Charles Harris v. United States ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 21-2394
    __________
    CHARLES HARRIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-20-cv-00631)
    District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    September 23, 2022
    Before: RESTREPO, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: September 28, 2022)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Charles Harris appeals from the District Court’s grant of judgment on the
    pleadings for defendants. We will vacate and remand to the District Court for further
    proceedings.
    At all relevant times, Harris was incarcerated at United States Penitentiary-
    Allenwood in White Deer, Pennsylvania.1 In February 2019, while walking from his
    housing unit to a computer class, Harris tripped on an uneven sidewalk in the vicinity of
    Unit 2 and fractured his right foot. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Harris
    filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1346
    , 2671 et
    seq., alleging that the sidewalk had settled, creating a crack with a one-inch height
    differential. Corrections officers, Harris maintained, were aware of the danger posed by
    the uneven sidewalk but did not fix the defect.2 After filing an answer, the Government
    filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the District Court granted. Harris
    timely appealed.3
    We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion for judgment on the
    pleadings. See Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express Inc., 
    914 F.3d 812
    , 816 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019).
    1
    Harris is currently incarcerated at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in
    Springfield, Missouri.
    2
    Harris named as defendants the United States of America and the United States Bureau
    of Prisons (BOP). On the Government’s motion, the District Court dismissed the BOP as
    defendant because the United States of America is the only proper defendant in an FTCA
    suit. See CNA v. United States, 
    535 F.3d 132
    , 139 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).
    3
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    2
    When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept as true the
    allegations of the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
    the non-moving party. See Zimmerman v. Corbett, 
    873 F.3d 414
    , 417-18 (3d Cir. 2017).
    Harris can survive a Rule 12(c) motion if his complaint contains “sufficient factual matter
    to show that the claim is facially plausible, thus enabling the court to draw the reasonable
    inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.” Warren Gen. Hosp.
    v. Amgen Inc., 
    643 F.3d 77
    , 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).
    Pennsylvania tort law governs Harris’s FTCA claim. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b);
    DeJesus v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    479 F.3d 271
    , 279 (3d Cir. 2007).
    Harris’s case turns on whether the Government owed a duty of care to him. Because
    Harris is an invitee, see Graf v. County of Northampton, 
    654 A.2d 131
    , 134 (Pa.
    Commw. 1995), the Government is liable for his injury only if it (1) knew of or
    reasonably would have discovered the land condition (the sidewalk differential), and
    should have realized that it posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) should have expected
    that Harris would not discover or would have failed to protect himself against the danger;
    and (3) failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the Harris from the danger. See
    Carrender v. Fitterer, 
    469 A.2d 120
    , 123 (Pa. 1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
    Torts § 343). Even if the sidewalk differential were known or obvious to Harris, the
    Government would still be liable if it should have anticipated the harm despite such
    knowledge or obviousness. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A).
    3
    In granting judgment for the Government, the District Court deemed it dispositive
    that Harris knew of the sidewalk condition and its potential dangerousness, an argument
    repeated by the Government on appeal. But neither considered whether the Government
    should have anticipated the harm to Harris despite his knowledge of the potential danger.
    Harris set forth sufficient allegations to raise the question of whether the Government
    should have anticipated the harm posed by the differential. In particular, he alleged that
    prison staff used the sidewalk each day and, before he fell, “other prisoners and staff
    members had also been injured by falling/tripping/stumbling in the same location.” ECF
    No. 1 at pp. 4-5. Because the sidewalks had settled in the twenty-five years since the
    prison was built, sidewalk cracks were ubiquitous. Id. at p. 4. And, in the summers of
    2016 and 2017, the Government replaced a portion of another sidewalk at the prison that
    was in a similar condition as the location where Harris fell but never fixed the sidewalk
    near Unit 2. Id. at p. 5.
    Relatedly, it is not clear that Harris assumed the risk of the harm by traversing the
    sidewalk. See Howell v. Clyde, 
    620 A.2d 1107
    , 1112-13 (Pa. 1993) (assumption of risk
    is incorporated in the duty analysis). In its brief supporting judgment on the pleadings,
    the Government argued that Harris had assumed the risk of the harm by walking on the
    sidewalk despite the obvious danger it posed. See ECF No. 17 at p. 10. Harris countered
    that he was unable to avoid the risk because he was “forced to commute” on the sidewalk
    to attend the computer class and other programs, the sidewalks were “congested” and
    4
    difficult to see because “hundreds of prisoners” traversed the area at a time, and, even if
    he could take another path (which he could not), “every several yards” of the surrounding
    area were equally dangerous. ECF No. 20 at pp. 4-5. Unlike cases where no duty was
    owed because a plaintiff could easily have avoided the harm, see Carrender, 469 A.2d at
    124 (plaintiff assumed the risk of the harm by parking on an ice patch although several
    ice-free parking spaces were available), Harris sufficiently alleged that the harm was
    unavoidable. See Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Associates, 
    243 F.3d 145
    , 156-57 (3d Cir.
    2001) (plaintiff did not assume the risk of the harm by using the stairwell because there
    was no other way to enter the building).
    Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the
    matter so that the District Court can consider whether the Government should have
    anticipated Harris’s injury. We express no opinion concerning the outcome of that
    inquiry.
    5