Charles Kinney v. Roger Boren ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 28 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHARLES G. KINNEY,                              No. 16-17255
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06505-VC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ROGER W. BOREN; DAVID LANE,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 18, 2017**
    Before:      WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing sua sponte his action arising from a state appellate court order requiring
    Kinney to post a security bond. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral
    argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
    review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 
    341 F.3d 1148
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Kinney’s action as barred by the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Kinney’s claims amount to a forbidden “de
    facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with
    that judgment. See 
    id. at 1163-65
    (discussing proper application of the Rooker-
    Feldman doctrine).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney’s motion
    for a temporary restraining order. See id.; Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
    
    351 F.3d 1291
    , 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint
    without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. Cervantes v.
    Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
    standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
    when amendment would be futile).
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                    16-17255