State of Minnesota v. Moses Gum Benjamin ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1974
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Moses Gum Benjamin,
Appellant.
Filed December 22, 2014
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-12-6676
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica Surges Shacka,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Because appellant did not acknowledge on the record that the evidence is
sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable-doubt standard, to find him guilty, and
because the record does not reflect that the district court independently concluded that a
strong probability exists that appellant would be found guilty of the charge of second-
degree assault with a dangerous weapon, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand
for further proceedings.
FACTS
In response to a dispatched report of assault, police arrived at F.A.A.’s residence
where F.A.A. told them that appellant Moses Gum Benjamin entered her residence
without her consent, argued with her, and refused to leave without his children. Benjamin
did not reside with F.A.A. but is the father of her children. F.A.A. reported that Benjamin
picked up a large kitchen knife and stated, “I can finish this right now. I’m serious. I will
finish this right now.” F.A.A. also reported that Benjamin walked toward her until his
chest was touching her chest and his hand in which he held the knife was touching her.
When a ringing telephone distracted Benjamin, F.A.A. ran out of the house with the
children. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Benjamin with three counts of first-
degree burglary, one count of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, one count
of terroristic threats, and one count of domestic assault.
At a plea hearing, Benjamin waived his right to a trial and entered an Alford plea
to the charge of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in exchange for
dismissal of the other charges. Benjamin affirmed that he was entering his plea freely and
voluntarily, that he was given enough time to talk with his attorney, and that he
understood that his plea could result in immigration consequences. While maintaining his
innocence, Benjamin affirmed that he was accepting the state’s plea offer because it
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would result in a better outcome for him than was likely if the case was taken to trial. The
prosecutor questioned Benjamin about the factual basis for the Alford plea as follows:
THE PROSECUTOR: Mr. Benjamin, you understand that the
police reports include information that [F.A.A.] reported to
the police?
BENJAMIN: I understand. But there’s a lot of them are not
correct.
THE PROSECUTOR: That you disagree with that?
BENJAMIN: Yeah, right.
THE PROSECUTOR: But among the things she told the
police is that you did not have her consent to come over to the
house?
BENJAMIN: Right.
THE PROSECUTOR: And you understand that entering
without consent and committing the assault that you’re
alleged to have committed would constitute burglary in the
first degree?
BENJAMIN: Right.
THE PROSECUTOR: And if [F.A.A.] testified at trial
consistent with the report that she gave to the police, there’s a
substantial likelihood a jury would find you guilty of first
degree burglary?
BENJAMIN: Right.
THE PROSECUTOR: And you also—you mentioned a
couple times that she had also reported that there was a knife
involved?
BENJAMIN: There was no knife. That was made out, sir.
THE PROSECUTOR: You understand that’s what she
reported to the police?
BENJAMIN: Right.
THE PROSECUTOR: And that it would be enough evidence
that a jury could convict you of what you’re pleading guilty
to, which is a second degree assault?
BENJAMIN: Right.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court accepted Benjamin’s plea to second-degree assault and
dismissed the other charges. A few days after the plea hearing, the prosecutor submitted
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copies of the police reports to the district court, stating that they were being sent “to
support the factual basis for this plea.” Before sentencing, Benjamin moved to withdraw
his plea, claiming that he had changed his mind about pleading and expressing
dissatisfaction with his attorney’s representation. He professed his innocence and argued
that allowing his plea withdrawal would be fair and just. The district court denied the
motion and sentenced Benjamin. This appeal follows.
DECISION
On appeal, Benjamin challenges the accuracy of his Alford plea. He did not argue
this ground for withdrawal in district court when he moved for permission to withdraw
his plea. “A defendant is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and
contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate” to establish
the requirements of a valid plea. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). We
review the validity of a plea de novo. See Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn.
2012) (“Whether a plea is valid is a question of law which we review de novo.”).
A Proper Factual Basis
A valid plea is one that is accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Trott, 338
N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to
protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be
convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” Id. To be accurate, a plea must be
supported by a “proper factual basis,” and the district court has the responsibility to
ensure that a proper factual basis is established. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994). A proper factual basis exists when “sufficient facts on the record . . .
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support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he
desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation
omitted).
Here, Benjamin entered an Alford plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
37–38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167−68 (1970) (holding constitutional court’s acceptance of
defendant’s guilty plea, even though defendant maintained his innocence, where state
demonstrated strong factual basis for plea and defendant clearly expressed his desire to
enter plea based on overwhelming evidence against him); see also State v. Goulette, 258
N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (permitting the acceptance of Alford pleas “if the court,
on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered
in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a
jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
entered”).
“[C]areful scrutiny of the factual basis for the plea is necessary within the context
of an Alford plea because of the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while maintaining
innocence.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 648−49 (Minn. 2007). An Alford plea
“requires a strong factual basis.” Id. at 649 (emphasis added). “[T]he defendant’s
acknowledgment that the State’s evidence is sufficient to convict is critical to the court’s
ability to serve the protective purpose of the accuracy requirement.” Id. In Theis, the
supreme court enunciated a “best practice” for ensuring a defendant this protection:
The best practice . . . is to have the defendant specifically
acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the
evidence the State would likely offer against him is sufficient
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for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find the
defendant guilty of the offense to which he is pleading guilty,
as was done in both Goulette and Ecker.
The strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement
that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction
provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that
there is a strong probability that the defendant would be
found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty,
notwithstanding his claims of innocence. In such a
circumstance, the court can ensure that an Alford plea meets
the accuracy prong.
Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, Benjamin offered an Alford plea to second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon. See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012) (stating that a person is
guilty of second-degree assault if he or she “assaults another with a dangerous weapon”).
“Assault” is defined as “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm or death” or “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm
upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2012). “Dangerous weapon” is defined to
include a “device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used,
is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Id., subd. 6 (2012).
Although Benjamin agreed, when questioned by the prosecutor, that “if [F.A.A.]
testified at trial consistent with the report that she gave to the police, there’s a substantial
likelihood a jury would find [him] guilty of first degree burglary,” he did not offer an
Alford plea to first-degree burglary—he offered an Alford plea to second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon. No one asked Benjamin, and he never specifically
acknowledged on the record at the plea hearing, “that the evidence the State would likely
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offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find
[him] guilty of the offense to which he [wa]s pleading guilty.” See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at
649. During his plea colloquy, Benjamin merely agreed with the prosecutor that “it would
be enough evidence that a jury could convict [him] of what [he was] pleading guilty to,
which [was] a second degree assault.” (Emphasis added.) Cf. id. at 650 (concluding that
Alford plea was invalid when defendant “acknowledged that there was a mere ‘risk’ that
he would be found guilty of the crime to which he was pleading guilty” and did nothing
“to affirm that the evidence supporting the[] allegations would lead a jury to find him
guilty”). We conclude that the facts contained in Benjamin’s plea colloquy are
insufficient to establish a strong factual basis for the Alford plea to second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon and that Benjamin’s plea is invalid because the facts are
insufficient to fulfill the accuracy requirement. See id. at 649 (“An Alford plea is not
supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim
of innocence; precedent therefore requires a strong factual basis for an Alford plea.”).
The state contends that a proper factual basis is established through the complaint
and the police reports. A court may consider the facts alleged in a criminal complaint in
determining whether a plea contains an adequate factual basis. See Trott, 338 N.W.2d at
252 (stating that record contained a copy of the complaint and “defendant, by his plea of
guilty, in effect judicially admitted the allegations contained in the complaint”). But, in
Trott, in concluding that a sufficient factual basis supported Trott’s plea, the supreme
court stated that “[t]he record also contains pictures of the victim’s injuries taken at the
hospital following the beating. Moreover, the trial judge carefully interrogated the
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defendant about the acts, and the defendant freely admitted that he had beaten the boy for
up to 10 minutes.” Id. In this case, the record contains no indication that Benjamin agreed
that the district court could rely on the probable-cause section of the complaint to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for Benjamin’s plea or that the court in fact
relied on the complaint. And the prosecutor did not submit the police reports to the
district court until a few days after the plea hearing.
A factual basis must be established before a court accepts a plea. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(8); Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 1979).
Because the record does not reflect an agreement of the parties that the district court
could rely on the complaint or the police reports, none of which was introduced or
offered to the court at the plea hearing, we will not consider them now to supplement the
facts contained in the record of the plea hearing.
Independent Analysis of Factual Basis by District Court
To ensure that an Alford plea meets the accuracy requirement of a valid plea, the
district court must analyze the factual basis offered for the plea and reasonably and
“independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be
found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of
innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647, 649 (citing Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 758, 760). In
this case, the record does not reflect that the district court conducted an independent
analysis of the factual basis or concluded that, based on the factual basis offered, a strong
probability exists that Benjamin would be found guilty of the charge of second-degree
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assault with a dangerous weapon, notwithstanding his claims of innocence. The district
court merely stated that it accepted Benjamin’s plea.
Because the factual basis established at the plea hearing is insufficient to support
Benjamin’s Alford plea to second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, and because
the record does not reflect that the district court conducted an independent analysis of the
factual basis or concluded that, based on the factual basis offered, a strong probability
exists that Benjamin would be found guilty of the charge of second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, we conclude that Benjamin’s plea is not accurate and therefore is
invalid.
Reversed and remanded.
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