James Donald Dahl v. State of Minnesota ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1870
James Donald Dahl, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed August 15, 2016
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-07-14970
Howard Bass, Bass Law Firm, PLLC, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2010, a Stearns County jury found James Donald Dahl guilty of criminal sexual
conduct. In 2014, Dahl petitioned for postconviction relief on the ground that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The postconviction court denied relief after a
three-day evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2007, St. Cloud police officers responded to a report of a physical
altercation at Dahl’s home, which he shared with P.M. Officers learned that Dahl was
involved in a fight with R.O., P.M.’s adult son, who was living in the basement of the home
temporarily. During the investigation, police officers interviewed C.L., P.M.’s 14-year-
old daughter, who also was living in Dahl’s home. C.L. told police officers that Dahl, who
at that time was 56 years old, had raped her in August of that year and several other times
since August.
The state charged Dahl with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subds. 1(g), (h)(iii) (2006), one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(d), and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2006). Dahl retained an attorney to represent him. Before
trial, Dahl twice moved for an in camera review of C.L.’s medical, school, human-services,
and juvenile records. The district court granted the motions seeking in camera review but
later ruled that the records were inadmissible. Dahl also filed a motion in limine in which
he sought 28 rulings concerning evidence that was expected to be offered at trial. The
district court granted relief with respect to most of the requests sought in the motion.
The case was tried to a jury on three days in January 2010. At the beginning of trial,
Dahl’s trial counsel deferred his opening statement until the defense’s case. The state
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called five witnesses in its case-in-chief, including R.O. and C.L. R.O. testified that Dahl
had revealed that he was engaging in a sexual relationship with C.L. R.O. testified that he
responded by grabbing Dahl by the neck, pushing him against the wall, and using a knife
to threaten him. C.L. testified that Dahl sexually assaulted her in August 2007 and on more
than ten other occasions between August and November of 2007. Dahl’s trial counsel
cross-examined both R.O. and C.L. and attempted to impeach their credibility. Dahl’s trial
counsel gave an opening statement and then called four witnesses on behalf of Dahl,
including two of Dahl’s relatives and Dahl himself. In Dahl’s testimony, he denied
engaging in any sexual conduct with C.L. The jury found Dahl guilty on all counts.
In February 2010, Dahl requested a Schwartz hearing to investigate possible juror
misconduct. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 328, 104
N.W.2d 301, 303 (1960). The district court conducted a hearing at which it received
testimony and oral arguments but concluded that there was no juror misconduct. Dahl also
moved for a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and that
the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1).
The district court denied the motion for a new trial in its entirety.
In July 2010, the district court sentenced Dahl to 173 months of imprisonment on
count 3. An attorney in the office of the state public defender pursued a direct appeal on
Dahl’s behalf. This court affirmed, and the supreme court denied Dahl’s petition for further
review. See State v. Dahl, 2011 WL 4435325 (Minn. App. Sept. 26, 2011), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 21, 2011).
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In March 2014, Dahl petitioned for postconviction relief. His petition, which was
signed by another privately retained attorney, alleged that Dahl had received ineffective
assistance from both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel. At approximately the same
time, Dahl’s trial counsel was appointed to the Seventh Judicial District Court. Dahl
moved to disqualify all Seventh District judges. The chief judge of the Seventh District
granted the motion. A judge of another judicial district was assigned to the postconviction
action.
In January 2015, the postconviction court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing
on Dahl’s postconviction claims. Dahl called five witnesses: his trial counsel, his appellate
counsel, two expert criminal-defense attorneys, and one of his sisters. Dahl also testified
on his own behalf. The state called only one witness: Dahl’s trial counsel. The
postconviction court denied Dahl’s petition on the merits in a 52-page order. Dahl appeals.
DECISION
Dahl argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for
postconviction relief. On appeal, Dahl challenges the postconviction court’s ruling only
with respect to his representation at trial; he does not challenge the postconviction court’s
ruling with respect to his representation by an assistant state public defender on direct
appeal.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art.
I, § 6. The right to the assistance of counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). To
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prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner “must affirmatively
prove [1] that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’ and [2] ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Gates v.
State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104
S. Ct. at 2064, 2068). In general, “there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance
fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” Bruestle v. State, 719 N.W.2d 698, 705
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). “We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the
best strategy for the client.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013). Thus, an
attorney’s “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at
2066.
When reviewing a postconviction court’s denial of a postconviction petition
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, this court applies a clear-error standard of review
to the postconviction court’s factual findings, a de novo standard of review to the
postconviction court’s legal conclusions, and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
the postconviction court’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at
503; Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012); Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387,
390 (Minn. 2010).
Dahl argues that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance in six
different ways, which we will consider and discuss in the manner and order in which he
presents them in his brief.
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A. Alleged Failure to Investigate and Present Dahl’s Defense
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not investigating two potentially favorable witnesses and not developing
evidence that Dahl had erectile dysfunction.
“[Defense] counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. A postconviction
court must “assess the evidence that a proper investigation would have discovered and
determine whether that evidence likely would have changed the outcome of the trial.”
Gates, 398 N.W.2d at 562.
1. Favorable Witnesses
Dahl contends that L.B., who was his neighbor, and D.G., who is his sister, would
have been favorable witnesses at trial but that his trial counsel did not do an adequate
investigation on which to base a decision whether to call them as witnesses. Dahl contends
that L.B. and D.G. would have testified at trial that they observed Dahl and C.L. together
and that C.L. did not appear uncomfortable around Dahl.
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel was unaware of D.G.
because Dahl did not give him sufficient information about her. The postconviction court
found that Dahl’s trial counsel knew of L.B. but did not pursue the possibility of calling
him as a witness because he had a prior criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and was facing
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additional charges of the same type, which might have undermined his credibility. The
postconviction court also noted that Dahl’s trial counsel’s investigator may have actually
interviewed L.B. The postconviction court concluded that Dahl’s trial counsel did not fail
to make a reasonable investigation with respect to these two persons.
Dahl challenges the postconviction court’s finding that his trial counsel was
unaware of D.G. Dahl also relies on the opinion of his expert witness in contending that
the lack of further investigation into L.B. and D.G. was objectively unreasonable. This
court must defer to the postconviction court’s findings to the extent that they resolve
disputed questions of fact, especially if the factfinder resolves those factual issues based
on the credibility of witnesses. See Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Minn. 2013).
Without knowledge that Dahl’s sister might have possessed helpful information, Dahl’s
trial counsel could not have conducted an investigation into whether to call her as a witness.
Dahl’s trial counsel’s reasons for not pursuing the possibility of calling L.B. as a witness
are objectively reasonable. His decision to not call L.B. as a witness is a matter of trial
strategy, which courts will not second-guess so long as the strategy is reasonable. Ives v.
State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 2003). In any event, evidence that C.L. did not appear
uncomfortable around Dahl would have limited probative value. The postconviction
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous with respect to the investigation of L.B. and D.G.
as potential defense witnesses.
2. Erectile Dysfunction
Dahl contends that he suffered from erectile dysfunction at the time of his offense
and that he told his trial counsel about the issue but that trial counsel did not conduct an
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adequate investigation into the issue and did not present extrinsic evidence on the issue at
trial. Dahl contends that such evidence would have shown that he was incapable of
committing the crime of which he was convicted.
The postconviction court found that Dahl told his trial counsel that he had erectile
dysfunction, that trial counsel told Dahl to obtain the medical records that would
corroborate his claim, and that Dahl never obtained the medical records. The
postconviction court found that it was reasonable for trial counsel to ask Dahl to obtain the
records because Dahl had obtained other records. The postconviction court further found
that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably doubted the truth of Dahl’s claim and appropriately
refrained from further investigation out of concern that extrinsic evidence might undermine
Dahl’s trial testimony that he had erectile dysfunction. The postconviction court concluded
that Dahl’s trial counsel did not fail to make a reasonable investigation with respect to the
issue of erectile dysfunction and that the absence of such evidence likely did not affect the
verdict.
Dahl relies on the opinion of his expert witness in contending that the lack of an
investigation into erectile dysfunction was objectively unreasonable. Dahl has not
established that the postconviction court clearly erred by finding that trial counsel
reasonably relied on Dahl to obtain his own medical records and reasonably refrained from
attempting to develop evidence without medical records. The postconviction court noted
that Dahl did not present any new evidence at the postconviction hearing to prove that he
actually had erectile dysfunction or that medical records existed. The postconviction
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous with respect to the issue of erectile dysfunction.
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B. Alleged Failure to Subpoena and Call as Witness Victim’s Father
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not serving a subpoena on C.L.’s adoptive father, C.J.L., for purposes of
investigation and by not calling him as a defense witness at trial.
“Which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury are
questions that lie within the proper discretion of the trial counsel. Such trial tactics should
not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of
hindsight.” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986). “Generally, we will not
review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.” Sanchez-Diaz v.
State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008) (citing Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421
(Minn. 2004)).
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel’s investigator contacted
C.J.L. but that he refused to cooperate. The postconviction court also found that Dahl was
aware of C.J.L.’s refusal to cooperate. The postconviction court further found that trial
counsel reasonably did not pursue the investigation further because calling C.J.L. to the
stand was unlikely to be fruitful. The postconviction court also noted that “subpoenaing a
hostile and unwilling witness for the suggested purposes potentially implicates
considerations of abuse of process and violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”
The postconviction court noted that Dahl’s expert witness suggested at the postconviction
hearing that, given the circumstances, it was reasonable for Dahl’s trial counsel to not call
C.J.L. as a witness without knowing whether he would give favorable testimony.
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Dahl contends that his trial counsel unreasonably declined to subpoena C.J.L. and
that C.J.L. would have assisted the defense by testifying that C.L. is prone to lying and
stealing. Dahl’s contention fails to address the fact that C.J.L. refused to cooperate with
his trial counsel’s investigator, which caused trial counsel to believe that C.J.L. would not
have testified favorably to the defense. Dahl’s contention also fails to overcome the
postconviction court’s observation that subpoenaing a hostile witness solely for purposes
of investigation might be improper. Dahl’s contention further fails to acknowledge that his
own expert witness suggested that it was reasonable for his trial counsel to not call C.J.L.
as a witness without knowing whether he would give favorable testimony. A trial
attorney’s reasoned decision about whom to call as witnesses is the type of strategic
decision that cannot be second-guessed in postconviction proceedings. See Ives, 655
N.W.2d at 636. The postconviction court’s findings are not clearly erroneous with respect
to the issue of subpoenaing C.J.L. and calling him as a witness.
C. Alleged Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Accusers
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not effectively cross-examining C.L. and R.O.
“[M]atters of trial strategy, including which witnesses to call, what defenses to raise
at trial, and specifically how to proceed at trial, will not be reviewed later by an appellate
court as long as the trial strategy was reasonable.” Id. Trial strategy includes decisions
about whether and how to introduce impeachment evidence in cross-examination. See
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 736 (Minn. 2010) (considering argument that trial counsel
should have impeached witnesses with certain evidence).
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Dahl contends that his trial counsel should have cross-examined C.L. more
extensively by questioning her about her improper use of Dahl’s credit card, threats she
had made against Dahl, and her juvenile-delinquency record. The postconviction court
found that C.L. used Dahl’s credit card to purchase music but that the total amount was
relatively small (approximately $25) and that Dahl had made similar purchases for C.L.,
which the state might have characterized as “grooming.” The postconviction court found
that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably refrained from cross-examining C.L. about her music
purchases because she likely would have denied it and because the total value of the
purchases was insignificant. The postconviction court also found that Dahl had told his
trial counsel that C.L. had said to Dahl, “I can get you in big trouble, buddy-boy.” But the
postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably refrained from questioning
C.L. about the statement because it could be understood in a way that would further
incriminate Dahl. The postconviction court also found that C.L. had no record of juvenile
delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions and that the trial court likely would not
have admitted evidence that C.L. had driven her mother’s vehicle without permission.
After examining the record, we conclude that the postconviction court did not clearly err
in its findings of fact that Dahl’s trial counsel made reasonable strategy decisions when
cross-examining C.L. and that the more extensive cross-examination suggested by Dahl
likely would not have affected the verdict.
Dahl also contends that his trial counsel should have cross-examined R.O. more
extensively by questioning him about his plea agreement in a related case, the fact that he
was on probation, his involvement in a hit-and-run accident while on probation, and
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whether he was engaged in a sexual relationship with C.L. The postconviction court found
that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably did not cross-examine R.O. about his plea to second-
degree assault for fighting with Dahl because the prosecutor already had questioned R.O.
about the subject on direct examination, and the postconviction court found that further
cross-examination would not have affected the verdict. The postconviction court found
that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably did not cross-examine R.O. about being on probation
for DWI because it was relatively insignificant and would not have affected the verdict.
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably did not cross-examine
R.O. about the alleged hit-and-run for similar reasons. And the postconviction court found
that Dahl’s trial counsel reasonably did not cross-examine R.O. as to whether he and C.L.
had a sexual relationship because the prosecutor already had asked the question on
direction examination and R.O. had denied it and because Dahl’s trial counsel had planned
to address the issue only briefly during the state’s case and to introduce the counter-
accusation more extensively in Dahl’s testimony. The postconviction court found that all
of these decisions were reasonable decisions of trial strategy. After examining the record,
we conclude that the postconviction court did not clearly err in its finding of fact that Dahl’s
trial counsel made reasonable strategy decisions when cross-examining R.O.
D. Alleged Failure to Present Evidence Favorable to Dahl
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not presenting evidence that would have portrayed him in a positive or
sympathetic light, such as evidence that he was injured in an automobile accident in 2006
and that he paid some of C.L.’s living expenses.
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The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel elicited evidence about
Dahl’s occupation and family, a brief mention of Dahl’s automobile accident, and the fact
that Dahl paid the bills incurred by the persons living in his house. The postconviction
court also found that Dahl’s trial counsel did not fail to introduce favorable evidence of the
type that might “humanize” Dahl. The postconviction court noted that Dahl’s trial counsel
called J.D., one of Dahl’s sisters, to “describe [Dahl’s] personality and generous nature”
and that trial counsel elicited testimony that Dahl made purchases for R.O. because he is a
“nice guy.” The postconviction court also noted that Dahl’s claims go to matters of trial
strategy. Dahl’s appellate brief does not challenge the postconviction court’s findings and
does not identify any other evidence of this type that Dahl’s trial counsel failed to introduce.
We agree that the issues raised by Dahl are classic matters of trial strategy. See State v.
Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999). Thus, the postconviction court did not
clearly err in its finding that Dahl’s trial counsel was not deficient in his presentation of
evidence favorable to Dahl.
E. Alleged Failure to Seek Remedy for Juror Misconduct
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not promptly notifying the district court of potential juror misconduct during
the trial. Dahl contends that he and two of his sisters overheard a group of jurors talking
about his case at a restaurant on the second day of trial, that they told trial counsel about it,
and that trial counsel took no action at that time.
A defendant may pursue a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct by
requesting a Schwartz hearing. See Schwartz, 258 Minn. at 328, 104 N.W.2d at 303. To
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establish juror misconduct, a party must make a prima facie showing of juror misconduct.
State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. 2000). To make a prima facie showing,
“a defendant must submit sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged,
would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” Id. (quoting State v. Larson, 281
N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1979)).
The postconviction court found that Dahl and two sisters, J.D. and C.J., returned
from lunch on the second day of trial and told Dahl’s trial counsel that they saw jurors at
the restaurant where they ate. The postconviction court found that Dahl and his sisters
informed Dahl’s trial counsel of the incident, that trial counsel explained to Dahl the
opportunity to request a Schwartz hearing, that Dahl said that he had not heard the
substance of the jurors’ conversations, and that Dahl said that he did not want a different
jury. The postconviction court also found that, after the guilty verdict, Dahl told his trial
counsel that one of his sisters had heard the jurors talking about him and the allegation that
he had possessed a gun. The postconviction court further found that trial counsel then
telephoned Dahl’s sisters, who informed trial counsel that they had not heard anything in
particular. The postconviction court further found trial counsel nonetheless requested a
Schwartz hearing, at which Dahl testified that his sisters did not hear the jurors’
conversation. The postconviction court rejected Dahl’s postconviction claim that, contrary
to his earlier testimony, one of his sisters did hear the jurors’ conversation. The
postconviction court expressly determined that trial counsel was more credible, in part
because Dahl admitted during trial that he has a poor memory. Accordingly, the
postconviction court found that trial counsel properly did not file a Schwartz motion on the
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second day of trial because he could not have established a prima facie case of juror
misconduct.
On appeal, Dahl contends that his trial counsel unreasonably failed to move for a
Schwartz hearing on the second day of trial. His argument is based on the evidence that he
introduced at the postconviction hearing. But the postconviction court specifically found
Dahl’s testimony to be less credible than trial counsel’s testimony. Given the information
available to trial counsel on the second day of trial, as found by the postconviction court,
there is no clear error in the postconviction court’s finding that trial counsel reasonably
refrained from moving for a Schwartz hearing on the second day of trial.
F. Alleged Failure to Zealously Represent Dahl
Dahl contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel by not zealously representing him at trial. Specifically, Dahl contends that his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient because he reserved his opening statement until after
the state rested its case and then made an opening statement that was too brief, because he
made a poor closing argument, because he did not adequately prepare Dahl for his trial
testimony, and because he generally did not present a theory of the case.
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel initially reserved his
opening statement and, after the state rested, made an opening statement consisting of four
sentences. The postconviction court found that trial counsel’s strategy with respect to his
opening statement was reasonable in light of uncertainty about what evidence the state
would introduce and uncertainty as to whether Dahl would testify and, if so, the extent of
his testimony.
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The postconviction court found that trial counsel’s strategy with respect to his
closing argument was reasonable in that he attacked the state’s evidence of the firearm and
attempted to show that doubts about the firearm raised doubts about the entire case. The
postconviction court also found that trial counsel made a reasonable effort to attack the
credibility of both C.L. and R.O. The postconviction court further found that trial counsel
argued that Dahl got into trouble because of a “big heart” and that he was physically
incapable of the alleged conduct. Dahl’s contentions on appeal do not undermine the
postconviction court’s finding that his trial counsel’s strategy decisions with respect to his
closing argument were reasonable. See Sanderson v. State, 601 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Minn.
App. 1999) (stating that counsel’s strategic decisions concerning opening statement and
closing argument “should not be second-guessed”), review granted (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000)
and review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2000).
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel and Dahl met in person at
least 15 times and spoke by telephone at least 30 times before trial. The postconviction
court found that trial counsel began preparing Dahl for trial approximately eight months
before trial, to the point that Dahl wrote a letter to his trial counsel complaining about a
practice session. The postconviction court also found that trial counsel met with Dahl at
trial counsel’s office at 6:30 a.m. on the third day of trial, the day of Dahl’s testimony. The
record corroborates these findings of historical fact, which support the postconviction
court’s finding that trial counsel did not fail to prepare Dahl for trial.
The postconviction court found that Dahl’s trial counsel’s overall presentation of a
theory of the defense was reasonable in light of the circumstances. The postconviction
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court recited trial counsel’s testimony that he was planning on introducing the defense
theory primarily through Dahl’s testimony but that when he met with Dahl in the early
morning of the third day of trial, he observed that Dahl was not as “loquacious, confident,
and articulate” as he had been in the past but, rather, “was a completely different person”
in that he was a “‘bundle’ (of nerves)” and no longer wanted to testify. The postconviction
court noted that Dahl eventually decided to testify but that trial counsel wanted to avoid
problems by limiting his testimony as much as possible. Dahl contradicted his trial
counsel’s testimony at the postconviction hearing by testifying that his trial counsel was
not fully engaged on that particular day. But the postconviction court ultimately found that
trial counsel was unable to fully present the defense theory that had been prepared because
of Dahl’s state of mind and that “it was reasonable [for trial counsel] to limit [Dahl’s] time
on the witness stand.” Again, this court must defer to the postconviction court’s findings
to the extent that they resolve disputed questions of fact, especially if the factfinder resolves
those factual issues based on the credibility of witnesses. See Miles, 840 N.W.2d at 201.
Dahl’s contention that his trial counsel failed to present a reasonable theory of the defense
does not overcome our standard of review. In any event, because the Sixth Amendment is
not concerned with the selection of one among several reasonable strategies, Dahl cannot
establish that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not developing and
presenting a theory of the defense. See Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d at 255 (stating that strategic
decisions concerning theory of the case are entitled to great deference).
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In sum, the postconviction court did not err by denying Dahl’s petition for
postconviction relief.
Affirmed.
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