Kelvin Michael v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 20 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KEVLIN VICTOR MICHAEL,                          No.    21-70103
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A208-615-661
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 16, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LEE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.
    Kelvin Victor Michael (“Michael”), a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions
    for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order dismissing his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying his application for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition for
    review.
    We review questions of law de novo, Retuta v. Holder, 
    591 F.3d 1181
    , 1184
    (9th Cir. 2010), and review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility
    determinations, for substantial evidence, Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 
    977 F.3d 924
    , 925
    (9th Cir. 2020). Under the substantial evidence standard, we must uphold the
    agency’s determination unless any reasonable trier of fact “‘would be compelled to
    conclude to the contrary’ based on the evidence in the record.” Bringas-Rodriguez v.
    Sessions, 
    850 F.3d 1051
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Zhi v. Holder, 
    751 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2014)). In assessing an adverse credibility finding, this
    court must look to the “totality of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors.” Alam
    v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1133
    , 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration in original)
    (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii)).
    1.     The agency’s adverse credibility finding relied on three factors: (1)
    Michael’s delay in submitting his fear of discrimination based on his sexual
    orientation; (2) Michael’s internal inconsistency in his testimony and inconsistency
    between previous interviews; and (3) Michael’s responsiveness and candor. It also
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    noted that his corroborating evidence did not rehabilitate his application. Under the
    totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
    credibility determination. Iman v. Barr, 
    972 F.3d 1058
    , 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2020).
    The agency did not err in relying on Michael’s delay in submitting his fear of
    discrimination based on his sexual orientation. Li v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 959
    , 963 (9th
    Cir. 2004) (holding that discrepancy between petitioner’s initial statements—that he
    came to United States for financial reasons and was not mistreated by foreign
    government—and later testimony asserting fear of persecution provided a valid basis
    for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination). Nor did the agency err in rejecting
    Michael’s explanation for his failure to disclose his fear of discrimination based on
    his sexual orientation.1 The agency reasonably rejected his explanation because it was
    rehearsed and rote. See Ling Huang v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2014);
    Zamanov v. Holder, 
    649 F.3d 969
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he record does not compel
    the finding that the [agency’s] unwillingness to believe this explanation, in light of the
    importance of the omitted incidents to his asylum claim, was erroneous.”).
    1
    Mousa v. Mukasey, 
    530 F.3d 1025
     (9th Cir. 2008), is inapposite. There,
    the petitioner had a compelling explanation for her failure to disclose her fear of
    persecution. See 
    id. at 1028-29
    . Moreover, while Michael omitted any reference to
    his sexual-orientation claim in his asylum application, Mousa did mention a general
    fear of sexual violence in her asylum application. 
    Id. at 1028
    .
    -3-
    The agency also did not err in relying on Michael’s multiple, material
    inconsistent statements. See Zamanov, 
    649 F.3d at 973
     (“[I]nconsistencies regarding
    events that form the basis of the asylum claim are sufficient to support an adverse
    credibility determination.”); see also Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1091
    ,
    1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[D]espite [petitioner’s] testimony in October 2017
    that this threat occurred in February 2016, the report he provided from the prosecutor
    twice stated, on different pages, that the threats occurred in January 2016, and the IJ
    found that [petitioner] did not have a convincing explanation for the discrepancy.”);
    Li, 
    378 F.3d at 962
    .
    Nor did the agency err in relying on Michael’s demeanor to find him not
    credible. Singh-Kaur v. INS, 
    183 F.3d 1147
    , 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that this
    court gives “special deference” to a credibility determination that is based on
    demeanor); Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This instance
    of blatant and unexplained unresponsiveness supports the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination.”).
    Finally, the agency did not err in concluding that Michael’s corroborating
    evidence did not rehabilitate his application. See Garcia v. Holder, 
    749 F.3d 785
    , 791
    (9th Cir. 2014) (“These documents do not reveal any independent knowledge of
    [petitioner’s] alleged abuse.”).
    -4-
    Absent credible supporting testimony, substantial evidence supports the
    agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
    2.     Michael has waived his challenge to the denial of his CAT relief by not
    addressing it “specifically and distinctly” in his opening brief. Christian Legal Soc’y
    Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 
    626 F.3d 483
    , 487 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller v.
    Fairchild Indust., Inc., 
    797 F.3d 727
    , 738 (9th Cir. 1986)). Even if he did not waive
    this challenge, the record does not compel the conclusion that Michael will personally
    face torture if he returns to Nigeria, i.e., it does not show a particularized risk of
    torture. Lalayan v. Garland, 
    4 F.4th 822
    , 840 (9th Cir. 2021).
    PETITION DENIED.
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