State of Minnesota v. Zakaria Hussein Ali ( 2014 )


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  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A13-2254
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Zakaria Hussein Ali,
    Appellant.
    Filed October 20, 2014
    Affirmed
    Stauber, Judge
    Hennepin County District Court
    File No. 27CR1242328
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
    Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
    Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and
    Stauber, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    STAUBER, Judge
    On appeal from his conviction of prohibited person in possession of a firearm,
    appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
    either disclosure of the identity of the confidential reliable informant (CRI), or for an in
    camera review with the CRI to determine if disclosure was necessary. We affirm.
    FACTS
    In December 2012, appellant Zakaria Ali was charged with one count of
    prohibited person in possession of a firearm. The complaint alleged that police learned
    from a CRI that appellant and others “were planning a robbery in south Minneapolis for
    that day.” According to the complaint, police learned from the CRI that appellant and
    “two others would be picked up by a blue [Ford] Taurus in the area of 83rd and Halifax
    Avenue North in Brooklyn Park . . . and that they would be driven to an apartment near
    46th and Lyndale Avenue North . . . where the CRI said they would be picking up a gun.”
    The complaint also alleged that police set up surveillance and corroborated the
    information provided by the CRI. The complaint further alleged that after the group left
    the Lyndale Avenue North apartment, but before any robbery occurred, police observed
    appellant, who was the front-seat passenger of the Taurus, “bend down and then sit
    upright.” Police then “stopped the car on the entrance ramp to I-94 heading towards
    south Minneapolis” and, following a search of the car, discovered a 9mm handgun under
    the front passenger seat.
    Appellant moved to disclose the identity of the CRI, claiming that “[n]either the
    complaint nor the discovery . . . contain any information about the criteria the officers
    used to determine whether the CRI was in fact reliable, the criminal history of the CRI, or
    any past experience that the [police] ha[ve] had with this CRI.” Appellant argued that the
    identity of the informant must be disclosed (1) “to allow the defendant to prepare his
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    defense and receive a fair trial” and (2) “to determine whether the police had reasonable
    suspicion justifying a stop of the vehicle.” Appellant argued alternatively that if the
    CRI’s identity were not disclosed, an in camera hearing should be held.
    The district court concluded that (1) appellant did not meet his burden of
    establishing necessity or materiality regarding disclosure of the CRI’s identity; (2) police
    had an independent reasonable suspicion justifying a stop of appellant’s vehicle; and
    (3) there was no basis for an inquiry justifying an in camera hearing. The district court
    denied appellant’s motion to disclose the identity of the CRI or to hold an in camera
    hearing. A jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense, and the district court
    imposed the mandatory 60-months executed prison sentence. This appeal followed.
    DECISION
    Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
    for either disclosure of the identity of the CRI or for an in camera review with the
    informant to determine if disclosure was necessary. The district court’s order regarding
    disclosure of the identity of a CRI is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
    Rambahal, 
    751 N.W.2d 84
    , 90 (Minn. 2008).
    A defendant can establish a basis for an in camera inquiry “by making a prima
    facie showing challenging the veracity of a search warrant, or by making a prima facie
    showing that the informant may be a material witness at trial.” State v. Wessels, 
    424 N.W.2d 572
    , 575 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1988). But the
    supreme court has held that it is inappropriate to disclose the identity of a confidential
    informant or to hold an in camera inquiry only “to allow defense counsel to conduct a
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    fishing expedition in the hope of discovering other possible misrepresentations on which
    to attack probable cause for the warrant.” State v. Moore, 
    438 N.W.2d 101
    , 106 (Minn.
    1989). “[C]ourts should not require in camera disclosure solely on the basis of
    speculation by the defendant that the informant’s testimony might be helpful. The
    defendant must explain precisely what testimony he thinks the informant will give and
    how this testimony will be relevant to a material issue of guilt or innocence.” Syrovatka
    v. State, 
    278 N.W.2d 558
    , 562 (Minn. 1979).
    Here, as the district court found, appellant has “presented no evidence to establish
    the low standard needed for a basis for inquiry.” Instead, appellant surmised that the CRI
    was “likely” to be “someone who was involved in planning the robbery” and that
    disclosure of the CRI’s identity would demonstrate that the CRI did not gain “his
    information through rumors and conjecture.” But appellant provides no more than “mere
    speculation” that disclosure of the CRI’s identity would be helpful. Thus, the district
    court did not err by denying appellant’s request for disclosure without conducting an in
    camera review. And because appellant failed to make the lesser showing to support his
    argument that the district court should have held an in camera hearing, appellant cannot
    satisfy the “ultimate burden of proving that disclosure of the informant’s identity is
    necessary.” See Wessels, 
    424 N.W.2d at 574-75
     (noting that defendant’s burden to
    establish the need for an in camera hearing “is somewhat lighter than the defendant’s
    ultimate burden of proving that disclosure of the informant’s identity is necessary”).
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A13-2254

Filed Date: 10/20/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021