In the Interest of J.M. and E.K., Minor Children ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1908
Filed February 16, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF J.M. and E.K.,
Minor Children,
L.K., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, Linnea M.N.
Nicol, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Sandra Benzschawel of Meyer, Lorentzen & Nelson, Decorah, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Whitney L. Gessner of Gessner Law Office, Postville, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor children.
Considered by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her young
children, E.K., born in 2017, and J.M., born in 2020. She challenges the statutory
grounds supporting termination.1 We affirm.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518,
522 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there
is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Evidence
is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re T.S., 868
N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).
We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of a
parent’s rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We consider:
(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether
termination is in the children’s best interests, and (3) whether we should exercise
any of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. “However, if a
parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not address it.” In re
J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).
1 The mother also argues the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) did not
make reasonable efforts toward reunification. We do not address this issue
because she did not raise her concerns to the juvenile court before the termination
hearing. In re E.H., No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30,
2021) (requiring reasonable-efforts challenges be raised before the court prior to
termination hearings).
She also argues that, because DHS purportedly did not make reasonable
efforts toward reunification, we should permit her another six months to achieve
reunification. Because we consider her reasonable-efforts challenge waived, we
need not address her proposed remedy.
3
Here, the mother claims the State failed to satisfy the statutory grounds
authorizing termination. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights
to both children pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2021). It authorizes
termination of parental rights when:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
in section 232.102 at the present time.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The mother only challenges the fourth element. It is
satisfied when the State establishes the children cannot be safely returned to the
parent at the time of the termination hearing. In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL
1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).
We agree with the juvenile court that E.K. and J.M. could not have been
safely returned to their mother. Although the mother has made some progress,
she has not reached the level of stability necessary to safely care for her two young
children.
For one thing, the mother’s relationship with J.M.’s father has been
unsteady at best and dangerous at worst. In the past, E.K. felt it necessary to
intervene when the mother and J.M.’s father argued—placing E.K. in a vulnerable
situation. This seems to be part of a larger pattern in which the mother’s
relationship with J.M.’s father takes priority over the needs of her children.
4
Additionally, the mother’s housing has been unstable. At the time of the
termination hearing, the mother had not secured permanent housing for herself.
She had not yet obtained a crib for J.M. either. During visits, the mother has
sometimes been unable to provide basic necessities for the children. And the
mother has not progressed beyond supervised visitation.
All of these issues seem tied to the mother’s serious mental-health needs.
She has a history of diagnoses for bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and
multiple personality disorder. She has reported seeing “spirits” and has sometimes
presented herself as an alternate personality. The mother now receives weekly
treatment for anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Much of her
treatment has focused on “crisis management,” or learning to cope with the day-
to-day struggles the mother experiences any given week. Care providers have
recommended the mother participate in additional treatment, but she has been
unable to begin because of the high level of instability in her life. Although the
mother attempted in-patient substance-abuse treatment, she decided the program
“wasn’t for her.”
Considering all this, we believe the State showed by clear and convincing
evidence that J.M. and E.K. could not have been returned to their mother. Grounds
for termination were satisfied. And the mother does not challenge the juvenile
court’s best-interests determination. Nor does she argue that an exception to
termination should be applied. So we do not consider those steps in our analysis.
We affirm the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.