State of Minnesota v. Arthur Charles Huffman ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1926
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Arthur Charles Huffman,
Appellant.
Filed July 11, 2016
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CR-14-131
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant Wabasha County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences for convictions
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, domestic assault by strangulation, and terroristic
threats, appellant argues that his total sentence of 196 months and two days unfairly
exaggerates the criminality of his conduct. Because the district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Arthur Charles Huffman was charged with eight counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, one count of domestic assault by strangulation, and three counts
of terroristic threats as a result of events that occurred during one night in February 2014.
This court described the events in the opinion issued in Huffman’s initial appeal. See State
v. Huffman, No. A14-1363, 2015 WL 1757966, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2015), review
denied (Minn. June 30, 2015). A jury found Huffman guilty of three counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (oral, vaginal, and digital penetration), one count of domestic
assault by strangulation, and one count of terroristic threats. The jury also found that
Huffman used force and coercion in the commission of each of the criminal-sexual-conduct
offenses. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 360 months for one of the
criminal-sexual-conduct convictions, 33 months for the domestic-assault conviction, and
33 months for the terroristic-threats conviction.
Huffman raised several arguments in the initial appeal. See id. at *2-9. Regarding
the entry of convictions, this court determined that the district court erred by entering
convictions on more than one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct but did not err
by entering convictions on the counts of domestic assault by strangulation and terroristic
threats. Id. at *5-6. Regarding the sentence, this court determined that the district court
incorrectly calculated Huffman’s criminal-history score and erred by imposing a
2
durational-departure sentence for criminal sexual conduct without prior written notice to
Huffman and without making necessary findings. Id. at *6-8. This court reversed in part
and remanded for resentencing. Id. at *5, 7-8.
On remand, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 172 months for the
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and one year and one day each for the domestic-
assault-by-strangulation and terroristic-threats convictions. The district court noted that
the crimes involved “multiple forms of penetration” and “gratuitous violence” and that the
victim “was treated in a particularly degrading way.” This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of
sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “[T]he decision to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences rests within the discretion of the district court.”
State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 2015).
“Generally, when an offender is convicted of multiple current offenses . . .
concurrent sentencing is presumptive.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F (2012). But the
criminal code provides that
a prosecution or conviction for committing [first- through
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct] with force or violence
is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime
committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct. If an
offender is punished for more than one crime as authorized by
this subdivision and the court imposes consecutive sentences
for the crimes, the consecutive sentences are not a departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines.
3
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 6 (2012). The imposition of consecutive sentences in
accordance with section 609.035, subdivision 6, is “always permissive and there is no
dispositional departure if the sentences are executed.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.F.2.a.(2)(iii).
Huffman had a criminal-history score of zero for the purpose of sentencing him on
his criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, and he received a presumptive guidelines sentence
of 172 months for that conviction. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2012) (providing for
presumptive commitment and discretionary range between 144 and 172 months for first-
degree criminal sexual conduct with zero criminal-history score); see also Minn. Sent.
Guidelines cmt. 2.C.02 (2012) (“Any sentence length given that is within the range of
sentence length shown in the appropriate cell on the applicable Grid is not a departure from
the Guidelines . . . .”).
“For each felony offense sentenced consecutively to another felony offense(s), the
court must use a Criminal History Score of 0 . . . to determine the presumptive duration. A
consecutive sentence at any other duration is a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.
For an offender with a criminal-history score of zero, the presumptive sentence for
domestic assault by strangulation and for terroristic threats is a stayed sentence of one year
and one day. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012) (providing for presumptive stayed
sentence of one year and one day for crime of severity level of four with zero criminal-
history score); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A (2012) (assigning severity level of four to
crimes of domestic assault by strangulation and terroristic threats). Huffman received
sentences of the presumptive duration for each of these crimes, and, under the sentencing
4
guidelines, the district court’s execution of the sentences was not a dispositional departure.
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(2)(iii).
Huffman acknowledges that he received presumptive guidelines sentences and that
consecutive sentencing is permissive in this case. But he argues that the resulting sentence
unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct. “The district court abuses its discretion
in imposing consecutive sentences when the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 584 (Minn. 2009).
“In determining whether a sentence has exaggerated the criminality of a defendant’s
conduct, [an appellate court] will take guidance from past sentences imposed on similarly
situated defendants.” Id.The district court identified the multiple forms of penetration and Huffman’s
treatment of the victim as factors relevant to sentencing. Appellate courts have affirmed
significant upward durational departures in criminal-sexual-conduct cases involving
multiple forms of penetration and particularly cruel treatment of the victim. See, e.g., State
v. Vance, 765 N.W.2d 390, 393, 395-96 (Minn. 2009) (stating that “[w]e have previously
concluded that a double upward durational departure is appropriate on finding particular
cruelty [to the victim] alone” and affirming 288-month sentence, a departure from
presumptive 144-month sentence, for first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on factors
of particular cruelty to victim and multiple forms of penetration); State v. Adell, 755
N.W.2d 767, 770, 775-76 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that “multiple penetrations alone will
generally justify a double . . . upward durational departure” and affirming 288-month
sentence, a departure from presumptive 144-month sentence, for first-degree criminal
5
sexual conduct based on factors of physical injury to victim and multiple forms of
penetration (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2008). Huffman
committed multiple forms of penetration. He also slapped the victim repeatedly, pulled
her hair, spit in her face, hit her, bit her face, punched her in the head and ribs, strangled
her, and threatened her. See Huffman, 2015 WL 1757966, at *1. The victim testified that
she could not breathe while Huffman was strangling her and that she “thought [she] was
going to die.” Based on a comparison of Huffman’s total sentence of 196 months and two
days to the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants, the imposition of
consecutive sentences does not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of Huffman’s conduct.
Huffman correctly points out that consecutive sentences are commonly imposed in
cases that involve multiple victims. See State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 259 (Minn. 2014)
(“In cases with multiple victims, consecutive sentences are rarely, if ever, disproportionate
to the offense.”). But the statutes and sentencing guidelines also explicitly permit
consecutive sentencing when first-degree criminal sexual conduct was committed with
force or violence as part of the same course of conduct as other crimes. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035, subd. 6; Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(2)(iii). The district court did not abuse
its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.
6