United States v. Griffin , 347 F. App'x 896 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4865
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CLEVELAND LAQUINCY GRIFFIN, a/k/a Q,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
    Judge. (3:07-cr-00926-JFA-1)
    Submitted:    September 3, 2009             Decided:   October 15, 2009
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Aileen P.
    Clare, Research and Writing Specialist, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
    PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    William Walter Wilkins, III, United States Attorney, John David
    Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cleveland      Laquincy         Griffin     pleaded        guilty     to
    possession         of   cocaine    base     with       intent    to   distribute,      in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a), (b)(1)(A) (2006 & West Supp.
    2009).       Griffin was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and
    now   appeals.          His    attorney     has     filed    a   brief      pursuant   to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), raising two issues
    but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
    Griffin filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an additional
    issue. *     We affirm.
    In the Anders brief, counsel first questions whether
    the district court erred in accepting Griffin’s guilty plea.
    Prior       to    accepting    a   guilty    plea,       a   trial    court,    through
    colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and
    determine        that   he    understands,       the   nature    of   the    charges   to
    which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
    maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
    relinquishing by pleading guilty.                  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).             The
    court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
    the plea.         Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 120 (4th
    Cir. 1991).         The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure
    *
    We have considered the claim raised in Griffin’s pro se
    brief and conclude the claim lacks merit.
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    that    the    plea     of    guilt     is   entered       into     knowingly     and
    voluntarily.       See United States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 58 (2002).
    Because Griffin did not move in the district court to
    withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
    reviewed for plain error.             United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th Cir. 2002).             “To establish plain error, [Griffin]
    must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and
    that    the    error      affected    his    substantial      rights.”        United
    States v. Muhammad, 
    478 F.3d 247
    , 249 (4th Cir. 2007).                      Even if
    Griffin satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error
    remains    within     our    discretion,     which    we   should    not   exercise
    . . .     unless    the      error    seriously      affect[s]      the    fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”                          
    Id.
    Our review of the transcript reveals full compliance with the
    requirements of Rule 11, and we conclude that Griffin pleaded
    guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
    Counsel     next   questions    whether      the     district     court
    erred in sentencing Griffin as a career offender.                     The district
    court considered a prior conviction for failure to stop for a
    blue light as a predicate offense for purposes of the career
    offender designation under the advisory guidelines.                        See U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2008).                      We conclude that
    this was error.           See United States v. Roseboro, 
    551 F.3d 226
    (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that failure to stop for a blue light
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    under South Carolina law is not per se violent felony under the
    Armed    Career       Criminal     Act).      However,       Griffin   had     two   other
    prior offenses that qualified as predicates for career offender
    purposes and, therefore, the district court properly designated
    Griffin    a    career     offender.         Accordingly,       this   error     did    not
    affect Griffin’s substantial rights.                    See Muhammad, 
    478 F.3d at 249
     (providing standard for plain error review).
    We have examined the entire record in accordance with
    the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
    for appeal.           We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
    court.     This        court    requires     that     counsel   inform       Griffin,   in
    writing,       of    the   right      to   petition    the   Supreme    Court    of     the
    United States for further review.                     If Griffin requests that a
    petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    leave to withdraw from representation.                        Counsel’s motion must
    state that a copy thereof was served on Griffin.                             We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately          presented    in    the   materials       before    the    court     and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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