United States v. Johnson , 94 F. App'x 964 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-20-2004
    USA v. Johnson
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-2880
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Johnson" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 804.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/804
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 03-2880
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    JAMES W. JOHNSON,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (Dist. Court No. 01-cr-00394)
    District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 2, 2004
    Before: ALITO, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: April 20, 2004)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the
    procedural history and the contentions presented, we will not recite them except as
    necessary to the discussion. James W. Johnson, an inmate at FCI Schuylkill, was
    charged with possession of a knife-like weapon while incarcerated in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1791
    , and has been found guilty by a jury and sentenced. He raises two
    arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in determining that he had not made out a
    prime facie case of selective prosecution and (2) the court clearly erred in finding that he
    understood and knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right against
    compulsory self-incrimination. For the reasons that follow we reject both of Appellant’s
    contentions.
    As a general rule, so long as there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has
    committed an offense, the decision to prosecute rests in the prosecutor’s discretion.
    Wayte v. United States, 
    470 U.S. 598
    , 607 (1985). To sustain a claim of selective
    persecution, Johnson must demonstrate, first, disparate treatment of similarly situation
    persons and, second, that this disparate treatment is a product of prospective decisions
    deliberately based on some unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or some other
    arbitrary classification. See United States v. Schoolcraft, 
    879 F.2d 64
    , 68 (3d Cir. 1989).
    We agree with the district court that Appellant did not carry his heavy burden of
    demonstrating that he was improperly singled out for prosecution.
    Johnson has failed to point to any evidence to establish that other similarly situated
    persons were not prosecuted by the government for possessing weapons in prison. The
    decision to prosecute was made because the knife-like weapon was found in Appellant’s
    shoe, and Appellant admitted the knife was his and not his cell mate’s. Moreover the
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    impetus for the search that resulted in the seizure of the knife was the report that the
    Appellant, not his cell mate, had brandished it threateningly at another inmate. The
    Appendix to the government’s response to Appellant’s motion to dismiss disclosed that
    the government does actively pursue prison contraband possession cases like this,
    including cases arising out of SCI Schuylkill. We conclude that the district court did not
    err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss based upon alleged selective prosecution.
    As to Johnson’s argument regarding compulsory self-incrimination, it is clear that
    the government is entitled to admit a defendant’s statement when it can show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in a valid waiver of his
    Miranda rights. Colorado v. Connolly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 168 (1986) (citations omitted). The
    cumulative experience of the judiciary demonstrates that Miranda waivers have been
    sustained when engaged in by criminal felons like Johnson, who have significant prior
    experience with the legal system. See e.g. United States v. Burrous, 
    147 F.3d 111
    , 116-
    117 (2nd Cir. 1998). We have examined the record and conclude that Johnson expressly
    waived his Miranda rights both orally and in writing, and therefore the district court did
    not err in dismissing Appellant’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to the FBI.
    After correctional officers found a homemade knife-like weapon made of metal
    concealed in Appellant’s shoe, an FBI agent interviewed Appellant. Before the Appellant
    gave his incriminating statement, the agent informed Appellant that he was from the FBI,
    explained that he was interviewing Appellant regarding Appellant’s possession of a knife,
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    advised Appellant of his Miranda rights and obtained from Appellant an express written
    waiver of those rights. In addition, in a taped prison telephone conversation Johnson
    once again admitted to possessing a knife in prison. We reject Appellant’s argument that
    he thought that he was being interviewed by the FBI only for administrative procedures,
    as Appellant clearly reflected in this conversation that he understood that he was the
    subject of a criminal investigation. Appellant acknowledged that authorities “might be
    trying to take [him] down to court,” he hoped that if they did he would get “no more than
    . . . an extra six months” and he recognized that it was a distinct possibility that
    authorities would bring charges even though “the[y] ain’t acting like, they pressing
    charges . . . .” We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
    Appellant knowingly and voluntary waived his Miranda rights, and accordingly, we
    affirm the court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statements.
    We have considered all of the contentions presented by the parties and conclude
    that no additional discussion is necessary.
    The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 03-2880

Citation Numbers: 94 F. App'x 964

Filed Date: 4/20/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023