State of Minnesota v. Byron Dean Sayers ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1345
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Byron Dean Sayers,
Appellant.
Filed April 25, 2016
Reversed and remanded
Reyes, Judge
Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-14-256
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Donovan D. Dearstyne, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant Byron Sayers challenges his probation revocation, arguing that the
district court did not make sufficient fact findings on any of the necessary factors under
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980). Because the district court did not make
adequate findings regarding the second and third Austin factors, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In 2014, Byron Sayers was on probation and living with his fiancée, B.M. B.M.’s
adult son came to stay with the couple and brought his three firearms with him. The
firearms were stored in an unlocked closet in the couple’s bedroom. On March 7,
Sayers’s probation officer and several police officers arrived at the home to conduct a
check because they had received information that he was keeping a shotgun in his
bedroom closet. Sayers admitted to the officers that the firearms were in his closet, and
the state subsequently charged him with one count of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)
(2012). He pleaded guilty to the charge in exchange for a stay of adjudication and ten
years of probation.
Almost three months after the entry of his plea, Sayers admitted to violating the
terms of his probation by drinking alcohol. The district court ordered Sayers to serve 90
days’ local incarceration and reinstated the stay of adjudication. Several weeks after he
was released from jail, police were called to B.M.’s residence on a report of domestic
violence. Hubbard County deputy sheriff Shane Plautz testified at a contested omnibus
2
hearing on Sayers’s third-degree assault charge that when he arrived at the home he
found Sayers in the kitchen. Sayers appeared to be very intoxicated, but there was no
indication that Sayers had assaulted B.M. The deputy testified that Sayers became
belligerent and attempted to enter the bedroom where B.M. was located. The deputy
tried to block Sayers’s path, prompting Sayers to shove the deputy into the refrigerator
and throw a punch at his head. The deputy pursued Sayers into the bedroom and tackled
him onto the bed and on top of B.M. Another officer helped subdue Sayers by tasing
him, and Sayers was placed under arrest. Deputy Plautz suffered a dislocated shoulder as
a result of the altercation.
Based on this incident, Sayers was charged with third-degree assault, fourth-
degree assault, and obstructing legal process with force. Sayers’s probation officer also
filed a report alleging that he violated his probation because he failed to abstain from
alcohol, failed to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and failed to remain law abiding.
Sayers pleaded guilty to obstructing legal process with force and admitted that he
violated his probation by drinking alcohol and by failing to remain law abiding. At his
sentencing hearing, Sayers submitted a chemical-dependency assessment that
recommended inpatient alcohol treatment, and he requested that the court give him an
opportunity to attend a treatment program. The district court judge stated that he would
take the issue under advisement.
At his probation revocation hearing before the same judge, the parties
acknowledged that Sayers had admitted to violating the terms of his probation on two
different occasions since the stay of adjudication had been granted. The district court
3
decided to revoke Sayers’s probation and vacate the stay of adjudication, enter a
judgment of conviction, and sentence Sayers to 63 months in prison, stating:
All right. I am going to vacate the stay of adjudication, Mr.
Sayers. Those two violations here, both were um, underscored
by your use of alcohol. And the most recent one, there was an
emergency call placed, law enforcement responded based on
allegations of assaultive behavior toward [B.M.]. I know you
pled guilty to an obstructing charge rather than the assault
charge. An officer was injured in the course of taking you into
custody. But, more importantly, I’m seeing an escalation of
your behaviors. No showing that you are taking the restrictions
and terms of your probation seriously. You were granted an
extremely[] huge opportunity by getting the stay of
adjudication. And I understand the background of the case that
the guns were somebody else’s. [B.M.’s] son or step-son. But
nonetheless, they were in your possession. You were
convicted of that–you pled guilty to that offense. I did not enter
adjudication at that time, based on a joint request. And so, you
had the support of the State at that time. They thought that was
a reasonable way to address this. You have the support of
probation, even at the time of the first violation. Ms. Welk, as
I recall, did not think, at that point, your use of alcohol should
result in you going to prison. But when I look at the whole
history of this case, I see an escalation and therefore, I am
going to revoke the stay of adjudication.
The district court judge did not address Sayers’s earlier request to attend inpatient
alcohol treatment. Sayers now appeals.
DECISION
When a probationer violates a term of his probation, the district court has the
option to continue probation, revoke probation and impose a stayed sentence, or order
intermediate sanctions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14 subd. 3 (2014). The district court “has
broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and
should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d
4
at 249-50. But before revoking probation, the district court must “1) designate the
specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” Id. at 250. We review de novo whether the district court has made
the required Austin findings. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
Sayers argues that the district court erred by revoking his probation without
making any of the necessary Austin findings. When performing the Austin analysis, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the district court must make specific findings that
convey the “substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon,” and may
not simply “recit[e] the three factors and offer[] general, non-specific reasons for
revocation.” Id. at 608. The district court need not issue a written order, but it must
“create [a] thorough, fact-specific record[] setting forth [its] reasons for revoking
probation.” Id. & n.4. Even if the evidence is sufficient to support the revocation, failure
to address all three Austin factors requires reversal and remand. Id. at 606-08 (reversing
and remanding because the district court did not address the second and third Austin
factors). Because the record here does not indicate that the court sufficiently considered
the second and third Austin factors, we reverse and remand.
I. The First Austin Factor
To satisfy the first Austin factor, the district court must designate which specific
probation conditions were violated. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Sayers admitted to
violating the terms of his probation by drinking alcohol on two occasions and by failing
to remain law abiding. At his probation-revocation hearing, both parties acknowledged
5
on the record that these admissions were made. Because the district court’s analysis
references those violations, the record is sufficient for us to conclude that the court
accepted Sayers’s admissions and implicitly found the first Austin factor to be satisfied.
II. The Second Austin Factor
Under the second Austin factor, the district court must find that the probationer’s
violations were intentional or inexcusable. Id. Here, it is not evident that the district
court made the necessary findings. Although the district court appears to have
recognized Sayers’s admissions that he violated his probation, this is a separate inquiry
than whether those violations were intentional or inexcusable. The district court’s
analysis does not contain any statements with regard to Sayers’s reasons for the
violations. Because there is no unequivocal statement by the court, Modtland’s
requirement that the court “create [a] thorough, fact-specific record[]” stating the reasons
for the revocation is not satisfied. 695 N.W.2d at 608.
III. The Third Austin Factor
The third Austin factor requires the district court to consider whether the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring continued probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at
250. The district court “must bear in mind that ‘policy considerations may require that
probation not be revoked even though the facts may allow it’ and that ‘[t]he purpose of
probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when
treatment has failed.’” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 606 (alteration in original) (quoting
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250). In making this determination, the district court considers
whether:
6
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which
can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.
Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).
The district court here did not explicitly consider any of the three subfactors, did
not make any findings on the policies favoring probation, and did not make an explicit
finding as to whether the need for Sayers’s confinement outweighed the strong policies
favoring probation. In determining that Sayers’s probation should be revoked, the court
noted what it believed was an “escalation” in his behavior in that his most recent
probation violation involved the injury of a police officer. It also expressed the opinion
that Sayers was not “taking the restrictions and terms of [his] probation seriously.”
Although these findings relate generally to the need to confine Sayers, this is only part of
the necessary analysis. Austin requires the district court to go further and weigh that need
against the policies in favor of probation. Here, the district court did not address the
policies favoring probation, including rehabilitation and whether treatment has failed. In
particular, it failed to address Sayers’s earlier request to attend inpatient chemical-
dependency treatment. Without any consideration of whether such treatment could have
helped Sayers, or why this course of action was inferior to revocation, we lack a
sufficient record to review whether the district court abused its discretion in choosing to
revoke. See id. at 608 (“[I]t is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record to
determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.”).
7
Because the record is inadequate with regard to the second and third Austin factors,
including the three subfactors, we reverse and remand for additional findings.
Reversed and remanded.
8