United States v. Matthew Glasscock , 341 F. App'x 513 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-12874 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 10, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00110-CR-2-SLB-PWG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MATTHEW GLASSCOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 10, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Matthew Glasscock appeals his 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation
of his supervised release.1 No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
On appeal, Glasscock argues that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing the statutory maximum sentence based on his rehabilitative needs. He
contends that his revocation was mandatory, and, thus, the district court was not
permitted to consider his rehabilitative needs in determining sentence.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may revoke supervised
release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering certain 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors, including the need to provide the defendant with correctional
treatment. We review a defendant’s sentence upon revocation of supervised
release for reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07
(11th Cir. 2006). And we evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence --
whether inside or outside the guidelines range -- under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007) (in the
1
Glasscock committed the following supervised release violations: (1) committing a
federal, state, or local crime as evidenced by his guilty plea to writing worthless checks; (2)
failing to submit required written reports to his probation officer; (3) failing to follow the
instructions of his probation officer by not responding to phone calls or letters; and (4) failing to
complete inpatient mental health and drug treatment. On appeal, he does not challenge that he
committed these violations.
2
context of original criminal sentencing).2
We first conclude that the district court considered no impermissible factor
in sentencing Glasscock. The district court was allowed to consider Glasscock’s
mental health issues and drug addiction in determining that a 24-month sentence
was appropriate, no matter whether Glasscock’s revocation was mandatory or
permissive. As we explained in United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir.
2000), a court “may consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant when
imposing or determining the length of a term of imprisonment upon mandatory or
permissive revocation of supervised release.”3 Id. at 1243 (emphasis added). Only
for an initial sentence of incarceration can a court not impose a sentence for the
purpose of providing a defendant with rehabilitative treatment. See 28 U.S.C. §
994(k); Brown, 224 F.3d at 1242.
And we also conclude that Glasscock’s sentence otherwise was not
unreasonable. Glasscock’s 24-month sentence did not exceed the statutory
maximum for his underlying Class C felony of bank robbery. See 18 U.S.C. §§
2
In addition, we review de novo whether the district court considered an impermissible
factor in sentencing a defendant. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252
(11th Cir. 2008).
3
Glasscock contends that his revocation was mandatory because he failed to comply with
drug testing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(3). But the district court revoked his supervised release, in
part, for failure to complete inpatient drug treatment -- not for failing to submit to required drug
testing. Still, as noted, the district court was permitted to consider Glasscock’s rehabilitative
needs in either a mandatory or permissive revocation situation.
3
2113(a), 3583(e)(3). Although Glasscock’s sentence exceeded significantly the
advisory sentencing range set out in the Chapter 7 policy statements, the district
court was not required to sentence Glasscock within that range.4 See United States
v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the recommended
ranges are advisory and that the court, while required to consider the ranges, is not
bound by them). In addition to considering Glasscock’s need for mental health
evaluation and polysubstance abuse treatment, the court also determined that a
sentence of 24 months was necessary “to prevent further violations of law” in the
light of Glasscock’s criminal history and many supervised release violations. All
these reasons are supported by the record given that, while under supervision,
Glasscock pleaded guilty to writing worthless checks, was arrested for public
intoxication and criminal mischief, tested positive for drugs, and failed to complete
required drug treatment.
On this record, no abuse of discretion has been shown; and we conclude that
Glasscock’s sentence is reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
4
Glasscock’s Chapter 7 sentencing range was 6 to 12 months, based on his original
sentencing criminal history score of IV and commission of Grade C supervision violations. See
U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(3), 7B1.4(a).
4