Preeti Kaur Rajpal v. Regents of the University of Minnesota ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1207
Preeti Kaur Rajpal,
Appellant,
vs.
Regents of the University of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed April 25, 2016
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-13-18627
Richard T. Wylie, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
William P. Donohue, General Counsel, Brian J. Slovut, Associate General Counsel,
University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Randall, Judge. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
University of Minnesota dismissed student Preeti Rajpal from its medical school
after Rajpal flunked two clinical courses. This was Rajpal’s second dismissal. Rajpal sued

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
the university, alleging that it failed to accommodate her performance anxiety as required
by the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act and that her
dismissal violated her constitutional due process rights. The district court granted summary
judgment to the university. Because Rajpal produced no evidence establishing that she was
qualified to continue as a medical student even with her proposed accommodations, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of her discrimination claim. And because the university
removed Rajpal from the program using a procedure that meets any procedural and
substantive constitutional requirements, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of her
due process claim.
FACTS
Preeti Rajpal enrolled in the University of Minnesota Medical School in 2002. The
school dismissed her in 2005 for poor academic performance. She maintained that a
misdiagnosis of depression caused her academic difficulties. Rajpal and the university
reached a settlement concerning the 2005 dismissal, affording her a path to readmit. The
school readmitted Rajpal as a full-time medical student in 2007.
Rajpal’s academic difficulties continued after her readmission. She failed step 1 of
her United States Medical Licensing Examination (known as “boards”) and the clinical
clerkship component of the Medicine I rotation. Under school policy, the clinical failure
required her to appear before the medical school’s Committee on Student Scholastic
Standing (COSSS) and request permission to retake the course. The committee granted her
request to repeat the clerkship, and she passed it without any accommodation. Rajpal asked
the school to extend her graduation date because of her academic difficulties. The school
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granted the request, but it cautioned that it was “very concerned about [her] needing
additional time to successfully complete [her] medical education.” In May 2010 Rajpal
failed another clinical clerkship, specifically, the OB-GYN clerkship. Because this was
Rajpal’s second clinical course failure, it triggered a mandatory dismissal hearing before
the COSSS.
Soon afterward, Dr. Jennifer Beldon of Boynton Health Services diagnosed Rajpal
with “performance anxiety.” Dr. Beldon believed that Rajpal’s performance anxiety could
be accommodated if she was given extra time on written tests and was provided with a
quiet examination space to take them. Consistent with Dr. Beldon’s recommendation, the
university’s disability-services office provided Rajpal a letter recommending that she be
allowed extended testing time and a quiet study space. But Dr. Beldon did not recommend
any specific accommodation for clinical studies. Similarly, the disability-services office
did not make any recommendation for those studies.
In July 2010 the COSSS held a hearing to determine whether Rajpal should be
dismissed from medical school. Rajpal appeared and informed the committee that she had
performance anxiety and was seeking professional treatment, but she did not identify any
accommodations. She blamed her clinical failure on her lack of learning, which she in turn
blamed on her not being given the opportunity to see many patients on her own. She
asserted that these deficiencies at the clinical site prevented her from reinforcing her
academic knowledge. The COSSS postponed deliberating until it could review a letter from
Dr. Cheryl Hanson, the onsite director of Rajpal’s OB-GYN clerkship. Dr. Hanson wrote
that it would be reasonable to allow Rajpal to retake the clinical course at a more structured
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setting in a different location. Before the committee deliberated, an additional failing grade
for a pediatric gastroenterology clinical course was mistakenly entered on Rajpal’s record;
Rajpal had in fact passed that course. The errant failing notation was noted on the agenda
of the August COSSS meeting.
The COSSS members voted to dismiss Rajpal. In its letter explaining the decision,
the committee included an erroneous failing grade in second-year gastrointestinal
pathophysiology. Rajpal appealed and asked the committee to reconsider its decision.
Rajpal emphasized that she had performance anxiety as diagnosed by Dr. Beldon and
requested that she be allowed to retake the OB-GYN course with her doctor’s
recommended accommodations. The COSSS convened for another hearing, after which it
denied Rajpal’s reconsideration request and voted to affirm its previous dismissal decision.
This time, the committee acknowledged the error in including Rajpal’s supposed
gastrointestinal pathophysiology failure, and it informed Rajpal that her record had been
corrected.
Rajpal complained about the COSSS determination, and, after a hearing, a three-
member grievance panel determined that the COSSS did not violate any policy, procedure,
or established practice by dismissing her. Dr. Aaron Friedman, the extant dean of the
medical school, reviewed the decision and concurred with the panel’s findings. Rajpal
appealed to the provost, who upheld the dismissal decision after concluding that she
received due process.
Rajpal sued the university and Dean Friedman, alleging, among other things, that
the school dismissed her on the basis of her disability in violation of the Federal
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Rehabilitation Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). She also claimed that
the dismissal violated her constitutional right to due process. The university moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted.
Rajpal appeals.
DECISION
Rajpal argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on her
disability-discrimination claim and by failing to recognize the viability of her claim that
the university violated her procedural and substantive due process rights. We review
summary judgment decisions de novo to determine whether the district court applied the
law correctly and whether genuine issues of material fact prevent judgment as a matter of
law. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014). We rely on
undisputed facts and construe any disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See id.I
We first address Rajpal’s argument that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment on her disability-discrimination claim. The Federal Rehabilitation Act prohibits
educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance from denying otherwise
qualified persons the benefits of their programs because of a disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2012). The MHRA similarly makes it an unfair discriminatory practice to dismiss students
based on their disabilities. Minn. Stat. § 363A.13, subd. 2 (2014). Because these statutes
contain similar language and are directed toward a similar purpose, we will interpret and
apply together the claims arising from the Rehabilitation Act and the MHRA. See, e.g.,
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State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 1989) (relying on
interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act to construe the MHRA).
To succeed on a claim of discrimination based on the alleged failure to
accommodate, a plaintiff must establish that she is an otherwise qualified person with a
disability and that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate that disability. See
Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 547 (Minn. 2001). We will
assume, without deciding, that Rajpal’s scholastic performance anxiety is indeed a
disability that would entitle her to a reasonable accommodation in her medical studies. We
focus our analysis on whether the university failed to make accommodations that would
render her qualified to continue her medical studies.
Rajpal’s failure-to-accommodate claim begins on a narrow platform because courts
are ill-suited to second-guess the professional judgment of educators in determining
whether a program’s standards are satisfied. See Falcone v. Univ. of Minn., 388 F.3d 656,
656 (8th Cir. 2004). Our deference exists because the decision to dismiss a student for
academic reasons “requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.” Bd.
of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90, 98 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1978); see
also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S. Ct. 507, 513 (1985)
(“When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they
should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”).
And the platform of her claim is further narrowed because the only accommodations
she requested were the two test-taking accommodations recommended by Dr. Beldon and
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adopted by the school and the single clinical-oriented accommodation of retaking the failed
OB-GYN clinical course at a location or under circumstances more suited to her particular
learning style. On this platform, Rajpal’s claim fails because she does not demonstrate that
the requested accommodation is reasonable or that she is “otherwise qualified” even with
the proposed accommodation. (We do not reach the other apparent problem, which is that
Rajpal’s request for a more conducive setting for the clinical program bears only on her
personal learning style and has no apparent relationship to her stated performance-anxiety
disability.)
The academic grievance panel concluded that providing a different clinical site
would not be reasonable because “part of being a physician involves being able to work
competently in different and changing clinical circumstances.” It recognized that the school
expects (and insists) that its medical students will work, and adaptively learn, in any
clinical condition. The panel took the position that Rajpal was responsible for learning the
required material “regardless of the clinical cases she was presented with.” Rajpal gives us
no persuasive reason to question this logic.
Because Rajpal’s failure in the clinic arose from her failure to learn the material
rather than from her disability, the university takes the position that she was not otherwise
qualified even if she had sought and been given a reasonable accommodation for her
disability. Rajpal counters by maintaining that the university’s ostensible exercise of its
professional, academic judgment is only a pretext for its disability discrimination, pointing
out that multiple other medical students were not dismissed after they failed other clinical
courses. This argument could draw us into second-guessing the school’s highly subjective
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and academically determined measures in its distinguishing between the quality of different
students’ academic proficiencies and between the nature of the various clinical
opportunities. We are wholly unqualified for that task. And we deem fatal to Rajpal’s
argument her lack of any evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that the
nondismissed students are similarly situated to her. She points to nothing in the record
indicating, for example, that the clinical failures of any of the other students arose from
their admitted inability to learn in their clinical setting. In sum, the committee expressed
serious misgivings about Rajpal’s ability to perform as a medical doctor. This opinion
rested on its assessment of her performance as a medical student, including her two clinical
course failures. We cannot say that the committee’s decision to dismiss Rajpal was either
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms that it did not actually exercise
professional judgment, see Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225, 106 S. Ct. at 513, or that it reflects
illegal, disparate treatment.
Rajpal also argues that the University failed to engage in an interactive process to
determine whether reasonable accommodations were possible. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (2015). This argument overlooks that Rajpal has the burden to proffer a
reasonable accommodation that would make her otherwise qualified. See Stern v. Univ. of
Osteopathic Med. & Health Scis., 220 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2000). Because Rajpal’s
proposed accommodation of retaking the clinic in a different setting would not render her
qualified, the argument fails.
The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on Rajpal’s
discrimination claim.
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II
We turn to Rajpal’s argument that the dismissal violated her procedural and
substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument
does not lead us to reverse.
Procedural Due Process
Rajpal argues that the committee violated her due process rights by dismissing her
based on false evidence and by not allowing her to be present at its August 19 committee
deliberation. The Due Process Clause does not obligate a university to provide a formal
hearing to a student dismissed for performance deficiencies. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90, 98
S. Ct. at 955. The school satisfies the student’s due process rights by notifying her of the
deficiencies and of the possibility of her dismissal, and by making its decision carefully
and deliberately. Id. at 85, 98 S. Ct. at 952.
The university afforded Rajpal adequate process. It repeatedly informed Rajpal of
her poor performance and that her failure could lead to dismissal. After her first clerkship
failure, the school told her in writing that another clinical failure would mandate a dismissal
hearing. It reminded her of the school’s dismissal policy after it granted her request to
extend her graduation date. And although the Constitution does not require it, the school
provided her formal hearing opportunities. It provided her a forum to contest her dismissal
and another hearing after she asked the school to reconsider its decision. It had no
constitutional duty to invite her to attend the August 19 deliberation. The university also
provided a forum for her to appeal the committee’s decision to an academic grievance
panel, to the dean of the medical school, and to the provost. She was represented by counsel
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throughout these proceedings and had the full opportunity to challenge the substance of the
committee’s decision.
Rajpal also maintains that the process was constitutionally inadequate because the
committee based its findings on false information. Her argument faces insurmountable
legal and factual obstacles.
The legal problem with the argument is that Rajpal relies only on a host of criminal
cases that stand for the proposition that the state violates due process by knowingly
introducing false evidence to secure a criminal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 871
N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2015). She cites no caselaw applying this precept of criminal law
to administrative academic decisions. But we can assume, without further inquiry, that
knowingly presenting false evidence offends due process in the academic-dismissal arena
as well.
Rajpal’s argument fails as a matter of fact because no evidence indicates that the
school relied on the false information, let alone that it did so knowingly. Rajpal highlights
three facts: (1) the transcript provided to the committee included incorrect grades for two
second-year courses; (2) the committee incorrectly based its decision in part on an
erroneous gastrointestinal pathophysiology failure; and (3) the committee erroneously
relied on her pediatric gastroenterology failure because in fact she passed that course. But
she identified no evidence countering the university’s evidence indicating affirmatively
that it did not base its decision on the erroneous grade notations. Rajpal points us to nothing
in the record suggesting that the committee was even aware of the two second-year course
failures mistakenly included on her school transcript. And the committee did not mention
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those failures in its letter explaining its decision. It is true that the committee initially listed
the gastrointestinal pathophysiology failure as one of its reasons for dismissing Rajpal. But
the evidence establishes without contradiction that the committee later expressly
recognized that Rajpal had indeed passed that course, and it corrected its mistaken
reference to that course on reconsideration. For the pediatric gastroenterology course,
committee chairperson Dr. Colin Campbell’s deposition testimony states that the
committee did not consider that failure in reaching its conclusion. We understand under
the circumstances that a student in Rajpal’s shoes might wonder if the committee relied on
the mistaken information, but the nonmoving party must identify admissible probative
evidence, not merely reasons for speculation, to avoid summary judgment.
Substantive Due Process
Rajpal argues that her dismissal violated her substantive due process rights. She
must demonstrate that the university acted arbitrarily in dismissing her or that the dismissal
was “such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” Ewing,
474 U.S. at 225, 106 S. Ct. at 513. This standard requires her to show that her dismissal
was unrelated to her academic performance and instead motivated by bad faith or ill will.
Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1986).
Rajpal argues without evidentiary citation that her dismissal was arbitrary and does
not reflect professional judgment because members of the administration acted in bad faith
by “feeding false information” to the committee and that her lack of academic progress
was manufactured or intentionally overblown. She similarly argues that a jury could find
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that she was intentionally excluded from the COSSS’s August 19 deliberations to prevent
her from correcting the erroneous information submitted to the committee. Rajpal’s
complete lack of evidence prevents us from considering her accusations any further. And
even if the record included evidence of this sort of attempted malicious sabotage, again,
the unrebutted evidence teaches that the COSSS did not rely on the erroneous academic
information when it dismissed Rajpal.
The district court rightly rejected the substantive due process claim.
Affirmed.
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