State of Minnesota v. David Lee King ( 2015 )


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  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-0838
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    David Lee King,
    Appellant.
    Filed January 20, 2015
    Affirmed
    Reilly, Judge
    Sherburne County District Court
    File No. 71-CR-12-1703
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Samuel Wertheimer, II, Assistant
    County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
    Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Chutich,
    Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    REILLY, Judge
    In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, appellant seeks to withdraw
    his guilty plea to third-degree assault. Because we determine that appellant’s guilty plea
    was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, we affirm.
    FACTS
    On August 27, 2012, appellant David Lee King, an inmate at the Minnesota
    Correctional Facility at St. Cloud, committed an assault against fellow-inmate C.J.H.
    Appellant testified that C.J.H. “walked by and grabbed my buttocks as we were walking
    back to our unit, to our cells, and I took that offensive . . . so I beat him up.” Appellant
    admitted to throwing “numerous punches” and kicking C.J.H. during the assault. C.J.H.
    was treated for lacerations to his left eye and cheek.       The state thereafter charged
    appellant with one count of felony third-degree assault, substantial bodily harm, in
    violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2012).
    Appellant entered into a resolution with the prosecution to plead guilty to third-
    degree assault in exchange for a 15-month consecutive sentence, pursuant to the
    sentencing guidelines. The prosecutor informed the district court that because appellant
    committed assault while serving a prison term, his sentence would be a presumptive-
    consecutive sentence to his current sentence, which means he would not be entitled to
    credit for time served. The district court asked appellant if that was “what [he] want[ed]
    to do today,” and appellant agreed that it was. After being sworn in, appellant engaged in
    the following discussion with his counsel:
    2
    [Defense attorney]: Mr. King, we had the opportunity to go
    over this three-page document entitled Petition to Enter a Plea
    of Guilty in a Felony Case Pursuant to Rule 15. Did we go
    over this document line by line before court?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    [Defense attorney]: You understand that you’re pleading
    guilty to a third degree assault?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    ....
    [Defense attorney]: And you understand that it is a 15-month
    consecutive sentence, meaning 15 months will be added on to
    your sentence - -
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    [Defense attorney]: - - that you’re serving right now? Yes?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    Appellant stated that he understood his right to go to trial and waived that right to
    enter a guilty plea. The district court received the petition, finding that appellant made an
    “adequate, knowing, and voluntary waiver” of his trial rights. Appellant pleaded guilty to
    third-degree assault. Appellant admitted that C.J.H.’s injuries constituted substantial
    bodily harm and stated that he was not acting in self-defense when he punched and
    kicked his victim. The district court found appellant guilty of third-degree assault in
    accordance with the plea agreement and committed him to the custody of the
    commissioner of corrections “for a period of 15 months consecutive to the sentence
    which [he was] already serving.” This appeal followed.
    DECISION
    “A defendant who wishes to overturn a guilty plea may file a petition for
    postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 (2012), move to withdraw
    the plea under Rule 15.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, or seek
    withdrawal on a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.” State v. Miller, 849
    
    3 N.W.2d 94
    , 97 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2; State v.
    Anyanwu, 
    681 N.W.2d 411
    , 413 (Minn. App. 2004) (“[A] defendant has a right to
    challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal even though he has not moved to withdraw the
    guilty plea in the district court.”)). The validity of a plea presents a question of law that
    we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 
    778 N.W.2d 90
    , 94 (Minn. 2010). Appellant bears
    the burden of showing that his plea was invalid. 
    Id. A criminal
    defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea
    once entered. Perkins v. State, 
    559 N.W.2d 678
    , 685 (Minn. 1997). Rather, a defendant
    may withdraw a guilty plea after being sentenced only by establishing that it is necessary
    to correct a “manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice
    exists if a guilty plea is invalid. 
    Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94
    (citing State v. Theis, 
    742 N.W.2d 643
    , 646 (Minn. 2007)). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be
    accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” 
    Id. Appellant argues
    that his guilty plea is invalid
    and unconstitutional because it was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent.1 Appellant
    also seeks jail credit dating back to August 27, 2012, the date of the offense.
    Accurate
    “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from
    pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist
    on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 
    338 N.W.2d 248
    , 251 (Minn. 1983). An accurate
    plea must be grounded on a proper factual basis. 
    Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94
    . Although
    1
    The focus of appellant’s argument is that his plea was not intelligently made. We
    considered all three requirements and determined that the record supports a conclusion
    that appellant’s plea is valid.
    4
    appellant argued that his plea was not accurate, he did not identify any evidence to
    support his position. The record reflects that the district court developed an adequate
    factual basis for the plea by asking appellant, in his own words, to describe what
    happened.    See 
    id. (stating that
    district court “typically satisfies the factual basis
    requirement by asking the defendant to express in his own words what happened”). The
    accuracy requirement is satisfied.
    Voluntary
    To determine whether a plea is voluntary, we look to what the parties reasonably
    understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.       
    Id. at 96.
    The purpose of the
    voluntariness requirement is to ensure that a defendant is not pleading guilty because of
    “improper pressures.” 
    Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251
    . Although appellant argued that his plea
    was involuntary, he did not claim that he was subject to improper pressures or
    inducements. A review of the record confirms that the voluntariness requirement is
    satisfied.
    Intelligent
    The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant “understands the charges,
    understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and understands the
    consequences of his plea.”     
    Id. During the
    plea hearing, appellant agreed that he
    understood the charge against him, understood that he was waiving certain rights, and
    wanted to enter a plea of guilty. On appeal, appellant argues that his plea was not
    “knowingly made” because he did not understand that he was ineligible for jail credit.
    5
    The state charged appellant with felony third-degree assault. The statute provides
    that “[w]hoever assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm may be sentenced to
    imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than
    $10,000, or both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to
    this offense and provided an adequate factual basis to support the charge. During the plea
    hearing, appellant agreed that he went over the plea petition “line by line” with his
    attorney and understood that he was pleading guilty to third-degree assault. Appellant’s
    counsel asked appellant if he understood that he would serve a 15-month consecutive
    sentence, and specifically that “15 months will be added on to your sentence[.]”
    Appellant indicated that he understood. We conclude that the intelligence requirement is
    satisfied.
    Pursuant to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, for convictions committed
    while an offender is serving an executed prison sentence, it is presumptive to impose the
    sentence for the current offense consecutive to the sentence the offender was serving at
    the time the new offense was committed. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.1.a(1)(i) (2012).
    Moreover, Minnesota statute is clear that:
    If an inmate of a state correctional facility is convicted
    of violating [section 609.223] while confined in the facility,
    the sentence imposed for the assault shall be executed and run
    consecutively to any unexpired portion of the offender’s
    earlier sentence. The inmate is not entitled to credit against
    the sentence imposed for the assault for time served in
    confinement for the earlier sentence.
    Minn. Stat. § 609.2232 (2012).
    6
    Because we conclude that the district court properly imposed a consecutive
    sentence under a plain reading of the statute, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to
    relief on his direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.
    Affirmed.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A14-838

Filed Date: 1/20/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/20/2015