Com. v. Williford, S. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S20024-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    STEVEN JAMAL WILLIFORD                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1157 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 30, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002358-2015
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                 FILED AUGUST 06, 2018
    Steven Jamal Williford brings this appeal from the judgment of sentence
    imposed on June 30, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
    County. A jury found Williford guilty of possession with intent to deliver a
    Schedule I controlled substance – heroin1, and the trial court sentenced him
    to a term of incarceration of three months to ten years. The sole issue raised
    by Williford in this appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
    Based upon the following, we affirm.
    The trial court aptly summarized the relevant facts as follows:
    This matter began with [Williford] walking off from his work-
    release sentence on unrelated charges on or about January 16,
    2015. [Williford] remained a fugitive from justice from that time
    until April 2015, when he was located by a task force consisting
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    J-S20024-18
    of the United States Marshalls, the Cumberland County Sheriff’s
    Office, and the Cumberland County Drug Task Force. Information
    concerning [Williford]’s whereabouts first came to the attention of
    the police when a confidential informant (hereinafter, “CI”) came
    forward and indicated that he had contact information for
    [Williford] and might be able to purchase narcotics from
    [Williford]. While the CI initially hoped for favorable treatment on
    his own criminal matters in exchange for his cooperation, he
    ultimately provided the information to locate [Williford] without
    any agreement with the Commonwealth.
    On April 09, 2015, a controlled drug buy was set up. The CI called
    a drug dealer known to him as “Molly-Mack.” The CI arranged to
    purchase a quantity of heroin within approximately 20 minutes
    after placing the phone call. At trial, the CI positively identified
    [Williford] as “Molly-Mack.” The deal was to occur at a local
    Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. At the restaurant, the CI met
    an individual, later identified as Marquis Jackson, and proceeded
    to exchange $80 in official funds for a bundle containing 9 baggies
    of heroin. The bundle was noted to be distinctly packaged, to the
    point where the only other time a bundle packaged in that manner
    was found was when [Williford]’s hotel room was searched.
    It was discovered that a block of rooms was rented out at the
    Knights Inn in Carlisle under the names of Marquis Jackson and
    Simon Williford. Eventually, [Appellant Steven Williford]’s location
    was determined by the U.S. Marshalls Service to be Room 264 at
    the Knights Inn. An arrest warrant was executed on the room
    which was rented in the name of Marquis Jackson. [Williford] was
    located in the room and placed under arrest. In plain view inside
    the room was a quantity of cash on a nightstand and a marijuana
    blunt on the corner of a table.[2] [Williford] was read his Miranda
    rights and stated that everything in the room belonged to him
    including “a little bit of weed in the room.” Subsequent to
    [Williford]’s arrest, a search warrant was applied for, received,
    and executed on the room. More marijuana was discovered during
    the search. Concealed in the room’s drop ceiling were thirteen
    bundles of heroin as well as packaging materials.
    ____________________________________________
    2 An officer present at the scene testified both beds were disheveled and
    appeared to have been used. See N.T., 12/12/17, at 122. Additionally,
    women’s products were found in the bathroom. See 
    id. -2- J-S20024-18
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2017, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in
    original).
    Williford was convicted and sentenced, as stated above. He filed this
    timely appeal and, thereafter, a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement
    of errors complained of on appeal.
    At the outset, we state our standard of review:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-
    finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
    may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
    be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    may sustain its burden of proving every element beyond a
    reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be
    evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.
    Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
    witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
    believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Irvin, 
    134 A.3d 67
    , 75-76 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
    omitted).
    Here, Williford was convicted of violating Section 780-113(a)(30) of the
    Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which states:
    (a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
    Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
    ...
    -3-
    J-S20024-18
    (30) Except as authorized by this act, the
    manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
    manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a
    person not registered under this act, or a practitioner
    not registered or licensed by the appropriate State
    board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing
    with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled
    substance.
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    Because    the   heroin   was   not   found   on   Williford’s   person,   the
    Commonwealth must prove constructive possession. See Commonwealth
    v. Hopkins, 
    67 A.3d 817
    , 820 (Pa. Super. 2013). It is well settled that
    [c]onstructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct
    to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
    possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that
    possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
    defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. We
    subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control
    the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid
    application, we have held that constructive possession may be
    established by the totality of the circumstances.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “[T]he power and intent to control the contraband does not need to be
    exclusive to the defendant,” as “constructive possession may be found in one
    or more actors where the item [at] issue is in an area of joint control and
    equal access.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 
    108 A.3d 858
    , 869 (Pa. Super.
    2014) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “where more than one person has
    equal access to where drugs are stored, presence alone in conjunction with
    such access will not prove conscious dominion over the contraband.” 
    Id. at -4-
    J-S20024-18
    869, citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 
    480 A.2d 1035
    , 1045 (Pa. 1984)
    (emphasis omitted). However,
    although ‘mere presence’ at a crime scene cannot alone sustain a
    conviction for possession of contraband… a jury need not ignore
    presence, proximity and association when presented in
    conjunction with other evidence of guilt. Indeed, presence at the
    scene where drugs are being processed and packaged is a material
    and probative factor which the jury may consider.
    
    Vargas, supra
    , 108 A.3d at 869 (citation omitted). “[T]he Commonwealth
    must introduce evidence demonstrating either [the defendant’s] participation
    in the drug related activity or evidence connecting [the defendant] to the
    specific room or areas where the drugs were kept.” 
    Id. Williford argues
    that the circumstantial evidence does not prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt that he had constructive control of the heroin found in the
    hotel room. See Williford’s Brief at 11. Williford relies on Commonwealth
    v. Rodriguez, 
    618 A.2d 1007
    (Pa. Super. 1993), in which a panel of this Court
    determined that the evidence of constructive control was insufficient, although
    the defendant was present at the scene where drugs were hidden. See 
    id. at 1009.
    Officers found cocaine in the pocket of a sports coat hanging in the
    closet where the defendant was hiding.      See 
    id. at 1008.
        Although the
    defendant had a key to the front door, the apartment belonged to the
    defendant’s friend, who was also present at the scene. See 
    id. This Court
    determined that the defendant’s presence and his possession of the key were
    not enough to establish control of the apartment, and therefore the
    Commonwealth could not establish constructive possession. See 
    id. at 1009.
    -5-
    J-S20024-18
    Williford argues Rodriguez is analogous, as the room was registered in
    Marquis Jackson’s name and he was merely present at the time of the search.
    See Williford’s Brief at 17.
    Williford also relies on Commonwealth v. Frometa, 
    580 A.2d 865
    (Pa.
    Super. 1990), in which a panel of this Court determined that constructive
    possession could not be established when drugs were found in the basement
    of the defendant’s apartment building. See 
    id. at 867.
    Officers obtained a
    search warrant for the defendant’s apartment after executing a controlled buy.
    See 
    id. at 866.
       They discovered a key on the defendant’s person, which
    opened a door to the basement where a plastic bag containing cocaine was
    found. See 
    id. at 866-867.
    The Frometa Court concluded the defendant did
    not constructively possess the drugs, as there was no evidence she knew the
    drugs were there and no evidence that she did not share the basement with
    the tenants of the seven other apartments in the building. See 
    id. Williford argues
    Frometa governs because he did not have exclusive access to the
    hotel room. See Williford’s Brief at 12. He cites the registration of the room
    in Marquis Jackson’s name, the two disheveled beds, and the women’s
    products in the bathroom as evidence that more than one person occupied the
    room. See 
    id. In rejecting
    Williford’s sufficiency claim, the trial court opined:
    The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, established that
    [Williford] was a drug dealer operating with the street name
    “Molly-Mack.” A confidential informant placing a telephone call to
    -6-
    J-S20024-18
    “Molly-Mack” was able to purchase a bundle of uniquely packaged
    heroin, delivered by Marquis Jackson, who the CI definitively
    stated was not “Molly-Mack.” The U.S. Marshalls Service traced
    [Williford]’s location to a hotel room registered to Marquis
    Jackson, part of a block of rooms registered to either Marquis
    Jackson or Simon Williford. The unrebutted evidence submitted
    at trial, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    demonstrated that drug dealers typically did not rent hotel rooms
    in their own names. This specific hotel room contained several
    items of [Williford]’s personal property including a WiFi hotspot
    and a video game system[,] which a jury could infer provided
    evidence that the room belonged to [Williford]. After executing a
    search warrant on the hotel room, bundles of heroin were
    discovered packaged in the same manner as the bundle sold to
    the confidential informant. The testimony presented at trial
    demonstrated that the bundles were of such a quantity and
    packaged in such a manner as to be for sale rather than personal
    use. In review of the evidence, the Commonwealth did meet its
    burden to prove that [Williford], rather than being an innocent
    bystander, was in fact the drug dealer operating under the name
    “Molly-Mack” and did possess heroin with the intention to
    distribute it.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/2017, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). We agree with
    the trial court’s conclusion.
    We are guided by Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    5 A.3d 345
    (Pa. Super.
    2010), in which a panel of this Court held the Commonwealth’s evidence
    established that the occupant of an apartment constructively possessed drugs
    found during a police search. See 
    id. at 347.
    In Muniz, a baggie of marijuana
    and numerous bags of cocaine were found hidden between the defendant’s
    mattress and box spring.        See 
    id. The defendant
    argued he was “merely
    present” during the search, as the individual the police were searching for in
    connection with the drugs no longer lived at the address.         
    Id. at 348.
    However, this Court found the evidence sufficient to prove constructive
    -7-
    J-S20024-18
    possession, as the defendant was the sole occupant of the apartment and his
    wallet and other identifying documents were found in the bedroom where the
    contraband was discovered. 
    Id. at 349.
    Here, as in 
    Muniz, supra
    , Williford was the sole person present in the
    hotel room, and his personal possessions, including an X-Box and a WiFi
    hotspot, were in the room.         Additionally, the testimony of the confidential
    informant identified Williford as the drug dealer “Molly-Mack” and connected
    him to the controlled buy that the police conducted prior to the search. The
    distinct packaging used to store the heroin found in the room matched those
    used during the controlled buy. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances 3
    establishes Williford’s constructive possession and “participation in the drug
    related activity...” 
    Vargas, supra
    , 108 A.3d at 869.
    Williford’s reliance on case law fails under scrutiny. 
    Rodriguez, supra
    ,
    is distinguishable in that the evidence only showed the defendant’s presence
    and a key that he had to the apartment. Here, Williford’s room contained his
    personal belongings and he was the sole person present. Unlike 
    Frometa, supra
    , in which the contraband was found in a common area accessible to the
    other apartment tenants, the heroin found here was concealed in the ceiling
    ____________________________________________
    3  Although Williford attempts to argue Jackson’s name on the room
    registration establishes he was merely present, our courts have found
    evidence sufficient to establish constructive possession without the defendant
    directly owning or renting the property. See, e.g. Commonwealth v.
    Kinard, 
    95 A.3d 279
    292-293 (Pa. Super. 2014) (defendant constructively
    possessed narcotics found in his cousin’s home).
    -8-
    J-S20024-18
    of a private hotel room. Furthermore, in contrast to Rodriguez and Frometa,
    there was other evidence, including the CI’s testimony and the distinct
    packaging of the heroin. While Williford’s brief raises the possibility Jackson
    or the owner of the women’s products hid the drugs without his knowledge
    prior to the search, this argument improperly asks this Court to review the
    evidence in the light most favorable to Williford, contrary to our standard of
    review. See 
    Irvin, supra
    , 134 A.3d at 75. Moreover, constructive possession
    “may be found in one or more actors.” 
    Vargas, supra
    , 108 A.3d at 869.
    Based on our review, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth
    presented ample evidence to support a finding of Williford’s constructive
    possession, and there is no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/6/2018
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1157 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 8/6/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2018