State of Minnesota v. Nathaniel Donald Beulah ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1899
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Nathaniel Donald Beulah,
Appellant.
Filed August 1, 2016
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-39779
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Daniel Guerrero, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Hennepin County jury found Nathaniel Donnie Beulah1 guilty of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct based on evidence that he sexually abused a stepgranddaughter.
Beulah argues that the district court erred by admitting Spreigl evidence at trial and by
denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure at sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
Between 1999 and 2003, Beulah and C.T. lived together in a home in Minneapolis.
Several of Beulah’s children, C.T.’s children, and their joint children lived in the home
during that period of time. Other relatives and friends were frequent visitors and overnight
guests.
In 2013, Beulah was accused of sexually abusing two girls who lived in his home
years earlier. One of those girls is J.T., who was a stepdaughter of a son of C.T. J.T.
moved into Beulah’s home with her mother, stepfather, and younger brother in 1999, when
she was five years old. J.T. and her three family members moved out in 2000 into a home
that was a short distance away. Beulah and C.T. continued to care for J.T. before and after
school, on some weekends, and during the summertime, until J.T. was nine or ten years
old. J.T. viewed Beulah as a grandfather and often stayed overnight in Beulah’s home.
The record indicates that appellant’s middle name actually is Donnie, even though
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the caption of the complaint says Donald. Before trial, the state moved to amend the
complaint to identify Beulah as Nathaniel Donnie Beulah, and the district court granted the
motion. But the district court continued to use the original caption in its subsequent orders,
and this court’s caption follows the district court caption.
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J.T. testified at trial that Beulah began sexually abusing her in 2000 when she was
approximately five years old. The first incident of sexual abuse that she remembers
occurred when she stayed at Beulah’s home for an overnight visit while her mother was
away. She was lying on a mattress on the main level of the home when Beulah entered the
room, sat next to her, and touched her vagina with his hand. The last incident of sexual
abuse that J.T. remembers occurred in approximately 2003, when she was eight or nine
years old. Beulah brought J.T. downstairs to his basement bathroom, which was connected
to his bedroom. Beulah removed her clothes and rubbed his penis on her vagina. J.T.
believes that Beulah tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was interrupted by a knock
on the bedroom door. Beulah sexually abused J.T. frequently in between the first and last
incidents by touching her chest and vagina, both over and under her clothes. Although
Beulah’s basement bedroom generally was off limits to all others, Beulah often lured J.T.
to the basement by offering her money, candy, or a treat. The abuse often occurred when
Beulah was the only adult at home. If other persons were present in the home, they were
upstairs on the main level or the upper level. J.T. did not tell anyone about the abuse
because she was afraid that Beulah would hurt her or her family.
Beulah also was accused of sexually abusing J.B., who is C.T.’s daughter. J.B.
moved into Beulah’s home as an infant and lived there throughout her childhood. During
the period when she was sexually abused, J.B. lived with her mother, Beulah, four siblings,
and several other persons. J.B. moved out in 2003 or 2004, when she was 18 or 19 years
old, after she told Beulah that she would move out of the home if he did not move out.
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J.B. testified at trial that, at the time Beulah sexually abused her, she believed that
he was her biological father. When J.B. was 13, Beulah told her that he wanted to teach
her about sex. Beulah typically sexually abused her in the afternoon, when her mother was
at work. The abuse often occurred while she and Beulah were watching television in
Beulah’s bedroom. Beulah often would remove her clothing and touch her vagina with his
hands. The abuse intensified until Beulah touched her vagina with his penis. The sexual
abuse ended when J.B. refused to go into Beulah’s bedroom with him. J.B. told no one
about the abuse because Beulah “asked [her] not to.” J.B. also testified that she once
entered Beulah’s bedroom and saw Beulah on top of J.T.
In April 2013, an event triggered J.T.’s memory of her sexual abuse. After
discussing the issue with her mother, J.T. reported the abuse to the police. Shortly
thereafter, J.T.’s mother spoke with J.B. about J.T.’s report. As a result of that
conversation, J.B. reported to the police that Beulah also had sexually abused her on
multiple occasions in 1998 and 1999, when she was approximately 13 and 14 years old.
In December 2013, the state charged Beulah in a single complaint with criminal
conduct toward both J.T. and J.B. The complaint alleged three offenses: (1) first-degree
criminal sexual conduct toward J.B., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(1998); (2) first-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.T., in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2002); and (3) second-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.B.,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(b) (1998).
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In July 2014, Beulah moved to sever counts 1 and 3 from count 2. The district court
granted the motion. This appeal is concerned solely with subsequent proceedings on count
2, which alleged criminal sexual conduct toward J.T.
Before trial, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence of Beulah’s alleged sexual
abuse of J.B. to show Beulah’s intent, absence of mistake, and common scheme or plan
with respect to J.T. Beulah opposed the state’s motion. At the outset of trial, the district
court granted the state’s motion, thereby allowing J.B. to testify that Beulah had sexually
abused her.
The case was tried to a jury on seven days in July 2015. The state called five
witnesses: J.T., J.B., J.T.’s mother, C.T., and a police sergeant. Beulah testified at trial and
denied sexually abusing either J.T. or J.B. Beulah also called six other witnesses: four of
his children, a former girlfriend of one of his children, and a crime-scene investigator. The
jury found Beulah guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.T.
Before sentencing, Beulah moved for a downward dispositional departure from the
presumptive guidelines sentencing range. The district court denied the motion and imposed
a presumptive sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Beulah appeals.
DECISION
I. Spreigl Evidence
Beulah argues that the district court erred by admitting J.B.’s testimony that Beulah
sexually abused her when she was a child.
Beulah’s argument is governed by a rule of evidence that states, in relevant part:
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Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not
be admitted unless . . . the other crime, wrong, or act and the
participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and
convincing evidence . . . .
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be admissible to prove a
common scheme or plan. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). Evidence
of other crimes or bad acts is known in Minnesota as “Spreigl evidence.” Id. (citing State
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965)). A district court must apply a five-
part test to determine whether Spreigl evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such
evidence is admissible if:
1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the evidence
consistent with the rules of criminal procedure; 2) the
prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be offered
to prove; 3) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation
in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing
evidence; 4) the evidence is relevant to the prosecutor’s case;
and 5) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (Minn. 2006). This
court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s admission of
Spreigl evidence. State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 345 (Minn. 2007).
In this case, there is no dispute that the state has satisfied the first, second, and third
requirements of the five-part test. Beulah challenges the admission of the state’s Spreigl
evidence under the fourth and fifth requirements.
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A. Relevance
Beulah contends that the district court erred by finding that the state’s Spreigl
evidence is relevant to the state’s case.
When offering its Spreigl evidence, the state asserted that the evidence is relevant
to prove Beulah’s intent, the absence of mistake, and a common scheme or plan. The
district court found the state’s Spreigl evidence relevant for the asserted purposes. The
district court specifically found the Spreigl evidence relevant due to similarities between
the abuse of J.B. and J.T. in terms of the ages of the victims, the lack of a nearby parent,
the escalation from “non-criminal” touching to genital touching, the time frame of the
abuse, Beulah’s means of coercing compliance, and Beulah’s efforts to keep the conduct
secret.
We begin by addressing the relevance of the state’s Spreigl evidence to the common
scheme or plan exception. To be relevant under this exception, Spreigl evidence must have
a “marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 687-
88. “[I]f the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it
ordinarily should be excluded.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346 (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted). It is well established that, in prosecutions for sexual abuse, Spreigl
evidence may be admitted under the common scheme or plan exception to establish that a
sexual act occurred. Id.; State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Minn. 1993).
In particular, if a defendant contends that a charge of criminal sexual conduct is a
fabrication, Spreigl evidence is admissible to rebut that contention so long as the evidence
is “sufficiently relevant to the charged crime.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346.
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Our comparison of the testimony of J.T. and the testimony of J.B. reveals that the
two witnesses described sexual abuse that was very similar. Each girl was a family member
or relative of Beulah. Each girl was abused in Beulah’s home when he typically was the
only adult present or when other persons were in other areas of the home. Each girl was
abused in Beulah’s basement bedroom, a room where others were specifically excluded.
Each girl’s abuse escalated to Beulah’s placing or rubbing his penis on the girl’s vagina.
Beulah used his familial authority over each girl to influence or threaten her into keeping
the abuse a secret. In these ways, the sexual abuse of J.T. and J.B. share marked similarities
in modus operandi. The facts of this case are comparable to Kennedy, in which the supreme
court affirmed the admission of Spreigl evidence in a sexual-assault case to show common
scheme or plan because the conduct in each situation was “nearly identical” and occurred
in the same bedroom. 585 N.W.2d at 391.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that J.B.’s
testimony is relevant to show that Beulah committed criminal sexual conduct against J.T.
and J.B. according to a common scheme or plan. Because we conclude that the Spreigl
evidence is relevant for that purpose, we need not consider whether the evidence is relevant
for the other reasons asserted by the state.
B. Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice
Beulah also contends that the district court erred by finding that the probative value
of the state’s Spreigl evidence substantially outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice.
Specifically, he contends that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence was low and that
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the state’s Spreigl evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it “invit[ed] the jury to punish
[him] for acts other than the offense charged.”
In determining whether the probative value of Spreigl evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact, we balance the relevance of the evidence and “the State’s need to
strengthen weak or inadequate proof” against the risk that the evidence will be used as
propensity evidence. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009). In this case,
the probative value was relatively high. As discussed above, the state’s Spreigl evidence
tended to show that Beulah committed criminal sexual conduct against both J.T. and J.B.
according to a common scheme or plan. See supra part I.A. Beulah suggests that the state
did not need to corroborate J.T.’s testimony with J.B.’s testimony because J.T.’s testimony
alone was sufficient to prove the state’s case. But Beulah acknowledges that there was no
physical evidence of the alleged sexual abuse and that J.T. reported it years afterward. In
addition, Beulah denied having any sexual contact with J.T., thereby implying that J.T.
fabricated the accusation. For these reasons, the state’s Spreigl evidence had significant
probative value in light of the state’s need to prove its case. See Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346;
Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 391-92; Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 242; State v. Rucker,
752 N.W.2d 538, 550-51 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
Beulah relies on Ness, in which the supreme court concluded that the state’s Spreigl
evidence that the defendant had sexually abused a child in the past was unfairly prejudicial.
Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 689-91. But in Ness, the state’s case was particularly strong, in part
because the state had a credible eyewitness to the alleged abuse. Id. at 690-91. This case
is distinguishable from Ness because the state had no such evidence. Rather, the
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circumstances indicate that the state’s need for J.B.’s testimony was not insubstantial.
Furthermore, the possibility of unfair prejudice was lessened because the district court gave
the jury two cautionary instructions about the permissible uses of the Spreigl evidence,
immediately before the state presented the Spreigl evidence and again before the jury began
deliberating. See State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009) (stating that courts
“presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction”); Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 392
(reasoning that cautionary instructions concerning Spreigl evidence lessened probability of
undue prejudice).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
probative value of J.B.’s testimony evidence substantially outweighs the potential for
unfair prejudice. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting the state’s motion to
admit its Spreigl evidence.
II. Downward Dispositional Departure
Beulah also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
downward dispositional departure.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide for a presumptive sentence for a
felony offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.C (2003). The presumptive sentence is
“presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense
severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines app. (2003). Accordingly, a district court
“shall utilize the presumptive sentence . . . unless the individual case involves substantial
and compelling circumstances.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. (2003); see also State v.
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). If the district court departs from the presumptive
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guidelines range, the district court is required to state the reason or reasons for the
departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. But if the district court does not depart, the district
court is not required to state reasons for imposing a guidelines sentence. State v. Johnson,
831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State v.
Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
A district court may grant a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive
guidelines range if a defendant has a “particular amenability to individualized treatment in
a probationary setting.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). In considering
whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation so as to justify a downward
dispositional departure, a district court may consider, among other things, “the defendant’s
age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the
support of friends and/or family.” Id. If the defendant requests a downward dispositional
departure, the district court must “deliberately consider[]” the factors that are urged by a
defendant in support of the motion. State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. App.
2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). This court applies a very deferential standard
of review to a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure. See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). This court will reverse
such a decision only if the district court abused its discretion. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d
251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011).
In this case, Beulah argued that a downward dispositional departure is appropriate
because he has been law abiding since offending, was cooperative with the district court,
has the support of family and friends, and has no conditional-release violations. Beulah
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also argued that incarceration would not be suitable for him because he was 65 years old,
in poor health, and suffering from cognitive deficits. The state opposed Beulah’s motion
and urged the district court to impose an executed sentence of 48 months of imprisonment,
which was the presumptive guidelines sentence at the time of the offense. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines IV & V (2003). The state argued that Beulah is not amenable to probation
because he has not accepted responsibility for the crime or apologized to J.T. and, thus, is
unlikely to be rehabilitated in a probationary program.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had
reviewed everything that had been submitted, which included a pre-sentence investigation
report, a psychosexual-evaluation report, Beulah’s memorandum of law, and numerous
letters from relatives. During the sentencing hearing, the district court received victim-
impact statements from J.T., J.T.’s mother, and J.B. The district court received an oral
statement from C.T. in support of Beulah and allowed Beulah to make a personal statement.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it was
“deeply impressed by both the testimony of [J.T.] and [J.B.]” and that “[i]t was clear . . .
that the impact of that offense is deep and long-lasting.” Addressing Beulah directly, the
district court stated: “Despite all of the good that you have done in your life, I cannot find
substantial and compelling reasons to depart. To do so would undervalue the criminality
of the offense of which you have been convicted.” These and other aspects of the record
indicate that the district court “deliberately considered” the relevant factors and exercised
its discretion when it denied Beulah’s motion. See Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d at 483. No more
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was required of the district court. See Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925; Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d
at 80.
Beulah contends that the district court erred because it ignored the opinions stated
in a psychosexual-evaluation report. In that report, a psychologist recommended that
Beulah participate in outpatient sex offender treatment. Beulah’s contention is inconsistent
with the caselaw, which recognizes that a district court is not obligated to depart merely
because a mitigating factor is present. See Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668; Kindem, 313
N.W.2d at 7-8; Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253-54. This court recently reiterated that “the
presence of factors supporting departure does not require departure.” State v. Abrahamson,
758 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). This case
is similar to Abrahamson, in which the district court denied a motion for a downward
dispositional departure despite a doctor’s opinion that the defendant, who was convicted
of criminal sexual conduct against a child, had a low risk of reoffending. Id. at 335-36.
The district court acknowledged that there was “some hope” for treatment of the defendant
and that his lack of a criminal history supported a dispositional departure. Id. at 336.
Nonetheless, the district court emphasized the serious nature of the defendant’s crime and
the need for punishment by way of incarceration. Id. This court affirmed the denial of the
motion for a downward dispositional departure. Id. at 337. Likewise, in this case, despite
the presence of factors that might support a downward dispositional departure, the district
court deliberately considered Beulah’s arguments and exercised its discretion by
concluding that a downward dispositional departure is inappropriate. The only question
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for this court is whether the district court abused its discretion, and we conclude that it did
not do so.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Beulah’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure.
Affirmed.
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