Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC ( 2022 )


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    COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
    OPPORTUNITIES v. EDGE
    FITNESS, LLC, ET AL.
    (SC 20538)
    Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
    Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
    Syllabus
    Pursuant to the Public Accommodation Act (§ 46a-64 (a)), ‘‘[i]t shall be a
    discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction
    of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public
    accommodation . . . because of . . . sex . . . [or] to discriminate,
    segregate or separate on account of . . . sex . . . .’’
    Pursuant further to that act (§ 46a-64 (b) (1)), the provisions of § 46a-64
    prohibiting sex discrimination ‘‘shall not apply to . . . separate bath-
    rooms or locker rooms based on sex.’’
    The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, appealed
    to the trial court from the decision of the commission’s human rights
    referee, who found that the defendants, E Co. and C Co., had not engaged
    in discriminatory public accommodations practices by providing sepa-
    rate women’s only workout areas in their otherwise public fitness facili-
    ties. The complainants, two members of the defendants’ respective gyms
    who both identified as male, filed complaints with the commission after
    they experienced delays in completing their workouts because they had
    to wait for other members to finish using the equipment in the coed
    portions of the facilities. The human rights referee concluded that the
    defendants did not violate § 46a-64 by maintaining women’s only work-
    out areas and dismissed their complaints. On appeal to the trial court,
    that court recognized that a women’s only workout area is neither a
    bathroom nor a locker room but nonetheless concluded that the defen-
    dants’ provision of such areas did not violate the sex discrimination
    provisions of the Public Accommodation Act because there was an
    implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a-
    64 (b) (1). In so concluding, the court considered the privacy interests
    underlying the bathroom and locker room exceptions, as well as the
    burden that the elimination of women’s only areas would place on
    women of certain religious practices. The trial court observed that,
    without an implied gender privacy exception, the provision of other
    types of separate facilities, such as showers, dressing rooms and hospital
    rooms, would constitute a violation of the act. Accordingly, the court
    rendered judgment dismissing the commission’s administrative appeal,
    from which the commission appealed. Held that the trial court incor-
    rectly concluded that § 46a-64 (b) (1) contains an implied gender privacy
    exception that exempted the defendants’ provision of women’s only
    workout areas from the act’s general prohibition against sex discrimina-
    tion, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment and
    remanded the case with direction to render judgment sustaining the
    commission’s administrative appeal: it was undisputed that the defen-
    dants’ gyms are places of public accommodation and that their provision
    of women’s only workout areas constitutes a discriminatory practice
    under the act unless subject to a statutory exception, and, because
    women’s only workout areas did not fit within the plain meaning of the
    terms ‘‘bathroom’’ or ‘‘locker room,’’ as gleaned from their dictionary
    definitions, this court concluded that the exceptions set forth in § 46a-
    64 (b) (1) plainly and unambiguously did not encompass women’s only
    workout areas; moreover, if the legislature had intended to include an
    additional exception to the act’s general ban on sex based discrimination
    in public accommodations, it could have done so, as it did in the statute
    (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) providing for an exception to the general ban on sex
    discrimination when sex constitutes a bona fide occupational qualifica-
    tion for a position of employment, and interpreting § 46a-64 (b) (1) to
    include an implied gender privacy exception would be inconsistent with
    the maxim that remedial statutes, like the act, should be construed
    liberally but that exceptions to remedial statutes should be construed
    narrowly; furthermore, the legislative history indicated that the legisla-
    ture had rejected a version of the act that exempted the provision of
    separate facilities for males and females ‘‘based on considerations of
    privacy and modesty’’ as being too broad and subjective, instead adopt-
    ing the cabined exception limited to ‘‘separate bathrooms or locker
    rooms based on sex’’; in addition, the fact that this court’s construction
    of § 46a-64 may lead to results unintended by the legislature, as posited
    by the parties, the referee and the trial court with respect to lactation
    and dressing rooms, was not a reason to depart from the plain and
    unambiguous statutory text of the statute, and the sensitivity of the
    determination of where to limit antidiscrimination protections on the
    basis of sex rendered the issue uniquely well suited for consideration
    in the first instance by the legislature.
    Argued May 5, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022*
    Procedural History
    Appeal from the decision of the plaintiff that the
    named defendant and the defendant Club Camel, Inc.,
    Bloomfield, did not engage in discriminatory public
    accommodations practices, brought to the Superior
    Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the
    case was tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment dis-
    missing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed.
    Reversed; judgment directed.
    Michael E. Roberts, human rights attorney, for the
    appellant (plaintiff).
    James F. Shea, with whom was Allison P. Dearing-
    ton, for the appellee (named defendant).
    Mario R. Borelli, for the appellee (defendant Club
    Camel, Inc., Bloomfield).
    Kenneth J. Bartschi filed a brief for the GLBTQ Legal
    Advocates & Defenders et al. as amici curiae.
    Kevin M. Barry filed a brief for the Quinnipiac Uni-
    versity School of Law Legal Clinic as amicus curiae.
    Erick M. Sandler filed a brief for the Jewish Federa-
    tion of Greater Hartford et al. as amici curiae.
    Dan Barrett filed a brief for the American Civil Liber-
    ties Union of Connecticut as amicus curiae.
    Opinion
    ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal presents a significant
    question of first impression with respect to whether
    the Public Accommodation Act, General Statutes § 46a-
    64,1 contains an implied customer gender privacy excep-
    tion to its general prohibition against sex based discrim-
    ination.2 The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights
    and Opportunities (commission), appeals3 from the
    judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative
    appeal from the decision of the commission’s human
    rights referee (referee), who found that the defendants
    Edge Fitness, LLC (Edge Fitness) and Club Camel, Inc.,
    Bloomfield, doing business as Club Fitness (Club Fit-
    ness),4 did not engage in discriminatory public accom-
    modations practices. On appeal, the commission claims
    that the trial court incorrectly concluded that women’s
    only workout areas in otherwise public gyms did not
    violate § 46a-64 because that statute contains an implied
    customer gender privacy exception. We conclude that
    the exceptions to the general prohibition against dis-
    crimination on the basis of sex in public accommoda-
    tions are limited to those expressly provided by the
    plain language of § 46a-64 and, therefore, that there is
    no implied customer gender privacy exception to the
    statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The record reveals the following undisputed facts
    and procedural history. The complainants, Alex Chaplin
    and Daniel Brelsford, were members of the defendants’
    gyms, Club Fitness and Edge Fitness, respectively. Both
    individuals identify as males and used the larger coed
    portions of the facilities. While using equipment in the
    main workout areas, the complainants experienced
    slight delays in completing their workouts because they
    had to wait for other members to finish using that equip-
    ment. This led the complainants to believe that the
    defendants, by providing separate women’s only fitness
    areas in their facilities, had discriminated against them
    on the basis of sex, and they filed complaints with
    the commission challenging the practice. The referee
    concluded that the defendants did not violate § 46a-
    64 by maintaining women’s only workout areas and
    dismissed the complaints.
    The commission filed an administrative appeal from
    the decision of the referee with the trial court pursuant
    to General Statutes § 4-183. In its memorandum of deci-
    sion, the trial court first recognized that a women’s only
    fitness area is neither a bathroom nor a locker room.
    The court then questioned whether ‘‘§ 46a-64 (b) (1)
    allow[s] for exceptions to the sex based antidiscrimina-
    tion prohibitions in cases other than bathrooms or
    locker rooms [in which] the same gender privacy inter-
    ests that allowed for the exceptions for bathrooms and
    locker rooms are in play.’’ The trial court observed that,
    ‘‘unless the statute is read to include a gender privacy
    exception similar to the express exception for bath-
    rooms and locker rooms, it would be a violation to
    provide separate showers, dressing rooms and hospital
    rooms for men and women in public accommodations.’’
    The trial court further considered the burden that the
    elimination of women’s only workout areas would place
    on women of certain religious practices. The trial court,
    therefore, concluded that ‘‘the provision of women’s
    only exercise areas in fitness centers of public accom-
    modation does not violate the sex based antidiscrimina-
    tion provisions of . . . § 46a-64.’’ Accordingly, the trial
    court rendered judgment dismissing the commission’s
    administrative appeal. This appeal followed.5 See foot-
    note 3 of this opinion.
    On appeal, the commission claims that the language
    of § 46a-64 (b) (1) is plain and unambiguous and does
    not contain a gender privacy exception to the general
    prohibition against sex discrimination. The commission
    asserts that a gender privacy exception is not a valid
    defense to an otherwise discriminatory sex based classi-
    fication.6 In response, the defendants argue that, because
    antidiscrimination statutes are to be construed broadly
    to effectuate their beneficent purpose, the remedial pur-
    pose of § 46a-64 is advanced by the defendants’ provi-
    sion of women’s only workout areas. The defendants
    also contend that the commission’s reading of the stat-
    ute is so narrow that it would yield absurd results. We
    agree with the commission and conclude that the trial
    court’s expansion of the exceptions in § 46a-64 (b) (1)
    to the general prohibition against sex discrimination
    was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
    Whether the trial court correctly determined that
    there is an implied customer gender privacy exception
    encompassed within § 46a-64 (b) (1) is a question of
    statutory construction that presents a question of law,
    over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Bois-
    vert v. Gavis, 
    332 Conn. 115
    , 141, 
    210 A.3d 1
     (2019). It
    is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule
    in General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes ‘‘to
    ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
    legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena
    v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,
    
    333 Conn. 30
    , 45, 
    213 A.3d 1110
     (2019); see, e.g., 
    id.,
    45–46 (setting forth plain meaning rule).
    In interpreting statutes, words and phrases not other-
    wise defined by the statutory scheme are construed
    according to their ‘‘commonly approved usage . . . .’’
    General Statutes § 1-1 (a); see, e.g., State v. Panek, 
    328 Conn. 219
    , 227–28, 
    177 A.3d 1113
     (2018). In determining
    the commonly approved usage of the statutory language
    at issue, we consult dictionary definitions. See, e.g., 
    id., 229
    . It is well established that a statute is considered
    plain and unambiguous when ‘‘the meaning . . . is so
    strongly indicated or suggested by the [statutory] lan-
    guage . . . that . . . it appears to be the meaning and
    appears to preclude any other likely meaning. . . . [I]f
    the text of the statute at issue . . . would permit more
    than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot
    be said to be plain and unambiguous.’’ (Emphasis in
    original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ledyard v.
    WMS Gaming, Inc., 
    338 Conn. 687
    , 698 n.6, 
    258 A.3d 1268
     (2021).
    As required by § 1-2z, we first determine whether
    the statutory language is ambiguous. Section 46a-64 (a)
    provides in relevant part that it ‘‘shall be a discrimina-
    tory practice in violation of this section: (1) [t]o deny
    any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and
    equal accommodations in any place of public accommo-
    dation, resort or amusement because of . . . sex . . .
    [or] (2) to discriminate, segregate or separate on
    account of . . . sex . . . .’’ Section 46a-64 (b) (1) then
    sets forth the exceptions to the statute’s general prohibi-
    tion against discrimination based on sex, which it limits
    to ‘‘the rental of sleeping accommodations provided
    by associates and organizations which rent all such
    sleeping accommodations on a temporary or permanent
    basis for the exclusive use of persons of the same sex
    or . . . separate bathrooms or locker rooms based on
    sex.’’ See footnote 1 of this opinion.
    It is undisputed that the defendants’ gyms are
    ‘‘place[s] of public accommodation’’ within the meaning
    of § 46a-64 (a) (1). It is also undisputed that the defen-
    dants’ provision of women’s only workout areas consti-
    tutes a ‘‘discriminatory practice’’7 in violation of that
    subsection unless it is subject to a statutory exception,
    which is the focus of our analysis in this appeal.
    The legislature enacted the bathroom and locker
    room exceptions set forth in § 46a-64 (b) (1) as No.
    94-238, § 4, of the 1994 Public Acts (P.A. 94-238). In
    determining the commonly approved usage of the terms
    ‘‘bathroom’’ and ‘‘locker room,’’ we look to their diction-
    ary definitions. See, e.g., State v. Panek, supra, 
    328 Conn. 229
    . Contemporary to the passage of the 1994
    amendment to § 46a-64, ‘‘bathroom’’ was defined as ‘‘a
    room equipped for taking a bath or shower . . . toilet
    . . . .’’ Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d Ed.
    1993) p. 177. ‘‘Locker room’’ was defined as ‘‘a room
    containing lockers, as in a gymnasium, factory, or
    school, for changing clothes and for the storage and
    safekeeping of personal belongings.’’ Id., p. 1128. The
    parties do not proffer alternative meanings for these
    terms or suggest that the women’s only workout areas
    fit within the plain meaning of those definitions as a
    factual matter.8 Accordingly, we conclude that the
    exceptions set forth in § 46a-64 (b) (1) plainly and unam-
    biguously do not encompass the women’s only workout
    areas for purposes of the § 1-2z analysis.
    Because the women’s only workout spaces do not
    fall under an express exception, the defendants ask us
    to interpret § 46a-64 (b) (1) to include a third, implicit
    exception to the prohibition against sex based discrimi-
    nation, namely, a broad gender privacy exception. The
    defendants argue that such an exception is implied by
    the bodily privacy interests that the enumerated excep-
    tions protect and that the inclusion of a third exception
    would be consistent with other portions of the statutory
    scheme. The defendants further rely on General Stat-
    utes § 46a-60 (b) (1),9 which provides for an exception
    to the general ban on sex discrimination in employment
    when sex constitutes a bona fide occupational qualifica-
    tion (BFOQ) for a position. The defendants ask us to
    read the statutes in relation to one another and to con-
    clude that the inclusion of the BFOQ defense in the
    context of employment discrimination evidences a leg-
    islative intent to include an implied gender privacy
    exception to the ban on discrimination in public accom-
    modations. We disagree with this reading of § 46a-64
    (b) (1).
    It is well established ‘‘that the legislature, in amending
    or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to have cre-
    ated a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courch-
    esne, 
    296 Conn. 622
    , 709, 
    998 A.2d 1
     (2010). Declining
    to read a BFOQ like exception into § 46a-64 (b) (1) does
    not render it inconsistent with § 46a-60 (b) (1). Had the
    legislature intended to include a third exception to the
    general ban on sex based discrimination in public accom-
    modations, it could have done so. Indeed, the legisla-
    ture’s inclusion of a BFOQ exception in § 46a-60 (b) (1)
    demonstrates that the legislature could have provided
    such an exception in the public accommodation statute
    but consciously elected not to do so. See, e.g., DeNun-
    zio v. DeNunzio, 
    320 Conn. 178
    , 194, 
    128 A.3d 901
     (2016)
    (common principle of statutory construction is that,
    when legislature expresses list of items, exclusion of
    particular item is deliberate); Stafford v. Roadway, 
    312 Conn. 184
    , 194, 
    93 A.3d 1058
     (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a well settled
    principle of statutory construction that the legislature
    knows how to convey its intent expressly . . . or to
    use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do
    so’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)). As this court stated more than thirty years ago,
    ‘‘[a] review of our labor legislation discloses that our
    General Statutes treat employment discrimination sepa-
    rately from public accommodation discrimination. We
    deem it especially significant that only the former stat-
    ute contains an express exception for a ‘bona fide occu-
    pational qualification or need’ . . . [in concluding that]
    [o]ur public accommodation statute . . . gives no indi-
    cation that it was intended to encompass the proffer
    of services within its definition of discriminatory
    accommodation practices. The absence of a statutory
    exception for a ‘bona fide occupational qualification or
    need’ in the text of [the public accommodation statute]
    is more consistent with a legislative intent to leave
    such practices to be regulated by statutes that address
    employment discrimination rather than by statutes
    directed to discrimination in public accommodations.’’
    (Citations omitted.) Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts
    of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights &
    Opportunities, 
    204 Conn. 287
    , 302, 
    528 A.2d 352
     (1987);
    see 
    id.,
     302–303 (denying woman opportunity to serve
    as scoutmaster of Boy Scout troop did not deprive her
    of ‘‘accommodation’’ on basis of sex).
    Declining to import a gender privacy exception into
    § 46a-64 is consistent with the maxim that ‘‘remedial
    statutes should be construed liberally in favor of those
    whom the law is intended to protect,’’ but exceptions
    to those statutes ‘‘should be construed narrowly.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights,
    Inc. v. Dickal, 
    305 Conn. 488
    , 502, 
    45 A.3d 627
     (2012);
    see Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,
    
    260 Conn. 691
    , 715, 
    802 A.2d 731
     (2002) (‘‘recogniz[ing]
    the balance that the legislature has struck between the
    state’s dual interest’’ in broadly prohibiting sex discrimi-
    nation and narrowly exempting small employers); Gay
    & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees,
    
    236 Conn. 453
    , 473–74, 
    673 A.2d 484
     (1996) (‘‘provisos
    and exceptions to statutes are to be strictly construed
    with doubts resolved in favor of the general rule rather
    than the exception and . . . those who claim the bene-
    fit of an exception under a statute have the burden of
    proving that they come within the limited class for
    whose benefit it was established’’ (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). Particular caution is warranted in the
    construction of exceptions to antidiscrimination laws
    because a broad construction poses the risk of swal-
    lowing the rule. See, e.g., Commission on Human
    Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 
    250 Conn. 763
    , 788–89, 
    739 A.2d 238
     (1999) (concluding that
    ‘‘ ‘insufficient income’ ’’ exception to Fair Housing Act
    under General Statutes § 46a-64c (b) (5) does not cate-
    gorically exclude tenants receiving section 8 assistance
    but, instead, receives ‘‘[a] narrow construction . . .
    [that] affords a landlord an opportunity to determine
    whether, presumably for reasons extrinsic to the sec-
    tion 8 housing assistance calculations, a potential ten-
    ant lacks sufficient income to give the landlord reason-
    able assurance that the tenant’s portion of the stipulated
    rental will be paid promptly and that the tenant will
    undertake to meet the other obligations implied in the
    tenancy’’).
    In this vein, we address the argument of the defen-
    dants and interfaith amici; see footnote 5 of this opinion;
    that a conclusion that the statutory text plainly and
    unambiguously lacks a gender privacy exception will
    lead to absurd or bizarre results by eliminating other
    women’s only spaces and impeding the religious free-
    dom of women seeking to use those facilities.10 They
    rely on the prediction of the referee and the trial court
    that, if the statute’s exceptions were construed strictly,
    the provision of separate showers, dressing rooms, lac-
    tation rooms, domestic violence shelters, and hospital
    rooms would constitute a violation of the statute. We
    disagree. First, although such facilities are not at issue
    in this appeal, it is not at all clear that they would not fall
    within the existing statutory exceptions for bathrooms,
    locker rooms, and sleeping accommodations, as inter-
    preted using our rules of statutory construction. See
    General Statutes § 46a-64 (b) (1) and (2). Second, even
    if we were to assume, without deciding, that restricting
    the facilities identified by the referee and the trial court
    to women constitutes impermissible discrimination and
    that such a result is indeed absurd,11 thus permitting
    resort to the legislative history of § 46a-64 (b) (1), that
    legislative history does not support the defendants’ argu-
    ment. See, e.g., State v. Bischoff, 
    337 Conn. 739
    , 746,
    
    258 A.3d 14
     (2021) (‘‘[o]nly if we determine that the
    statute is not plain and unambiguous or yields absurd
    or unworkable results may we consider extratextual
    evidence of its meaning such as the legislative history
    and circumstances surrounding its enactment’’ (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Instead, it indicates that the
    legislature has rejected the concept of abstract notions
    of gender privacy in favor of a more narrowly cabined
    exception when warranted.
    As we noted previously, the bathroom and locker
    room exception in § 46a-64 (b) (1) was enacted in 1994
    as § 4 of P.A. 94-238, which was first introduced as
    Substitute House Bill No. 5606. In his written testimony
    before the Judiciary Committee in support of Substitute
    House Bill No. 5606,12 then Attorney General Richard
    Blumenthal described the bill as intended to ‘‘clarif[y]
    that the prohibition against discrimination based on sex
    does not mean that places of public accommodations
    such as gyms, bars, and restaurants cannot provide
    separate bathroom and locker room facilities. Although
    this is common sense, it is not clear that such an
    exception exists in the current statute.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Written testimony from Richard Blumenthal,
    Attorney General, submitted to the Joint Committee on
    Judiciary, Connecticut General Assembly (March 11,
    1994);13 see 37 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1994 Sess., p. 7240,
    remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano (‘‘this
    section . . . makes it clear that it’s not illegal under
    the public accommodations act to have separate bath-
    rooms in locker rooms for men and women’’). The origi-
    nally raised House Bill No. 5606 was expressly intended
    to allow ‘‘the provision of separate facilities for males
    and females where privacy concerns exist’’; it would
    have exempted from the act ‘‘the provision of bathroom
    and locker room facilities based on considerations of
    privacy and modesty.’’ (Emphasis added.) Raised Bill
    No. 5606, 1994 Sess., § 1. During testimony on House Bill
    No. 5606 before the Judiciary Committee, Commission
    Counsel Philip A. Murphy, Jr., representing the commis-
    sion, criticized the drafting of this proposed exception
    for its potential to ‘‘be interpreted too broadly and . . .
    [to] cause needless litigation.’’ Conn. Joint Standing
    Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1994 Sess., p. 513.
    In his written testimony, Murphy urged that the ‘‘section
    [of the raised bill] be deleted or substantially rewritten,’’
    arguing that ‘‘the exception is so broad that it will result
    in the exception swallowing the discriminatory prac-
    tice. Thus a public accommodation that wishes to serve
    only men can decline to provide women’s restrooms or
    locker rooms and claim that it does not have to serve
    women because of ‘privacy and modesty’ concerns.’’
    Id., p. 591. Subsequently, the substitute bill, which was
    ultimately enacted as Public Act No. 94-238, addressed
    this criticism by eliminating the potentially problematic
    ‘‘considerations of privacy and modesty’’ language in
    favor of the more simple exception for ‘‘separate bath-
    rooms or locker rooms based on sex.’’ Substitute House
    Bill No. 5606, 1994 Sess., § 1. Our legislature elected,
    therefore, to address an application of the sex discrimi-
    nation prohibition that might be inconsistent with ‘‘com-
    mon sense,’’ by using simpler terms, rather than qualify-
    ing the prohibition with reference to the subjective
    morass of ‘‘modesty’’ and ‘‘privacy’’ urged by the defen-
    dants and the amici. See In re Valerie D., 
    223 Conn. 492
    , 518 n.19, 523, 
    613 A.2d 748
     (1992) (noting that court
    ordinarily does not consider legislature’s failure to act
    but considering ‘‘limited circumstances’’ of legislature’s
    rejection of one bill and immediate adoption of compet-
    ing bill ‘‘in its stead’’ as evidence of legislative intent);
    see also Rainbow Housing Corp. v. Cromwell, 
    340 Conn. 501
    , 519 n.10,          A.3d.    (2021).
    Consistent with the concerns of the commission in
    advocating for the enactment of a bathroom and locker
    room exception that did not include vague language
    allowing for the ‘‘consideration of privacy and mod-
    esty,’’ we observe that a reading of § 46b-64 (b) (1) to
    imply a gender privacy exception, although presumably
    to benefit women, could also negatively affect the rights
    of women in a different way. As discussed in the amicus
    briefs filed by the Quinnipiac University School of Law
    Legal Clinic, the American Civil Liberties Union of Con-
    necticut, and the GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders,
    Lambda Legal Education and Defense Fund, Inc., and
    the Connecticut Transadvocacy Coalition, such an
    exception could be invoked to exclude women based
    on the privacy interests of men and could justify dis-
    crimination against transgender individuals because
    some customers, ‘‘due to modesty, find it uncomfort-
    able’’ to be around such people. Livingwell (North),
    Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
    
    147 Pa. Commw. 116
    , 121, 
    606 A.2d 1287
    , appeal denied,
    
    533 Pa. 611
    , 
    618 A.2d 401
     (1992); see 
    id.,
     121–22 (‘‘The
    privacy interest expressed involves situations [in which]
    the customers, due to modesty, find it uncomfortable
    to have the opposite sex present because of the physical
    condition in which they find themselves or the physical
    activity in which they are engaged as customers at the
    business entity. These customers would be embar-
    rassed or humiliated if cared for or observed by mem-
    bers of the opposite sex.’’). Such a result of potentially
    limiting the access of women and transgender people
    access to spaces on the basis of the privacy interests
    of men or the ‘‘moral comfort’’ of customers defeats
    the purpose of our state’s antidiscrimination legislation.
    See, e.g., Corcoran v. German Social Society Frohsinn,
    Inc., 
    99 Conn. App. 839
    , 843–44, 
    916 A.2d 70
     (noting
    legislative intent to broaden rather than limit scope of
    § 46a-64), cert. denied, 
    282 Conn. 910
    , 
    922 A.2d 1098
    (2007).
    Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our analysis of
    the plain and unambiguous statutory text of § 46a-64
    may lead to a result that might well have been unin-
    tended by the legislature, including with respect to its
    application in hypothetical scenarios involving lactation
    rooms or dressing rooms, as posited by the defendants,
    the referee, and the trial court. See footnotes 10 and
    11 of this opinion and accompanying text. As the United
    States Supreme Court recently noted in construing the
    language ‘‘because of sex’’ in Title VII of the Civil Rights
    Act of 1964 to apply to employment discrimination
    against homosexual or transgender persons, this effect
    is not a reason to depart from the plain and unambigu-
    ous statutory text of § 46a-64. See Bostock v. Clayton
    County,        U.S.     , 
    140 S. Ct. 1731
    , 1737, 
    207 L. Ed. 2d 218
     (2020) (‘‘Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act
    might not have anticipated their work would lead to
    this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about
    many of the [Civil Rights] Act’s consequences that have
    become apparent over the years, including its prohibi-
    tion against discrimination on the basis of motherhood
    or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees.
    But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no
    reason to ignore the law’s demands.’’); see also id., 1749
    (‘‘the fact that [a statute] has been applied in situations
    not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demon-
    strate ambiguity; instead, it simply demonstrates [the]
    breadth of a legislative command’’ (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). The purpose of the Public Accommo-
    dation Act is to provide all sexes ‘‘full and equal accom-
    modations in any place of public accommodation
    . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46a-64 (a) (1). This purpose
    is not frustrated by a broad reading of the statutory
    language of § 46a-64 (a) or a narrow construction of the
    exceptions provided under subsection (b) of the statute.
    Thus, the sensitivity of the determination of where
    to limit antidiscrimination protections, along with
    evolving contemporary understandings of the terms
    ‘‘gender’’ and ‘‘sex’’; see footnote 2 of this opinion; ren-
    ders this issue uniquely well suited for consideration
    in the first instance by the legislature, which is the
    policy-making branch of our government. See, e.g., Thi-
    bodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra,
    
    260 Conn. 715
     (recognizing policy-making role of legis-
    lature in context of sex discrimination); see also Fay
    v. Merrill, 
    338 Conn. 1
    , 51–52, 
    256 A.3d 622
     (2021)
    (‘‘[g]iven the reasonable policy concerns that support
    the parties’ respective state constitutional arguments,
    in interpreting our state’s constitution, we must defer
    to the legislature’s primary responsibility in pronouncing
    the public policy of our state’’ (internal quotation marks
    omitted)); State v. Lockhart, 
    298 Conn. 537
    , 574, 
    4 A.3d 1176
     (2010) (The court declined to adopt a state consti-
    tutional rule requiring the recording of custodial interro-
    gations because, although the rule would likely be bene-
    ficial, ‘‘[d]etermining [its] parameters . . . requires
    weighing competing public policies and evaluating a
    wide variety of possible rules. . . . In [the court’s]
    view, such determinations are often made by a legisla-
    tive body because it is in a better position to evaluate
    the competing policy interests at play . . . .’’ (Citation
    omitted.)).
    We therefore conclude that the defendants’ gyms are
    places of public accommodation that have denied the
    complainants full and equal accommodations on the
    basis of their sex. We further conclude that that denial
    does not fall within an exception expressly provided for
    in § 46a-64 (b) (1), rendering the practice of maintaining
    women’s only workout areas within an otherwise public
    gym a violation of the Public Accommodation Act.
    The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
    with direction to render judgment sustaining the com-
    mission’s administrative appeal.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    * January 25, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    General Statutes § 46a-64 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) It shall be a
    discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person
    within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any
    place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed,
    color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital
    status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability,
    physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness, or
    status as a veteran, of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and
    limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; (2) to
    discriminate, segregate or separate on account of race, creed, color, national
    origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful
    source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability, learning disability,
    physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness, or
    status as a veteran . . . .
    ‘‘(b) (1) The provisions of this section with respect to the prohibition of sex
    discrimination shall not apply to (A) the rental of sleeping accommodations
    provided by associations and organizations which rent all such sleeping
    accommodations on a temporary or permanent basis for the exclusive use
    of persons of the same sex or (B) separate bathrooms or locker rooms
    based on sex. . . .’’
    2
    For purposes of this opinion, we describe the claim at issue as ‘‘sex
    discrimination’’ because that is the nature of the claim as raised and
    described by the complainants. This description is consistent with this
    court’s general practice of accepting the parties’ characterization of the
    nature of the discrimination at issue. See, e.g., Spiotti v. Wolcott, 
    326 Conn. 190
    , 193, 
    163 A.3d 46
     (2017) (considering complainant’s allegations of sex
    discrimination). We do, however, recognize that the terms ‘‘sex’’ and ‘‘gen-
    der’’ are not specifically defined by the statutory scheme and that the under-
    standing of them has evolved over time. See, e.g., R. Oliveri, ‘‘Sexual Orienta-
    After Bostock v. Clayton County,’’ 
    69 U. Kan. L. Rev. 409
    , 423–25 (2021).
    Resolution of this appeal does not, however, require us to delve further into
    the definitions of the terms ‘‘sex’’ or ‘‘gender,’’ as used in the statutory
    scheme.
    3
    The commission appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
    Appellate Court, and we subsequently transferred the appeal to this court
    pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
    4
    ‘‘Due to unusual procedures applicable to proceedings before the com-
    mission, in this administrative appeal, the commission is named as both a
    plaintiff (in its own capacity) and as a defendant (in its capacity as the
    agency under which the . . . referee issued the decision from which the
    commission appealed). See General Statutes § 46a-94a.’’ Commission on
    Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance, 
    322 Conn. 154
    ,
    157 n.1, 
    140 A.3d 190
     (2016). Likewise, the complainants before the commis-
    sion, Alex Chaplin and Daniel Brelsford, were named as defendants in the
    administrative appeal, but they did not participate therein. Accordingly,
    unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the defendants are to
    Edge Fitness and Club Fitness, collectively.
    5
    We note that, on March 2, 2021, we invited amici curiae to file briefs to
    address the following question: ‘‘In this administrative appeal, did the trial
    court and the [referee] properly determine that the provision of [women’s]
    only workout areas by the defendant gyms did not violate . . . § 46a-64 (a)
    and its prohibition against sex discrimination in public accommodations?’’
    The following amici curiae accepted our invitation and filed briefs: (1)
    the Jewish Federation of Greater Hartford, the Muslim Coalition of Connecti-
    cut, and other religious organizations (collectively, interfaith amici); (2) the
    Quinnipiac University School of Law Legal Clinic; (3) the GLBTQ Legal
    Advocates & Defenders, Lambda Legal Education and Defense Fund, Inc.,
    and the Connecticut Transadvocacy Coalition; and (4) the American Civil
    Liberties Union of Connecticut. We are grateful to the amici for their thought-
    ful advocacy in response to our invitation for briefs.
    6
    We note that the commission also argues that Edge Fitness failed to
    plead the customer gender privacy exception before the referee and, there-
    fore, waived the defense. We disagree. As the trial court observed in rejecting
    this claim, (1) ‘‘these matters were consolidated and tried as one matter,’’
    (2) ‘‘the formal requirements of pleading do not apply in administrative
    proceedings,’’ (3) ‘‘these two issues were in fact specifically raised at the
    hearing, tried, and reflected in the [referee’s] decision,’’ (4) ‘‘issues such as
    the appropriateness of pleadings and evidentiary rulings in an administrative
    [proceeding] are reviewed on appeal . . . on an abuse of discretion basis,’’
    (5) ‘‘the issue presented in this matter is an important issue that has ramifica-
    tions beyond the parties,’’ and (6) ‘‘issues such as gender privacy and reli-
    gious rights are legal principles that are naturally intertwined with a defense
    against the discrimination alleged.’’ See generally Presidential Village, LLC
    v. Phillips, 
    325 Conn. 394
    , 412 n.15, 
    158 A.3d 772
     (2017) (‘‘[t]he fundamental
    purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court
    and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not
    concealed until the trial is underway’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    We therefore agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Edge Fitness did
    not waive the special defense, which was raised and argued during the
    administrative proceeding, because the commission was on notice of it.
    7
    We note that, for purposes of the Public Accommodation Act, the legisla-
    ture defines the term ‘‘discrimination’’ as ‘‘includ[ing] segregation and sepa-
    ration . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46a-51 (6); see also General Statutes § 46a-
    51 (8) (defining ‘‘discriminatory practice’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘a violation of’’ § 46a-
    64). The statutory scheme does not, however, define the terms ‘‘segregate,’’
    ‘‘segregation,’’ ‘‘separate,’’ or ‘‘separation.’’ Looking to the dictionary for the
    common usage of those terms; see, e.g., State v. Panek, supra, 
    328 Conn. 229
    ; we observe that Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the
    term ‘‘segregate’’ as ‘‘to separate or set apart from others or from the general
    mass: isolate . . . .’’ Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.
    1993) p. 1058. Similarly, the term ‘‘segregation’’ refers to the ‘‘act or process
    of separation’’; Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 1358; or to ‘‘the
    separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by . . . divided
    educational facilities, or other discriminatory means . . . .’’ Webster’s Third
    New International Dictionary (1961) p. 2057; accord Merriam Webster’s
    Collegiate Dictionary, supra, p. 1058; see also Sheff v. O’Neill, 
    238 Conn. 1
    ,
    28 and n.31, 
    678 A.2d 1267
     (1996) (similarly defining term ‘‘segregation,’’ as
    used in article first, § 20, of state constitution). The term ‘‘separate’’ is
    defined as ‘‘set or kept apart,’’ ‘‘not shared with another: INDIVIDUAL,
    SINGLE,’’ ‘‘AUTONOMOUS, INDEPENDENT,’’ and ‘‘DISTINCT, DIFFER-
    ENT . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra, p. 2069;
    see also Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra, p. 1067 (defining
    ‘‘separate’’ as ‘‘set or kept apart’’ and ‘‘existing by itself’’). These definitions
    plainly and unambiguously prohibit, without qualification, any isolation,
    separation or keeping apart ‘‘on account of sex,’’ within a ‘‘public accommo-
    dation,’’ and do not by themselves account for isolation, separation or keep-
    ing apart to protect or advantage a class of people that might be deemed
    to need or deserve protection or advantage, as the defendants argue with
    respect to the salutatory effects of women’s only fitness facilities. Cf. General
    Statutes § 46a-64 (b) (2) (prohibition on age discrimination ‘‘shall not apply
    to minors or to special discount or other public or private programs to
    assist persons sixty years of age and older’’).
    8
    We note that it is undisputed that the women’s only workout areas at
    issue in this appeal do not fall within the plain meaning of the statutory
    terms ‘‘bathroom’’ or ‘‘locker room.’’ More specifically, the record indicates
    that the women’s only workout areas in each facility are separated from
    the larger portions of the gyms by doors with blinds and branding, as well
    as by walls without windows. The women’s only areas are small relative to
    the rest of the facilities and, therefore, contain a lesser amount of the same
    equipment. There is no indication in the record that either of the women’s
    only workout areas at issue contain showers, toilets, lockers, or any other
    feature associated with a bathroom or locker room.
    9
    General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be
    a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or an employer,
    by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide
    occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
    to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against
    such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
    employment because of the individual’s . . . sex . . . .’’
    10
    We note that no constitutional claim has been raised in this appeal.
    Thus, we do not consider the implications that § 46a-64 may have in relation
    to constitutional provisions and statutory safeguards such as the Connecticut
    Act Concerning Religious Freedom. See General Statutes § 52-571b. We leave
    these questions, including any gloss necessary to save § 46a-64 (a) from
    constitutional jeopardy, for another day, in a case that squarely presents
    them. See Bostock v. Clayton County,            U.S.    , 
    140 S. Ct. 1731
    , 1753–54,
    
    207 L. Ed. 2d 218
     (2020) (declining to address ‘‘[the employers’] fear that
    complying with Title VII’s requirement [as to not discriminating against
    homosexual or transgender persons] may require some employers to violate
    their religious convictions’’ because ‘‘how [the] doctrines protecting religious
    liberty [namely, the first amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration
    Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.] interact with Title VII [is a question]
    for future cases’’ given lack of religious liberty claim); see also Fay v. Merrill,
    
    338 Conn. 1
    , 21 n.18, 
    256 A.3d 622
     (2021) (noting ‘‘the general rule that
    [c]onstitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to
    the decision of a case’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    11
    We may consider hypothetical scenarios beyond the facts of the case
    before us in determining whether a construction of the plain language of a
    statute will lead to an absurd result. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 
    310 Conn. 693
    , 708–709, 
    80 A.3d 878
     (2013) (determining that interpretation of special
    parole statute created absurd results on basis of hypothetical factual scenar-
    ios ); State v. Gelormino, 
    291 Conn. 373
    , 383–84, 
    968 A.2d 379
     (2009) (consid-
    ering but rejecting defendant’s argument that plain and unambiguous lan-
    guage of mandatory minimum sentencing statute yielded absurd result when
    considered in context of hypothetical fact patterns).
    12
    ‘‘[I]t is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees
    may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the
    legislature sought to address by the legislation. . . . This is because legisla-
    tion is a purposive act . . . and, therefore, identifying the particular problem
    that the legislature sought to resolve helps to identify the purpose or pur-
    poses for which the legislature used the language in question.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) In re Elianah T.-T., 
    326 Conn. 614
    , 625–26 n.10,
    
    165 A.3d 1236
     (2017); see, e.g., Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 
    263 Conn. 279
    , 314–15, 
    819 A.2d 260
     (2003).
    13
    We note that the written testimony of then Attorney General Blumenthal
    is not contained in the printed record of the Joint Standing Committee
    Hearings but is included in the legislative bill file available in the Connecticut
    State Library.