying Progressive’s motion for
summary disposition because Auto Club failed to present evidence that there was a genuine issue
of fact regarding whether plaintiff was domiciled with Jack at the time of the accident.
Lastly, Progressive argues that Auto Club cannot claim estoppel. At the outset, we note
that Auto Club never actually claimed estoppel in the trial court. Auto Club’s one sentence
statement2 in its answer was made simply in furtherance of its contention that an enforceable
contract existed—but Auto Club conceded on appeal at oral argument that it was not claiming that
an enforceable contract existed. If anything, it could be implied that Auto Club was suggesting
applicability of promissory estoppel. The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: “(1) a
promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promise, and (3) that in fact produced reliance or
forbearance of that nature in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is
to be avoided.” Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679,
2
Auto Club’s statement was: “Simply put, there is a question of fact as to Progressive’s status of
priority in this case because Progressive fully intended and acted like it was on the same level of
priority as Auto Club since before the inception of this litigation.”
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713; 950 NW2d 502 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A promise is a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specific way, so made as to justify a promise in
understanding that a commitment has been made.” Zaremba Equip, Inc v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 280
Mich App 16, 41; 761 NW2d 151 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The promise
must be definite and clear, and the reliance on it must be reasonable.” Id.Progressive promised to pay a specific sum in accordance with the demand sent by Auto
Club, but did not a promise to pay half of any and all of plaintiff’s statutory claims for PIP benefits.
Moreover, Auto Club cannot claim reasonable reliance because Auto Club did not change its
position, or take any action indicating its reliance on Progressive being responsible to pay for half
of all plaintiff’s claims for benefits. Further, enforcement of this “promise” would not be necessary
to avoid injustice. Auto Club is obligated to pay plaintiff statutory PIP benefits because she was
domiciled in the same household as its named insured, James. In fact, Progressive was not
obligated to pay any of plaintiff’s PIP benefits because she was not domiciled in the same
household as its named insured, Jack. As such, it is not an injustice to allow Progressive to avoid
further liability on plaintiff’s claim it was never obligated to pay. Therefore, the trial court erred
in denying Progressive’s motion for summary disposition because there was no enforceable
contract and Auto Club cannot legitimately assert promissory estoppel.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Progressive is entitled to costs as the prevailing party. See MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Anica Letica
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