State of Minnesota v. Daniel Joseph Devens , 852 N.W.2d 255 ( 2014 )

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A12-2065
Court of Appeals Lillehaug, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: August 20, 2014
Office of Appellate Courts
Daniel Joseph Devens,
Appellant.
________________________
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General,
Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
The district court did not err when it instructed the jury that appellant, while in the
hallway of his apartment building, had a duty to retreat if reasonably possible before
acting in self-defense against a non-resident of the building.
Affirmed.
1
OPINION
LILLEHAUG, Justice.
At his trial for third-degree assault, appellant Daniel Joseph Devens claimed that
he acted in self-defense during a hallway confrontation with a non-resident of his
apartment building. Over Devens’ objection, the district court instructed the jury that
Devens had a duty to retreat if reasonably possible before acting in self-defense. After
the jury found him guilty of third-degree assault and the lesser included offense of fifth-
degree assault, Devens appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted review on
the issue of whether the duty to retreat applies when a defendant claims to have acted in
self-defense in a hallway of his apartment building against a non-resident of the building.
Because we conclude that Devens had a duty to retreat if reasonably possible, we affirm.
I.
Around midnight on October 14, 2011, Devens heard loud noises coming from the
hallway of his secured apartment building in Waseca. He opened his apartment door to
investigate. Approximately 35 feet down the hallway, Devens saw an individual—whom
he later learned was J.P.—knocking on a neighbor’s apartment door. Devens did not
recognize J.P. but he knew that J.P. did not live there.1
1
J.P. was able to gain access to the secured apartment building because the front
door was propped open. He had made plans to stay overnight with a friend who lived in
the building.
2
Devens stepped out of his apartment and asked J.P. to leave. J.P. did not. Devens
then approached J.P. and again asked J.P. to leave. This time, J.P. complied. The two
men walked down the hallway toward the exit.
Devens and J.P. offer conflicting accounts of what happened next. According to
Devens, without warning, J.P. attempted to punch him and Devens simply defended
himself. But according to J.P., Devens started the fight. Devens allegedly “jumped” J.P.
from behind and hit J.P. on his back, shoulders, and head. During the struggle, J.P. fell
down a flight of stairs and lost consciousness.2
When police arrived, Devens admitted that he had fought with J.P. But he
maintained that he only used force in order to protect himself.
After an investigation, the State charged Devens with first-degree assault, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2012), and third-degree assault, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2012). The first-degree assault charge was dismissed
for lack of probable cause. On the third-degree assault charge, Devens’ defense theory
was self-defense.
Before trial, the State requested that a duty-to-retreat instruction accompany any
self-defense jury instruction. The State argued that because Devens was in the hallway of
his apartment building during the confrontation with J.P., not in his own apartment, he
had a duty to retreat if reasonably possible before acting in self-defense. Devens
2
As a result of the confrontation, J.P. suffered head injuries. He was intubated and
airlifted to North Memorial Medical Center. But he did not sustain any permanent
injuries.
3
disagreed. He argued that, under the “castle doctrine,” he had no duty to retreat because
the hallway of his secured apartment building was his home for the purpose of self-
defense.
The district court agreed with the State. The district court reasoned that, unlike
when one acts in self-defense in his or her home, in this case there was somewhere safer
for Devens to go: his own apartment. In other words, the district court decided that the
hallway was not Devens’ home for the purpose of self-defense.
At trial, Devens testified that he acted in self-defense. Before the case was
submitted to the jury, and consistent with a prior order, the district court instructed the
jury that “[t]he legal excuse of self-defense is available only to those who act honestly
and in good faith. This includes the duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably
possible.” In so doing, the district court followed the duty-to-retreat instruction from
CRIMJIG 7.08.3 See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction
Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.08 (5th ed. 2006).
The jury found Devens guilty of third-degree assault and the lesser included
offense of fifth-degree assault. The district court stayed imposition of sentence and
placed Devens on probation.
3
The district court also gave the jury the general self-defense instruction from
CRIMJIG 7.06. That instruction provides, in relevant part, that when acting in self-
defense, a “person may use all force and means that the person reasonably believes to be
necessary and that would appear to a reasonable person, in similar circumstances, to be
necessary to prevent an injury that appears to be imminent.” See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges
Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.06 (5th ed.
2006).
4
Devens appealed. Among other things, he argued that the district court erred in
giving a duty-to-retreat instruction. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals
affirmed. State v. Devens, No. A12-2065, 2013 WL 6389594, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 9,
2013). The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in giving a duty-to-retreat instruction because “there was somewhere safer for [Devens]
to go at the time of the altercation . . . .” Id. at *3.
We granted Devens’ petition for further review on the duty-to-retreat issue. We
denied review on all other issues.
II.
Whether the duty to retreat applies in this case is a question of law that we review
de novo. See State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 2012). We afford district
courts significant discretion to craft jury instructions. State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471,
476 (Minn. 1998). But a jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law.
State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Minn. 1997).
A.
In Minnesota, a person may act in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes
that force is necessary and uses only the level of force reasonably necessary to prevent
the bodily harm feared. State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001). This
right of self-defense is codified at Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2012). That
subdivision provides, in relevant part, that reasonable force may be used upon another
without the other’s consent “when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to
resist an offense against the person . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3).
5
We have read Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3), to include four elements:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant;
(2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he or she was in imminent
danger of . . . bodily harm; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that
belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the
danger.
State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Minn. 1997). Once a defendant meets the
burden of “going forward with evidence to support a claim of self-defense,” the State
bears the burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the four
elements. Id. at 286.
The fourth element of self-defense—the duty to retreat—is at issue in this case.
Generally, the law requires that a person retreat if reasonably possible before acting in
self-defense. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 399. This is because the law presumes that there
is somewhere safer to go—home. Id. at 401. As a result, if a person is outside his or her
home and can safely retreat, then the person’s use of force is unreasonable as a matter of
law. Id. at 399-400; see also State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 545-46, 548 (Minn.
1988) (noting that the defendant had a duty to retreat before acting in self-defense
because the shooting took place in the parking lot adjacent to his apartment).
However, under the so-called “castle doctrine,” a person need not retreat from his
or her home before acting in self-defense.4 State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 622, 629
4
Devens uses the phrase “castle doctrine” to refer to the concept that a person need
not retreat from his or her home before acting in self-defense. We have used the phrase
in a defense-of-dwelling case, State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1998), and
have referred to the home as a “castle” while discussing the duty to retreat in a self-
defense case, State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn. 1999).
6
(Minn. 2006) (noting that the defendant did not have a duty to retreat before acting in
self-defense because the shooting took place in the upstairs bedroom of his home); State
v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Minn. 1999) (“[E]arly Minnesota caselaw rejected a
duty to retreat in cases of self-defense occurring in one’s home.”). After all, the home is
“a place critical for the protection of the family.” Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 901. One’s
home is a “sanctuary.” Id. at 900. “Requiring retreat from the home before acting in
self-defense would require one to leave one’s safest place.”5 Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at
401.
B.
Here, Devens asks that we extend the castle doctrine to the hallway of his
apartment building. We decline to do so.
As New York’s highest court aptly recognized, “the determination of whether a
particular location is part of a defendant’s dwelling [for the purpose of self-defense]
depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters
with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question.”
People v. Hernandez, 774 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 2002). Stated differently, the castle
doctrine extends to “a house, an apartment or part of a structure where defendant lives
and where others are ordinarily excluded—the antithesis of which is routine access to or
use of an area by strangers.” Id.; see also People v. Aiken, 828 N.E.2d 74, 79 (N.Y.
5
Importantly, “the lack of a duty to retreat does not abrogate the obligation to act
reasonably when using force in self-defense.” Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 402. Both the
use of force and the level of force must be reasonable. Id.
7
2005) (holding that the defendant had a duty to retreat from the doorway between his
apartment and the apartment hallway because that area functioned as a “hybrid private-
public space”).
Devens enjoyed a significant property interest in his own apartment. For example,
he could exclude even his landlord unless the landlord had a reasonable business purpose
for entering and made a good faith effort to notify Devens of the entry. See Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.211, subd. 2 (2012). By contrast, Devens did not exercise exclusive (or near-
exclusive) possession and control over the apartment hallway. The hallway was a shared
space owned by Devens’ landlord. As a tenant, Devens was required to tolerate, at a
minimum, the presence of other tenants, their guests, the landlord, and the landlord’s
guests and agents.
Because Devens did not exercise exclusive (or anything close to exclusive)
possession and control over the apartment hallway, it was not his safest place or his
sanctuary. Without these essential characteristics, see, e.g., Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at
900 (noting that early Minnesota case law was “fiercely protective of the home as a
sanctuary”), the apartment hallway was not Devens’ castle for the purpose of self-
defense.
Moreover, extending the castle doctrine to the apartment hallway might
encourage, rather than discourage, unnecessary and potentially deadly confrontations.
State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 232 (Gil. 178, 184) (1865) (“Where the [defendant] has
not retreated from or attempted to shun the combat, but has . . . unnecessarily entered into
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it, his act is not one of self-defense.”). Indeed, in this very case, Devens left the relative
safety of his own apartment to confront J.P. in a non-exclusive space owned by another.
Nevertheless, Devens argues that he did not have a duty to retreat from the
apartment hallway because his apartment building was (or was supposed to be) a secured
building. We disagree. The safety benefit of a locked front door does not mean that all
of the non-exclusive space behind that locked door—including lobbies, hallways, stairs,
elevators, laundry rooms, pools, and mailrooms—is a sanctuary critical for the protection
of self and family. See Hernandez, 774 N.E.2d at 203 (“Whether a person is entitled to
the benefit of the ‘no duty to retreat’ rule should not turn on how well protected the area
in question is at the time of the attack.”).
Devens also argues that the definition of “[d]welling” from Minnesota’s burglary
statute should apply in this case. Although that definition is broad enough to include an
apartment hallway, see Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 3 (2012), it is expressly limited (and
tailored) to the crime of burglary. Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 1 (2012). And to the
extent that Minnesota’s burglary statute and the castle doctrine share a respect for the
sanctity of the home, they do so for somewhat different reasons. The burglary statute
criminalizes behavior even when a lessee’s immediate personal safety is not at risk. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2 (2012). But in the self-defense context, the home is
important precisely because it functions as the resident’s safest place when threatened
with bodily harm.
Finally, Devens cites three cases—Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 559-60
(1895); State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 328, 104 N.W. 971, 975 (1905); and State v.
9
Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 207 (Minn. 2006)—to argue that the “home” is defined
broadly to include not only one’s living quarters, but also the property connected to and
surrounding it. But the cases cited by Devens are distinguishable because, among other
reasons, the defendants in those cases exercised a greater degree of exclusive possession
and control over the areas in question than Devens did here. It is not necessary for us to
resolve for all time the contours of what is “home” for us to conclude, under these facts,
that Devens had a duty to retreat from the hallway. 6
Based on this analysis, the district court did not err when it instructed the jury that,
before acting in self-defense, Devens had a duty to retreat, if reasonably possible, while
in a non-exclusive hallway of his apartment building.
Affirmed.
6
In so concluding, we also conclude that the court of appeals’ citation to Fourth
Amendment case law is of limited relevance to the question presented in this case.
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