Lovett v. Lovett , 2022 ND 37 ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    FEBRUARY 18, 2022
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2022 ND 37
    Viviana J. Lovett,                                      Plaintiff and Appellant
    v.
    Antonio R. Lovett,                                     Defendant and Appellee
    and
    State of North Dakota,                         Statutory Real Party in Interest
    No. 20210198
    Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial
    District, the Honorable Stacy J. Louser, Judge.
    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.
    Christene A. Reierson, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on
    brief.
    Kyle R. Craig, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellee; submitted on brief.
    Lovett v. Lovett
    No. 20210198
    VandeWalle, Justice.
    [¶1] Viviana Lovett appealed from an order denying her motion to modify
    primary residential responsibility for the children she has with Antonio Lovett.
    Viviana Lovett argues the district court erred by finding she failed to establish
    a prima facie case for modification because the divorce judgment stated the
    parties would revisit the parenting plan if either parent intends to move and
    Antonio Lovett filed a motion to relocate the children. We do not reach the
    merits of Viviana Lovett’s argument because we conclude the issue on appeal
    is now moot. We dismiss the appeal.
    I
    [¶2] Viviana Lovett and Antonio Lovett divorced in 2018 and have two minor
    children together. The divorce judgment, which adopted the parties’
    stipulation, awarded the parties equal residential responsibility for the
    children and included a parenting plan. The judgment included a provision
    stating the parenting plan would be reviewed upon the oldest child reaching
    the age of ten or if either parent intends to move more than 50 miles from their
    current residence.
    [¶3] In 2019, Antonio Lovett moved to modify primary residential
    responsibility for the children. In January 2020, the district court granted the
    father’s motion and awarded him primary residential responsibility for the
    children. The parties agreed to modify certain sections of the parenting plan,
    the court adopted the parties’ stipulation, and judgment was entered. The
    judgment indicated which paragraphs of the prior judgment were modified and
    stated all other provisions of the parenting plan incorporated in the 2018
    judgment “that do not conflict with the terms agreed upon shall remain
    unchanged.”
    1
    [¶4] In April 2021, Antonio Lovett moved to relocate with the children to
    Japan. Viviana Lovett moved to modify residential responsibility, arguing the
    judgment allows a motion to modify residential responsibility in less than two
    years from the prior order if either party intends to move more than 50 miles
    and Antonio Lovett’s motion to relocate triggers that provision.
    [¶5] In June 2021, the district court denied Viviana Lovett’s motion to modify
    primary residential responsibility, finding she failed to establish a prima facie
    case for modification because she did not allege any of the statutory exceptions
    to the two-year time limitation on modification motions applied. In August
    2021, the court denied Antonio Lovett’s motion to relocate.
    II
    [¶6] Viviana Lovett argues the district court erred by finding she failed to
    establish a prima facie case for modification. She asserts the parties stipulated
    and the parenting plan provided that they would review the parenting plan
    upon the oldest child reaching the age of ten or if either parent intends to move
    more than 50 miles from their current residence. She claims this provision
    from the 2018 judgment was incorporated by reference in the 2020 judgment,
    both of those conditions have been met, and therefore she was not required to
    show any of the statutory exceptions to overcome the two-year time limitation
    on modifying residential responsibility.
    [¶7] Section 14-09-06.6, N.D.C.C., governs modifications of primary
    residential responsibility and provides:
    1. Unless agreed to in writing by the parties, or if included in the
    parenting plan, no motion for an order to modify primary
    residential responsibility may be made earlier than two years after
    the date of entry of an order establishing primary residential
    responsibility, except in accordance with subsection 3.
    2. Unless agreed to in writing by the parties, or if included in the
    parenting plan, if a motion for modification has been disposed of
    upon its merits, no subsequent motion may be filed within two
    years of disposition of the prior motion, except in accordance with
    subsection 5.
    2
    3. The time limitation in subsections 1 and 2 does not apply if the
    court finds:
    a. The persistent and willful denial or interference with
    parenting time;
    b. The child’s present environment may endanger the child’s
    physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional
    development; or
    c. The primary residential responsibility for the child has
    changed to the other parent for longer than six months.
    [¶8] The party moving to modify residential responsibility within two years
    of a prior order deciding a motion on its merits is required to establish a prima
    facie case justifying modification to obtain an evidentiary hearing. N.D.C.C. §
    14-09-06.6(4); Wald v. Holmes, 
    2013 ND 212
    , ¶ 3, 
    839 N.W.2d 820
    . “A prima
    facie case is established by the moving party ‘alleging, with supporting
    affidavits, sufficient facts which, if they remained uncontradicted at an
    evidentiary hearing, would support a [primary residential responsibility]
    modification in her favor.’” Wald, at ¶ 5 (quoting Tank v. Tank, 
    2004 ND 15
    , ¶
    9, 
    673 N.W.2d 622
    ). “Whether a moving party has established a prima facie
    case for a modification of primary residential responsibility is a question of law
    which this Court reviews de novo on appeal.” Kerzmann v. Kerzmann, 
    2021 ND 183
    , ¶ 6, 
    965 N.W.2d 427
     (quoting Baker v. Baker, 
    2019 ND 225
    , ¶ 7, 
    932 N.W.2d 510
    ).
    [¶9] Here, the district court found Viviana Lovett failed to establish a prima
    facie case for modification of residential responsibility. The court explained the
    two-year limitation on a motion to modify does not apply if the court finds any
    of the exceptions under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(3), Viviana Lovett did not allege
    any of the three statutory exceptions, her arguments about Antonio Lovett’s
    proposed move to Japan ignores the 2020 order and assumes the father has
    already moved, and there is no evidence the move has taken place. The court
    found it had no option but to deny the motion to modify.
    [¶10] Viviana Lovett alleges the judgment allows the district court to modify
    residential responsibility within two years of a prior order when a parent
    intends to move more than 50 miles from their current residence. She claims
    Antonio Lovett requested the court order he be allowed to relocate with the
    3
    children to Japan, and therefore she established a prima facie case for
    modification. However, even if we were to conclude the district court
    misapplied the law and erred in finding Viviana Lovett failed to establish a
    prima facie case for modification, the basis for modification no longer exists.
    The district court subsequently denied Antonio Lovett’s motion to relocate.
    There was no other evidence that he has an intent to move more than 50 miles
    from his current residence.
    [¶11] This Court does not render advisory opinions and there must be an
    actual controversy to be determined before we can properly adjudicate. Bies v.
    Obregon, 
    1997 ND 18
    , ¶ 9, 
    558 N.W.2d 855
    . “No actual controversy exists if
    subsequent events make it impossible for a court to provide effective relief, or
    if the lapse of time has made the issue moot.” Nelson v. Nelson, 
    2020 ND 130
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    944 N.W.2d 335
     (quoting In re Estate of Shubert, 
    2013 ND 215
    , ¶ 12, 
    839 N.W.2d 811
    ). “An appeal is moot when ‘a determination is sought which, when
    rendered, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then-existing
    controversy.’” Interest of B.A.C., 
    2017 ND 247
    , ¶ 7, 
    902 N.W.2d 767
     (quoting
    Varnson v. Satran, 
    368 N.W.2d 533
    , 535 (N.D. 1985)).
    [¶12] Because Antonio Lovett’s motion to relocate was denied and the basis for
    Viviana Lovett’s motion to modify no longer exists, our review of the district
    court’s decision would have no practical legal effect. We conclude any issue
    about whether the district court erred in finding Viviana Lovett failed to
    establish a prima facie case for modification is moot.
    [¶13] Viviana Lovett did not argue to the district court that the parenting plan
    was subject to review because the oldest child is now ten years old. She raised
    this issue for the first time on appeal. We will not consider arguments raised
    for the first time on appeal. See Orwig v. Orwig, 
    2021 ND 33
    , ¶ 48, 
    955 N.W.2d 34
    .
    4
    III
    [¶14] We hold the issue raised on appeal is moot, and we dismiss the appeal.
    [¶15] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20210198

Citation Numbers: 2022 ND 37

Judges: VandeWalle, Gerald W.

Filed Date: 2/18/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2022