Shannon Montgomery v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation ( 2004 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-00091-SCT
SHANNON MONTGOMERY AND JOHN DAVID
MONTGOMERY AS THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF DAVID
E. MONTGOMERY, DECEASED
v.
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION f/k/a
GLAXOWELLCOME, INC., d/b/a
GLAXOSMITHKLINE; EDWARD GORE, M.D.;
NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER; NORTH
MISSISSIPPI FAMILY MEDICAL CLINIC,
INC.,d/b/a CHICKASAW FAMILY MEDICAL
CLINIC; AND WAL-MART STORES, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/2004
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER, III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: JONATHAN THOMAS CRUMP
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JOSIAH DENNIS COLEMAN
ROBERT K. UPCHURCH
DAVID W. UPCHURCH
JOHN G. WHEELER
DONNA M. BARNES
R. BRITTAIN VIRDEN
CHARLES S. HEWINS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/24/2005
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. According to plaintiffs Shannon and John David Montgomery, David E. Montgomery
died on November 17, 1999, as a result of taking Allopurinol, a drug manufactured by
SmithKline Beecham Corp.1 The prescription was written by Dr. Edward Gore, plaintiffs
further allege that while acting as the agent of North Mississippi Medical Center and North
Mississippi Family Medical Clinics, Inc. d/b/a Chickasaw Family Medical Clinic) and was
filled by the pharmacy at Wal Mart Store #10-0411 in Houston, Mississippi.
¶2. Suit was filed November 16, 2001, but plaintiffs did not immediately attempt to have
process served on the defendants. Instead, on February 20, 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion,
representing to the court that additional time was needed for service of process. The basis of
the motion was that the law firm, Greer, Pipkin and Russell, had been recently associated, and
“[a]fter several attempts, Plaintiffs’ newly associated counsel [had] been unable to properly
confer with plaintiffs Shannon Montgomery and John David Montgomery.” Also, plaintiffs’
counsel represented that “additional time [would] allow plaintiffs to file an amended complaint
that [would] simplify the issues.” An order granting “an additional 120 days from the date of
entry of [the] order” was signed on February 12, 2002 (eight days before the motion was filed);
but for reasons we are not told, the order was not entered of record until April 23, 2002.2
¶3. On July 22, 2002, neither counsel for plaintiffs had served process on the defendants.
The plaintiffs’ attorneys signed an agreed ordered allowing Greer, Pipkin and Russell to
withdraw from the action, and plaintiffs filed another motion for additional time (60 days) for
service of process, stating as their “good cause” the fact that Greer, Pipkin and Russell had not
caused process to be served, and “Shelton & Associates have had no time to effect service of
1
Formerly known as GlaxoWellcome, Inc., d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline.
2
Assuming arguendo plaintiffs’ reason for the extension constituted “good cause” (discussed
infra), the court’s order extended the time for service of process until August 21, 2002.
2
process on the defendants.” The motion also requested that the court “relate back” the
additional time to the February 12, 2002, order. An order was entered on July 22, 2002,
granting the requested extension and ordering that the order “shall relate back to the court’s
order of February 12, 2002.” Assuming arguendo the plaintiffs’ reasons for the extension
constituted “good cause” (discussed infra), the court’s July 22, 2002 order extended the time
for service of process for sixty days from July 31, 2002 (the date of entry of the order).
However, as of September 29, 2002, (sixty days later), process had not been served, and no
further extension had been requested, as of that date.
¶4. On December 3, 2002, 65 days after the expiration of the extension granted by the July
31, 2002 order, counsel for plaintiffs filed their third motion for additional time to serve
process, stating that the attorney of record, Paul Goodman, was shot and killed, and his “sudden
and unexpected death left the status of this file in question.” The motion further averred that
“it could not be determined if Mr. Goodman had time before his death to attempt service upon
Defendants. . . .” Plaintiffs’ new counsel, Jon T. Crump,3 urged that these circumstances
warranted a finding of excusable neglect. He requested an additional 30 days to serve process
and further requested that the court have the extension “relate back” to the July 22, 2002 order.
An ordered was signed and entered on December 3, 2002, “granting an additional 30 days from
the entry of [the] order to effectuate service of process on the defendants. . . .” The order
further purported to “relate back” to the court’s prior order of July 22, 2002.
3
Jon T. Crump later signed an amended complaint (discussed infra) which listed his firm name
as “Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates, P.A. He also listed the same address and phone number as
plaintiffs’ counsel who signed the original complaint, and all interim motions.
3
¶5. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed, on December 9, 2002, an amended complaint which: (a) named
the same defendants as the original complaint; (2) alleged the same counts and claims as the
original complaint; and (3) had 64 numbered paragraphs, whereas the original complaint had
63. On the same day the amended complaint was filed, process was served on Dr. Gore and
Chickasaw Family Medical Clinic As of December 30, 2002, all defendants had been served
with process.
¶6. On January 8, 2003, Dr. Gore, North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc., and North
Mississippi Medical Clinics, Inc. d/b/a Chickasaw Family Medical Clinic filed a Motion to
Dismiss based upon insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process with 120
days after the filing of the Complaint, expiration of the statute of limitations, and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶7. On January 14, 2003, SmithKline Beecham f/k/a GlaxoWellcome, Inc., d/b/a
GlaxoSmithKline filed its motion to dismiss on similar grounds, as did Walmart Stores, Inc.
on January 22, 2003.
¶8. On July 2, 2003, a hearing was conducted on the motions to dismiss, and a Final
Judgment granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissing the case with prejudice
as to all defendants was signed by the trial judge on January 5, 2004, and entered of record on
January 7, 2004. The plaintiffs now appeal from that judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. This Court has held:
A trial court’s finding of fact on the existence of good cause for the delay in
service of process has been deemed ‘a discretionary ruling . . . and entitled to
deferential review’ on appeal. Rains v. Gardner, 731 So. 2d 1192, 1197-98
4
(Miss. 1999). When reviewing fact-based findings, we will only examine
‘whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether there was substantial
evidence supporting the determination.’ Id. at 1197. However, a decision to
grant or deny an extension of time based upon a question of law will be reviewed
de novo. Id. at 1198.
Holmes v. Coast Transit Auth., 815 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Miss. 2002) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶10. Plaintiffs raise two issues: (1) Whether they demonstrated good cause for
failing to serve process within 120 days of filing the complaint, and (2) whether the trial court
is bound by its own order granting an extension of time to serve process. Our resolution of
the first issue renders resolution of the second unnecessary.
¶11. Rule 4(h) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within
120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without
prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or upon
motion.
¶12. The strict language of Rule 4(h) suggests that “good cause” can only be shown after the
expiration of the 120-day period – and then, only to demonstrate “why such service was not
made within that period, . . . .” (Emphasis added). The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
do not provide for prospective good cause, that is, good cause which extends into the future,
and there is no provision for extending the time for service of process.
¶13. Indeed, this Court has stated that, although there is no requirement of a motion for
additional time, “the better method to be utilized in future cases would be for plaintiff’s
counsel to seek authority for extensions from the court, rather than unilaterally making this
5
decision himself.” Fortenberry v. Mem’l. Hosp., 676 So. 2d 252, 256 (Miss. 1996).
Ordinarily under Rule 4(h), where the 120 days has expired, a court must notify the plaintiff
that, because of the failure to serve process, the case is subject to dismissal. The plaintiff must
then appear and attempt to show good cause why process was not served within the 120-day
period for service.4 “Good cause” can never be demonstrated where plaintiff has not been
diligent in attempting to serve process. Bang v. Pittman, 749 So. 2d 47, 52 (Miss. 1999). In
demonstrating good cause and diligence, a plaintiff must show that he or she has been unable
to serve process because the defendant evaded process or engaged in misleading conduct, or
for some other acceptable reason, as discussed in Holmes, 815 So. 2d at 1186.
¶14. Notwithstanding the absence of any specific rule allowing or requiring a motion for
additional time for service of process, this Court has held that, if it appears process cannot be
served within the 120-day period, “a diligent plaintiff should file [a motion for additional time
to serve process] within the 120-day time period. Such diligence would support an allegation
that good cause exists for failure to serve process timely.” Webster v. Webster, 835 So. 2d
26, 29 (Miss. 2002). In Webster this Court went on to say:
Rule 4(h) does not require that a motion for additional time for service of
process be filed within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. Arkansas and
New York’s rules of civil procedure mandate that a motion for additional time
be filed within the 120-day period. See, e.g., Weymouth v. Chism, 75 Ark.App.
164, 55 S.W.3d 307 (2001); Norstar Bank of Upstate New York v. Wittbrodt,
154 Misc. 2d 260, 594 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1993). Arkansas’s
counterpart to Rule 4(h) specifically provides, ‘If a motion to extend is made
within 120 days of the filing of the suit, the time of service may be extended by
the court upon a showing of good cause.’ Ark.R.Civ.P. 4(i). New York’s rule is
4
Although the rule specifically addresses only the 120-day period, the diligence and good cause
requirements extend until the time process is served.
6
similar. Therefore, if the drafters of our rules of civil procedure wished to
require that motions for additional time in which to serve process be filed within
the 120 days, they could have done so.
Webster, 834 So. 2d at 28-29.
¶15. This Court’s holding in Webster did not expand the rules and create a new right to seek
an additional period of time for service of process; but rather provided a practical and logical
suggestion for one factor a court could consider when trying to determine whether a plaintiff
has been diligent. Stated another way, a plaintiff who – prior to expiration of the service period
– files a motion representing that he or she has been unable to serve process, will more likely
succeed in demonstrating diligence than a plaintiff who does nothing. Either way, however, the
plaintiff must demonstrate diligence.
¶16. Plaintiffs cite the permissive language in Webster for the proposition that a motion for
additional time to effect service of process may be filed after the 120 day period has run. They
then state:
The Court has also held, in 2003, that the motion for additional time must be
filed before the expiration of the 120 day time period. Mitchell v. Brown, 835
So. 2d 110, 112; 2003WL 139598 (Miss. App. 2003). However, the Mitchell
decision was based upon a case decided in 2001, Moore v. Boyd, 799 So. 2d 133
[(Miss. App. 2001)] Id. at 112.
¶17. Plaintiffs’ first motion for additional time was filed within the 120-day period, the
second motion was filed within the 120-day extended period, and the third motion was filed
after expiration of the second extension. They point out, however, that each order granting the
extension of time “related back” to the previous extension thereby bridging the lapses.
Furthermore, they argue that Webster is controlling; and therefore, the motions could be filed
after the running of the 120-day period.
7
¶18. Plaintiffs place far too much emphasis on when a motion should be filed, while ignoring
any demonstration of diligence. They do, however, discuss “good cause,” telling us:
The first motion offered as good cause the association of a second law firm.
This firm wished to ensure itself that the proper parties were being sued before
serving process as to avoid suing an innocent party. The desire to avoid
unnecessary litigation is certainly good cause. The second motion was based
upon the fact that the law firm of Greer, Pipkin and Russell had withdrawn but
not returned the file. The firm who took the file back had no reason to know that
service had not been made prior to Greer, Pipkin and Russell’s withdrawal. This
exchange at least constituted excusable neglect. Such has been held enough to
constitute good cause. The final motion for additional time was based upon the
death of the attorney handling the case. The delays accompanying such an event
are unavoidable. It takes time for another attorney to be assigned the case. And
once the case [i]s reassigned the other attorney will need time to familiarize
himself with the case. This too is good cause to extend a deadline.
¶19. These same arguments were presented to the trial judge with respect to defendants’
motions for dismissal, to which the court responded in a well-written judgment and considered
opinion. We include the trial judge’s opinion, in its entirety, as Appendix “A” hereto.
¶20. Although we find the trial court’s reasoning to be compelling, we must point out other
problems with all three of plaintiffs’ motions.
The first motion for additional time.
¶21. First, we notice that the justification offered to the trial court by plaintiffs’ counsel for
the first extension of time, does not exactly match the justification offered to this Court.
When speaking to this Court, plaintiffs’ counsel
offered as good cause the association of a second law firm. This firm wished
to ensure itself that the proper parties were being sued before serving
process [so] as to avoid suing an innocent party. The desire to avoid unnecessary
litigation is certainly good cause.
8
(Emphasis added). Upon review of the motion, we find the following representation to the trial
court as the claimed basis for the request for additional time:
Counsel for plaintiffs were recently associated on this matter by the law firm
of Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates. The 120 day period for service of process
provided in Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure will lapse prior
to present counsel having an opportunity to properly review the immediate
lawsuit. After several attempts, Plaintiffs’ newly associated counsel has been
unable to properly confer with plaintiffs Shannon Montgomery and John David
Montgomery. Counsel is of good faith belief that additional time will allow
plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint that will simplify the issues to be
presented to the Court, thereby promoting judicial economy.
¶22. As we read it, the motion says nothing about the new firm’s “need to ensure itself that
the proper parties were being sued before serving process as to avoid suing an innocent party.”
The motion indicates counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to confer with the clients.
We are also told that counsel anticipated an amended complaint to “simplify the issues.” Thus,
regarding the need for the first extension of time, the representations made to this Court do
not match the representations made to the trial court.
¶23. Furthermore, we are not told when Greer, Pipkin and Russell was associated on the case
by Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates. Assuming it was close to the end of the 120-day period
for service of process,5 we are unable to locate any evidence whatsoever that plaintiffs’
counsel diligently attempted to serve process during the months prior to associating this firm.
To the contrary, it appears counsel did not make any attempt – diligent or otherwise – to serve
process. Plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating “good cause why such service was not
5
On February 20, 2002, Greer, Pipkin and Russell represented to the trial court that they had
been “recently associated.”
9
made within that [120-day] period.” Instead, plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate why the newly
associated firm required an additional 120-days for service of process.
¶24. The burden is upon the plaintiffs to demonstrate good cause for failure to timely serve
process. Holmes, 815 So. 2d at 1184. More is required than “simple inadvertence, mistake
of counsel, or ignorance of rules. . . .” Watters v. Stripling, 675 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Miss
1996). The standard is strict, and requires diligence. Bang v. Pittman, 749 So. 2d 47, 52
(Miss. 1999); Moore v. Boyd, 799 So. 2d 133, 136 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ( citing Black v.
Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Miss. 1990));. In all of these respects,
plaintiffs are woefully deficient. In short, with respect to the first motion for time, plaintiffs
completely failed to demonstrate “good cause” as required by Rule 4(h).
The second motion for additional time.
¶25. Plaintiffs tell us that “[t]he second motion was based upon the fact that the law firm of
Greer, Pipkin and Russell had withdrawn but not returned the file. The firm who took the file
back had no reason to know that service had not been made prior to Greer, Pipkin and Russell’s
withdrawal.” Again, we find the representations of counsel to be less than forthright.
¶26. Plaintiffs’ counsel leaves the implication, once Greer, Pipkin and Russell was
associated on the case, Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates no longer had responsibilities to
represent the plaintiffs, including the responsibility to make sure process was timely served.
Counsel implies that his firm “took the file back” and “had no reason to know that service had
not been made prior to Greer, Pipkin and Russell’s withdrawal.” The fact is, Jimmy D. Shelton
& Associates never lost possession of the file – at least, not in the legal sense. And for
counsel to represent to this Court that his firm “had no reason to know that service had not
10
been made prior to Greer, Pipkin and Russell’s withdrawal” is unsupportable. Jimmy D.
Shelton & Associates has been counsel of record in this matter since its inception, and as
counsel of record, maintained all the duties and obligations to the client as provided in Rules
1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct.
The third motion for additional time.
¶27. Finally, counsel tell us that a third motion for additional time to serve process was
necessary because of the untimely death of attorney Paul Goodman, which occurred “a matter
of weeks subsequent to” the trial court’s third order granting additional time to serve process.
As with the previous motions, we are given no evidence or indication that plaintiffs used
reasonable diligence to serve process prior to Goodman’s death. We further note that attorney
Jimmy D. Shelton signed the complaint filed on November 16, 2001, and we are provided no
explanation why Shelton did not cause process to be served.
¶28. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and find plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
good cause why process was not timely served, and as a result the dismissal of this civil action
must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
¶29. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate good cause for their failure to timely serve
process. Consequently, the statute of limitations has run as to all defendants. The Final
Judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed.
¶30. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., CARLSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
11
EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
EASLEY, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶31. I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion today finding that the Plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate good cause why process had not been timely served on the Defendants and
affirming the trial court’s ruling and dismissal of the case with prejudice as to all Defendants.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs demonstrated valid and good cause for an extension of time to serve
process because of the sudden murder of the attorney of record in the case, Paul Goodman.
In addition, the circuit court judge granted a third extension to the Plaintiffs and service of
process was complete as to all Defendants prior to the expiration of the court ordered
extension period. Therefore, I disagree with this Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s order
subsequently granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice.
¶32. The record shows that the Plaintiffs filed suit on November 16, 2001. Prior to the
expiration of the 120 day service of process period, a motion for extension of time was
granted by the trial court. New counsel was associated on the case, and counsel had problems
conferring with the Plaintiffs.
¶33. Thereafter, a second motion for extension of time was granted which related back the
time to the first order. The new counsel for Plaintiffs had withdrawn from representation.
¶34. Finally, a third motion for extension of time was granted by the trial court. This order,
like the other orders all related back to the first extension order. Every defendant was served
with process within the extension period. The main reason for the extension was the death of
the attorney handling the case.
12
¶35. After service of process was complete, the Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss
the case. More than one year after the trial court granted the third extension and service of
process was complete, the trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
¶36. The death of an attorney handling a case is a valid reason for an extension. The
subsequent need to review the dead attorney’s caseload, establish a new attorney to handle the
case and allow time to review the file is a valid reason and good cause for any delay. At a
minimum, these reasons clearly demonstrate excusable neglect.
¶37. Second, the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s grant of the Defendants’ motion
to dismiss ignores the fact that the trial court granted a third extension for time. The trial court
entered a valid order and the plaintiffs complied with that order by serving process on all
defendants. Only after service of process was complete did the Defendants file a motion to
dismiss with prejudice. A fundamental problem exists when numerous trial court orders are
entered permitting extensions of time to serve process and then when service of process is
complete within the extension, the trial court effectively overrules its prior orders allowing
the extensions for service of process.
¶38. Incidentally, the majority makes much of the fact that the justification for the first
extension was different when argued to the trial court as opposed to this Court on appeal. In
specific, the majority cites to the Plaintiffs’ reasoning, in part, argued to the trial court that
counsel needed “an opportunity to properly view the immediate lawsuit.” The reasoning to this
Court for the first extension was that the firm “wished to ensure itself that the proper parties
were being sued before service of process [so] as to avoid suing an innocent party.”
13
Maj. Op. ¶ 22. The majority states that the representations to the trial court and this Court do
not match. However, part of a “proper review” process of a file would indicate if there was a
potential problem with whether the correct parties were being sued. Therefore, I do not see
a conflict with the justification as stated to the trial court and this Court on appeal.
¶39. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s ruling today. I would reverse
the circuit court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.
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Appendix A