Moreno (Daniel) v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                   aggregate percentage of different minority groups in the community, he
    failed to allege that a distinct group had been underrepresented. As he
    did not allege sufficient facts to warrant further inquiry, the district court
    did not err in denying Moreno's claim without conducting an evidentiary
    hearing.
    Second, Moreno argues that the district court erred in denying
    his motion to suppress his statements to police as he invoked his right to
    remain silent and his right to counsel. We disagree. The record does not
    indicate that Moreno invoked his right to counsel or to remain silent
    regarding the instant charges. Moreno was given Miranda' warnings
    prior to questioning. He inquired about his representation by counsel as it
    related to the other charges for which he was represented, but this mere
    inquiry did not amount to an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel
    on the instant charges.    See •Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
    560 U.S. 370
    , 381
    (2010) (providing that an accused must invoke his right to remain silent
    unambiguously); Kaczmarek v. State, 
    120 Nev. 314
    , 329, 
    91 P.3d 16
    , 27
    (2004) (requiring unambiguous invocation of right to counsel). Moreno
    continued with the interview and did not ask for counsel or express a
    desire not to answer questions at any time thereafter.      See Berghuis, 
    560 U.S. at 384
     ("Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was
    given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced
    statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.");
    Mendoza v. State, 
    122 Nev. 267
    , 276, 
    130 P.3d 176
    , 182 (2006) (stating
    that written or oral statement of waiver of right to remain silent
    unnecessary but waiver of right may be inferred from actions and words of
    'Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
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    accused). Given this context, the district court did not err in denying the
    motion to suppress.
    Third, Moreno contends that the district court erred in
    permitting the State to shift the burden of proof to Moreno to provide an
    alibi during questioning by Detective Nelson. We conclude that the
    district court did not err in concluding that no prosecutorial misconduct
    occurred. The State's questioning did not suggest that Moreno had to
    produce an alibi or testify on his behalf. See Evans v. State, 
    117 Nev. 609
    ,
    631, 
    28 P.3d 498
    , 513 (2001) ("Generally, prosecutorial comment on the
    failure of the defense to present witnesses or evidence impermissibly shifts
    the burden of proof."). Instead, it sought to establish that Moreno had an
    opportunity to commit the charged crimes. Moreover, the jury was
    instructed that the State bore the burden of proving the facts supporting
    the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and that Moreno did not have to
    prove his innocence or call witnesses on his behalf. Therefore, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objection.
    Fourth, Moreno argues that the State introduced evidence
    that his DNA was found on a pistol that was found in an uncharged
    robbery in violation of a district court order denying the State's motion to
    admit evidence of other crimes. We discern no abuse of discretion.       See
    Mclellan v. State, 
    124 Nev. 263
    , 267, 
    182 P.3d 106
    , 109 (2008). Although
    the district court denied the State's motion to admit evidence of the
    uncharged robbery during which the pistol was dropped, the district court
    ruled that evidence that Moreno's DNA was found on the pistol was
    admissible. The fact that Moreno possessed a pistol less than two weeks
    after the charged armed robberies is relevant to whether he committed the
    armed robberies. See NRS 48.015 (relevant evidence tends "to make the
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    existence of any fact that is of consequenceS to the determination of the
    action more or less probable").
    Having considered Moreno's contentions and concluding that
    they lack merit, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Gibbons
    J.
    cc: Hon. Valerie Adair, District Judge
    Clark County Public Defender
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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