Mandy Jensen v. Gary Hadden ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MANDY JENSEN and BRADLEY JENSEN, UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 2023
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 361270
Allegan Circuit Court
GARY HADDEN, LC No. 18-060106-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and YATES, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, Mandy and Bradley Jensen, sued their landlord over bedbugs they found in the
home they rented from defendant, Gary Hadden. Plaintiffs represented themselves and, as pro se
litigants are wont to do, they struggled mightily with the requirements of civil procedure. At the
outset, the trial court awarded defendant summary disposition on plaintiffs’ initial complaint, but
we resurrected the case by affording plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint. Jensen v
Hadden, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2020
(Docket No. 351591). On remand, plaintiffs fared no better in their second pleading attempt. The
trial court again awarded summary disposition to defendant, but the trial court permitted plaintiffs
leave to file one more amended complaint. Alas, plaintiffs missed the filing deadline for the second
amended complaint, so the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice and imposed sanctions
on plaintiffs. Despite plaintiffs’ presentation of a myriad of issues on this appeal, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As we explained when this case was before us on plaintiffs’ first appeal, plaintiffs rented a
home from defendant and subsequently found bedbugs in their rental unit. Defendant undertook
efforts to exterminate the bedbugs, but plaintiffs continued to experience problems, so they decided
to file suit on their own behalf against defendant. The trial court patiently tried to guide plaintiffs
through the complexities of the court system, but to no avail. On October 17, 2019, the trial court
issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice and denying plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint. On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for intentional and negligent
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infliction of emotional distress, but we ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to leave to file an amended
complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(5).
On remand, plaintiffs filed a 17-count amended complaint requesting millions of dollars in
damages. Defendant filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (prior
judgment) and (C)(8) (failure to state a claim). Additionally, defendant moved to strike plaintiffs’
complaint under MCR 2.115 on the basis that it violated MCR 2.113(B)(2). Defendant contended
that 13 of plaintiffs’ claims did not state a legal basis for recovery; they simply demanded damages
that plaintiffs allegedly sustained because of defendant’s conduct. Defendant also argued that two
of the claims set forth in the amended complaint—intentional infliction of severe mental anguish
and negligent infliction of severe mental anguish—were repackaged versions of the claims that we
deemed unsustainable on the first appeal. The trial court heard oral argument on October 18, 2021,
and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, but gave plaintiffs leave to file a
second amended complaint to assert a claim for negligence that conformed with MCR 2.113(B).
After that argument, defendant submitted a proposed order under the seven-day rule, MCR
2.602(B)(3). But plaintiffs objected to the proposed order and presented arguments contesting the
substance of the trial court’s ruling and alleging that they had not received proper notice of the oral
argument on defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition. In addition, plaintiffs moved to
disqualify the trial judge and moved for summary disposition on the basis that defendant violated
MCR 2.116(C)(3) by failing to properly serve process. Defendant responded by seeking sanctions
under MCR 1.109(E)(6) in the forms of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in responding
to plaintiffs’ objection to the proposed order and their motions to disqualify the trial judge and for
summary disposition on service-of-process grounds.
The trial court heard those motions on November 15, 2021, and ruled from the bench at the
conclusion of the hearing. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for disqualification, stating that
he had no bias or prejudice against plaintiffs and he did not know any of the parties outside of this
litigation. Next, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ objections to the proposed order that defendant
had submitted under the seven-day rule. The trial court afforded plaintiffs 21 days from the date
of the hearing to file a second amended complaint consistent with what the trial court had discussed
at the October 18 hearing. Also, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition.
Finally, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for sanctions concerning plaintiffs’ objection to
the proposed order and their motion for summary disposition, but denied sanctions as to plaintiffs’
motion to disqualify the trial judge. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to
perform a reasonable inquiry into whether their objections and their summary disposition motion
were warranted by existing law.
Plaintiffs did not file a second amended complaint by December 6, 2021, i.e., 21 days after
the hearing on November 15, 2021, so defendant moved for dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)(1).
At the hearing on that motion on February 28, 2022, plaintiffs conceded that they filed their second
amended complaint on December 9, 2021, which was three days after the deadline established by
the trial court. But plaintiffs asserted that their tardiness should be excused because defendant did
not provide them with the signed order in a timely manner and they thought they had 21 days from
their receipt of the signed order to file the second amended complaint. The trial court rejected that
argument and granted defendant’s motion for dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)(1). Finally, the trial
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court entered orders in mid-April 2022 directing plaintiffs to pay defendant $5,244 in reasonable
attorney fees as a sanction and dismissing the case under MCR 2.504(B)(1). This appeal followed.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In a 50-page brief that is as puzzling as it is unconventional, plaintiffs contend that the trial
court erred in numerous respects. In addition to all the claims of error, plaintiffs identify all sorts
of occurrences in the trial court and ask this Court to explain the propriety of each of those events.
As we make clear in this opinion, plaintiffs are required to identify alleged errors and offer support
for the arguments that an error occurred. Merely identifying an incident that happened in the lower
court and asking this Court to explain why it happened is not sufficient to present an issue for this
Court’s review. Thus, we will confine our analysis to the purported errors identified in plaintiffs’
statement of questions presented that are properly before this Court.
A. NOTICE OF HEARING
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by awarding defendant partial summary disposition
even though defendant did not notify plaintiffs of the oral argument on that motion that took place
on October 18, 2021. We must “review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).
A trial court’s interpretation and application of the Michigan Court Rules is likewise reviewed de
novo. Snyder v Advantage Health Physicians, 281 Mich App 493, 500; 760 NW2d 834 (2008).
Unless a trial court chooses a different period, “a written motion under [MCR 2.116] with
supporting brief and any affidavits must be filed and served at least 21 days before the time set for
the hearing[.]” MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(i). Notice of a hearing on the motion must be served “at least
9 days before the time set for the hearing, if served by first-class mail[.]” MCR 2.119(C)(1)(a).
Service by mail requires placing the document “in a sealed envelope with first class postage fully
prepaid, addressed to the person to be served, and depositing the envelope and its contents in the
United States mail. Service by mail is complete at the time of mailing.” MCR 2.107(C)(3). Any
document properly addressed and placed in the mail is presumed to reach its destination. Crawford
v Michigan, 208 Mich App 117, 121; 527 NW2d 30 (1994), citing Stacey v Sankovich, 19 Mich
App 688, 694; 173 NW2d 225 (1969). The presumption may be rebutted, Stacey, 19 Mich App
at 694, but the mere denial of service is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. See Ins Co of
North America v Issett, 84 Mich App 45, 49; 269 NW2d 301 (1978).
Here, plaintiffs contend that they had been receiving documents from defendant via e-mail
with the exception of the notice of hearing on defendant’s summary disposition motion. Plaintiffs
alleged that they first learned of the hearing when they received an e-mail about the hearing a few
days before it was scheduled to take place. So, as the record reflects, plaintiffs were able to attend
the hearing. At the hearing, plaintiffs claimed that they had not received proper notice. The trial
court found that proper notice of the hearing had been sent to plaintiffs’ last known address. Also,
the trial court stated that it had tried to contact plaintiffs by telephone the week before the hearing,
but the telephone number on file for plaintiffs was disconnected. Therefore, the trial court rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that proper notice of the hearing was not given.
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The trial court’s ruling is supported by the proof of service filed by defendant, which shows
that the notice of hearing was served via first-class mail on August 9, 2021, which was more than
a month before the October 18, 2021 hearing. According to the proof of service, defendant mailed
the notice of hearing to the address listed on plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Defendant’s service
of the hearing notice for his motion for partial summary disposition complied with the court rules
governing timing and manner of service and filing of proof of service. See MCR 2.119(C)(1)(a).
Although plaintiffs claim that they had been served with all other documents via e-mail, the record
contains no stipulation that documents must be served by e-mail. Because the record reflects that
the notice of hearing was properly addressed and placed in the mail, it was presumed that it reached
its destination. See Crawford, 208 Mich App at 121. Plaintiffs offered no evidence to rebut that
presumption, and plaintiffs’ denial that they received the notice does not rebut that presumption.
See Stacey, 19 Mich App at 694; Ins Co of North America, 84 Mich App at 49. Thus, plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that the trial court erred when it decided that plaintiffs had received proper
notice of the hearing and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition after hearing
oral arguments from plaintiffs as well as defendant.
B. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
Plaintiffs contend that the trial judge erred by denying their motion to disqualify him. As
plaintiffs frame their argument, Judge Roberts A. Kengis should have recused himself because of
his bias against plaintiffs in particular or against unrepresented litigants in general. “We review a
trial court’s factual findings regarding a motion for disqualification for an abuse of discretion and
its application of the facts to the law de novo.” In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 564; 781 NW2d
132 (2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Due process requires that an unbiased and impartial decision-maker hear and decide a case.
Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 523; 823 NW2d 153 (2012). A trial judge is presumed to
be unbiased, and any party moving for disqualification bears the heavy burden of overcoming that
presumption. Id. Under MCR 2.003(C), there are several grounds that warrant disqualification.
For example, disqualification is justified if a judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party.
MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a). Generally, a trial judge is not disqualified absent a showing of actual bias
or prejudice. In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). Moreover,
disqualification “on the basis of bias or prejudice cannot be established merely by repeated rulings
against a litigant, even if the rulings are erroneous.” In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566. Nor does
a generalized hostility toward a class of claimants present disqualifying bias. Id. “A showing of
prejudice usually requires that the source of the bias be in events or information outside the judicial
proceeding.” Id. “[A]ll motions for disqualification must be filed within 14 days of the discovery
of the grounds for disqualification.” MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a).
Here, plaintiffs submitted their motion to disqualify Judge Kengis on October 21, 2021.
Plaintiffs alleged that Judge Kengis had demonstrated he was biased against unrepresented parties,
or against them specifically, “for an unknown reason.” Plaintiffs claimed that this bias was evident
because defendant had not been forced to abide by court rules and orders and because Judge Kengis
dismissed the complaint plaintiffs filed against the mediator in this case. Plaintiffs also asserted,
incorrectly, that Judge Kengis had decided it was immaterial that plaintiffs had not received notice
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of the October 18, 2021 hearing on defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition because
plaintiffs did not have a working phone.
The trial court addressed plaintiffs’ motion at the hearing on November 15, 2021. The trial
court determined that many of plaintiffs’ examples of bias were based on earlier rulings and were,
therefore, not timely filed. The trial court also determined that its ruling regarding the October 18,
2021 hearing comported with the governing court rules and was supported by the record. The trial
court further noted that it did not know either plaintiff outside of this case, and that it did not have
any bias against either plaintiff or in favor of defendant. Thus, the trial court denied the motion.
We conclude that plaintiffs have not met the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption
that Judge Kengis was unbiased. Mitchell, 296 Mich App at 523. The trial court did not err to the
extent that it denied plaintiffs’ motion on the basis that the alleged evidence of bias had surfaced
more than 14 days before the motion was filed. See MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a). Additionally, plaintiffs
have not suggested any extrajudicial event or information that could serve as a source of bias. See
In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566. Nor does their assumption that Judge Kengis is biased against
litigants acting in propriis personis find support in the record. In plaintiffs’ first appeal, the panel
determined that many of plaintiffs’ challenges to the trial court’s alleged unfair treatment of them
stemmed from plaintiffs’ “lack of familiarity with applicable court rules and practice.” Jensen,
unpub op at 6. Although the trial court could not give plaintiffs legal advice, the court “took time
to explain its actions and rulings throughout the proceedings.” Id. The same consideration was
evident on remand. Judge Kengis afforded plaintiffs the opportunity to submit a second amended
complaint to reassert a claim for negligence. At the hearing on November 15, 2021, the trial court
made a point of plainly advising plaintiffs that they had 21 days from the date of the hearing to file
their second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of Judge Kengis’s alleged bias against them or against
pro se litigants in general, nor does the record reveal any. Instead, plaintiffs refer to rulings that
the trial court made against them as the basis for their argument. But rulings against a party, even
if erroneous, do not establish a basis for disqualification, In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566, so the
trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for disqualification.
C. SANCTIONS
Plaintiffs fault the trial court for awarding defendant sanctions in the form of his reasonable
attorney fees under MCR 1.109(E)(6). We review an award of sanctions under MCR 1.109(E) for
abuse of discretion, and we review supporting factual findings for clear error. Sprenger v Bickle,
307 Mich App 411, 422-423; 861 NW2d 52 (2014). An abuse of discretion occurs only when “the
trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Macomb Co Dep’t of Human
Servs v Anderson, 304 Mich App 750, 754; 849 NW2d 408 (2014). A decision is clearly erroneous
when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661-662; 641 NW2d
245 (2002).
According to MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b), a signature of a person filing a document, “whether or
not represented by an attorney,” certifies that, to the best of the signer’s “knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted
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by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law[.]” The reasonableness of the inquiry is judged by an objective standard, not by the subjective
good faith of the inquirer. New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Covert Twp, 334 Mich App 24, 91;
964 NW2d 378 (2020). “A claim is devoid of arguable legal merit if it is not sufficiently grounded
in law or fact, such as when it violates basic, longstanding, and unmistakably evident precedent.”
Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). The signer also certifies that “the document
is not interposed for any improper purpose . . . .” MCR 1.109(E)(5)(c).
Whenever a document is signed in violation of MCR 1.109(E)(5), “the court, on the motion
of a party or on its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party,
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including
reasonable attorney fees.” MCR 1.109(E)(6). Sanctions are mandatory for all documents filed in
violation of MCR 1.109(E)(5). See Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC,
330 Mich App 679, 709; 950 NW2d 502 (2019). And the language of MCR 1.109(E) makes clear
“that sanctions may be imposed upon unrepresented parties who sign their own pleadings . . . .”
People v Herrera, 204 Mich App 333, 338; 514 NW2d 543 (1994).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions under MCR 1.109(E) for
plaintiffs’ submission of objections to defendant’s proposed order and for the filing of plaintiffs’
October 22, 2021 summary disposition motion. After the hearing on defendant’s motion for partial
summary disposition, defendant’s attorney submitted a proposed order under MCR 2.602(B)(3),
which states that “[w]ithin 7 days after the granting of the judgment or order . . . a party may serve
a copy of the proposed judgment or order on the other parties, with a notice to them that it will be
submitted to the court for signing if no written objections to its accuracy or completeness are filed
with the court clerk within 7 days after service of the notice. . . .” Here, plaintiffs’ objections to
the proposed order were based on allegations that defendant did not provide proper notice of the
motion hearing and that the trial court erroneously found that notice had been properly provided.
Plaintiffs further asserted that the trial court never responded to their motion for virtual hearings.
None of those objections was warranted by existing law, i.e., MCR 2.602(B)(3), because they did
not pertain to the form of the proposed order.
Additionally, to the extent that plaintiffs believed that such objections were warranted by
existing law, that belief was not formed after reasonable inquiry. In fact, it defies logic to surmise
that plaintiffs had such a belief. Although courts typically afford a degree of leniency to litigants
engaged in self-representation, “[a]ppearance in pro per does not excuse all application of court
rules.” Bachor v Detroit, 49 Mich App 507, 512; 212 NW2d 302 (1973). Indeed, earlier in this
case, plaintiffs had filed objections to defendant’s proposed order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition—the order that was the subject of plaintiffs’ first appeal. Most of plaintiffs’
objections in that filing contested the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion. Defendant
responded by noting various ways in which the objections failed to comply with MCR 2.602(B)(3),
and the trial court denied plaintiffs’ objections on the basis that the objections did not comply with
MCR 2.602(B)(3). That experience necessarily made plaintiffs aware of MCR 2.602(B)(3) and
its requirements. In the very same situation in 2021, plaintiffs made substantially the same error.
Plaintiffs’ claim that they were not aware until recently that they could only object to the accuracy
and completeness of a proposed order is belied by the record. Given plaintiffs’ previous experience
in this case that drove home the requirements of MCR 2.602(B)(3), we conclude that the trial court
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did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions under MCR 1.109(E)(6) for plaintiffs’ filing of
objections to defendant’s proposed order.
Additionally, the trial court sanctioned plaintiffs for filing a summary disposition motion
on October 22, 2021. Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(3), which
allows summary disposition if service of process was insufficient. Plaintiffs do not understand the
meaning of “process.” Plaintiffs have exhibited some familiarity with the Michigan Court Rules,
and a reasonable inquiry to determine the meaning of “process” would have led them to Michigan
Court Rule Subchapter 2.100, which includes “service of process” in its heading. MCR 2.105(A)
addresses the manner of service on individuals and makes clear that “process” refers to a summons
and a copy of the complaint filed by a plaintiff to commence a civil action. Even a cursory inquiry
would have informed plaintiffs that MCR 2.116(C)(3) was inapplicable because a notice of hearing
was neither a summons nor a complaint, documents with which plaintiffs were familiar because
they filed those document to initiate this civil action. Plaintiffs assert that they honestly believed
that the motion for summary disposition was appropriate. But a litigant’s subjective good faith is
not the standard by which a court determines whether plaintiffs made a reasonable inquiry before
signing and filing a document. New Covert Generating Co, LLC, 334 Mich App at 91.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ summary disposition request under MCR 2.116(C)(3) was not well-
grounded in fact because it was based, in part, on the purported improper notice of the October 18,
2021 hearing. The other allegations concern unfair treatment of plaintiffs prior to our remand of
this case. Those allegations regarding the October 18 hearing are contradicted by the transcript of
that hearing, where the trial court found that the record revealed “proper notice of hearing that was
sent to [plaintiffs’] last known address for today’s hearing.” The trial court went on to note that it
had tried to call plaintiffs before the hearing, but was unsuccessful because their telephone number
had been disconnected. Plaintiffs’ claim in their motion for summary disposition that “Defendant
was allowed to get away with not notifying the Plaintiffs because the court could not reach the
Plaintiffs by phone regarding another motion” finds no support in the record. Indeed, it is directly
contrary to the trial court’s findings on the record at the hearing on October 18. Plaintiffs’ motion,
therefore, was not well-grounded in fact. That would have been obvious from a reasonable inquiry.
See MCR 1.109(E)(5). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned
plaintiffs for filling a legally frivolous and factually inaccurate motion.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant’s attorney did not show that the attorney fees that
he requested were the actual attorney fees he charged his client. When a trial court awards attorney
fees, the award is for “reasonable” fees, not necessarily actual fees. See Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich
519, 528 & n 12; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). Plaintiffs have not challenged the trial court’s finding
that the attorney fees requested were reasonable, so plaintiffs’ challenge to the attorney-fee award
is unpersuasive.
D. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs insist that the trial court erred by dismissing their case under MCR 2.504(B)(1)
because the second amended complaint was filed late. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they filed their
second amended complaint three days after the deadline set by the trial court’s November 15, 2021
order, but plaintiffs contend that dismissal was improper because they did not receive the order on
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time. “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to dismiss an action under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995).
Under MCR 2.504(B)(1), if a party “fails to comply with these rules or a court order, upon
motion by an opposing party, or sua sponte, the court may enter a default against the noncomplying
party or a dismissal of the noncomplying party’s action or claims.” Defendant sought dismissal of
plaintiffs’ case under MCR 2.504(B)(1) after plaintiffs failed to comply with the trial court’s order
granting plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint within 21 days of November 15, 2021.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assumption, their receipt of the order had no impact on that deadline. Under
the language of the order, the 21-day clock started running upon entry of the order, not plaintiffs’
receipt of the order. The order was signed, date-stamped, and recorded in the register of actions
on November 15, 2021. Further, even if it was error for defense counsel to fail to serve a copy of
the November 15 order on plaintiffs within seven days after the trial court signed it, as required by
MCR 2.602(E)(1), the error was harmless. Before plaintiffs received their copy of that order, they
knew that their second amended complaint was due by December 6, 2021, because the trial court
told them so at the November 15 hearing. Therefore, although there was a delay between the entry
of the order and plaintiffs’ receipt of that order, they cannot show that that delay prejudiced them.
Plaintiffs had known since October 18, 2021, that the trial court was going to grant them leave to
file a second amended complaint, and they knew on November 15 that they had 21 days from that
date to file the pleading. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the case.
Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court dismissed their case in retaliation for their
motion to disqualify the trial judge. This allegation finds no support in the record. At the hearing
on October 18, 2021, four days before plaintiffs moved to disqualify the trial judge, the judge told
plaintiffs that he would afford them leave to file a second amended complaint, but the case would
be dismissed if the amended complaint was not filed within 21 days. The trial court then extended
that deadline, giving plaintiffs 21 days from the hearing on November 15 to file a second amended
complaint. The fact that the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ case occurred just as the trial court
outlined is convincing evidence that the trial court did not dismiss plaintiffs’ case in retaliation for
their subsequently filed disqualification motion. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it dismissed plaintiffs’ case pursuant to MCR 2.504(B)(1).
E. UNFAIR TREATMENT
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court allowed defendant’s counsel to make mistakes on several
occasions, and they now request that this Court explain why that was permitted. Plaintiffs’ analysis
of this issue is brief, consisting of a mere three sentences that fail to identify any supposed errors
by defendant’s counsel. This request for an explanation is a common theme throughout plaintiffs’
brief. In their statement of facts, plaintiffs identify at least 35 rulings and other issues in the trial
court and they ask this Court to explain why the rulings were made or why something was allowed
to occur. Plaintiffs’ requests for clarification include questions such as “[w]hy is the justice system
so one sided” and “[w]hy did the court of appeals allow all of this injustice?”
This Court is an error-correcting court. Our “purpose is to determine if the trial court made
an error when it rendered its decision.” Wolfenbarger v Wright, 336 Mich App 1, 27; 969 NW2d
518 (2021). To properly present claims of error to this Court, appellants must specify their issues
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in the statement of questions presented section of their brief on appeal, English v Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mich, 263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004), which should state “concisely
and without repetition the questions involved in the appeal.” MCR 7.212(C)(5). Moreover, failure
to provide argument in support of a claim of error will result in this Court deeming that issue to be
abandoned. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not enough for
an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”).
Plaintiffs make numerous requests to this Court to explain why something occurred (or did
not occur) in the trial court or to explain the propriety of certain court actions. But these requests
misconstrue this Court’s role, which is to determine if the trial court erred in rendering its decision.
Wolfenbarger, 336 Mich App at 27. An appellant fails to properly present an issue for this Court’s
review by merely identifying an occurrence in the lower court and then requesting an explanation,
without any argument or authority to suggest that the occurrence was some sort of error. Therefore,
plaintiffs have failed to properly present to this Court any instance of unfair treatment for which
relief may be warranted on appeal.
In addition, many issues raised in this appeal were already raised and addressed in our first
look at this case on appeal in 2020. The panel in that appeal concluded that there was “simply no
evidence that the court treated the Jensens unfairly.” Jensen, unpub op at 6. Because those issues
were already decided by a panel of this Court, we are now precluded from revisiting those issues.
See Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286-287; 972 NW2d 789 (2021) (holding that the law-of-the-case
doctrine applies to issues decided on appeal, and provides that “an appellate court’s determination
of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals”
if the facts remain materially the same). Thus, we need not—and cannot—say anything definitive
about those issues on plaintiffs’ return trip to this Court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
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