In re the Matter of: Jesse Eugene Schultz v. Christie Jo Ruff ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1762
In re the Matter of:
Jesse Eugene Schultz, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Christie Jo Ruff,
Appellant.
Filed August 10, 2015
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-13-1767
Zachary A. Kretchmer, Michael H. Fink, Arnold, Rodman & Kretchmer, PLLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Linda S. De Beer, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from an order determining that it is in the children’s best interests to
attend school in the school district of respondent-father’s residence, appellant-mother
argues that (1) the district court erred by applying the abuse-of-discretion standard when
reviewing the parenting consultant’s determination of the children’s best interests even
though the parties stipulated to that standard of review, and (2) the district court’s
decision does not properly address the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Christie Jo Ruff and respondent-father Jesse Eugene Schultz are
the parents of two minor children, A.S. born in 2009, and Z.S., born in 2010. Mother
also has an infant son with her fiancé. In November 2013, the parties stipulated to a
parenting plan that awarded the parties joint legal custody and mother sole physical
custody. The parenting plan states that the custody designations are “[s]olely for
enforcement of the final judgement and decree where this designation is required for that
enforcement and for no other purpose or legal effect under the laws of this state, any
other state, or another country.” See Minn. Stat. § 517.1705, subd. 4 (Minn. 2014)
(governing parenting-plan custody designations). Under the parenting plan, during every
14-day period, the children spent eight overnights with mother and six overnights with
father. The parenting plan did not designate a primary residence and instead provided
that the children’s residence would be shared between both parents’ homes.
The parenting plan states:
No later than the summer of 2014, the parties shall
engage the services of a parenting consultant to decide where
[the children] attend school. The parenting consultant shall be
appointed by separate order, with each party responsible for
one-half the cost. The parenting consultant shall have the
authority to modify the parties’ parenting time schedule in
whatever manner found to be in the children’s best interests.
The label of sole physical custody, given to Mother pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 518.1705 Subd. (4), shall not inhibit the
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parenting consultant from recommending the parenting
schedule she/he finds is in the children’s best interests.
Father lives in Otsego, Minnesota, in the same house where he has lived for over
11 years. In January 2014, mother moved from Burnsville, Minnesota to Willow River,
Minnesota, which is about 100 miles away from Otsego. Mother lives with her fiancé,
who is gone for two out of every three weeks for work.
The parties were unable to agree on whether the children will attend school in
Otsego or Willow River and, in March 2014, stipulated to the appointment of Jennifer E.
Joseph as parenting consultant. The parties stipulated to review of the parenting
consultant’s decision by the district court under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
The parties identified the following criteria to be considered in deciding where the
children will attend school: school in a location providing a safe environment; teacher
qualifications; diversified programming (art, music, sports); how the school district
handles problems if the problems are not appropriately handled at the individual school
level; school/district graduation rates; surroundings with active, intelligent children with
involved parents; school’s policy regarding peer relationships, for example, how they
handle bullying issues; and “[n]ext school availability in district.” The parenting
consultant made detailed findings on these factors. The parenting consultant found that
the diversified-programming factor favored Otsego because “Otsego offers a significantly
wider range of diversified programming, including art, and a broad range of specialized
programming for students requiring special services.” The parenting consultant found
that the data were insufficient to determine whether the district’s handling of problems at
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the district level favored either school. The parenting consultant found that the other
factors identified by the parties did not favor either school.
In addition to the factors identified by the parties, the parenting consultant
considered logistics. The parenting consultant found:
Willow River Elementary School is approximately 9.4
miles from [mother’s] residence, or approximately 15 minutes
by car. [Mother] reports she will drive the children to and
from school, rather than relying on bus[]ing. However, as
[A.S.] enters kindergarten, [mother] still has two other
children to care for: [Z.S.], and her newborn son . . . (born
05/24/2014). In addition, [mother’s] boyfriend . . . works in
the oil industry in North Dakota. His schedule requires him
to be in North Dakota to work a three week schedule, where
he is on for fourteen consecutive days, and off for seven.
This will require [mother] to manage three young children,
and to consistently get [A.S.] to school as a single parent two
out of every three weeks. Moreover, her home is in a remote
location, with several miles of unpaved roads between her
and Willow River. She reports she has trouble managing the
children’s behavior at times. She has not identified a
contingency plan for ensuring [A.S.] gets to school
consistently during times [her boyfriend] is working and she
is without support.
In contrast, [father’s] home is .5 miles from Otsego
Elementary School, or 1 minute by car. He indicates he
intends to transport the children to and from school when he
is available. When he is working, he indicates his girlfriend
is available for transportation, or, in the alternative, he has
several neighbors with children at Otsego Elementary School.
[Father] notes that [A.S.] can either carpool with the
neighbors to and from school, or wait with them before and
after school and ride the bus.
This factor favors Otsego.
The parenting consultant also made detailed findings on the statutory best-interests
factors.
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The parenting consultant decided that the children’s best interests would be served
by attending school in Otsego and designated the children’s primary residence as Otsego
for the purpose of school enrollment. The parenting consultant modified the parenting-
time schedule by granting father parenting time from 6:00 p.m. Sunday until 6:00 p.m.
Friday and the third weekend of every month and the fifth weekend in months with five
weekends and mother parenting time the first, second, and fourth weekends of every
month during the school year. The schedule is reversed during the summer months.
Mother moved the district court to vacate the parenting consultant’s decision, to
order her home the children’s primary residence during the 2014-2015 school year, to
order the Willow River school district the children’s school district for the 2014-2015
school year, and to appoint a guardian ad litem to determine father’s parenting time.
Father moved the court to deny mother’s motions and sustain the parenting consultant’s
decision. The district court found that the record was unclear why mother chose to move
to Willow River, that the main concern was the lack of a reason for mother to move so far
away, that mother continued to separate the children from father and tried to limit their
contact with him, and that the parenting consultant thoroughly analyzed the best-interests
factors and did not abuse her discretion. The district court adopted the parenting
consultant’s report, granted father’s motions, and denied mother’s motions.1
This appeal followed.
1
The order incorrectly states that it granted “respondent’s” motions and denied
“petitioner’s” motions. In the district court, mother was the respondent, and father was
the petitioner.
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DECISION
This court reviews a district court’s custody determinations for an abuse of
discretion. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 281-82 (Minn. 2008); see also
Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989) (“The law makes no
distinction between general determinations of custody and resolution of specific issues of
custodial care.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). “A district court abuses [its]
discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or improperly applying the
law.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App. 2010). We review factual
findings under a clearly-erroneous standard and defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
I.
The term “parenting consultant” is not used in the Minnesota statutes, but in
practice refers to “a creature of contract or of an agreement of the parties which is
generally incorporated into . . . a district court’s custody ruling.” Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. App. 2007). Stipulations in divorce
proceedings are favored by courts “as a means of simplifying and expediting litigation”
and “are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561
N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). But the interests of children are “nonbargainable” and
“less subject to restraint by stipulation.” Kaiser v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 180, 186
N.W.2d 678, 683 (1971) (stated in context of child-support requirements).
“Upon the request of both parents, a parenting plan must be created in lieu of an
order for child custody and parenting time unless the court makes detailed findings that
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the proposed plan is not in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.1705, subd.
3(a) (2014). “A parenting plan must include . . . a method of dispute resolution.” Id.,subd. 2(a)(3) (2014). In the parenting plan, the parties stipulated that disputes with
respect to school choice would be submitted to a parenting consultant for determination
and authorized the parenting consultant to modify the parenting-time schedule when
making that determination “in whatever manner found to be in the children’s best
interests.” When the parenting consultant was appointed, the parties stipulated to review
of her decision by the district court under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Mother argues that the stipulation to the standard of review should be held
unenforceable because it “could prevent the [district] court from guarding the children’s
best interests.” Parents who have joint legal custody have “equal rights and
responsibilities, including the right to participate in major decisions determining the
child’s upbringing, including education.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2014).
When joint legal custodians cannot agree on which school their child should attend, the
district court must resolve the dispute based on the child’s best interests. Novak, 446
N.W.2d at 424-25.
Although mother is correct that school attendance must be determined based on
the children’s best interests, she is incorrect that the stipulated standard of review does
not protect those interests. Consistent with Minnesota law, the parenting plan requires
that the parenting consultant determine school attendance based on the children’s best
interests. An improper application of the law is an abuse of discretion. Hagen, 783
N.W.2d at 215. Therefore, if the parenting consultant’s determination of school
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attendance was not in the children’s best interests, the decision would have been an abuse
of discretion, and the district court could not have adopted it.
II.
Mother argues that the district court’s decision does not properly address the
children’s best interests. She argues that the district court improperly considered the
quality of schools and the distances from the parents’ homes to the schools, which are not
statutory best-interests factors.2 But “‘[t]he best interests of the child’ means all relevant
factors to be considered and evaluated by the court,” including 13 specific factors
identified in the statute. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2014). The parties stipulated to
consideration of criteria related to school quality, and the only criterion found by the
district court to favor Otsego was the wider range of diversified programming offered,
which was relevant to the children’s best interests. The district court considered location
as related to the logistics of getting the children to school, which also was relevant to
their best interests.
Mother argues that the district court incorrectly found that mother’s infant son was
a factor weighing against her. The district court considered mother’s responsibilities to
Z.S. and the infant in addressing the logistics of getting A.S. to school. In analyzing the
children’s best interests, the district court found that both Z.S. and A.S. were very
interested in their younger sibling and respectful of his belongings and that A.S. was
2
Because the district court adopted the parenting consultant’s order, the parenting
consultant’s findings are referred to as the district court’s findings.
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interested in helping with feedings. These findings do not show that mother’s infant son
was a factor weighed against mother.
Mother also disputes the district court’s findings on several of the statutory best-
interests factors under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1. We address each factor briefly.
Primary caretaker
Based on her affidavit, mother argues that the district court erred in finding that
since August 2013, both parties have performed the tasks typically associated with the
primary-caretaker role. This court defers to the district court’s credibility determinations.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. Since August 2013, the children have spent almost equal
time with father and mother.
Intimacy of relationship between each parent and the children
Mother argues that she shares a stronger bond with the children. The district
court’s finding that “[b]oth parents appear to enjoy close and intimate relationships with
the children” was based on the parenting consultant’s observations during visits to both
parties’ homes.
Interaction and interrelationship of children with parents and others
Mother argues that the district court did not address the emotional bond between
the children and other individuals. The court found that the children sought comfort and
assistance from father’s girlfriend and mother’s fiancé and were responsive to limits set
by them. The court also addressed the relationship between the children and mother’s
infant son. Mother argues that the district court erred in failing to consider the children’s
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relationship with their maternal grandmother but cites no evidence that attending school
in Otsego will limit the grandmother’s role in the children’s lives.
Children’s adjustment to home, school, and community
Mother argues that the district court erred in not finding that the children are
integrated into the Willow River community. The district court’s consideration of this
factor was based on the length of time the children have been in the Willow River
community. Until January 2014, the children resided in the Otsego and Burnsville
communities.
Length of time child has lived in stable, satisfactory environment and desirability
of maintaining continuity
The district court found that father’s girlfriend is a relatively stable presence in the
children’s lives, that mother’s fiancé is a relatively inconsistent presence due to his work
schedule, and that the new baby contributed to the instability of mother’s home
environment. Mother’s fiancé’s work requires him to be gone two out of every three
weeks, leaving mother without help in caring for A.S., Z.S., and the infant.
Permanence, as a family unit, of existing or proposed custodial home
The district court found that both mother and father are in committed relationships
and intend to remain in their current homes for the foreseeable future.
Mental and physical health of all individuals involved
Mother argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing
instead of adopting the parenting consultant’s finding that there are issues regarding the
parties’ and the children’s mental health. The parenting consultant explained in detail her
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concerns regarding the parties’ and children’s mental health. Mother declined a custody
evaluation or focused assessment. Father was participating in counseling, but mother was
not.
Capacity and disposition of parties to give child love, affection, and guidance and
to continue educating and raising child in child’s culture and religion or creed if any
The district court found:
Both parents clearly love the children, and both
purport to want what is best for them. Both parents
demonstrate some measure of parental warmth, and were
affectionate with the children both during the home visits, and
during the MIM Assessment . . . . However, . . . there is
significant concern regarding overall parenting skills for both
parents. Both parents report troubling behaviors when the
children are in their care. Both parents are quick to blame the
other parent’s lack of skill for the children’s issues, but both
also demonstrate difficulty setting and enforcing appropriate
limits for the children. [Mother] and [father] each
demonstrate an egregious lack of insight regarding their own
parenting deficits.
Effect on child of actions of an abuser, if related to domestic abuse, as defined in
section 518B.01
Mother argues that she raised “grave concerns” regarding alleged verbal,
emotional, and physical abuse by father. The district court noted mother’s concerns but
found that the record was insufficient to show domestic abuse.
Disposition of each parent to encourage and permit frequent and continuing
contact by the other parent with the child
The district court noted concerns raised by both parties and found that “[b]oth
parents express a desire for the children to have a relationship with the other parent, and
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state they are willing to facilitate ongoing contact with the other parent” but that “their
actions tend to indicate otherwise.
Statutory requirements.
Finally, mother contends that the district court erred in not complying with the
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2014), as to modification of the original parenting
plan. The parties’ stipulated parenting plan provides for the determination of school
attendance based on the children’s best interests. That stipulation is enforceable under
Minn. Stat. § 518.1705, subd. 9 (2014), which allows parties to agree to application of the
best-interests standard instead of Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) when deciding a modification
motion.
The district court’s findings on the children’s best interests are supported by
evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous, and those findings support the
determination that attending school in Otsego is in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
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