Lennis Bentrud, Relator v. Robin Drug Corp., Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2014 )


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  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-0371
    Lennis Bentrud,
    Relator,
    vs.
    Robin Drug Corp.,
    Respondent,
    Department of Employment and Economic Development,
    Respondent.
    Filed October 6, 2014
    Affirmed
    Reyes, Judge
    Department of Employment and Economic Development
    File No. 29094553-9
    Lennis Bentrud, St. Anthony, Minnesota (pro se relator)
    Robin Drug Corp., New Brighton, Minnesota (respondent employer)
    Lee B. Nelson, Munazza A. Humayun, Minnesota Department of Employment and
    Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Department)
    Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
    Reyes, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    REYES, Judge
    On certiorari appeal from a determination by an unemployment law judge (ULJ)
    that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits, relator argues that the ULJ erred by
    determining that she quit employment without good reason caused by the employer. We
    affirm.
    FACTS
    Relator Lennis Bentrud ended her employment at respondent Robin Drug Corp. on
    December 16, 2011, following an issue with her supervisor, Paul Joy, about unpaid leave.
    Bentrud established an account with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment
    and Economic Development (DEED) seeking unemployment benefits. DEED
    determined that Bentrud was ineligible for benefits because Bentrud did not have a
    reason to quit that “would cause the average reasonable worker to quit.”
    Bentrud appealed the determination of ineligibility arguing that she quit “because
    [she] felt threatened and harassed” after her “supervisor falsified [her] time card and
    physically came at [her] when [she] asked him about it.” A ULJ held a hearing on the
    matter and determined Bentrud was ineligible for benefits. This determination was
    reversed on certiorari review because the ULJ lacked statutory authority to conduct
    hearings and issue orders, and the matter was remanded “for an additional evidentiary
    hearing, to be conducted by an unemployment law judge who is licensed to practice law.”
    Bentrud v. Robin Drug Corp., No. A12-1092 (Minn. App. Nov. 1, 2012) (order op.).
    Another hearing was then held by a different ULJ during which Bentrud and two
    representatives from Robin Drug’s human-resources (HR) department, Nancy Finke and
    Cindy Mollet, testified. Bentrud alleged that on December 16, 2011, Joy charged at her,
    acted as though he was going to slap her, and taunted her, telling her “that he could do
    whatever he wanted to [her].” Bentrud v. Robin Drug Corp., No. A13-0328, 
    2013 WL
                                            2
    6050374, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 18, 2013). Bentrud also made several other allegations
    against Joy, including that he falsified her time card on December 16, 2011, by altering
    her time off from unpaid to paid, contrary to her intentions, and created a hostile work
    environment. 
    Id.
    The ULJ issued written findings of fact and a decision concluding that Bentrud
    was ineligible for benefits, finding that “Bentrud quit because of perceived harassment
    and mistreatment at work,” and concluded that “[a]n average, reasonable worker would
    not quit and become unemployed due to the issues that Bentrud experienced with Joy at
    Robin Drug.” Id. at *2. The ULJ also concluded that Bentrud did not properly complain
    to her employer or give the employer an opportunity to address her concerns and
    therefore did not quit for a good reason caused be her employer. Id. Following
    Bentrud’s request for reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed the determination of ineligibility,
    and Bentrud thereafter brought a certiorari appeal. Id.
    We reversed the ULJ’s determination and remanded with instructions that the ULJ
    make more detailed “findings of fact and credibility determinations.” Id. at *6. We listed
    the necessary findings as “whether Joy behaved inappropriately, whether Bentrud
    reported that behavior to [HR representative] Samuelson, and whether Samuelson offered
    to address the accusations,” and “a determination of Bentrud’s credibility.” Such
    findings were necessary to determine the legal questions of (1) “whether Bentrud’s
    reason ‘would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
    rather than remaining in the employment,’” and (2) “whether Bentrud ‘complain[ed] to
    3
    the employer and [gave] the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse
    working conditions.’” Id. (citations omitted).
    In December 2012, the ULJ held another evidentiary hearing and thereafter issued
    written findings of fact and a decision, again determining that Bentrud was ineligible for
    unemployment benefits. The ULJ found that Joy did not threaten, taunt, rush at, put his
    hands near, or make verbal threats to Bentrud. The ULJ also found that “the first time
    Bentrud indicated . . . that she wanted her concerns with Joy to be addressed or assistance
    resolving issues with Joy” was on December 16, 2011, the day that she quit, and that
    “Bentrud did not complain to human resources or Joy’s supervisors and request that the
    issues be resolved regarding any of [her] concerns.” The ULJ further found that Bentrud
    had not brought up her concerns about Joy’s behavior in a phone call regarding her
    paycheck concern on December 16, 2011, with Joy and company HR representatives and
    that when Bentrud went to see HR representative Andrea Samuelson later that day, she
    did not tell Samuelson about Joy’s threatening behavior. Rather, she “indicated [that] she
    was going to quit because of the paycheck issue.”
    Additionally, the ULJ found that Bentrud’s testimony was not credible and that
    her account of her interactions with Joy on December 16, 2011, was exaggerated
    “because she was upset.” The ULJ found the company’s HR representatives to be more
    credible than Bentrud because they “were direct and clear about what actions Samuelson
    would have taken if Bentrud had raised concerns about threatening behavior.” The ULJ
    determined that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence shows that . . . Bentrud
    quit . . . because Joy changed her timecard and therefore paid her for time she wanted to
    4
    take unpaid leave.” The ULJ ultimately concluded that (1) “[a]n average, reasonable
    worker would not quit and become unemployed due to this issue;” (2) Bentrud had no
    other reason for quitting, but noted that even if she quit in part due to Joy’s behavior
    before December 16, 2011, she did not allow her employer a reasonable opportunity to
    correct her concerns; and (3) Bentrud quit without good reason caused by her employer,
    making her ineligible for unemployment benefits.
    Bentrud requested reconsideration, contending that the ULJ’s factual findings
    about her reason for departure were untrue and that the legal conclusions were incorrect.
    The ULJ affirmed the determination of ineligibility. This certiorari appeal followed.
    DECISION
    We may reverse or modify the ULJ’s decision “if the substantial rights of the
    petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or
    decision” are, among other reasons, affected by errors of law, arbitrary or capricious, or
    unsupported by substantial evidence. 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.105
    , subd. 7(d) (2014).
    Substantial evidence “is: (1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than
    some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; and (5) evidence considered in its entirety.”
    CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 
    633 N.W.2d 557
    , 563 (Minn. App. 2001),
    review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001).
    An applicant who quits employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits,
    unless “the applicant quit the employment because of a good reason caused by the
    employer.” 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.095
    , subd. 1(1) (2012). A good reason to quit caused by an
    5
    employer “is a reason: (1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the
    employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an
    average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
    employment.” 
    Id.,
     subd. 3(a) (2012). However, “[i]f an applicant was subjected to
    adverse working conditions by the employer, the applicant must complain to the
    employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working
    conditions before that may be considered a good reason caused by the employer for
    quitting.” 
    Id.,
     subd. 3(c) (2012).
    An employee’s reason for quitting employment is an issue of fact for the ULJ, and
    we accept the ULJ’s findings “if the evidence reasonably tends to sustain them.” Peppi v.
    Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 
    614 N.W.2d 750
    , 752 (Minn. App. 2000). We view the
    factual findings in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision, Lolling v. Midwest
    Patrol, 
    545 N.W.2d 372
    , 377 (Minn. 1996), and give deference to the ULJ’s credibility
    determinations, Jenson v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    617 N.W.2d 627
    , 631 (Minn. App.
    2000), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 2000). Whether the employee’s reason for quitting
    meets the statutory standard of “a good reason caused by the employer” is a legal
    question, which we review de novo. Peppi, 
    614 N.W.2d at 752
    .
    Bentrud disputes many of the ULJ’s factual findings, contending that she quit
    because of the actions and behavior of her supervisor, not the paycheck issue. During the
    evidentiary hearing, from which the ULJ made the findings being reviewed here, Bentrud
    testified that (1) she talked about the paycheck issue with a supervisor who recommended
    that Bentrud go see HR; (2) she went to see HR representative Samuelson on December
    6
    16 to explain her interaction with Joy earlier that day, but did not provide Samuelson with
    the background information about her problems with Joy; and (3) her meeting with
    Samuelson, where Bentrud wrote her resignation letter, lasted for a total of about ten
    minutes. Finke testified that Bentrud’s conversation with Samuelson was about
    Bentrud’s paycheck only, that there is no record of Bentrud making other complaints
    about Joy to HR, and that Bentrud’s complaints about Joy would have been taken very
    seriously and resulted in an investigation. Bentrud admits that she did not complain to
    Joy’s supervisor or to HR about Joy’s allegedly ongoing offensive behavior.
    Bentrud also contends that she is more credible than the HR representatives that
    testified because they did not have firsthand knowledge of the relevant events. But a ULJ
    may receive any evidence with probative value, including hearsay and testimony from
    witnesses without firsthand knowledge of the evidence. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 
    721 N.W.2d 340
    , 345 (Minn. App. 2006). And the ULJ set out the reasoning for discrediting
    Bentrud’s testimony, assessing that Bentrud was “overly sensitive about her interactions
    with Joy and exaggerated the December 16, 2011 conversation because she was upset.”
    See 2014 Minn. Laws. ch. 251, art 2, § 15, at 862 (to be codified at 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.105
    ,
    subd. 1(d) (2014)) (“When the credibility of a witness testifying in a hearing has a
    significant effect on the outcome of a decision, the unemployment law judge must set out
    the reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony.”).1 The evidence Bentrud
    1
    The quoted session law amended 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.105
    , subd. 1(c) (2012). The
    amendment changed the lettering of the paragraphs in subdivision 1 and made
    nonsubstantive changes to the wording of the former paragraph (c). See Braylock v.
    Jesson, 
    819 N.W.2d 585
    , 588 (Minn. 2012) (providing that when an amendment clarifies
    7
    presented establishes that she had a tense relationship with Joy, which could have led to
    oversensitivity as to their interactions. Moreover, the ULJ found credible the HR
    representatives’ testimony that action would have been taken on Bentrud’s complaints
    had she lodged them with Samuelson. Bentrud testified and reiterates on appeal that
    Samuelson was empathetic when they met, suggesting that she would have taken action
    had Bentrud reported Joy’s behavior. Because there is evidence to support the ULJ’s
    determination that the HR representatives’ testimony was more credible than Bentrud’s
    testimony as to what Bentrud told Samuelson on December 16, 2011, we defer to the
    ULJ’s credibility determination. Icenhower v. Total Auto., Inc., 
    845 N.W.2d 849
    , 855
    (Minn. App. 2014) (providing that we give deference to the ULJ’s credibility
    determinations), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2014). In light of this credibility
    determination, the evidence reasonably tends to sustain the ULJ’s findings that Bentrud
    did not report Joy’s actions as a basis for her quitting and that she quit her job because of
    the issue with her paycheck.
    Bentrud admits that no harm came to her by receiving payment for her time off, as
    opposed to taking the time off unpaid, though she complained that Joy “falsified” her
    timecard. Additionally, the evidence established that Bentrud would still be able to take
    unpaid time off at a future date, if she so chose. Based on these facts, we conclude that a
    reasonable, average worker would not quit employment in favor of unemployment where
    the alteration to her timecard resulted in her receiving more pay than anticipated. Joy’s
    a law without substantively changing it, the amended statute applies to pending
    litigation).
    8
    alteration to Bentrud’s timecard does not constitute a good reason to quit caused by
    Bentrud’s employer. The ULJ did not err by determining that Bentrud quit without good
    reason caused by her employer and is therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits.
    Affirmed.
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