Lane Francis Weitzel v. State of Minnesota , 883 N.W.2d 553 ( 2016 )

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A14-1186
Court of Appeals Dietzen, J.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Gildea, C.J.
and Anderson, J.
Took no part, Chutich J.
Lane Francis Weitzel,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: August 10, 2016
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
________________________
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant
Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and,
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Debra J. Hilstrom, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota, for
respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
When the State fails to raise the time limits in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), (c)
(2014), as an affirmative defense, the postconviction court has the discretion to raise the
time limit on its own motion to control its docket. Before ruling on the timeliness issue,
1
however, the postconviction court must give the parties notice and afford them an
opportunity to be heard.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
DIETZEN, Justice.
In 2007, appellant Lane Francis Weitzel pleaded guilty and was convicted of one
count of failure to register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5(a) (2014). In 2014, he filed a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01 (2014), alleging his guilty plea was inaccurate and should be withdrawn in the
interests of justice. The postconviction court denied the petition on the ground that it was
untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). On appeal, Weitzel argued the
postconviction court was required to consider his petition on the merits because the State
forfeited its right to assert subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense.1 The court of
appeals affirmed. Weitzel v. State, 868 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. App. 2015). We
conclude that a postconviction court may raise the subdivision 4(c) time limit on its own
motion to control its docket, so long as the court gives notice to the parties and affords
them an opportunity to be heard. Because the postconviction court failed to provide the
required notice and opportunity to be heard, we reverse and remand.
1
We recently clarified the distinction between waiver and forfeiture. State v.
Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278 n. 3 (Minn. 2015). In Beaulieu, we observed that
forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right, and waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Id. (citing United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). Consistent with this distinction, we use the word “forfeiture”
when referring to a failure to make a timely assertion of a right.
2
Weitzel was obligated to register as a predatory offender due to a 1992 conviction
for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In September 2006, the State charged
Weitzel with failure to register, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). The
complaint alleged that around May 24, 2006, Weitzel knowingly violated the statute by
failing to notify the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) of an address change
within 5 days. Weitzel submitted a verification letter to the BCA listing an address in the
City of Ramsey, Minnesota. Seven months later, the BCA sent an address verification
letter to the Ramsey address. When the letter was returned to the post office as
undeliverable, the police began an investigation. The police went to the Ramsey address
and spoke with the homeowner, who stated that she had evicted Weitzel in October 2005.
A records check revealed that the BCA had not received a change of address form as
required by statute.
In April 2007, Weitzel and the State reached a plea agreement. Weitzel agreed to
plead guilty to the offense in exchange for the State agreeing to support a sentence at the
lower end of the presumptive range and a dispositional departure of probation. As part of
his factual basis, Weitzel admitted that he did not tell any law enforcement agency or the
BCA that he had moved from Ramsey to Fridley. The district court accepted Weitzel’s
guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender,
and imposed a sentence of 17 months, but stayed execution of the sentence and placed
Weitzel on probation for 5 years. Weitzel did not appeal. The district court discharged
Weitzel from probation in March 2010.
3
In March 2014, Weitzel filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his plea was inaccurate and invalid because it
lacked an adequate factual basis. Specifically, Weitzel argued that his statement in the
plea colloquy, in which he admitted that he provided the Ramsey address to Anoka
County Corrections, satisfied his reporting requirement and was incompatible with a
finding of guilt. Weitzel alleged his petition was timely filed under Minn. Stat. § 590.01because his interests-of-justice claim under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5), arose less
than 2 years before he filed the petition. See Id., subd. 4(c). The State denied the
allegations in the petition and claimed the petition failed to state a claim entitling Weitzel
to relief under the postconviction statute. The State did not raise the untimeliness of
Weitzel’s petition to the postconviction court.
The postconviction court denied the petition, concluding that Weitzel’s claim
arose no later than September 7, 2011, when Weitzel learned he had a right to appeal and
requested that the State Public Defender’s Office review his case. Accordingly, the court
held that the petition was filed after the expiration of the time limit in section 590.01,
subdivision 4(c) (requiring that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in
paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises”). Alternatively,
the court concluded that Weitzel had failed to establish that his claim had substantive
merit.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a postconviction court may raise
subdivision 4(c) on its own motion, even if the State forfeited its right to assert
subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense, provided that the court first gives the parties
4
notice of its intent to consider the issue and an opportunity to present their respective
positions. Weitzel, 868 N.W.2d at 277, 279-81. Although the court of appeals
acknowledged that the postconviction court erred when it failed to provide the parties
with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the applicability of Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(c), the court of appeals concluded the error was harmless. Weitzel, 868 N.W.2d
at 281.
I.
Weitzel argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition as
untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). According to Weitzel, the
postconviction court was required to consider his petition on the merits because the State
forfeited its right to assert subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense.
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Colbert
v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 2015). Our review of legal issues is de novo, but
our review of factual matters is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the postconviction court’s findings. Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781,
786 (Minn. 2015); see also Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
When a petitioner seeks to withdraw a guilty plea made after sentencing the
request must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief. James v. State, 699 N.W.2d
723, 727 (Minn. 2005). A defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw a
valid guilty plea. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). The Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure do allow, however, a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
after sentencing if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R.
5
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs when the record, including the
factual basis for the plea, fails to satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid guilty plea.
Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646-49. A defendant bears the burden of proving his plea was
invalid. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015).
The postconviction statute provides that “[n]o petition for postconviction relief
may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition
of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). Section 590.01,
subdivision 4(b)(5), provides that the court may hear a petition outside of the 2-year
limitation period if “the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the
petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” But a petition invoking an
exception under subdivision 4(b) must be filed within 2 years of the date the interests-of-
justice claim arises. Id., subd. 4(c); Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012);
Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Minn. 2011). A petitioner’s claim “arises when
the petitioner knew or should have known that he had a claim.” Id. at 560. This is an
objective, rather than a “subjective, actual knowledge standard.” Id. at 558.
Previously, we have considered whether the limitation periods in Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a), (c), are jurisdictional. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775 (Minn.
2013); Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012). In Carlton, we concluded that
the time limit contained in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), did not operate as a
jurisdictional bar, but was comparable to a statute of limitations that could be asserted as
an affirmative defense by the State. 816 N.W.2d at 600-02. We further concluded that
6
the State forfeits its right to raise subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense when it fails
to make a timely assertion of that right. Id. at 606. In Hooper, we considered the related
question of whether the 2-year limitation period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a),
operates as a jurisdictional bar. 838 N.W.2d at 780-82. We concluded that the limitation
period in subdivision 4(a) does not restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the
postconviction court. Id. at 782. We reasoned that because the State had failed to raise
subdivision 4(a) as an affirmative defense, the State forfeited its right to assert the
defense for the first time on appeal. Id. at 780-82. We reaffirm our decisions in Carlton
and Hooper that the limitation periods in section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), (c), are not
jurisdictional bars that restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the postconviction court.
Instead, they are statutes of limitations that the State may assert as an affirmative defense.
We also reaffirm that the State forfeits its right to raise subdivision 4(a) or 4(c) as an
affirmative defense when it fails to make a timely assertion of that right.
Carlton and Hooper do not address the question of whether a forfeiture of the
State’s right to raise subdivision 4(a) or 4(c) as an affirmative defense precludes the
postconviction court from exercising the court’s authority to control its docket by
considering the applicability of subdivision 4(a) and (c) on its own motion. But the
United States Supreme Court has considered an analogous question in the context of the
federal habeas statutes in Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), and Wood v.
Milyard, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012).
In Day, the court considered the 1-year limitation period for filing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
7
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)(2012). Day, 547 U.S. at 201. The AEDPA statute
of limitations was enacted to promote “judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial
resources, [to] safeguard the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of
constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and [to] lend finality to state court
judgments within a reasonable time.” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d
117, 123 (2nd Cir. 2000)). Day filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus approximately
3 weeks after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 201. Due to a miscalculation
of the untolled time, the State’s answer asserted the habeas petition was timely filed. Id.The district court raised the issue of timeliness sua sponte and, after giving Day notice
and an opportunity to be heard, dismissed the petition as untimely. Id. at 201-02. On
appeal, Day argued the State forfeited its right to assert the 1-year statute of limitations
when it failed to assert that right in a timely manner. Id. at 207. In response, the State
argued that the considerations underlying the enactment of the AEDPA, including
expeditious handling of habeas proceedings, supported a rule that allowed a court to
“exercise discretion in each case to decide whether the administration of justice is better
served by dismissing the case on statute of limitations grounds or reaching the merits of
the petition.”2 Id. at 208. Persuaded by the State’s argument, the Supreme Court
affirmed, concluding that a district court has the discretion to consider on its own motion
the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition and to dismiss the petition as untimely
under the federal statute’s one-year statutes of limitation period. Id. at 209-10. The
2
The Day Court acknowledged that considerations of comity and finality also
motivated the enactment of the AEDPA. Day, 547 U.S. at 208.
8
Court compared the 1-year statute of limitation with other affirmative defenses such as
“exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and non-retroactivity.” Id. at 205. The
Court noted that the judge could have informed the State of the obvious computation
error and granted leave to amend the State’s answer. Id. at 209. According to the Court,
there is no material difference between allowing the State to amend its answer and
allowing the court to raise the timeliness issue on its own motion. Id. But the Court
cautioned that before raising the issue of timeliness on its own motion, the district court
must give notice to the parties and give them an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 210.
In Wood, the State was aware of the statute of limitations defense available to it
and the arguments that could be made in support of that defense. ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S.
Ct. at 1830-31. But the State twice informed the district court that it would not challenge
the timeliness of Wood’s petition. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1830-31. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, concluding that the State deliberately waived the statute of
limitations defense.3 Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1832-34. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed
the federal district court’s authority to consider a forfeited untimeliness defense when
3
In its answer to Weitzel’s petition, the State asserted that, “The allegations of the
Petition for Post Conviction Relief fail to state a claim entitling the Petitioner to relief as
provided by the Post Conviction Remedy Act, M.S. § 590.01-.06.” Although the State’s
answer is insufficient to invoke the statute of limitation in subdivision 4(c), it did not
expressly waive the time limits. There is no evidence that the State strategically
withheld, or otherwise waived, its right to raise the time limit. Instead, the record
indicates that the State failed to raise the time limit in its answer and therefore forfeited
its right to assert it as a defense.
9
extraordinary circumstances so warrant.4 Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1833-34. The Court
articulated two reasons for its holding. First, it would make little sense to treat a statute
of limitations defense differently than other constraints on federal habeas corpus
petitions. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1833. Second, affording the district court discretion
was appropriate because the statute of limitation implicates values beyond the concerns
of the parties. Specifically, “[t]he AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial
efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court
judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh,
and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time.” Id. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 1833 (quoting Day, 547 U.S. at 205-06).
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Day and Wood have been followed by other
courts that have considered the issue. See Davis v. State, 187 P.3d 654, 659 (Mont. 2008)
(concluding that nothing precludes a district court from raising, sua sponte, the timeliness
4
The concurrence and dissent alleges our decision in Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 606,
“already rejected the rule in Wood.” We disagree for two reasons. First, Carlton did not
address the rule announced in Wood. The Court in Wood held that both the federal
district court and appellate courts have the authority to consider a forfeited untimeliness
defense when extraordinary circumstances warrant doing so. ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct.
at 1834. Carlton did not address the authority of the federal district or appellate courts to
raise the untimeliness defense on its own motion. Instead, Carlton merely addressed
whether the State’s failure to raise the timeliness defense forfeited the State’s right to
raise the defense, and whether an appellate court may consider a statute of limitations
defense where neither the State nor the district court addressed the issue.
Our decision today only adopts in part the rule announced in Wood. Specifically,
we hold that the state district court has the authority to consider a forfeited untimeliness
defense when extraordinary circumstances warrant doing so. We do not, however,
extend the rule in Wood to the appellate courts.
10
of a postconviction petition); see also Agana Beach Condo. Homeowners’ Ass’n v.
Mafnas, 2013 Guam 9 ¶45 (Guam 2013) (concluding that trial courts may raise certain
non-jurisdictional issues sua sponte).
We are not bound by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Day and Wood because
those decisions involve statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a
federal statute. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278-79 (2008) (“Since Teague
is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal
statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts”); Danforth v.
State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that the Teague rule was tailored to
the unique context of federal habeas relief and therefore had no bearing on whether states
could provide broader relief in their postconviction proceedings). But the time limits set
forth in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), (c), were enacted to promote some of the same
interests discussed in Day and Wood.5 Specifically, they were enacted “in response to a
dramatic increase in the number of postconviction petitions, many of which involved old
5
The concurrence and dissent suggests that Day and Wood offer little guidance
because “[t]he rule announced in those cases was based in part on considerations of
comity between federal and state sovereigns.” Infra at C/D-1. It is true that comity was
one of the interests discussed in Day and Wood. But an equally important interest was a
court’s ability to control its docket. For example, in Wood the Court said: “Due regard
for the trial court’s processes and time investment is also a consideration appellate courts
should not overlook. It typically takes a district court more time to decide a habeas case
on the merits, than it does to resolve a petition on threshold procedural grounds.” ___
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1834. The fact that comity between federal and sovereign states
is not in play here does not preclude us from considering the other important interests
discussed in Day and Wood, including a court’s ability to control its docket. We believe
that a court’s need to control its docket provides a persuasive and compelling reason to
allow the court, in its discretion, to consider the time limits of subdivision 4(a) and (c) on
its own motion.
11
claims brought years after a conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.” Rhodes v. State,
875 N.W.2d 779, 783 n.2 (Minn. 2016). Moreover, it is well-established that courts have
the authority “to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants” and that “[h]ow this can best be done
calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co, 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (explaining that “the
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes on its docket”).
The time limits of section 590.01, subdivision 4, are broadly written. Subdivision
4(a) provides that “[n]o petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two
years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct
appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.”
Subdivision 4(c) states that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph
(b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” There is nothing in the
language of either statute that precludes the court from raising the time limits on its own
motion.
Moreover, the values underlying the time limits in a postconviction proceeding are
significantly different than those in an ordinary civil proceeding. On the one hand, a
statute of limitation defense in a civil case specifically benefits the opposing party. See
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)
(concluding that a statute of limitation defense is based on the proposition that if one
person has a claim against another it would be inequitable for that person to assert such
12
claim after an unreasonable lapse of time); Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co.,
201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697 (1937) (explaining that the purpose of a statute
of limitation is to protect defendants from being surprised by the revival of stale claims).
On the other hand, the time limits in section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), (c), not only benefit
the State, but also benefit the court. Specifically, the time limits in subdivision 4(a) and
(c) encourage the expeditious handling of postconviction appeals and allow
postconviction courts to control their docket by dismissing frivolous petitions that are
clearly untimely. The time limits set forth in the statute are unique because they
implicate the ability of the court to control its docket by dismissing frivolous claims.
In sum, a state district court has the authority to control the disposition of cases on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. A
rule that precludes a court from raising the time limits on its own motion because the
State forfeited its right to assert the time limits as an affirmative defense would
undermine the key purpose of the time limits in subdivision 4(a) and (c): allowing a court
to control its docket by dismissing untimely petitions. We therefore conclude that when
the State fails to raise the time limits set forth in section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) and (c),
the postconviction court has the discretion to consider the time limits on its own motion
in order to control its docket.6
6
Despite the assertion to the contrary in the concurring and dissenting opinion, we
do not hold that a postconviction court may raise the subdivision 4(a) and 4(c) time limits
as an affirmative defense on behalf of the State. Infra at C/D-1. Instead, we hold that a
postconviction court has the discretion to raise the time limits on its own behalf to protect
its docket from frivolous petitions. Cf. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55.
13
Before ruling on the issue, however, the court must give notice to the parties and
afford them the opportunity to be heard. Day, 547 U.S. at 210. Our approach provides
postconviction courts with the discretion, when faced with untimely claims, to determine
whether the administration of justice is better served by dismissing the case on statute of
limitations grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition. Accord Day, 547 U.S. at
208.
We conclude that a remand is necessary to vindicate Weitzel’s procedural due
process rights. The postconviction court failed to give the parties notice that it intended
to consider on its own motion the statute of limitation in section 590.01, subdivision 4(c).
Consequently, we remand the case to the postconviction court to allow the parties the
opportunity to be heard on the timeliness of Weitzel’s petition.
Reversed and remanded.
CHUTICH, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
14
CONCURRENCE & DISSENT
GILDEA, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Even though the State did not assert the statute of limitations in Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a), (c) (2014), the majority concludes that the postconviction court has
the discretion to raise that defense for the State. I disagree. I would follow our
longstanding rule and hold that the State’s failure to assert the affirmative defense
prevents the defense’s consideration. E.g., Rehberger v. Project Plumbing Co.,
295 Minn. 577, 578, 205 N.W.2d 126, 127 (1973) (noting that the failure to plead an
affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, constitutes a waiver of that
defense).1
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion based on Supreme Court habeas
cases. In my view, those cases should not drive the result here. The rule in those cases
was based in part on considerations of comity between federal and state sovereigns. See,
e.g., Wood v. Milyard, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2012). No such
considerations are in play here. Moreover, we have already rejected the rule in Wood. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court could raise the statute of
limitations defense for the first time on appeal. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1834. That is not
the rule in Minnesota. See State v. Carlton, 816 N.W.2d 590, 606 (2012) (holding that
the State’s failure to assert the statute of limitations in the postconviction statute, Minn.
1
This general rule is subject to a motion to amend the relevant pleading, but the
State made no such motion in this case. See id. (“A failure to plead an affirmative
defense, without later amendment of the pleading, waives the defense.”).
C/D-1
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), precluded the appellate court’s consideration of that defense).
I would extend our analysis in Carlton and hold that, in the absence of a motion for leave
to amend, the State’s failure to assert the statute of limitations in the postconviction court
precludes that court’s consideration of the defense. Accordingly, I would remand the
matter back to the postconviction court for consideration of the merits of the petition.
ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.
C/D-2