David Splan v. Estate of Edwin Earl Brown ( 2023 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    DAVID SPLAN,                                                         UNPUBLISHED
    August 24, 2023
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                    No. 360947
    Washtenaw Circuit Court
    JOSHUA FINK, Personal Representative of the                          LC No. 21-000250-NI
    ESTATE OF EDWIN EARL BROWN,
    Defendant,
    and
    HOME OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: GADOLA, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SWARTZLE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    The trial court denied Home Owners’s summary disposition because plaintiff’s policy
    language was ambiguous and did not entitle Home Owners to a setoff of the underinsured’s
    primary policy. We reverse.
    On April 8, 2019, Edwin Brown was driving northbound in a southbound lane, and he
    caused a multivehicle collision that injured plaintiff. Plaintiff did not participate in a settlement
    with Brown’s insurance company which resolved the claims of other parties who were injured by
    the collision. Consequently, plaintiff did not receive any benefit from Brown’s insurance
    company.
    Plaintiff then sued various parties for damages, including his insurance company, Home
    Owners, for denying him payment under its underinsured-motorist policy. Home Owners moved
    for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was entitled to setoff of
    plaintiff’s underinsured-motorist benefits as reduced by Brown’s primary-policy limit because the
    parties’ relevant policy language stated:
    -1-
    4. LIMIT OF LIABILITY:
    a. Our Limit of Liability for Underinsured Motorist Coverage shall not
    exceed the lowest of:
    (1) the amount by which the Underinsured Motorist Coverage limits
    stated in the Declarations exceed the total limits of all bodily injury
    liability bonds and policies available to the owner or operator of the
    underinsured automobile; or
    (2) the amount by which compensatory damages, including but not
    limited to loss of consortium, because of bodily injury exceed the
    total limits of those bodily injury liability bonds and policies.
    b. The Limit of Liability is not increased because of the number of
    (1) automobiles shown or premiums charged in the Declarations;
    (2) claims made or suits brought;
    (3) persons injured; or
    (4) automobiles involved in the occurrence,
    Home Owners argued that plaintiff’s underinsured-motorist policy covered damage up to
    $250,000, whereas Brown’s primary policy covered damage up to $500,000. Thus, when setting
    $250,000 off by $500,000, Home Owners’s liability amount would be zero.
    The trial court denied Home Owners’s motion for summary disposition because the policy
    was ambiguous and no amounts were paid to plaintiff from Brown’s insurance policy, meaning
    there was no amount from Brown to setoff against plaintiff’s policy with Home Owners.
    Home Owners moved for reconsideration, arguing that our Supreme Court in Wilkie v
    Auto-Owners Ins Co, 
    469 Mich 41
    , 49-50; 
    664 NW2d 776
     (2003), had held that policy language
    substantially similar to the policy in this case had setoff the amount owed by the policy limit of
    the underinsured, not the amount paid from the underinsured’s policy. The trial court denied the
    motion for reconsideration.
    Home Owners now submits its interlocutory appeal by leave granted. David Splan v Estate
    of Edwin Earl Brown, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued September 23, 2022
    (Docket No. 360947).
    “We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
    disposition.” Sherman v City of St Joseph, 
    332 Mich App 626
    , 632; 
    957 NW2d 838
     (2020)
    (citations omitted). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “by
    considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Patrick v Turkelson, 
    322 Mich App 595
    , 605; 
    913 NW2d 369
     (2018). “Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any
    -2-
    material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman, 332 Mich
    App at 632.
    The no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq, does not require underinsured-motorist coverage.
    “Therefore, the terms of the insurance contract control any potential entitlement to UM/UIM
    benefits.” Gueye v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022)
    (Docket No. 358992), slip op at 3 (cleaned up). “The proper interpretation of a contract is a
    question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” Wilkie, 
    469 Mich at 48
    . “The same standard
    applies to the question of whether an ambiguity exists in an insurance contract.” 
    Id.
     “Accordingly,
    we examine the language in the contract, giving it its ordinary and plain meaning if such would be
    apparent to a reader of the instrument.” 
    Id.
     “Where the language of an insurance policy is clear
    and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written.” Auto-Owners Ins Co v Harvey, 
    219 Mich App 466
    , 469, 
    556 NW2d 517
     (1996).
    Plaintiff argues that the relevant policy language—“the amount we pay will be reduced by
    any amounts paid or payable for the same bodily injury”—clearly intends a setoff only when other
    payments were made regarding plaintiff’s bodily injury. The payments made under Brown’s
    insurance policy were to other individuals for their own injuries, not plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff
    ignores, however, section 4a of his policy with Home Owners, which limits Home Owners’s
    liability to “the amount by which the Underinsured Motorist Coverage limits stated in the
    Declarations exceed the total limits of all bodily injury liability bonds and policies available to the
    owner or operator of the underinsured automobile.” (Emphasis added.) The plain reading of the
    policy’s liability limit considers all bodily injury policies available to Brown, regardless of whether
    payment was made to plaintiff or someone else.
    This reading is consistent with our Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilkie, which concerned
    policy language that was substantially similar to the policy in this case. Specifically, the language
    in Wilkie read as follows: “Our Limit of Liability for Underinsured Motorists Coverage shall not
    exceed the lowest of…the amount by which the Underinsured Motorist Coverage limits stated in
    the Declarations exceed the total limits of all bodily injury liability bonds and policies available to
    the owner or operator of the underinsured automobile.” Wilkie, 
    469 Mich at
    44 n 3. Our Supreme
    Court in that case held that “this provision cannot be reasonably understood to be referring to the
    amount actually received by the claimant because the provision specifically refers to the total
    available to the owner.” 
    Id. at 49-50
    .
    In this case, the total limit of all bodily injuries available to Brown was $500,000. The
    amount by which the underinsured-motorist coverage stated in the declarations of Home Owners’s
    no-fault policy with plaintiff was $250,000. When setting $250,000 off by $500,000, the resulting
    liability is $0. Therefore, when considering the plain language of the policy limits, as well as our
    Supreme Court’s precedent in Wilkie, the trial court erred when it denied summary disposition to
    Home Owners.
    Reversed.
    /s/ Michael F. Gadola
    /s/ Michael J. Kelly
    /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 360947

Filed Date: 8/24/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/25/2023