Bruce Douglas Martin v. State of Mississippi ( 2019 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2018-KA-01144-SCT
    BRUCE DOUGLAS MARTIN a/k/a BRUCE
    DOUGLAS MARTIN, JR. a/k/a BRUCE D. MARTIN
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                        05/01/2018
    TRIAL JUDGE:                             HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
    TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS:                   HEATHER MARIE ABY
    L. ABRAHAM ROWE, JR.
    BRYAN P. BUCKLEY
    JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR.
    JOEY WAYNE MAYES
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:               MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                  OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
    BY: ERIN E. BRIGGS
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                   OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: BARBARA BYRD
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                       JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR.
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                      CRIMINAL - FELONY
    DISPOSITION:                             AFFIRMED - 08/01/2019
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
    RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   Bruce Martin was found guilty of second-degree murder for the death of James
    Dwight Brown and was sentenced to serve forty years in the custody of the Mississippi
    Department of Corrections. Martin argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
    allowing two autopsy photographs to be published to the jury. Finding no error, we affirm
    Martin’s conviction and sentence.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.      Martin was indicted for Brown’s murder after beating him to death. Brown, who had
    only one leg, used his prosthesis, crutches, a rolling cart, or a scooter to get around. When
    he was at home, he often removed his prosthetic leg and got around just by scooting on the
    ground. At the time of his death, Brown had been dating Martin’s mother, Sandra Patrick,
    for approximately fifteen years.
    ¶3.      During the investigation, officers learned that Martin and Brown had been in an
    argument the night of Brown’s death that had turned physical. The investigation identified
    Martin as the aggressor. Brown, who was not wearing his prosthetic leg, attempted to retreat
    to the bedroom.
    ¶4.      Tasha Hontz, Martin’s sister, testified that her mother called her, hysterical, the night
    of the argument and said, “BJ’s1 beat Dwight.” Hontz hung up with her mother and
    immediately called 911. Hontz and her husband drove to her mother’s home. Hontz testified
    that her mother came out of the house and said, “BJ’s beat Dwight and he never tried to fight
    back.”
    ¶5.      Martin was arrested and photographed the next day by the police. Detective Michael
    Magahey testified that Martin had no injuries on his face, head, neck, or torso. He did have
    abrasions on his hands and forearms. After Martin was read his rights, he admitted beating
    and stomping Brown.2 Magahey testified that Martin bragged about giving Brown a “country
    1
    Tasha referred to her brother as BJ.
    2
    At this point in the interview, Martin had not been informed that Brown had died.
    2
    boy ass whooping.” Magahey found no evidence at the crime scene that Martin had acted
    in self-defense.
    ¶6.    As a result of Magahey’s investigation, Martin was charged with murder. A jury found
    Martin guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to a term of forty years.
    STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs
    alleged by Martin to be gruesome, inflammatory, and more prejudicial than
    probative.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7.    The standard of review for the admission of photographs was promulgated in
    Chamberlin v. State:
    Admission of photographs by the trial court is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion. Dampier v. State, 
    973 So. 2d 221
    , 230 (Miss. 2008). A decision
    favoring admissibility will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that judicial
    discretion. 
    Id. The discretion
    of the trial judge is “almost unlimited . . .
    regardless of the gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the extenuation of
    probative value.” 
    Id. (quoting Williams
    v. State, 
    544 So. 2d 782
    , 785 (Miss.
    1987)). See also Bennett v. State, 
    933 So. 2d 930
    , 946 (Miss. 2006); Jones v.
    State, 
    920 So. 2d 465
    , 476 (Miss. 2006); McIntosh v. State, 
    917 So. 2d 78
    , 83-
    84 (Miss. 2005); Dubose v. State, 
    919 So. 2d 5
    , 11 (Miss. 2005); Blake v.
    Clein, 
    903 So. 2d 710
    , 728 (Miss. 2005); Hodges v. State, 
    912 So. 2d 730
    , 781
    (Miss. 2005). “Some probative value is the only requirement needed in order
    to support a trial judge’s decision to admit photographs into evidence.” 
    Jones, 920 So. 2d at 476-477
    (quoting Jordan v. State, 
    728 So. 2d 1088
    , 1094 (Miss.
    1998) (quoting Scott v. State, 
    878 So. 2d 933
    , 985 (Miss.2004), overruled in
    part by Lynch v. State, 
    951 So. 2d 549
    (Miss. 2007)); McIntosh v. 
    State, 917 So. 2d at 84
    . “So long as a photograph has probative value and its introduction
    serves a meaningful evidentiary purpose, it may still be admissible despite
    being gruesome, grisly, unpleasant, or even inflammatory.” Dampier, 
    973 So. 2d
    at 230 (citations omitted). But see McNeal v. State, 
    551 So. 2d 151
           (Miss.1989)) (the solitary instance where this Court held a photograph, a
    close-up of the victim’s partly decomposed skull, was gruesome and lacked an
    evidentiary purpose and was more prejudicial than probative). A photograph
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    has a meaningful evidentiary purpose when it: (1) aids in describing the
    circumstances of the killing; (2) describes the location of the body or cause of
    death; or (3) supplements or clarifies witness testimony. Dampier, 
    973 So. 2d
           at 230.
    Similarly, autopsy photographs are admissible only if they possess
    probative value. 
    Hodges, 912 So. 2d at 781-82
    (citing Puckett v. State, 
    737 So. 2d
    322, 338 (Miss. 1999); Noe v. State, 
    616 So. 2d 298
    (Miss. 1993)). The
    comment to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 states that if there is any
    probative value, the rule favors admission of the evidence. Thorson [v. State],
    895 So. 2d [85,] 120 [(Miss. 2004)].
    Chamberlin v. State, 
    989 So. 2d 320
    , 340 (Miss. 2008).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶8.    The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting
    into evidence two photographs from Brown’s autopsy. The pathologist determined that
    Brown’s cause of death was multiple blunt-force trauma from a beating, with asphyxiation
    and multiple fractures as contributing causes of death. The State argued that it intended to
    introduce three3 photographs to support the pathologist’s testimony of Brown’s cause of
    death. Martin offered to stipulate the cause of death as blunt-force trauma. Martin had no
    objections to the pathologist’s testimony about Brown’s death but moved to suppress the
    photographs because they would result in unfair prejudice. The State argued that it
    anticipated Martin’s testifying consistently with his previous statements that he only hit
    Brown a few times and that the pictures would refute that testimony. The trial judge
    overruled Martin’s objection to the photographs because he found them to be probative as
    to the cause and manner of death.
    3
    The State withdrew one of the photographs, which depicted Brown’s stomach filled
    with blood.
    4
    ¶9.    Dr. Mark Levaughan, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed Brown’s
    autopsy and determined that the most severe injuries suffered by Brown were massive
    fractures of all of his facial bones. Using a photograph (Exhibit 7.8), which depicted Brown’s
    lungs filled with blood, Levaughan testified that the facial fractures caused a massive
    hemorrhage in Brown’s airways, leading to his aspirating, or drowning, in his blood.
    Levaughan also used a photograph (Exhibit 7.7) to show the jury the extent of the trauma and
    hemorrhaging to Brown’s head.
    ¶10.   The State was required to prove not only that Martin caused Brown’s death but that
    Martin did so in a manner that demonstrated a depraved heart. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-
    19(1)(b) (Rev. 2015). The State attempted to do so through the testimony of Magahey and
    Levaughan and by introducing the pictures to support the witnesses’ testimony.
    ¶11.   This Court has consistently upheld the admission of photographs depicting bloody
    injuries. In Miller v. State, the Court held that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting photographs of the victim before death and of the victim’s body as it was found
    at the crime scene because the photographs were “probative on the issue of how the shooting
    occurred.” Miller v. State, 
    740 So. 2d 858
    , 864-65 (Miss. 1999). In Jordan v. State, the
    Court held the trial court did not err in finding some probative value in certain photographs
    because those photographs “were deemed necessary evidence to corroborate the testimony
    of the witnesses . . . .” Jordan v. State, 
    728 So. 2d 1088
    , 1093-94 (Miss. 1998). In Williams
    v. State, the Court held that thirteen pictures depicting injuries to the victim, including the
    victim’s excised larynx, heart, vaginal, and anal areas, “were relevant and of probative value
    5
    to assist Dr. McGarry in his explanation to the jury as well as assisting the jury in
    understanding the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by [the victim].” Williams v.
    State, 
    684 So. 2d 1179
    , 1198-99 (Miss. 1996). In Jackson v. State, the Court found no abuse
    of discretion in the admission of photographs depicting fatal stab wounds to the neck and
    face of four children. Jackson v. State, 
    684 So. 2d 1213
    , 1230-31 (Miss. 1996). Likewise,
    here, this Court finds that the two pictures were relevant and of probative value to assist
    Levaughan in his explanation to the jury of the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by
    Brown. We find no error by the trial court in admitting these photographs into evidence.
    ¶12.   Martin also argues that because he offered to stipulate that Brown’s death was caused
    by blunt-force trauma, the trial judge should have excluded the pictures. This Court has held
    that
    [e]ven where the issue for which the photograph is introduced is ultimately
    stipulated to, “[a]s a general rule, the fact that a photograph of the deceased in
    a homicide case might arouse the emotions of jurors does not of itself render
    it incompetent in evidence so long as introduction of the photograph serves
    some legitimate, evidentiary purpose.”
    
    Miller, 740 So. 2d at 864-65
    (quoting Walker v. State, 
    671 So. 2d 581
    , 601 (Miss. 1995)).
    ¶13.   In Alexander v. State, the Court affirmed the admission of an autopsy photograph that
    depicted the victim’s opened skull created during the autopsy and not the assault, similar to
    the photograph at issue in today’s case. That photograph was allowed into evidence to
    establish the cause of death. Alexander v. State, 
    610 So. 2d 320
    , 338 (Miss. 1992). Like
    Martin, Alexander argued the admission was improper because he did not deny the death of
    the victim. 
    Id. That Court
    held that while the photograph was
    6
    graphic, it [was] not overly gruesome or inflammatory . . . . The photograph
    establishes the cause of death as a severe beating about the head, temple and
    ear with a blunt instrument and depicts bruising to the brain. While Alexander
    does not deny the death of Pannell, the cause of death was part of the State’s
    case-in-chief.
    
    Id. The Alexander
    Court held that the trial judge acted within his discretion in determining
    that the probative value of the photograph outweighed any prejudice. 
    Id. Here, the
    trial judge
    also found that the photographs served a legitimate purpose and were more probative than
    prejudicial. Martin’s argument is without merit.
    ¶14.   In McNeal v. State, the Court held that photographs, which were close-up shots
    depicting a partly decomposed, maggot-infested skull, were so gruesome and lacked any
    evidentiary purpose and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them. McNeal
    v. State, 
    551 So. 2d 151
    , 159 (Miss. 1989). Indeed, the Court proclaimed the photographs to
    be “some of the most gruesome photographs ever presented to this Court.” 
    Id. The Court
    opined that “the state could have shown the angle and entry of the bullet wound without the
    full-color, close-up view of the decomposed, maggot-infested skull.” 
    Id. In Bonds
    v. State,
    the Court held that a
    close-up, full-color photograph of the shooting victim’s rotting head was far
    more prejudicial than probative, and in light of the evidence at the State’s
    disposal, had little, if any, evidentiary value. The State could have shown the
    angle of entry of the bullet without resorting to this graphic and gruesome
    depiction.
    Bonds v. State, 
    138 So. 3d 914
    , 920 (Miss. 2014).
    ¶15.   The two photographs in today’s case do not rise to the level of gruesomeness of the
    pictures in McNeal or Bonds. Martin has failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from
    7
    the admission of these photographs. Like in Alexander, these photographs reflect the extent
    of Brown’s injuries as well as the injuries that led to his death without being overly gruesome
    or prejudicial. These photographs were used to aid witnesses’ testimony describing Brown’s
    injuries. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these two
    photographs.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16.   The sole issue presented on appeal by Martin is without merit. The trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in admitting two autopsy photographs depicting the injuries suffered by
    Brown, ultimately, the injuries that caused his death. We affirm Martin’s conviction and
    sentence.
    ¶17.   AFFIRMED.
    KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN,                              MAXWELL,          BEAM,
    CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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