Gale Allen Rachuy v. State of Minnesota ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0217
Gale Allen Rachuy, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed September 8, 2014
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-10-3321
Gale Allen Rachuy, Oakdale, Louisiana (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Kristen E. Swanson, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s calculation of custody credits, failure to
address the terms of his misdemeanor sentence upon remand, and rejection of his claim
that the assistant county attorney kidnapped him from Wisconsin to stand trial in
Minnesota. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2010, appellant Gale Rachuy purchased lawn and sports equipment and
gasoline from two businesses with checks from closed bank accounts. State v. Rachuy,
A11-1491, 2012 WL 3263765, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 13, 2012), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 24, 2012). Respondent State of Minnesota charged Rachuy with one count of felony
theft of services, one count of felony issuance of a dishonored check, and one count of
misdemeanor issuance of a dishonored check. Id. Rachuy appeared before the district
court in December 2010, posted bond, and was released from the St. Louis County jail.
On February 8, 2011, the FBI arrested Rachuy and held him in Wisconsin. While
in federal custody, Rachuy demanded a speedy trial for his Minnesota offenses. On April
11, 2011, the district court signed a detainer agreement allowing the St. Louis assistant
county attorney to accept temporary custody of Rachuy from the U.S. Marshal’s Office
“in connection with [Rachuy’s] request for disposition of detainer.” Rachuy returned to
the St. Louis County jail on May 2, 2011.
After the first day of trial for Rachuy’s Minnesota charges, the state dismissed the
count of felony theft of services. Rachuy, 2012 WL 3263765, at *1. The jury found
Rachuy guilty of the two remaining counts. Id. At sentencing on May 23, 2011, the
district court imposed 60 months’ imprisonment. Rachuy asserted that he should receive
222 days of custody credit. The presentence investigation report states that Rachuy has
119 days of credit for time confined in various Minnesota jails, not counting time that
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Rachuy was in federal custody. The district court added five days for a scheduling delay
and granted Rachuy 124 days of credit. Following sentencing, Rachuy returned to
federal custody to serve a sentence in Louisiana.
On direct appeal, we affirmed the felony conviction but reversed in part and
remanded because the district court failed to address the precise terms of the
misdemeanor sentence. Rachuy, 2012 WL 3263765, at *4. On remand, the district court
vacated the misdemeanor conviction, reasoning that judicial economy would not be
served by transporting Rachuy from federal custody in Louisiana to impose 90 days’
imprisonment in Minnesota.
In December 2013, Rachuy moved the district court to grant additional days of
custody credit for time spent in federal custody between February 8, 2011 and May 1,
2011. Rachuy also alleged that the district court “lost jurisdiction over the misdemeanor”
and that the assistant county attorney “caused the unlawful kidnapping” of him from
federal custody to stand trial in Minnesota.
The district court granted in part and denied in part Rachuy’s motion for additional
custody credit. The district court sua sponte subtracted 2 days of credit for a double-
counting miscalculation. The district court granted additional credit for part of the time
that Rachuy was in federal custody, adding 21 days for the period between April 11,
2011—the date the detainer agreement was signed—and May 1, 2011—the date Rachuy
returned to county jail. Accordingly, the district court determined that Rachuy was
entitled to 143 days of total credit. The district court dismissed Rachuy’s other
arguments. Rachuy appeals.
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DECISION
I.
Rachuy argues that the district court erred in calculating his custody credits. The
decision to grant or deny custody credit is not discretionary. State v. Johnson, 744
N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). A challenge to the district court’s grant of custody credit
raises a mixed question of law and fact. Id. “[T]he [district] court must determine the
circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to
those circumstances.” Id. Interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure is a question
of law reviewed de novo. Id. But we rely on a district court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id.The district court must state and deduct the number of days the defendant spent in
custody “in connection with the offense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). The
defendant bears the burden of establishing that he or she is entitled to custody credit.
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379.
Rachuy complains that he should be granted 227, rather than 143, days of credit.
But Rachuy’s argument fails for two reasons. First, his calculations are replete with
mathematical errors. He incorrectly calculates that there are eight days between July 22,
2010 and July 23, 2010, and that there are 89 days between February 8, 2011 and May 2,
2011. Rachuy also double-counts the day of December 22, 2010.
Second, Rachuy fails to meet his burden of showing that custody credits should be
given for the period between February 8, 2011—the date he was taken into federal
custody—and April 11, 2011—the date the detainer agreement was signed to transfer him
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to Minnesota. Rachuy argues that this period of federal custody was “in connection”
with the instant offense. But the inter-jurisdictional rule requires a district court to award
custody credit only for time spent in custody that is “‘solely’ in connection” with the
Minnesota offense. State v. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 2004) (emphasis
added) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004). Rachuy provides no
evidence to support his assertion that his federal custody during this time period was in
any way connected to the Minnesota offense, let alone that the Minnesota offense was the
sole reason for it. Moreover, the federal court of appeals’ decision reveals that Rachuy
was arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced in Wisconsin for transporting stolen
vehicles across state lines, an incident unrelated to the Minnesota offenses for which he
was sentenced in St. Louis County. See United States v. Rachuy, 743 F.3d 205, 207 (7th
Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying in part Rachuy’s motion
for additional custody credits.
II.
Rachuy argues that the district court “lost jurisdiction” over the misdemeanor
conviction because it did not sentence him on the misdemeanor conviction following our
remand on direct appeal. Rachuy contends, therefore, that we “must direct that the
misdemeanor be vacated in its entirety.” But the district court already vacated the
misdemeanor conviction upon remand in the interest of judicial economy. Rachuy
appears to be challenging the district court’s determination already granting the relief he
now seeks from us. No further relief is warranted.
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III.
Finally, Rachuy argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim that the
assistant county attorney “kidnapped” him from federal custody to stand trial in
Minnesota. He also contends that the district court judge “was not a good judge to have
decided the matter” because “he was just as involved as” the assistant county attorney.
But the record shows that Rachuy initiated and consented to his return to Minnesota. He
stated before the district court:
[The assistant county attorney] . . . will verify that I asked
[the judge] in the Federal Court that I be allowed to come
back to Minnesota to stand trial on this, along with everything
else. . . . . I asked [the judge] to allow me to come up here
and [the assistant county attorney] then asked as far as
bringing me out.
Rachuy complains that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) was violated
because he was not serving a term of imprisonment when the detainer agreement was
signed to transfer him to Minnesota. Under the IAD:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment
in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment
there is pending in any other party state any untried
indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to
be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final
disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or
complaint . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1, art. III(a) (2010) (emphases added).
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But the “term of imprisonment” provision of the IAD is only significant in
ensuring that a person serving a term of imprisonment in another jurisdiction is tried
within 180 days upon a request for a final disposition of a Minnesota charge. Moreover,
the IAD “should not be mechanically applied without an examination of the
circumstances of the case in light of the purpose of the [IAD].” State v. Lewis, 422
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. App. 1988). Indeed, “[i]t is anomalous to apply the law so
literally that its application subverts its very purpose. If the circumstances show that the
technical application of the [IAD] does not serve one of the protective functions, it should
not be so applied.” Id. “The purpose of [the IAD] is to provide cooperative procedures
between jurisdictions to ensure prompt disposition of outstanding charges, implement
prisoners’ rights to a speedy trial, and prevent interference with prisoners’ participation in
treatment and rehabilitation programs.” State v. Fuller, 560 N.W.2d 97, 98–99 (Minn.
App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 1997).
The IAD does not prohibit a situation, as here, in which the defendant, who is not
serving a term of imprisonment, voluntarily seeks final disposition of a Minnesota
charge. In such a scenario, the IAD’s 180-day deadline for trial is inapplicable. And
even if it is applicable, Rachuy himself requested a transfer to Minnesota, and he was
transferred, tried, convicted, and sentenced all within May 2011. Accordingly, the IAD’s
180-day deadline has been satisfied, and the underlying policies of the IAD were served
by Rachuy’s return to Minnesota. Rachuy’s kidnapping claim is without merit and
warrants no relief.
Affirmed.
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