United States v. Pate , 326 F. App'x 684 ( 2009 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4449
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    ANTHONY TREVINO PATE,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00478-NCT-3)
    Submitted:    April 13, 2009                  Decided:   May 4, 2009
    Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    C. Scott Holmes, BROCK, PAYNE & MEECE, PA, Durham, North
    Carolina, for Appellant.     Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
    Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Anthony Trevino Pate was charged with conspiring to
    distribute      fifty    grams        or       more    of     a    mixture      or    substance
    containing a detectable amount of crack cocaine, in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2006) (Count One), distribution of .2 grams of
    crack cocaine on May 9, 2005 (Count Two), distribution of .3
    grams of crack cocaine on October 19, 2005 (Count Thirteen), and
    distribution of 7.9 grams of crack cocaine on November 1, 2005
    (Count Fourteen), all in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1) (2006).         The jury convicted Pate of all four counts and
    found the drug amounts as alleged except for Count One.                                       With
    respect to Count One, the jury found Pate guilty of conspiring
    to distribute 12.6 grams of crack cocaine.                               At sentencing, the
    district court determined Pate was responsible for 50.4 grams of
    crack cocaine and sentenced him to 212 months’ imprisonment.
    On     appeal,          Pate    first       argues          that   his    conspiracy
    conviction    must      be    overturned            because       he    was   charged    with   a
    single   conspiracy          but     the       Government’s            evidence     established
    multiple conspiracies.               A variance occurs where the evidence
    presented at trial differs materially from the facts alleged in
    the indictment.         United States v. Kennedy, 
    32 F.3d 876
    , 883 (4th
    Cir. 1994).      “Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple
    conspiracies, . . . is a question of fact for the jury and we
    must   affirm    its     finding          of    a     single      conspiracy         unless   the
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    evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government,
    would not allow a reasonable jury to so find.”                             United States v.
    Harris,    
    39 F.3d 1262
    ,       1267    (4th Cir.        1994)      (quoting        United
    States v. Urbanik, 
    801 F.2d 692
    , 695 (4th Cir. 1986)).                                   Also, a
    reversal    is      proper    on     variance      grounds          only   if    the     variance
    infringed    the      appellant’s        substantial           rights      and    resulted    in
    actual prejudice.             Kennedy, 
    32 F.3d at 883
    .                       To show actual
    prejudice    from      a     multiple     conspiracy          variance,         the    appellant
    must show that there were so many defendants and conspiracies
    before the jury as to make it likely the jury would transfer
    evidence of the guilt of the members of one conspiracy to a
    defendant       who    was     not     involved          in   that     conspiracy.           
    Id.
    We have reviewed the record and determine that the
    evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Government, fully supports the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy
    count.      Moreover,            the    fact       that       the     jury       asked    during
    deliberations whether Pate could be convicted of conspiring with
    persons not named in the indictment and its finding of less than
    the fifty grams of crack cocaine alleged in Count One does not
    establish       a    fatal    variance.            See    United       States      v.     Powell,
    
    469 U.S. 57
    , 64-65, 67 (1984).                     Additionally, because he stood
    trial alone, Pate cannot establish actual prejudice from any
    variance    between        the     indictment       and       the    evidence.           Kennedy,
    
    32 F.3d at
    884 (citing United States v. Anguiano, 
    873 F.2d 1314
    ,
    3
    1318 (9th Cir. 1989).                 Accordingly, Pate’s variance claim is
    without merit.
    Pate         also        challenges      the      district           court’s
    determination       of     the    drug    amounts     attributable         to    him    for
    sentencing.         The    district      court’s    determination          of    the   drug
    amount for which a defendant is responsible is a factual issue
    reviewed for clear error.               United States v. Lamarr, 
    75 F.3d 964
    ,
    972 (4th Cir. 1996).             Accordingly, this court will reverse only
    if “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been committed.”             United States v. Stevenson, 
    396 F.3d 538
    ,
    542 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    ,   573   (1985)).            At   sentencing,    the    Government          need   only
    establish the amount of drugs involved by a preponderance of the
    evidence.     United States v. Cook, 
    76 F.3d 596
    , 604 (4th Cir.
    1996).       This    court       will    afford     the    district    court       “broad
    discretion    as     to    what       information    to    credit     in    making      its
    calculations.”        Cook, 
    76 F.3d at
    604 (citing United States v.
    Falesbork, 
    5 F.3d 715
    , 722 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations
    omitted)).     A district court need only determine “that it [is]
    more likely than not that the defendant was responsible for at
    least the drug quantity attributable to him.”                       United States v.
    Kiulin, 
    360 F.3d 456
    , 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Cook, 
    76 F.3d at 604
     (emphasis in the original)).                   Our review of the record
    leads us to conclude that Pate fails to demonstrate that the
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    district court clearly erred in holding him accountable for 50.4
    grams of crack cocaine.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.    We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court    and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional   process.
    AFFIRMED
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