Adoption of: L.S.P., Appeal of: Westmoreland CCB ( 2019 )


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  • J-S44014-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ADOPTION OF: L.S.P.                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: WESTMORELAND                  :
    COUNTY CHILDREN'S BUREAU                 :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 514 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
    at No(s): No. 135 of 2018
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 15, 2019
    The Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (the “Agency”) appeals
    from the order dated March 19, 2019, and entered March 20, 2019, denying
    the Agency’s petition seeking to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of
    A.M.K (“Mother”) and G.L.P. (“Father”), the biological parents of their son,
    L.S.P., born in October of 2016, (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23
    Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). We affirm.
    On September 19, 2017, the Agency assumed emergency custody of
    Child upon receiving reports that Mother was homeless and using illegal drugs
    in Child’s presence. N.T., 2/14/19, at 19. Father was incarcerated at the
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    time.1 Id. Child was adjudicated dependent on October 10, 2017 and was
    placed in the kinship foster home of his maternal grandmother. Id.
    On September 25, 2018, the Agency filed the petitions to involuntarily
    terminate the parental rights of Child’s parents.2 On February 14, 2019, the
    trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petitions.       Mother was not
    present at the hearing, but her counsel, Attorney Andrew Snyder, was
    present.      Father participated, via video conference, from the State
    Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Quehanna Boot Camp, where he was
    incarcerated. Father’s counsel, Attorney Eric Dee, was present at the hearing.
    The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child, Attorney Diane Murphy, was present
    at the hearing and participated.
    The Agency first proffered the testimony of Cody Johns, a supervisor of
    Justice Works Youth Center, the agency that provided supervised visits
    between the parents and Child until Father was incarcerated in June of 2018
    and Mother stopped visiting in July of 2018. N.T., 2/14/19, at 4–5. Mr. Johns
    was qualified as an expert in parent-child relationships.        Id. at 12–13.
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although Father was incarcerated at the time Child was removed from
    Mother’s custody, Father was released on September 22, 2017, at which point
    he entered inpatient treatment. N.T., 2/14/18 at 24. Following treatment,
    Father transitioned to a halfway house and then a three-quarter house. Id.
    In June of 2018, however, Father reoffended, was again incarcerated, and
    remained incarcerated for the pendency of the petitions to terminate.
    2   The trial court assigned the same trial court docket number to the petitions.
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    Next, Tara Lorenzo, a caseworker for the Agency assigned to Child,
    testified as an Agency witness. N.T., 2/14/19, at 18. Ms. Lorenzo testified
    that the trial court placed Child in Agency custody on September 19, 2017,
    and adjudicated him dependent on October 10, 2017. Id. at 19. At the time
    of the termination hearing, Child had been in Agency custody for seventeen
    months. Id. Ms. Lorenzo testified that Father had three visits with Child,
    each of which were initiated by Father, since Father’s incarceration in June of
    2018: on August 24, 2018, at the Washington County Prison; on September
    21, 2018, at SCI Greene; and on February 2, 2019, at SCI Quehanna Boot
    Camp. Id. at 26–27, 48. Child’s paternal grandmother transported Child to
    the three visits with Father. Id. at 27.
    On cross-examination by Father’s counsel, Ms. Lorenzo testified that
    Father sent three letters to Child’s maternal grandmother concerning Child.
    N.T., 2/14/19, at 43. On re-direct examination for the Agency, Ms. Lorenzo
    testified that, in the three letters, Father asked how Child was doing. Id. at
    47. In the letter that Father sent in late December of 2018, Father requested
    that maternal grandmother give Child a hug and a kiss, and tell Child that his
    daddy loves him. Id. On cross-examination by Attorney Murphy, Ms. Lorenzo
    testified that Child was immediately placed in kinship foster care with his
    maternal grandmother and step-maternal grandfather, who wish to adopt
    him, where he has remained. Id. at 35–36, 46. Ms. Lorenzo testified that
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    Child views his maternal grandmother and step-grandfather as his mother and
    father. Id. at 36.
    Father then testified on his own behalf from the SCI Quehanna Boot
    Camp Facility via video conference. N.T., 2/14/19, at 49. Father testified that
    he would be eligible for release from boot camp on July 2, 2019, and he
    planned to live with his mother and grandmother in Washington County. Id.
    at 52. He had last seen Child on February 2, 2019, when Child had a two-
    hour visit, at which he was permitted to have physical contact with Child. Id.
    at 52–53.     Father testified to his desire to overcome his substance abuse
    issues, to raise Child, and to his love for Child. Id. at 57–59, 67–80.
    On March 20, 2019, the trial court denied the Agency’s petitions. On
    April 2, 2019, the Agency filed a notice of appeal challenging the March 20,
    2019 order, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3
    In its brief on appeal, the Agency raises the following issues:
    1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
    discretion in denying the Agency’s petitions to involuntarily
    terminate Birth Parents’ rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(5)
    when the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    grounds for termination exist?
    ____________________________________________
    3 The Agency also filed a second notice of appeal from the March 19, 2019
    order, which was assigned our docket number 492 WDA 2019. This Court
    discontinued the appeal on April 17, 2019, after the Agency’s filed a praecipe
    for a discontinuance because the appeals were duplicative.           Notice of
    Discontinuance of Action, 4/17/19.
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    2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
    discretion in denying the Agency’s petitions to involuntarily
    terminate Birth Parents’ rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(8)
    when the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    grounds for termination exist?
    3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
    discretion in denying the Agency’s petitions to involuntarily
    terminate Birth Parents’ rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b)
    when the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    termination would best serve the needs and welfare of Child?
    4. Are the findings of fact and credibility determinations set forth
    in the [trial court’s] Opinions, dated March 19, 2019 and April 16,
    2019, supported by the record?
    Agency’s Brief, at 4.
    In reviewing an appeal from the denial of a petition to terminate parental
    rights, we adhere to the following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
    standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
    petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
    cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
    the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
    if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    ,
    [26,] 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
    supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
    made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [
    614 Pa. 275
    , 284,] 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)].
    As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
    merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
    different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
    Motors America, Inc., 
    613 Pa. 371
    [, 455], 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa.
    2011); Christianson v. Ely, [
    575 Pa. 647
    , 654-655], 
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
    abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id.
    As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
    applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
    We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
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    equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-
    30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
    support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
    termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
    second[-]guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
    determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
    judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
    and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
    law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [
    539 Pa. 161
    , 165,] 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
    rights are valid.    In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
    evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and
    convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re J.L.C.,
    
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “Satisfaction of the requirements
    in only one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with consideration of the
    provisions in Section 2511(b), is sufficient for termination.” Z.S.W., 
    946 A.2d 726
    , 729 (Pa. Super. 2008) (brackets omitted, emphasis in original).
    We will consider the Agency’s issues together, as its arguments are
    interrelated. In its brief on appeal, the Agency argues that it satisfied all of
    the statutory requirements to support the termination of both parents’
    parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act,
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    and that case law required the Agency to satisfy only one subsection of Section
    2511(a) in order to support termination.         Agency’s Brief, at 12–13.     The
    Agency complains that the trial court did not discuss its reasoning for denying
    the petitions with regard to Section 2511(a)(8) in its opinion dated March 19,
    2019, that accompanied its order, and only discussed that section in its Rule
    1925(a) opinion dated April 16, 2019. 
    Id.
     at 12–13.4 The Agency argues that
    the trial court’s failure to set forth support for its denial of the termination of
    parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a)(8) is reversible error. 
    Id.
     at
    12–14.
    The Agency claims that termination of both parents’ rights was
    warranted due to Father’s continued substance abuse and incarceration,
    Mother’s substance abuse and discontinuation of services, the length of Child’s
    placement in Agency custody, and the promotion of Child’s welfare in Child’s
    kinship foster home with his pre-adoptive maternal grandmother. Agency’s
    Brief at 15. The Agency contends that reunification of Child with either parent
    is not an appropriate or safe option for Child now or within the foreseeable
    future. 
    Id.
     Finally, the Agency asks us to reverse the trial court’s findings of
    fact and credibility determinations set forth in the trial court’s opinions, dated
    March 19, 2019, and April 16, 2019, arguing that the findings are not
    supported by the record. Id. at 4, 15. Accordingly, the Agency argues that
    ____________________________________________
    4 Moreover, the Agency asserts that in its denial order, the trial court
    erroneously cited Section 2311 of the Adoption Act rather than Section 2511.
    Agency’s Brief at 13. As this was clearly a clerical error, we do not find it to
    be a basis for vacating the order of the trial court.
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    the trial court should have terminated the parental rights of both parents
    under Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b).
    Section 2511 of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    ***
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
    an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the child continue
    to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those
    conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services
    or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not
    likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
    placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
    and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
    agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
    removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
    and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
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    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), (b).
    To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(5), the moving party
    must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
    (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2)
    the conditions which led to the child’s removal or placement continue to exist;
    (3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to removal
    or placement within a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably
    available to the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
    removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5) termination
    of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re
    Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1273–1274 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    When addressing Section 2511(a)(8), we apply the following standard:
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the
    child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more
    from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
    welfare of the child. Section (a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame
    for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s
    removal by the court. Once the 12-month period has been
    established, the court must next determine whether the conditions
    that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the
    reasonable good faith efforts of [the agency] supplied over a
    realistic time period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does
    not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or
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    ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or
    the availability or efficacy of [agency] services.
    In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
    This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
    efforts   toward    the   reasonably   prompt    assumption    of    full   parental
    responsibilities.   In re A.L.D., 
    797 A.2d 326
    , 340 (Pa. Super. 2002).            A
    parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
    the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
    or disingenuous. 
    Id.
          Regarding incarcerated parents, our Supreme Court
    has instructed:
    incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative
    factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist
    under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued
    incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and
    [] the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
    In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. Our          Supreme        Court    further
    reiterated the standard of review pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) for
    abandonment and added as follows:
    Applying [In re: Adoption of McCray,] the provision for
    termination of parental rights based upon abandonment, now
    codified as § 2511(a)(1), we noted that a parent “has an
    affirmative duty to love, protect and support his child and to make
    an effort to maintain communication and association with that
    child.” [
    460 Pa. 210
    , 217, 
    331 A.2d 652
    , 655]. We observed that
    the father’s incarceration made his performance of this duty “more
    difficult.” 
    Id.
    ***
    [A] parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to incarceration
    is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment. Nevertheless, we
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    are not willing to completely toll a parent’s responsibilities during
    his or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the
    parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while
    in prison in continuing a close relationship with the child. Where
    the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to
    yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.
    In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (quoting In re: Adoption of McCray,
    
    331 A.2d 652
    , 655 (Pa. 1975)) (footnotes and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Ultimately, the Court held “that incarceration, while not a litmus
    test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a parent
    is incapable of providing ‘essential parental care, control or subsistence.’” In
    re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830. The Court also noted that the length
    of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant regarding
    whether termination is proper under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption
    of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830.
    Regarding Section 2511(b), the court inquires whether the termination
    of the parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical and
    emotional needs and welfare of Child.      See In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    ,
    1286–87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
    stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
    
    Id. at 1287
     (citation omitted). The court must also discern the nature and
    status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing that bond. 
    Id.
     This Court has stated:
    Once the statutory requirement for involuntary termination of
    parental rights has been established under subsection (a), the
    court must consider whether the child’s needs and welfare will be
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    met by termination pursuant to subsection (b). In re D.W., 
    856 A.2d 1231
    , 1234 (Pa. Super. 2004). In this context, the court
    must take into account whether a bond exists between child and
    parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
    necessary and beneficial relationship. In re C.S., [
    761 A.2d 1197
    ,
    1202 (Pa. Super. 2000)].
    In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. We have explained that the focus in terminating
    parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child
    pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1008
    (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
    In its April 16, 2019 Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated as
    follows:
    In order to reach a conclusion under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(5)
    that a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights should be granted and
    parental rights terminated, we must find by clear and convincing
    evidence the following:
    The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
    not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
    period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
    available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child within a reasonable period of time and
    termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    Furthermore, it is well-settled that the fact of incarceration alone
    is not sufficient to justify the termination of parental rights. In re
    Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
     (2012).
    Based upon our careful consideration of the evidence
    presented, we cannot find that Father cannot or will not remedy
    the conditions within a reasonable period of time, given the
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    services and assistance now available to him and his realization of
    the gravity of his potential loss. Although he has been in and out
    of jail for many years, and in and out of periods of sobriety for
    many years, recovery from the disease of addiction is rarely
    achieved after one attempt. He sincerely expresses a desire to
    make a change and has taken steps to do so with his participation
    in boot camp. The structure and discipline of boot camp afford
    him the treatment resources and the opportunity to develop life
    skills that will lead to a steady income, stability, and the ability to
    parent.
    In addition, we recognize that a parent’s responsibilities are
    not tolled during incarceration. A parent must utilize available
    resources to maintain a close relationship with the child while he
    is in prison. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1006 (Pa.
    Super. 2008). A parent is expected to be steadfast in overcoming
    obstacles to maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re
    Burns, 
    379 A.2d 535
     (Pa. 1977). In this case, Father has
    continued to nurture his relationship with his son despite the
    constraints of incarceration. He made arrangements to see
    [Child] while he was in prison. He writes letters to [Child’s]
    caretaker, inquiring of the welfare of [Child]. He has a plan for
    housing when he is released. He has employment options and
    aspires to further his education. He enrolled in a military-style
    correctional facility that provides parenting classes, self-help
    groups, and drug and alcohol treatment in a therapeutic
    community.        (Transcript, pp. 50-51).       He continues to
    communicate with his caseworker at the [Agency].
    Father will be released from incarceration in only three
    months, at the beginning of July 2019. See In re Adoption of
    S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 830 (Pa. 2012) (the length of the remaining
    confinement can be considered highly relevant to whether the
    conditions and causes of the incapacity or neglect cannot or will
    not be remedied by the parent). In addition to the services
    available to Father while in boot camp, upon his release[,] the
    Agency can assess him for services to assist him in reunification
    with his son. If Father fails to benefit from the resources currently
    available to him, fails to follow recommended treatment for his
    disease, or fails to pursue job skills, employment, and housing
    after his release; if he fails to remain sober, and fails to comply
    with the recommendations of the Agency, this [c]ourt will consider
    all those factors if a subsequent petition for termination of
    parental rights is presented.
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    With respect to Mother, she has demonstrated that she
    cannot or will not remedy those conditions, and is not availing
    herself of the services or assistance that are likely to remedy the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the [Child]
    within a reasonable period of time. However, the purpose of the
    involuntary termination provisions of the Adoption Act is not to
    punish an ineffective or negligent parent. In re B.E., 
    377 A.2d 153
    , 156 (Pa. 1977). The purpose of the involuntary termination
    of parental rights process is to dispense with the need for parental
    consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has
    failed to meet the continuing needs of the child. In this case,
    having decided that Father’s rights should not be terminated
    pursuant to section 2511(a)(5), we will not terminate Mother’s
    rights under this section[,] either.
    In order to reach a conclusion under 23 Pa.C.S.
    § 2511(a)(8) that a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights should
    be granted and parental rights terminated, we must find by clear
    and convincing evidence the following:
    “The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
    the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
    months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
    placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
    of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
    would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.”
    Although more than 12 months have elapsed since the date
    of [Child]’s removal from the home, one of the conditions which
    led to the removal of the child does not continue to exist. Most
    significantly, a condition that no longer exists is Father’s inability
    to see himself as an addict with a disease in need of treatment.
    Since June of 2018, Father has awakened to an understanding of
    the role that addiction has played in his life since he was 20 years
    old.     With this insight, he has made a commitment to
    rehabilitation, sobriety and self-betterment for the first time in ten
    years. In other words, a condition which previously existed – that
    of a parent in active addiction – no longer exists; and with that
    one change, and Father’s impending release from incarceration,
    other conditions such as housing and employment are likely to
    follow.
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    Finally, we must take into account the impact of severing
    close parental ties and the resulting pain this may cause the child
    when considering “the best interests of the child” standard. In re
    Adoption of K.J., 
    936 A.2d 1128
     (Pa. Super. 2007). Because
    [Child] is only 2½ years old, he cannot articulate his feelings or
    desires; and because we do not have the benefit of expert opinion
    or a bonding assessment, we could only speculate as to the impact
    the loss of [Father] in his life may have on him. However, we do
    know that Father emphatically states he desires to maintain a
    relationship with his child, and he is doing so, to the extent he is
    able within the constraints of his incarceration. What little
    evidence we have indicates that a paternal bond exists between
    [Father] and son; [Child] runs to [Father] with a smile on his face
    and calls him “Dada.” Under the current circumstances, we do
    not find that the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
    welfare of [Child] would be served by severing his relationship
    with [Father].
    We acknowledge that the Juvenile Act emphasizes the need
    for permanency in a child’s life, because a child’s development is
    enhanced in stable, permanent families. However, we are also
    keenly aware that termination of parental rights is darkly, yet
    accurately, referred to as “the death penalty” of dependency
    court. Because of the seriousness and finality of the termination
    order, we will err on the side of denying a petition, rather than
    granting it; and[,] in this case, we believe it is in [Child’s] best
    interests to maintain the status quo, and to give Father a
    reasonable period of time from the time he is released from
    incarceration to establish that he will continue to remedy the
    conditions which led to the original removal and placement.
    Accordingly, we do not find that [the Agency] has met its
    burden of proof under section 2511(a)(8), as the conditions have
    changed and termination would not best serve the needs and
    welfare of [Child].
    Again, having decided that Father’s rights should not be
    terminated pursuant to section 2511(a)(8), we will not terminate
    Mother’s rights under this section[,] either.
    Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, we respectfully
    suggest that the decision to deny the [p]etition to terminate
    parental rights be affirmed.
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    J-S44014-19
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/19, at 10–14.5           The trial court’s determinations
    regarding Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) are supported by ample, competent
    evidence in the record.
    Generally, this Court has stated that a parent’s own feelings of love and
    affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In
    re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have stated that a “child’s
    life ‘simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
    ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.’”       In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1125 (Pa. Super. 2010). Our Supreme Court has instructed, however,
    that this Court should defer to the trial court where a “close call” was made.
    See R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
    Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
    as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
    appellate court must resist the urge to second[-]guess the trial
    court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
    instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
    findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
    conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [
    539 Pa. 161
    , 165,] 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    ____________________________________________
    5 In this case, the orphan’s court concluded that the Agency’s petition failed
    under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8); thus the court did not need to engage in
    the second prong of termination analysis under Section 2511(b). Because the
    trial court’s finding that the Agency failed to satisfy its burden of proof
    pursuant to Section 2511(a) is supported by the record, the Agency’s third
    issue, relating to the trial court’s failure to engage in a proper Section 2511(b)
    analysis, is without merit.
    - 16 -
    J-S44014-19
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d at
    826–827. Thus, the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in refusing to terminate the parental rights of Father and
    Mother pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8).6
    After a careful review of the record, we find that there was competent,
    clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s denial
    of the petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child
    under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    order.7
    ____________________________________________
    6 We note that the trial court declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights
    without engaging in a full analysis under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. In denying the
    petition to terminate Mother’s rights, the trial court looked to the fact that the
    purpose of the “Adoption Act is not to punish an ineffective or negligent
    parent” and noted that involuntary termination of parental rights is intended
    to dispose of the need for the parent’s consent to adoption of the child. Trial
    Court Opinion, 4/16/19, at 12. Because the trial court did not terminate
    Father’s parental rights, it found that no adoption proceedings would be
    initiated in the near future; thus, it declined to terminate Mother’s parental
    rights as well. Following a thorough review of the record, we note that the
    trial court has essentially preserved the status quo. After a review of the
    record and given our deferential standard on review, we find that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in preserving the status quo in the instant
    case. See In re S.P., 
    47 A.3d at 826
     (noting that this Court should not second
    guess the trial court and impose its own judgment if the trial court’s
    conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion).
    7 Notably, on September 19, 2017, when Child was removed from Mother’s
    care and custody, and Child was placed in emergency custody, Father was
    incarcerated in the Washington County Prison. See N.T., 2/14/19, at 19, 24,
    33. As such, Child was not removed from Father’s care and custody, and
    neither subsection (a)(5) nor (a)(8) was applicable to the termination of
    Father’s parental rights. See In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d at
    1123 n.2 (providing that
    subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) do not apply when a natural father is
    incarcerated and has had no custody of the child). We, nevertheless, have
    - 17 -
    J-S44014-19
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/15/2019
    ____________________________________________
    written to express our agreement with the trial court’s reasoning in this
    matter.
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