M.D. Randy T. Warner v. Columbia/JFK Medical , 305 F. App'x 610 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    December 30, 2008
    No. 08-11403                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 07-80083-CV-LRJ
    M.D. RANDY T. WARNER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COLUMBIA/JFK MEDICAL CENTER, LLP,
    d.b.a. JFK Medical Center,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (December 30, 2008)
    Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Randy Warner appeals the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of
    Colombia/JFK Medical Center in his employment discrimination and retaliation
    action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    Warner, a black psychiatrist recruited by the Medical Center for a position as
    a psychiatrist on the hospital’s medical staff, filed a § 1981 action alleging
    discrimination and retaliation during the hospital’s credentialing process.
    According to the record, after being recruited for a position with the hospital,
    Warner relocated his practice to Florida and began the credentialing process. The
    terms of Warner’s employment contract provided that his position was contingent
    upon him receiving privileges at the Medical Center. Warner submitted an
    application for privileges and was called for an interview. Dissatisfied with the
    interview process, Warner accused various hospital administrators and members of
    the credentialing committee of discrimination. Although the committee initially
    voted to grant privileges, after Warner expressed his outrage at the way he thought
    he was treated, the committee concluded that they would be unable to engage in a
    working relationship with Warner and it denied privileges. As a result, Warner lost
    his employment with the hospital.
    The case proceeded to a jury trial before a magistrate judge. When the
    parties submitted proposed jury instructions, Warner objected to the Medical
    2
    Center’s proposed instruction 16, which stated, in relevant part, “[t]he decision
    here to deny employment to the plaintiff was made not by an individual but by a
    Committee. Under those circumstances, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove
    that a single person was unlawfully motivated by race or retaliation. Instead,
    plaintiff must prove that a majority of the Committee were unlawfully motivated
    by race or retaliation.” To signify his objection, Warner identified this proposed
    instruction in bold typeface. He did not, however, submit any written objection.
    At the charge conference, Warner stated that the instruction should not be
    given because “I think the last paragraph is certainly arguing Defendant’s case.”
    The Medical Center responded that the proposed instruction would clarify a
    missing element of the pattern instructions and was crucial to its case. Warner
    raised no other objection, and the court instructed the jury per the proposed
    instruction. The jury found in favor of the Medical Center, specifically finding that
    Warner did not engage in a protected interest and that neither race nor retaliation
    was a substantial or motivating factor in the committee’s decision.
    In his appeal, Warner challenges the proposed jury instruction as an
    inaccurate statement of the law. He contends the instruction applied to cases
    brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that § 1981 cases applied different law.
    We accord the trial judge “wide discretion as to the style and wording
    3
    employed” in jury instructions. Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 
    122 F.3d 997
    , 1005
    (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 
    79 F.3d 1532
    , 1543 (11th
    Cir. 1996)). “This court examines jury instructions as a whole to determine
    whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issue and correctly stated the
    law.” Christopher v. Cutter Laboratories, 
    53 F.3d 1184
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 1995).
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 51, “no party may assign as
    error an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
    verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (emphasis added). This court interprets Rule 51 strictly; thus, a
    party must to object to a jury instruction prior to jury deliberations in order to
    preserve the issue on appeal. Landsman Packing Co. v. Continental Can Co., 
    864 F.2d 721
    , 726 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The failure to make a timely
    objection waives the right to raise the issue on appeal. See Wood v. President of
    Spring Hill College, 
    978 F.2d 1214
    , 1221 (11th Cir. 1992); Golub v. J.W. Gant &
    Assocs., 
    863 F.2d 1516
    , 1521 (11th Cir. 1989). This requirement ensures that a
    trial judge has an opportunity to correct any error before a jury has begun its
    deliberations. See 
    Landsman, 864 F.2d at 726
    (citation omitted). There is a plain
    error exception to this rule that permits a court to consider an issue “where it is
    necessary to ‘correct a fundamental error or prevent a miscarriage of justice.”
    4
    
    Landsman, 864 F.2d at 726
    (citation omitted); see also 
    Wood, 978 F.2d at 1221
    .
    Here, a review of the record confirms that, although Warner’s objection at
    trial was timely under Rule 51, he failed to state “distinctly the matter objected to
    and the grounds of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Warner did not explain the
    grounds for his objection and his argument at the charge conference failed to put
    the court on notice of the grounds or to give the court an opportunity to correct any
    error. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 
    19 F.3d 557
    , 562 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly,
    Warner has waived his argument that the instruction was erroneous.
    Even if we were to apply the plain error exception, Warner cannot show
    plain error.1 In the context of jury instructions in a civil case,
    [p]lain error review is an extremely stringent form of review. . . .
    [R]eversal for plain error in the jury instructions or verdict form will
    occur only in exceptional cases where the error is so fundamental as to
    result in a miscarriage of justice. To meet this stringent standard, a
    party must prove that the challenged instruction was an incorrect
    statement of the law and [that] it was probably responsible for an
    incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice. This element is
    satisfied if a party proves that the instruction will mislead the jury or
    leave the jury to speculate as to an essential point of law. In other
    words, the error of law must be so prejudicial as to have affected the
    outcome of the proceedings.
    1
    We note Warner argues there is a distinction between § 1981 and § 1983 cases for the first
    time on appeal. We do not consider this argument. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 
    488 F.3d 904
    , 912
    (11th Cir. 2007); see also Formby v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 
    904 F.2d 627
    , 633 n.10 (11th Cir.
    1990) (explaining that objecting on one ground does not preserve other, unstated objections for
    appeal).
    5
    Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    197 F.3d 1322
    , 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1999)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    In this case, the jury instruction as given would not have misled the jury. In
    fact, the instruction given was a correct statement of the law in this circuit. See
    Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 
    434 F.3d 1306
    , 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). As such,
    Warner cannot show plain error.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    6