People of Michigan v. Anthony Michael Ashley ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 359547
Eaton Circuit Court
ANTHONY MICHAEL ASHLEY, LC No. 2020-020127-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Anthony Michael Ashley, was convicted by a jury of first-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82(1),
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1),
and third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 257.602a(3). The trial court sentenced
defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve 35 to 70 years in prison for
the first-degree home invasion conviction, 10 to 15 years in prison for the felonious assault
conviction, two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, and 10 to 25 years in prison for
the third-degree fleeing and eluding conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentence for
felony-firearm be served consecutively to the sentence for felonious assault, and that the additional
sentences be served concurrently;1 the trial court also ordered that all the sentences be served
consecutively to defendant’s existing parole sentence. We affirm defendant’s convictions and
sentences, but remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence to accurately
reflect the consecutive sentence imposed for felony-firearm.
I. FACTS
On April 7, 2020, defendant, his half-brother, Matthew Eckhart, and defendant’s two minor
stepchildren, committed a home invasion, which led to an assault and a subsequent high-speed
1
As noted by defendant, the judgment of sentence erroneously indicates that the felony-firearm
sentence was to be served consecutively to each of the other three sentences.
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police chase. On that day, a homeowner was working in her basement with a handyman, Scottie
Hatcher, when they heard footsteps upstairs. The homeowner went upstairs and saw a stranger,
later identified as defendant’s 13-year-old stepson, IR, standing in her kitchen. The homeowner
demanded that IR leave and followed him out to the driveway, where she saw a van that she did
not recognize. IR got into the back seat of the van and began honking the horn. Meanwhile,
Hatcher had come up from the basement and discovered that his phone was missing from its
charger in the kitchen. He went outside to the van and confronted IR about his missing phone.
At that time, defendant, Eckhart, and defendant’s other stepson appeared from the far side
of the homeowner’s garage. Defendant had Hatcher’s cell phone in his hand; Hatcher approached
defendant and took the phone from defendant. Hatcher then reached into the van and took the keys
out of the ignition; he told defendant and the others that they were not leaving until the police
arrived. Defendant demanded that Hatcher return the keys, but Hatcher refused. Defendant’s
brother, Matthew Eckhart, then pulled a firearm from the van and approached Hatcher, pointed the
gun at him, and demanded the van keys. Defendant also continued to demand the keys. The
homeowner called the police, then pleaded with Hatcher to return the keys. Hatcher threw the
keys on the ground; defendant retrieved the keys and drove away in the van with Eckhart and
defendant’s step-children as passengers.
Officers from the Eaton County Sheriff’s Department, Michigan State Police, and Lansing
Police Department sighted the van on Lansing Road and pursued the van onto eastbound I-96 and
Waverly Road in Lansing. The officers attempted to stop defendant’s van using roadblocking
maneuvers, but were unsuccessful. During one of the attempted roadblocks, defendant ran into
the side of a police car. Eventually, defendant drove onto Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard and
drove north at speeds of over 100 miles per hour through Lansing. When defendant and the officers
arrived at a T-intersection, the officers stopped the van by blocking it. Two of the passengers fled
on foot; police pursued them and apprehended defendant and all the passengers. After a jury trial,
defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion, felonious assault, felony-firearm, and
third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer. Defendant now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that his convictions of felonious assault and felony-firearm under an
aiding and abetting theory must be vacated because the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence
to establish that defendant knew about the firearm or that defendant assisted Eckhart with the
possession of the firearm or the assault. We disagree that the evidence was insufficient.
We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction.
People v Byczek, 337 Mich App 173, 182; 976 NW2d 7 (2021). When evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id., citing People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 126; 845 NW2d 477 (2014). In
doing so, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict. People v Oros, 502 Mich
229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018).
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To support a conviction, the prosecution is required to prove each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Eason, 435 Mich 228, 238; 458 NW2d 17 (1990). The
elements of a crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising
from that evidence. Oros, 502 Mich at 239. The trier of fact determines the inferences that may
be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to accord that evidence. People v Hardiman,
466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
In this case, the jury found defendant guilty of felonious assault and felony-firearm under
an aiding and abetting theory. With regard to felonious assault, MCL 750.82(1) provides, in
relevant part, that “a person who assaults another person with a gun . . . or other dangerous weapon
without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is guilty of a
felony. . . .” The elements of felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon,
and (3) with the intent to injure the victim or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an
immediate battery. People v Nix, 301 Mich App 195, 205; 836 NW2d 224 (2013).
With regard to felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1) provides that “[a] person who carries or
has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony . . .
is guilty of a felony.” The elements of felony-firearm are (1) the defendant possessed a firearm
(2) while committing or attempting to commit a felony. People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268-
269; 893 NW2d 140 (2016).
At trial, the prosecution contended that defendant was guilty of felonious assault and
felony-firearm because he aided and abetted Eckhart in those offenses. MCL 767.39 provides that
“[e]very person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act
constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be
prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed
such offense.” To support a finding that defendant aided and abetted the felonious assault and
felony-firearm, the prosecutor was required to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying crime was
“committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave
encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time
he gave aid and encouragement.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 589; 808 NW2d 541(2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Aiding and abetting includes all forms of
assistance, including words or deeds that support or encourage the commission of a crime. Id.The intent element may be proved by demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant
intended to aid in the charged offense, knew the principal intended to commit the charged offense,
or, alternatively, that the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the intended offense.” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 15; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
“[A] defendant who intends to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of a crime . . . is liable
for that crime as well as the natural and probable consequences of that crime.” Id. at 3.
In this case, defendant and Eckhart embarked upon the felony of home invasion. There is
no dispute that during the home invasion, Eckhart assaulted Hatcher with a gun, thereby
committing the offenses of felonious assault and felony-firearm. Defendant argues that he did not
aid and abet in the felonious assault or the felony-firearm because he did not know that Eckhart
had a firearm in the van. Regardless of whether defendant knew about the gun before embarking
on the home invasion, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that defendant’s words and
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actions supported, encouraged, or incited the felonious assault committed by Eckhart. Defendant
was arguing with Hatcher about the van keys when Eckhart retrieved a firearm from the van and
pointed it at Hatcher. Defendant then continued to demand the keys to the van without expressing
surprise or making any attempt to dissuade Eckhart from pointing the gun at Hatcher. Although
Eckhart was holding the gun, defendant and Eckhart acted in concert to use the firearm to augment
defendant’s demand that Hatcher return the van keys to enable them to flee together in the van.
The same evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant supported, encouraged, or
incited Eckhart’s violation of the felony-firearm statute. When Eckhart pointed the gun at Hatcher,
defendant did not protest or attempt to dissuade Eckhart. Rather, defendant took advantage of the
firearm to intimidate Hatcher to return the van keys. Regardless of whether defendant knew about
the gun before embarking on the criminal enterprise, defendant’s actions after Eckhart retrieved
the gun from the van supports the jury’s finding that defendant aided and abetted Eckhart in using
the gun to assault Hatcher.
Moreover, the offenses occurred while defendant and Eckhart were together engaged in the
crime of home invasion. As discussed, “a defendant who intends to aid, abet, counsel, or procure
the commission of a crime is liable for that crime as well as the natural and probable consequences
of that crime.” Robinson, 475 Mich at 3. An aider and abetter’s knowledge of the principal’s
intent can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the event, People v Bennett, 290 Mich
App 465, 474; 802 NW2d 627 (2010), and even minimal evidence and reasonable circumstances
suffice to demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge, People v Miller, 326 Mich App 719, 735; 929
NW2d 821 (2019).
Here, defendant intentionally embarked upon the crime of home invasion with Eckhart. A
natural and probable consequence of the home invasion was being confronted by someone during
the home invasion, which led to an assault with a weapon during defendant’s and Eckhart’s attempt
to flee the crime scene. Defendant is guilty as an accomplice for “those crimes that are the natural
and probable consequences of the offense he intends to aid or abet.” Robinson, 475 Mich at 15.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of felonious assault and felony-firearm.
B. DEPARTURE SENTENCE
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide proper
justification for its upward departure from the minimum sentencing guidelines range for
defendant’s first-degree home invasion conviction. We disagree.
We review a sentence that departs from the applicable sentencing guidelines range for
reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). We review the
reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court fails to
follow the principle of proportionality or fails to provide adequate reasons for the extent of the
departure from the sentencing guidelines. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d
327 (2017). We review the trial court’s factual determinations for clear error on appeal, People v
Lawhorn, 320 Mich App 194, 205; 907 NW2d 832 (2017), and will find clear error if this Court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that an error was made, People v McChester, 310 Mich
App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015).
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When imposing a sentence that departs from the sentencing guidelines, the trial court must
justify the sentence sufficiently to facilitate appellate review. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. The
trial court must explain “why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the
offender than a different sentence would have been.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490,
525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing a departure
sentence, this Court evaluates “whether reasons exist to depart from the sentencing guidelines and
whether the extent of the departure can satisfy the principle of proportionality.” People v
Steanhouse (On Remand), 322 Mich App 233, 239; 911 NW2d 253 (2017), vacated in part on
other grounds 504 Mich 969 (2019). Considerations include whether the guidelines accurately
reflect the seriousness of the crime, factors not considered by the guidelines, and factors considered
by the guidelines but given inadequate weight. Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525. “[T]he trial
court’s articulation of the reasons for imposing a departure sentence must explain how the extent
of the departure is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the offender.” Id.In this case, the minimum sentencing guidelines range for defendant’s first-degree home
invasion conviction was calculated at 99 to 320 months. The trial court departed upward from the
guidelines by imposing a sentence of 35 to 70 years; the minimum sentence of 35 years (420
months) exceeded the minimum range by 100 months. A defendant’s extensive criminal history
and likelihood to reoffend are appropriate considerations supporting a departure sentence. People
v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 318; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). Here, in justifying the upward departure,
the trial court observed that defendant’s extensive criminal history, which included 31 felonies and
16 misdemeanors, began when defendant was 15 years old and only ceased when defendant was
incarcerated. The trial court noted that “breaking and entering in the houses and stealing valuables
from the owners of that home is [defendant’s] main source of income, or what he would call his
work.” Defendant committed the instant first-degree home invasion while on parole for a second-
degree home invasion conviction. The trial court also observed that on this occasion, defendant
involved his two minor stepchildren in his criminal activity and appeared to be “training the next
generation of criminals and thieves by including children” in the home invasion.
The trial court also emphasized that defendant had engaged “in one of the most dangerous
fleeing and eluding [events the] court has ever seen” by driving at speeds well over 100 miles per
hour on a main thoroughfare in the City of Lansing, running a red light at a major intersection.
This conduct is not adequately considered by the sentencing guidelines. Fifteen points were
assessed for Offense Variable (OV) 19, which states that 15 points should be scored when “[t]he
offender used force or the threat of force against another person . . . to interfere with, [or] attempt
to interfere with[,] . . . the administration of justice or the rendering of emergency services.” MCL
777.49(b). The scoring of OV 19 does not account adequately for the fact that defendant engaged
in a dangerous car chase and drove at speeds of over one hundred miles per hour through “a main
thoroughfare in the City of Lansing.”
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by exceeding the sentencing
guidelines when imposing defendant’s sentence. The trial court justified the departure from the
guidelines based on defendant’s extensive criminal history and likelihood to reoffend, the
seriousness of the offenses, defendant’s involvement of his young stepsons in his criminal
enterprise, and defendant’s dangerous high-speed evasion of the police. The trial court’s departure
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of 100 months from the guidelines range of 99 to 320 months did not violate the principle of
proportionality. See Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 520.
C. CORRECTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
Defendant contends that remand is necessary to correct a clerical error in his judgment of
sentence. We agree.2 The felony information indicates that defendant’s felony-firearm charge
was predicated on the commission, or attempted commission, of felonious assault. “[A] felony-
firearm sentence [is] consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.” People v
Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). At sentencing, the trial court correctly ordered
that defendant’s felony-firearm sentence would run consecutively only to the felonious assault
sentence, while the remaining sentences for the first-degree home invasion and third-degree fleeing
and eluding would run concurrently with the felony-firearm sentence. However, the judgment of
sentence states that all defendant’s sentences run consecutively to the felony-firearm sentence.
We remand for correction of this error. See MCR 6.435(A); MCR 7.216(A)(7).
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences. We remand to the trial court for the
ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
2
We note that the prosecutor concedes this error.
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