In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Rachel B. Sabin. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0711
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Rachel B. Sabin.
Filed September 12, 2016
Affirmed in part and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge
LeSueur County District Court
File No. 40-PR-16-139
Jennifer L. Thon, Ryan B. Magnus, Jones and Magnus, Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Brent Christian, LeSueur County Attorney, Catherine A. Weniger, Megan E. Gaudette
Coryell, Assistant County Attorneys, LeCenter, Minnesota (for respondent county)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order continuing her civil commitment as
a mentally ill person. She argues that (1) the district court erred by finding that the
petition at issue here is a petition for continued commitment rather than initial
commitment, (2) the district court’s order does not contain findings required under the
statute to order a continued commitment, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support
the district court’s conclusion that she meets the statutory criteria for continued
commitment. Because the district court’s finding that this is a petition for continued
commitment rather than an initial commitment is not clearly erroneous, we affirm in part.
But because the district court did not make the specific findings required under the
statute, we remand for further findings.
FACTS
On February 26, 2014, the district court issued an order finding appellant Rachel
B. Sabin to be mentally ill under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Minn.
Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 (2014),1 and committing her to the commissioner of human services
for 180 days. On August 29, 2014, the district court issued an order finding that Sabin
continues to be mentally ill and continuing her commitment for 180 days. On February
27, 2015, the district court issued an order finding that Sabin continues to be mentally ill
and continuing her commitment for 12 months. Nothing in the record indicates that
Sabin appealed the district court’s order initially committing her or the two subsequent
orders continuing her commitment.
On February 12, 2016, Le Sueur County Department of Human Services (the
county) petitioned the district court to continue Sabin’s commitment. The district court
held a hearing to determine the need for Sabin’s continued commitment. The district
court heard testimony from Linda Marshall, Ph.D., LP, the court-appointed examiner;
1
We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 because it has not been
amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as
it exists at the time they rule on a case” unless doing so would affect vested rights or
result in a manifest injustice).
2
Penny Zwecker, Ph.D., whom Sabin requested as a second examiner; MaLinda
Henderson, a psychiatric nurse practitioner who provides psychiatric services to Sabin;
Sabin’s case manager from the county; and two employees from Haugbeck Homes, an
adult foster home where Sabin resides, who regularly interact with Sabin.
Dr. Marshall testified that Sabin meets the criteria to be diagnosed with
schizophrenia. Dr. Marshall stated that schizophrenia is a substantial psychiatric disorder
that affects thought, mood, perception, orientation, and memory. Dr. Marshall testified
that Sabin has engaged in conduct that constitutes an attempt to physically harm herself,
including taking Adderall that resulted in a hospital visit and taking another medication
that was not prescribed for her. Dr. Marshall testified that, as a result of this behavior,
Sabin poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to herself if she is not committed.
According to Dr. Marshall, there is an imminent danger of Sabin causing harm to herself
if she were released from commitment because Sabin may not follow through with taking
her medications as prescribed or may take medications that were not prescribed for her.
Dr. Zwecker diagnosed Sabin with paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Zwecker observed
that Sabin has “prominent paranoid thoughts,” including a delusion that her former boss
is harassing her in various ways. Like Dr. Marshall, Dr. Zwecker testified that without
continuing the commitment, Sabin poses a threat of harm to herself because of her taking
medications that are not prescribed for her. Dr. Zwecker, Dr. Marshall, and Henderson
all agreed that Sabin taking medications that are not prescribed for her could make her a
danger to herself and could exacerbate her symptoms.
3
The district court ordered that Sabin’s commitment continue for not more than six
months. The district court concluded that Sabin continues to be mentally ill, that
involuntary commitment is necessary for her protection or the protection of others, and
that there is no alternative to involuntary commitment. But the district court made no
factual findings regarding Sabin’s conduct that formed the basis for the continued
commitment. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Sabin argues that the district court erred by finding that the petition at issue here is
a petition for recommitment rather than a petition for initial commitment because of
“procedural irregularities” in her prior commitment proceedings. The district court found
that this is a petition for recommitment but did not explain its reasoning for that
determination. We will not reverse the district court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. 1995).
The standard of proof for an initial commitment is higher than the standard of
proof for a continued commitment. Compare Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (defining
“person who is mentally ill” as one who poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm
as demonstrated by “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others” or
“failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care”), with Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 4 (specifying that, in determining whether a person continues to be
mentally ill, the district court need not find “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm
self or others, or a recent failure to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or
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medical care” but instead “must find that the patient is likely to attempt to physically
harm self or others, or to fail to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care unless involuntary commitment is continued”).
Sabin contends that errors that occurred in the second extension of her
commitment render this case an initial commitment rather than a continued commitment.
First, she argues that a motion was filed requesting that her commitment continue for 12
months instead of a petition, which the statute requires. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd.
1 (stating that a “commitment may not be continued unless a new petition is filed”
(emphasis added)). Second, Sabin alleges that because she already spent six months
under the first extension of her commitment, the 12-month extension of her second
continued commitment resulted in an unlawful continued commitment of 18 months. See
id. (stating that a continued commitment may not exceed 12 months). Third, Sabin
argues that it is not clear from the order which legal standard the district court used in the
second recommitment and that the order does not contain the required findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
Sabin’s arguments constitute an impermissible collateral attack on her prior
commitment orders. This court has stated:
[P]ublic policy favors the finality of judgments and the ability
of parties to rely on court orders. Thus, Minnesota law does
not permit the collateral attack on a judgment valid on its
face. A judgment alleged to be merely erroneous, or founded
upon irregularities in the proceedings not going to the
jurisdiction of the court, is not subject to attack.
5
Nussbaumer v. Fetrow, 556 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn. App. 1996) (citations omitted),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997); see also Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 275 Minn.
365, 370, 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1966) (“Even though the decision of the [district] court
in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the
time for appeal has expired.”). Sabin concedes that the district court had both personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction over her previous commitments. She is merely alleging
“irregularities in the proceedings not going to the jurisdiction of the court,” and her prior
commitments are therefore “not subject to attack.” Nussbaumer, 556 N.W.2d at 599.
Because Sabin was subjected to prior commitments based on court orders that went
unchallenged, the district court’s finding that this is a petition for recommitment rather
than an initial commitment is not clearly erroneous.
II.
Sabin argues that the district court’s order does not contain the requisite specificity
in the findings of fact and conclusions of law. “In reviewing a commitment, we are
limited to an examination of whether the district court complied with the requirements of
the commitment act.” In re Civil Commitment of Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn.
App. 2003).
The district court cannot order a continued commitment of a mentally ill person
“unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person continues to
be mentally ill . . . ; (2) involuntary commitment is necessary for the protection of the
patient or others; and (3) there is no alternative to involuntary commitment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 4. “In determining whether a person continues to be mentally ill, . . .
6
the court need not find that there has been a recent attempt or threat to physically harm
self or others, or a recent failure to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care.” Id. “Instead, the court must find that the patient is likely to attempt to
physically harm self or others, or to fail to provide necessary personal food, clothing,
shelter, or medical care unless involuntary commitment is continued.” Id. When the
district court orders a continued commitment, the law mandates that “the findings of fact
and conclusions of law shall specifically state the conduct of the proposed patient which
is the basis for the final determination.” Id., subd. 7. The district court must also
consider less-restrictive alternatives to commitment and state its reasons for rejecting the
alternatives. Id.
Here, the district court did not make any specific findings about Sabin’s conduct
required by Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 7, that established the basis for its determination
that she requires continued commitment. The district court’s order instead simply recites
the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4, in conclusory fashion. This case is
similar to In re Stewart, 352 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. App. 1984). In that case, the district
court ordered continued commitment of Stewart after he was found to be schizophrenic.
Stewart, 352 N.W.2d at 812. This court concluded that, while the evidence supported the
district court’s decision, the district court failed to comply with Minn. Stat. § 253B.12,
subd. 7, by not specifying the conduct that supported its determination, stating that the
statutory criteria for commitment had been met, or discussing less-restrictive alternatives.
Id. at 812-13. We remanded the case for further findings. Id. at 813.
7
The county argues that the district court’s findings are adequate because the record
is sufficient to support them. The county cites In re Adams, where this court stated, “In
civil cases, where the record is reasonably clear and the facts not seriously disputed, the
judgment of the trial court can be upheld in the absence of trial court findings[.]” 352
N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. App. 1984) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). But the
Adams court clarified that it appears that the legislative intent behind Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 7, was for district courts to make specific findings in civil-commitment
cases. Id. The district court in Adams “found that Adams was not medically stabilized,
that he did not acknowledge the need to take medications on a regular basis or to bring
his behavior under control, and that there is no community based treatment program that
is willing to accept him at the present time.” Id. This court concluded that those findings
were sufficient for the district court to determine that the statutory criteria for continued
commitment had been met. Id. But we stated that “we encourage specific findings on
each of the statutory requisites for continued commitment and a clear recitation of the
evidence supporting the court’s conclusion. Careful attention should be paid to the
language of the statute.” Id. This case is distinguishable because, whereas the district
court in Adams made some, albeit scant, factual findings, the district court here made no
factual findings about Sabin’s conduct in support of its conclusion that she meets the
statutory requirements for continued commitment. Under these circumstances, where the
district court did not comply with the statute’s explicit requirement for specific findings,
we must remand for the district court to make findings about Sabin’s conduct that support
its conclusion that she requires continued commitment.
8
In addition to the lack of factual findings, Sabin notes several errors in the district
court’s order. For example, some of the district court’s stated reasons for rejecting less-
restrictive alternatives to commitment are clearly erroneous. The district court found that
Sabin’s “needs require inpatient hospitalization in a state facility” and that she has an
“inability to care for self outside of a hospital setting.” These findings are clearly
erroneous because Sabin has been residing in an adult foster home, not a hospital, and
neither Dr. Marshall nor Dr. Zwecker testified that Sabin currently requires inpatient
hospitalization. The district court also found that Sabin did not request an independent
examiner. This finding is clearly erroneous because the record plainly indicates that
Sabin requested Dr. Zwecker to be her second examiner. And the district court found by
a “preponderance of the evidence” that Sabin is likely to physically harm herself or
others, but the statute requires “clear and convincing evidence” when ordering a
continued commitment. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4. The district court can
remedy these errors on remand.
Sabin also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that she meets the
statutory criteria for continued commitment. But effective appellate review of this
argument is not possible until the district court makes findings about what evidence it
relied on in reaching its conclusions. Whether to reopen the record on remand is
discretionary with the district court.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
9